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Abstract 
Recent studies into the political aspects of large scale change in organisations have 
highlighted the need for a deeper understanding of managerial elites in the change 
context. The extant literature is guilty of conflating large scale change into a single 
process, and commentators describe and prescribe political processes and behaviours 
without differentiating between the proposal and implementation stages of change. The 
research presented in this thesis provides insights into the nature and characteristics of 
large scale change proposal coalitions and the behaviours and tactics of coalition leaders 
in top management teams across a range of organisational settings in the UK private 
sector. 
Data was collected and analysed using a qualitative methodology. An elite style semi- 
structured interview schedule was used with a research sample of fifty members of top 
management teams drawn from across fourteen organisations in thirteen industries. 
The findings suggest that large scale change proposal coalitions follow a five phase life- 
cycle: initiate, build, sustain, dissolve, and capture and transfer. Within these phases 
coalition leaders tend to perform three primary roles: builder, sustainer and dissolver. 
The sequence of gathering support to build a coalition is heavily influenced by the 
hierarchical position of the builder, and the behaviours and tactics used are contingent 
upon whether an individual is engaged in an upward inter-tier, intra-tier, or downward 
inter-tier support gathering exercise. 
Once a large scale change proposal coalition had been established the leadership role 
changes from building to sustaining. Four principal types of coalition are identified: 
aligned coalitions, unaligned coalitions, unfocused coalitions and fragmented coalitions. 
Different leadership skills are required for each. ' 
Once a proposal has been approved or rejected the evidence suggests that coalitions 
should be dissolved as rapidly as practically possible using one or a combination of three 
dissolution techniques. 
These findings have important implications for academic enquiry and practitioners. 
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Introduction 
"The study of managerial elites is one of the most important, yet neglected 
areas of social science research. " (Pettigrew, 1992, p. 163) 
Introduction 
Academic enquiry into the large scale change process is currently failing on two key 
fronts. Firstly, an influential section of the extant literature is culpable of presenting 
change as a rational-linear process. Influenced by the humanistic objectives of the 
Organisational Development school of management, many writers fail to acknowledge 
the inherently political nature of change, and of those that do admit to its presence, a 
significant majority view it as a negative characteristic which should be eliminated. 
Politics is portrayed as an unfortunate and undesirable feature which inhibits effective 
change. This is a naive and dangerous assumption which is leading researchers and 
practitioners in the wrong direction. Large scale change is a political process, 
characterised by the competing and often conflicting agendas of top management team 
members who attempt to influence the strategic direction of the organisation, whilst 
protecting and promoting their own self-interests. Political behaviour in large scale 
change initiatives is inevitable and if we are to deepen our understanding of the change 
context and produce robust and insightful descriptions, we must pursue this more 
realistic and pragmatic approach. 
The second reason why academic enquiry into large scale change is failing is because in 
general it treats change as a single homogenous process. There is little acceptance that it 
is comprised of several stages or sub-processes. There is a paucity of empirically 
generated literature into the first of these, the proposal stage, when ideas for change are 
formed and designed. There is no empirically generated literature on the role of 
coalitions in the top management team during the proposal stage. The nature and 
characteristics of large scale change proposal coalitions have not been investigated and 
neither have the behaviours and tactics of those who lead them. That this crucial 
direction setting element of the change context has not been explored is a serious gap in 
our understanding of large scale change and managerial elites. This thesis will confront 
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the two failings by engaging the extant literature and reporting the findings of an 
empirical study which provides a pioneering and elucidatory insight into large scale 
change proposal coalitions in top management teams. 
The objectives of the thesis are to investigate the nature and characteristics of large 
scale change proposal coalitions and the behaviour and tactics of coalition leaders in 
top management teams across a range of organisational settings in the UK private sector 
for the purpose of informing academic enquiry and practitioners. 
The introduction to the thesis is divided into four sections. The first section explains the 
background to the thesis and how the researcher came to investigate large scale change 
proposal coalitions. The second section highlights the key failings of the extant change 
literature and makes clear why the research presented in this thesis is necessary to 
deepen our understanding of managerial elites in the change context. In this regard it 
lays the foundations for a detailed engagement with the literature in chapters one, two 
and three. The third section headlines the key contributions of the research. The fourth 
and final section presents the thesis structure. 
Background to the thesis 
In 1990 the researcher was working at BP. The company operated in over seventy 
countries, employed over one hundred and fifteen thousand people, made profits that 
could be measured in billions of dollars and enjoyed a market capitalisation that ranked it 
in the top twenty largest industrial corporations in the world. In early 1990 BP embarked 
on a well publicised large scale change initiative that would see it change strategic 
direction, sell off two-thirds of its businesses, make half of its workforce redundant, 
reduce operating costs to match industry leadership standards, shift its culture from 
bureaucratic to entrepreneurial, post record losses and then record profits and culminate 
in August 1998 with the announcement of a merger with Amoco that will take it into the 
premier league of oil and gas companies and enable it to compete head on with the two 
giants Shell and Exxon for the most attractive exploration sites around the world. 
During my time with the company I was involved intimately with the large scale change 
initiative. I had been educated at university in large scale change management so I knew 
what to expect. Lots of charts laying out milestones and activities, supported by 
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mandatory behaviour changing workshops and incentives to change. There was an 
abundance of literature explaining the rationale for change and the consequences of not 
doing so. There were helplines and chatlines inviting me to share my concerns and 
bulletin boards to update me and the rest of the organisation on progress. If ever a 
change programme had been thought through and rolled out smoothly this was it. 
However, as the change began to unfold I observed that we were not following the 
schedule on the wall charts. Deadlines were missed, activities were revisited, and the 
process became political. Meetings started to take place behind closed doors as 
individuals and groups attempted to exert influence over the change process. Temporary 
alliances were formed, resources were traded, promises were made and threats were 
issued. Some people enjoyed significant increases in their roles and responsibilities. 
Others suffered a loss of status or were made redundant. Much of this failed to tally with 
my textbooks or the internal literature. BP was definitely out of process. 
Through discussions with senior management it became clear that the battle to determine 
the strategic future of the firm had involved a coalition within the top management team 
designing a change proposal and presenting it to the key decision makers. The proposal 
process had apparently been characterised by a high level of political backstaging and 
support winning exercises which used a range of behaviours and tactics from rapid 
promotion to dismissal. This was not the dry, rational-linear process I had been taught. 
Top management team members assured me that political behaviour was an integral and 
normal part of large scale change. The wall charts were for public consumption only. 
Excited by this finding I returned to the literature and found one or two dissenting voices 
who described change in a manner I had observed. However, I was unable to uncover 
any literature which reported on large scale change proposal coalitions. I had stumbled 
on an unexplored area of the change context. Ambitions to enter management consulting 
were placed on hold so I could investigate whether this was a peculiarity to BP or a 
wider occurrence. The results of that research are presented here in this thesis. I now 
lead large scale change projects in a range of industries, both at the proposal and 
implementation stages, for KPMG in our work with national and multi-national clients. 
This research has proved highly valuable and has been built into our approach and 
methodologies. The findings of this study have been confirmed many times over in my 
work, yet at the time of writing no other empirical research has reported in this area. 
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Until this problem is addressed our understanding of managerial elites in the change 
context is at best partial. 
Failings in the extant literature 
An analysis of the change management literature clearly identifies the heavy influence of 
the Organisational Development (OD) school of management. Empirical researchers and 
practitioners alike could be forgiven for believing that change is an orderly, processual 
and rational affair. We have been informed that opposition and resistance can be 
avoided or mitigated by ensuring participatory decision making throughout all stages of 
the change process (for example, Beckhard, 1967; Bennis, 1965; Blake and Mouton, 
1964,1968; Lewin, 1967 and Schein, 1965). Furthermore, adopting an open and honest 
approach to change meant that politics, which is inherently undesirable, were unlikely to 
enter the process. We know from more recent research that this approach paints an 
idealistic and unrealistic picture of change which is likely to produce frustration and 
dissatisfaction for both the empirical researcher and practitioner. 
Concern with the rational-linear model of change has prompted the emergence of a 
power-oriented behaviour based approach that acknowledges the validity and relevance 
of political tactics ranging from collaboration to coercion to achieve desired outcomes. 
Management writers such as Buchanan and Boddy (1992), Egan (1994), Kanter (1983) 
Pettigrew (1985,1987,1992) and Pfeffer (1981,1992) are a few of those who have been 
at the forefront of promoting these arguments. Pettigrew (1985) criticised OD advocates 
for adopting a "truth, trust, love and collaboration" approach to change. He encouraged 
practitioners and academics to focus instead on understanding the "political and cultural 
mosaic" of behaviours and processes which constitute large scale change. The 
increasing complexity and magnitude of large scale change and the increasing frequency 
with which organisations have to conduct large scale change programmes requires a 
resilient and pragmatic framework within which to plan and act. The contemporary 
environment is characterised by the globalisation of competition, convergence between 
industries, large scale mergers and acquisitions and new technologies such as the Internet 
which are changing the competitive dynamic. Organisations need to constantly identify 
opportunities which enable them to sustain and improve their competitiveness. The 
rational-linear approach is too mechanistic and simplistic. Context specific approaches 
to change which seek to match the scale and complexity of change with style of change 
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management (Dunphy and Stace, 1990) or the pace of change against the centrality or 
peripherality of change to the primary task of the organisation (Buchanan and Boddy, 
1992) are a step in the right direction. They admit the relevance and effectiveness of 
political behaviours in certain situations. For example, if the fit between the organisation 
and its environment is incongruent and the importance, magnitude, complexity or 
urgency of the change is great then directive and coercive methods are an important 
influencing tactic for those tasked with design or implementation. The weaknesses of 
the rational-linear approach to change and the need for a power-oriented behaviour based 
alternative is debated more fully in chapter one of the literature review. 
Large scale change often impacts the structure of the organisation with the result that 
some individuals will increase their influence due to control over additional resources, 
new roles and responsibilities, or access to important information. There are many more 
reasons than these few examples. At the same time other individuals will lose out, which 
can cause resistance and opposition as those impacted attempt to protect or promote their 
self-interests. This politicking process which involves lobbying and support gathering 
has been found to take place largely backstage (Buchanan and Boddy, 1992). Within the 
top management team the process can be intense as members jockey for position and 
influence. If we accept this description then we must also accept that organisations are 
political arenas and politics emerge in top management teams since it is the key decision 
makers who are able to influence the strategic direction of the organisation and the 
design of the change to be implemented. 
Both Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) and Allison (1971) have argued that strategic 
decision making is political because it involves decisions with uncertain outcomes and 
parties who resolve conflict through the exercise of power. Others have contended that 
organisations are comprised of constantly shifting groups which seek to impose their will 
and shape the strategic direction (Burns, 1961; Butler, 1971; and Frost and Hayes, 1977). 
There are also several theories of why politics emerge in top management teams. One 
view is that the decentralisation of power within the team encourages conflict and 
competition. On the other hand it has been argued that the centralisation of power in the 
hands of the chief executive officer causes politics because it forces members to engage 
in insurgency behaviours in an attempt to increase their influence. Another view is that a 
self-serving personality generates political behaviour in colleagues. If it is the chief 
executive who demonstrates a propensity for political behaviour then it legitimises the 
use of similar actions by the rest of the top management team. A fourth suggestion is 
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that conflict causes politics. This may be between employees or it may evolve around 
issues and events. Arguably, the more radical the change being proposed, the greater the 
likelihood of top management team members engaging in political behaviour. However, 
for top management team members to engage meaningfully in political behaviour they 
must first understand the sources of power in organisations. 
The literature on intraorganisational power is disappointingly antagonistic. 
Commentators tend to write from one of three perspectives which gives the impression 
of mutual exclusivity and fragmentation. Power is portrayed as being either a personal, 
structural or situational construct. These are dangerous and misleading assumptions. In 
reality it is all three of these but there is a tension between the schools which manifests 
itself in a simplistic `either-or' debate and serves to cloud our understanding of the 
phenomenon rather than elucidate it. Supporters of the personal view believe that power 
is either an attribute of the individual or it exists in the interpersonal relationship between 
two people. It is thought of as a human phenomenon. The position is described best by 
Berle (1969, p. 60) who stated, "Power... does not exist without a holder. " Exponents of 
the structural school criticise the personal power supporters for ignoring the influence of 
structure. For them structure is the "ultimate constraint on behaviour" (Brass and 
Burkhardt, 1993). Roles and responsibilities are structural endowments and network 
centrality, hierarchical authority and control over resources and work design are just a 
few of the sources of structural power. Advocates of the situational school suggest that 
power is a pervasive phenomenon which resides in the internal and external environment 
of the organisation. Individuals or organisational sub-units which can exert control over 
the key interdependencies and manage the critical uncertainties will acquire power 
(Hickson et al, 1971; Hinings et al, 1974; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977). We engage with 
this debate more fully in chapter two of the literature review. 
Power is characterised by its tendency to erode. The amount of power that exists in a 
particular context or organisational setting is not fixed, and the individuals who hold it 
will witness it ebbing and flowing due to personal, structural and situational events. For 
instance a general manager could experience a deterioration in their relationship with the 
chief executive officer and suffer a reduction in the level of power they enjoy. 
Alternatively, a large scale change initiative might transfer a successful sales force to the 
control of the marketing director, resulting in an increase in their power to influence the 
strategy formulation process. Researchers and practitioners alike will understand the 
large scale change process better if they attempt to synthesise the three schools. 
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The literature on the political behaviours and tactics of large scale change proposal 
coalitions is non-existent. This is the point of departure for chapter three. Instead, we 
are left to consider the descriptions and prescriptions of those who have conflated change 
into a single homogenous process, or alternatively written with implementation in mind. 
This is a serious gap which this thesis will address. The rich descriptions of the 
behaviours and tactics used by large scale change proposal coalition leaders are the first 
to be reported, and as such constitute a pioneering breakthrough. They represent a 
beach-head from which others can conduct research to challenge and build on the 
findings. 
At this juncture it is useful to note that the unit of analysis is the coalition leader in the 
context of a large scale change proposal coalition. It is clear from the discussion 
immediately above and the research objectives that our interest is on the behaviours and 
tactics used by large scale change proposal coalition leaders in their interactions with 
other members of the coalition. However, investigating behaviours without a context is 
of limited value, so we will also describe the nature, characteristics of the large scale 
change proposal coalition process in order to establish a context within which to create 
relevance and meaning. 
Recent commentary on the role of the top management team has suggested that one of its 
primary tasks is to design and lead the implementation of large scale change. Bennis 
(1997, p. 150) has asserted that top management team members need to ensure "they are 
constantly reinventing the organisation. " In a similar vein Pascale (1989) remarked that 
the highly competitive and uncertain environment which organisations currently find 
themselves in is forcing senior management to identify and develop transformational 
options for change rather than incremental improvements. However, the increasing 
frequency, magnitude and complexity of change is too demanding a task for just one 
individual -the chief executive officer- to take on. What is required is for a member 
of the top management team to take an idea and build a large scale change proposal 
coalition comprising executive colleagues who will design and submit the proposal for 
approval by the appropriate decision makers in the top management team. This notion 
has recently found support in the literature. Kotter (1996) asserted: 
"No-one individual, even a monarch-like CEO, is ever able to develop the 
right vision, communicate it to large numbers of people, eliminate all the 
key obstacles, generate short-term wins, lead and manage dozens of 
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change projects, and anchor new approaches deep in the organisation's 
culture... A strong guiding coalition is always needed -one with the right 
composition, level of trust, and shared objective. Building a team is 
always an essential part of the early stages of any effort to restructure, 
engineer, or retool a set of strategies. " (Kotter, 1996, p. 51-52) 
However, his arguments are based on casual observation or ancillary findings from 
previous initiatives rather than empirical research designed to investigate large scale 
change proposal coalitions. Unfortunately, he is not able to describe the coalition 
building process. There is no empirically generated literature on the large scale change 
proposal coalition building process in top management teams and this is a serious gap. It 
is not known who the coalition builder approaches for support or in what order they 
recruit members. Neither is it known what behaviours and tactics a coalition builder uses 
and whether or not they vary depending on the hierarchical positions of the builder and 
the target. Indeed the whole subject of large scale change proposal coalitions in top 
management teams is empirically unexplored. We know nothing about their nature and 
characteristics, if there are different types, whether they evolve over time and what 
happens to them when they have submitted their proposal. Similarly there is no 
empirical research on the behaviours and tactics of large scale change proposal coalition 
leaders. We do not know what behaviours and tactics are used to build the coalition, 
whether different behaviours are used with different people, or at different stages of 
evolution or in different types of coalition. These are important issues which need to be 
investigated. They will be researched and reported in this thesis. Given the management 
literatures' fascination with change, managerial elites, decision making processes and the 
political behaviour of individuals, it is surprising that large scale change proposal 
coalitions in top management teams have not been empirically studied before now. The 
literature on coalitions that does exist is largely theoretically derived from laboratory 
experiments conducted using employees outside the top management team. It is overly 
rational and focuses rather simplistically and in a one-sided manner on the reasons why 
an individual would join a coalition. It does not consider any of the questions presented 
above. The empirical work on coalitions in top management teams does not include 
large scale change proposal coalitions. The findings of the research reported in this 
thesis conflict with influential writings, such as Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) who 
asserted that temporary coalitions do not form in top management teams which operate 
in "high-velocity" environments. The top management teams studied here which could 
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be described as operating in rapidly changing environments did establish coalitions for 
the purpose of proposing large scale change. 
One of the reasons why there is such a paucity of empirical research is the difficulty of 
gaining access to managerial elites. Although managerial elites is a value laden term for 
scholars, it is used pragmatically in this thesis to refer to members of the top 
management team in their role as the governing body of the organisation. They are 
expected, by virtue of their position in the hierarchy, to shape the strategic direction of 
the organisation. Others outside the top management team may contribute but it is not 
their primary role. Pettigrew (1992) has commented that gaining access is a complicated 
and frustrating process, made worse by the problem of identifying who in the top 
management team is a key decision maker. Titles can mislead the researcher into 
believing an individual is more influential than they really are. The situation is 
compounded yet further by the subject matter. Although the use of political behaviour is 
pervasive in organisations, it can be difficult to convince a member of a top management 
team to agree to talk about it, and even if they do, to then elicit rich, candid data that 
provides insightful descriptions. Therefore, an innovative research methodology is 
required. It may be that poor design is partly to blame for the lack of reporting. 
Classical structured interviews are unlikely to generate rich data because the interviewer 
is not supposed to allow or follow the interviewee if they go off on an unexpected but 
interesting tangent. There is also the danger that an unwillingness to deviate will cause 
the interviewer to disengage and contribute only poor quality data. Postal questionnaires 
are also unlikely to produce rich data because there is no opportunity to ask immediate 
supplementary questions or pursue an interesting line of enquiry which the interviewee 
raises. Direct observation techniques are highly likely to produce unrepresentative 
behaviour, thereby destroying the usefulness of the findings. What is required is a 
"permissive atmosphere" (Blum, 1952) which encourages candid reporting of the 
political behaviours and tactics used in large scale change proposal coalitions. This 
requires the establishment of trust which can be achieved, in part, by exchanging stories 
of political activity which legitimise the interviewee's own actions. An elite style semi- 
structured interview approach in which both parties engage in an "interview- 
conversation" (Blum, 1952) rather than the "rat-a-tat-tat" (Dexter, 1970) questioning 
style of the structured interview is conducive to creating a climate of trust. The elite 
style interview is characterised by the presentation of the situation as a discussion 
between near equals, with the researcher just below the respondent so as to encourage the 
latter to impart their knowledge. 
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Professional or personal ties are highly useful when attempting to interview managerial 
elites about sensitive topics such as political behaviour. The researcher can generate a 
sample by providing in-situ or well connected contacts with a precise specification of the 
desired interviewee and asking them to effect an introduction. If the intermediary enjoys 
the trust of the interview candidate then this is a major advantage. Key decision makers 
can be identified by asking the intermediary -or the chief executive officer once they 
have been interviewed- who is involved in setting the strategic direction of the 
organisation and who has played an influential role in previous large scale change 
initiatives. Titles such as director and general manager are used only as guides. As each 
interview takes place and the participant finds the encounter stimulating and cathartic 
they can be asked to introduce the researcher to another key decision maker in the top 
management team or indeed, one in another organisation. This technique is known as 
snowball sampling. The researcher enters each interview with a degree of credibility and 
trust awarded by the previous participant. In a research setting where a number of 
interviewees are set up and conducted this way the level of trust increases cumulatively 
and with it the richness and candour of the responses. In summary this was the 
innovative methodology design employed to construct a sample of fifty members of top 
management teams drawn from fourteen organisations in thirteen industries in the UK 
private sector for the empirical study reported in this thesis. As the results will convey, 
this approach produced deep insights into the nature and characteristics of large scale 
change proposal coalitions and the behaviours and tactics of coalition leaders. Neither of 
these areas of the change context have been explored by empirical researchers. 
The key contributions of this research 
This thesis provides a critical evaluation of the extant literature. The study engages with 
the literature and contributes to the debate by reporting the findings of the empirical 
research and assessing the implications for academic enquiry and practitioners. The key 
findings of the study are: 
  Large scale change proposal coalitions follow a five phase life-cycle model: initiate, 
build, sustain, dissolve, and capture and transfer, 
  Coalition leaders adopt three primary and sequential roles: building, sustaining and 
dissolving, 
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  Coalition leaders adopt one of four hierarchy-based coalition building approaches, 
  Coalition building processes, behaviours and tactics vary depending on whether they 
are upward inter-tier, intra-tier or downward inter-tier, 
  Four types of large scale change proposal coalition exist: aligned, unaligned, 
unfocused and fragmented. Each exhibiting their own nature and characteristics, and 
requiring different coalition leader behaviours and tactics, 
  Large scale change proposal coalitions should be dissolved as quickly as practically 
possible once the proposal has been approved for implementation or rejected, and 
  The chief executive officer, in conjunction with the coalition leader dissolves the 
large scale change proposal coalition using three principal techniques: new roles and 
responsibilities, geographic dispersal and new projects. 
The two key methodology learnings were firstly, the value of pursuing an opportunistic 
strategy of using professional and personal ties to generate a sample, and secondly, how 
to investigate a sensitive topic such as political behaviour and elicit rich, candid data 
which provides deep insights into large scale change proposal coalitions in top 
management teams. The methodology design and construction is discussed in chapter - 
four and the implications for research methods are debated in chapter nine. 
Thesis structure 
Chapter one takes as its point of departure one of the central themes in contemporary 
change management literature. It is argued that the rational-linear approach to change 
management is not the most suitable model for organisations faced with complex large 
scale change in environments experiencing a high state of flux and uncertainty. Instead 
we need to work from the assumption that organisations are political arenas and that a 
power-oriented behaviour based model of change is more resilient and pragmatic. This 
argument is presented by engaging with the extant literature. It is asserted also that 
because of the complexity, scale and frequency of large scale change, it is unrealistic for 
the chief executive officer (CEO) alone to design a large scale change proposal. Rather it 
is the role of the top management team to develop and execute options and within that 
group coalitions must form and propose change. During the debate the existing literature 
base is critiqued and several methodological and assumptive concerns are identified. It is 
asserted that the absence of empirical research into the nature of large scale change 
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proposal coalitions, the coalition formation and management process and the behaviours 
and tactics of coalition leaders is an important gap in the literature which must be 
addressed if our understanding of managerial elites is to be deepened. 
Chapter two builds on the arguments presented in chapter one. We consider the three 
major schools of thought on the nature and sources of intraorganisational power. The 
first school presents power as a personal construct which resides in personal attributes or 
interpersonal exchange. The second school asserts that power is located in the structure 
of an organisation. The third school contends that power is a situational construct and 
those who control the strategic contingencies enjoy power. Given that large scale change 
is likely to re-configure the structural design of the organisation there will be winners 
and losers within the top management team. Therefore, the coalition leader must 
anticipate opposition which will require meaningful engagement in public and backstage 
political activity. To do this effectively the coalition leader must understand the nature 
and sources of power in organisations. A coalition leader who understands these issues 
is in a position to construct a powerful coalition. In addition, the actions of other 
coalitions can be understood and predicted and steps can be taken to neutralise them or 
reduce the likelihood of them receiving approval for implementation. 
During the debate the schools are critiqued from several perspectives. Firstly, power 
does not reside in only one location or another but in all three locations simultaneously. 
Monocausal arguments are unhelpful and prevent a more elucidatory understanding of 
the phenomenon. Furthermore, there is no fixed amount of power and it ebbs and flows 
because of personal, structural and situational events. Secondly, much of the 
commentary on intraorganisational power is theoretically derived or constructed from 
casual observation. There is a paucity of empirical research, particularly with regard to 
the use of power in the context of large scale change proposal coalitions in top 
management teams. Thirdly, there are a number of arguable assumptions in several 
influential writings. It is concluded that a more synthesised approach to the study of 
intraorganisational power in top management teams is necessary if we are to develop our 
understanding of the large scale change proposal coalition building process and the 
behaviours and tactics of coalition leaders. 
Chapter three concludes the literature review. We begin by acknowledging that 
academic enquiry into the subject is fragmented and disparate. To evidence this we 
discuss the meaning of intraorganisational politics and lay out several of the main themes 
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around which theorists debate. The morality of engaging in political behaviour is 
considered briefly before the inevitability of politics in organisations is examined. The 
extant literature on coalition formation is critiqued on several assumptive and 
methodological grounds and important questions are raised. The commentary on 
political behaviours and tactics is criticised for being disturbingly generic, and context 
specific empirical research is called for to offset the dangerous conflation of large scale 
change into a single homogenous process by many change management writers. 
On closing the literature review seven lines of enquiry are identified for the empirical 
study to pursue. They aim to address serious gaps in the literature and elucidate our 
understanding of the nature and characteristics of large scale change proposal coalitions 
and the behaviour and tactics of coalition leaders in top management teams for the 
purpose of informing academic enquiry and practitioners. 
Chapter four discusses the methodology design and construction. It describes how the 
approach was strongly influenced and shaped by the need to overcome the difficulties of 
empirically investigating the political behaviours and tactics of top management team 
members in large scale change proposal coalitions. We consider the two key problems of 
firstly, gaining access to top management team members, and secondly, the sensitivity of 
political behaviours as a topic for investigation. It is also explained how a combination 
of professional and personal ties were used to establish a research sample of fifty 
members of top management teams in fourteen organisations across thirteen industries in 
the UK private sector. The elite style semi-structured interview approach is discussed 
along with the thematic based content analysis data analysis technique. In addition, the 
chapter also discusses the issue of revisiting rich interviews, assessing participant 
candour, and post-interview correspondence before concluding with a brief reflection on 
the methodological lessons learned. 
Chapter five presents the findings into the first and second lines of enquiry. It was found 
that the majority of large scale change proposal coalitions discussed by participants 
conformed to a five phase life-cycle model. The five phases are initiate, build, sustain, 
dissolve, and capture and transfer. During the five phases coalition leaders adopt three 
principal and sequential behaviours and tactics: building, sustaining and dissolving. The 
nature and characteristics of the five phases are described, as are the three roles. This is 
the first empirical research to describe the evolution of large scale change proposal 
coalitions in the top management team and the roles of the coalition leader. The 
13 
coalition life-cycle is clearly a managed process and the broader top management team is 
presented as long-termist and politically astute because of their preparedness to tolerate a 
temporary super-influential informal structure to exist for the benefit of the organisation. 
Chapter six presents the findings which relate to the third and fourth lines of enquiry. It 
is reported that the sequence of building a large scale change proposal coalition is 
heavily influenced by the hierarchical position of the builder in relation to the potential 
member, and four tier-specific approaches are commonly adopted. The finding that the 
coalition builder's behaviours and tactics vary according to whether they are engaged in 
upward inter-tier building, intra-tier building or downward inter-tier support gathering 
exercises is also discussed. The findings in this chapter provide a unique insight into an 
under-explored area of management. They provide compelling evidence to support the 
contention that large scale change is not a single homogenous process, and neither is it a 
rational-linear affair. Instead it is a rich political behaviour based process with members 
of top management teams being influenced by their structural position in the hierarchy, 
the quality of their relationship with the potential coalition member, and the magnitude 
and complexity of the change being proposed. 
Chapter seven presents the findings into the fifth line of enquiry which was concerned 
with whether different types of large scale change proposal coalition exist in top 
management teams. It was found that four types of coalition exist: aligned, unaligned, 
unfocused and fragmented. The nature and characteristics of each and the behaviours 
and tactics used by coalition leaders to sustain them to the point of proposal submission 
are discussed in turn. Stability and cohesion are strongest in aligned coalitions but 
become progressively weaker in unaligned, unfocused and fragmented types. We also 
discuss the finding that as stability and cohesiveness decrease, coalition leaders have to 
resort to higher levels of coercion and reward and more frequent renegotiations to extend 
the commitment and involvement of members. Overall, these three factors combine to 
result in increased maintenance time to keep the coalition together. The descriptive 
findings presented in this chapter constitute a pioneering breakthrough in our 
understanding of the nature and characteristics of large scale change proposal coalitions 
in top management teams, and the behaviours and tactics required to sustain them. No 
other empirical research has reported on these issues. The findings support the 
contentions made in chapters one and three that coercion has a place in the armoury of 
the coalition leader. They also clearly portray top management team members as 
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individuals with competing and often conflicting agendas who are prepared to engage in 
opposition and resistance. 
Chapter eight presents the findings which relate to the sixth and seventh lines of enquiry. 
The results of the study indicate that large scale change proposal coalitions should be 
dissolved as quickly as practically possible once the learnings have been captured and 
transfered into the working practices of the top management team. Eleven reasons for 
dissolution offered by participants are presented. In addition three popular dissolution 
techniques used by the chief executive in conjunction with the coalition leader are also 
discussed. The dissolution of large scale change proposal coalitions has not previously 
been researched. Therefore, the findings considered in this chapter provide a unique 
insight into the practitioner mindset. As with each of the other chapters we link 
behaviour with process. The descriptive nature of the findings once again elucidates our 
understanding of this crucial, yet unexplored, phase of the large scale change proposal 
process. 
Chapter nine concludes the thesis with a recapitulation of the findings and engages in a 
discussion which makes recommendations for academic enquiry, research methods and 
practitioners. Within the academic enquiry and practitioner sections the seven lines of 
enquiry are used as the organising device. The study findings are set against the extant 
literature, and where possible compared and contrasted to ascertain commonalties and 
differences. A view is taken on whether the findings are additive or substitutive to the 
existing literature. More often than not though it is not possible to compare directly with 
the extant literature because the research presented in this thesis is of a pioneering nature 
and consequently stands alone. During the debate a significant number of lines of 
enquiry for future research are identified which aim to test the study findings or deepen 
them. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the thesis has advanced our 
understanding of the change context and what it means for the research agenda. 
Specifically, it is argued that this thesis has broken new ground by linking behaviour and 
process to present rich, descriptive insights into large scale change proposal coalitions in 
top management teams. A crucially important but previously unresearched and 
unreported element of the change context. 
15 
Part one 
Literature review and 
methodology 
Chapter 1 
The changing role of the top 
management team 
"... linear thinking is useless in a non-linear world. Instead, we have to 
make an intellectual leap from the linear to the non-linear. From the 
known to the unknown. From terra firma to terra incognita. " (Gibson, 
1997, p. 7) 
Introduction 
This chapter takes as its point of departure one of the central themes in contemporary 
change management literature. It will be argued that the rational-linear approach to 
change management is not the most suitable option for organisations faced with complex 
large scale change in turbulent environments. Instead we should begin from the premise 
that organisations are political arenas and that a power-oriented behaviour based model 
of change is more resilient and pragmatic. This finds support from an influential section 
of the literature (Bateman, 1980; Buchanan and Boddy, 1992; Egan, 1994; Hayes, 1984; 
Kanter, 1983,1992; Mintzberg, 1985; Pfeffer, 1992). It will also be contended that 
because of the complexity, scale and frequency of change, it is unrealistic to expect or 
accept that the chief executive officer (CEO) alone designs large scale change initiatives. 
Rather, it is the role of the top management team to develop options, instigate and 
implement large scale change (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; Kakabadse, 1991; 
Kotter, 1996; Tushman, Newman and Romanelli, 1986), and within that group it is the 
role of coalitions to form and propose change (Gandz and Murray, 1980; Kotter, 1985; 
Morgan, 1986). 
During the discussion the existing literature base is critiqued and a number of 
methodological and assumptive problems identified. It is argued that the absence of 
empirically generated research into the nature of large scale change proposal coalitions, 
17 
the process of coalition formation and management, and the behaviours and tactics of 
coalition leaders is a serious gap in the literature, which if addressed, would deepen our 
understanding of managerial elites. 
Management research perspectives on organisational change: a brief overview 
The literature on organisational change is large and diverse, and although it is not the 
purpose of this short section to provide a critique, it is useful to lay out the major 
dimensions of the framework of enquiry since it will help locate the arguments presented 
in the rest of the chapter. 
Theorists and empirical researchers have written from a wide range of perspectives. For 
example, some researchers have studied the need for change, its stimulants (Child and 
Kieser, 1981; Meyer, 1982), and the executive leadership's interpretative processes 
(Dutton and Duncan, 1987; Milliken, 1990). Others have investigated who initiates 
change (Katzenback, 1996; Kelly and Amburgey, 1991; Robbins and Duncan, 1988; 
Tichy and Ulrich, 1984), the process of change (Kanter, 1983; Katzenback, 1996; 
Kissler, 1991; Kotter, 1996; Pettigrew, 1985; Quinn, 1980), and the constraints on 
change (Aldrich and Auster, 1986; Boeker, 1989; Pettigrew, 1985; Staw, Sandelands and 
Dutton, 1981; Stinchcombe, 1965). Another group of writers have examined the political 
skills of those involved in instigating, leading and managing change (Buchanan and 
Boddy, 1992; Dubrin, 1978; Kanter, 1983; Keen, 1981; Kipnis, 1984; Pettigrew, 1972, 
1985; Pfeffer, 1981,1992). A further perspective has considered how to anticipate, 
predict, and create change in industries (Hamel and Prahalad, 1992; Hamel, 1996; 
Strebel, 1992). 
Commentators have also studied the types of change an organisation may experience. 
Watzlawick (1978) distinguished between first-order and second-order change, while 
Quinn (1980) and Miller and Friesen (1984) wrote about incremental and quantum 
change. Continuous and discontinuous change was the subject of a series of papers 
involving Tushman and Romanelli (1985), Nadler and Tushman (1986), and Tushman, 
Newman and Romanelli (1986). Typologies of change have also been presented which 
plot the scale of change against styles of change management (Dunphy and Stace, 1990), 
and the pace of change against the centrality or peripherality of change to the primary 
task of the organisation (Buchanan and Boddy, 1992). 
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One increasingly influential section of the literature has argued that the rational-linear 
approach to change management is not sufficiently robust, flexible or sophisticated to 
enable organisations to cope effectively with complex large scale change in turbulent 
environments. These theorists argue instead that organisations are political arenas and 
that a power-oriented behaviour based model of change is more resilient and pragmatic 
(Buchanan and Boddy, 1992; Egan, 1994; Hayes, 1984; Kanter, 1983; Mintzberg, 1985; 
Pfeffer, 1992). It is this last position which serves as our point of departure. 
Stress fractures in the rational-linear approach to change 
Much of the change management literature from the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s was based 
on the assumption that change was a neat linear affair. Events were predicted to unfold 
logically and sequentially, and practitioners were advised to follow an orderly process or 
one of the many checklists spawned from the Organisational Development (OD) or 
`excellence' schools to deliver significant and lasting change. The volatile business 
environment of the middle to late 1990s has prompted commentators such as Buchanan 
and Boddy (1992) to claim the rational-linear approach to change is neither flexible or 
robust enough to cope with major and often unanticipated impacts. Nor is it proactive or 
sophisticated enough to provide practitioners with advice on how to change the rules of 
the game in their industry and establish a sustainable or renewable competitive advantage 
for their organisations. This is hardly surprising when the antecedents of conventional 
change management literature are considered. 
In looking back at the `control' literature of the early 1960s (for example, Cyert and 
March, 1963), it can be observed that one of the central tenets was the desirability of 
reducing uncertainty in order to create stability and predictability. In tracing the change 
management literature back to its roots, the strong influence of the control agenda can be 
identified. One of the underlying assumptions of the conventional change management 
literature is the objective of dampening down uncertainty so change agents can 
"refreeze" (Lewin, 1947) the organisation. If we turn these arguments upside down, we 
can find contemporary writers such as Hamel (1996) urging organisational members at 
all levels to act as "revolutionaries" and initiate change. He contends that in an era of 
global competition and rapidly converging markets, winning organisations are likely to 
be those which seek to amplify and exploit change rather than dampen it down. 
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Conventional change management thinking also has its roots in OD. Acolytes of this 
school have been criticised by Pettigrew (1985) for presenting change in a simplistic and 
naive manner. He accused them of adopting a "truth, trust, love and collaboration" 
approach to change. A few of the leading early exponents of the school included 
Beckhard (1967), Bennis (1965), Blake and Mouton (1964; 1968), Davis (1967), Lewin 
(1947), Likert (1967), and Schein (1965). According to Cummings and Huse (1989, p. 5) 
organisational change was a natural outlet for OD theory, but it was not one of the 
school's original areas of focus. They contended that OD had emerged from four major 
backgrounds: the development of training groups, early survey research and feedback, 
Kurt Lewin's work on group dynamics and social change, and an aim to increase 
productivity and the quality of working life. 
An important feature of the OD literature has been the participation in the design of 
organisational change by those members who stand to be impacted by it. This approach 
avoids accusations of totalitarian rule from senior decision makers who by virtue of their 
hierarchical position are often able to enforce change. It is also based on the notion that 
involvement reduces resistance and opposition with the result that change is embedded 
quickly into the organisation. Cummings and Huse (1989, p. 60), offered advice for 
change practitioners seeking to influence others: "The strategy of playing it straight 
is... the most widely used power strategy in OD. It involves determining the needs of 
particular stakeholders and presenting information for how the changes can benefit them. 
This relatively straightforward approach is... based on the premise that information and 
knowledge can persuade people about the need and direction for change. " This comment 
is surprising indeed, and is put forward without supporting evidence. It appears naive 
and idealistic, and fails to acknowledge the emotional and political dimensions of 
decision making in the change context. It infers that `playing it straight' will be 
sufficient to deter or avoid resistance. 
As early as 1969 Bennis began criticising the OD school's view of organisation man as a 
rational, trusting individual driven by concern for the welfare of fellow employees. By 
the 1980s some of the best known OD theorists had become critical of the school's core 
beliefs (Beckhard and Harris, 1977; Schein, 1977). Following their earlier statement on 
the prevalence of `honest' power strategies Cummings and Huse (1989, p. 60) admitted 
the emergence of opposing views, "Current thinking tends to view planned change as a 
rationally controlled, orderly process. Critics have argued that although this may be 
comforting, it is seriously misleading. They point out that planned change has a more 
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chaotic quality, often involving shifting goals, discontinuous activities, surprising events, 
and unexpected combinations of changes. " Despite this acknowledgement the authors 
failed to indicate an acceptance that perhaps there are weaknesses in OD thinking which 
undermine its relevance and validity as an effective change strategy in complex 
environments. Contemporary change management writers such as Buchanan and Boddy 
(1992, p. 61) agree with Quinn (1980), Pettigrew (1985; 1987; 1988), and revisionists 
such as Beckhard and Schein that large scale change is an "untidy cocktail", and not a 
logical rational-linear process. Consequently, `playing it straight' strategies are unlikely 
to be the most effective approach to winning support and overcoming resistance. Instead 
political behaviour which embraces backstage manoeuvring, negotiation and coercive 
tactics is more likely to be found in organisations attempting to cope with an uncertain 
and ambiguous change context. 
Beer, Eisenstat and Spector (1990) have also criticised the "programmatic" -rational 
linear- approach to change. Their criticism of the OD approach was that it relies 
heavily on training to change behaviour. Instead they recommended a "task aligned" 
mindset. They argued that successful change programmes are those which seek to 
reshape an individual's behaviour by modifying the task. In effect behaviour changes are 
`pulled' through the organisation, rather than `pushed' through by a series of training 
initiatives. This position is supported by Schaffer and Thomson (1992) who advocate a 
"results-driven" approach to change. They too are critical of the "energy dissipating", 
"activity-centred" pursuit of performance improvement. They argue, "This `rain dance' 
is the ardent pursuit of activities that sound good, look good, and allow managers to feel 
good -but in fact contribute little or nothing to bottom-line performance... Companies 
introduce these programs under the false assumption that if they carry out enough of the 
`right' improvement activities, actual performance improvements will inevitably 
materialise. At the heart of these programs, which we call `activity-centred', is a 
fundamentally flawed logic that confuses ends with means, processes with outcomes" 
(Schaffer and Thomson, 1992, p. 80). The authors' comparisons between activity-centred 
programmes and results-driven programmes are set out in Exhibit 1.1. 
Also seeking to link results with approach Pettigrew and Whipp (1991) proposed a two- 
dimensional, five-factor, forty-four element model of organisational change, which they 
claimed, explains the difference between high and low performing organisations. 
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Exhibit 1.1 - Schaffer and Thomson's 
Activity-centred programs versus 
Results-driven programs 
While activity-centred programs and results-driven programs share some common methodologies for 
initiating change, they differ in very drammatic ways. 
Activity-centred programs Results-driven programs i IThe improvement effort is defined mainly , 1 There are measurable short-term ; _ýý' in the long-term, global terms ("We are °; ° performance improvement goals, even 
going to be viewed as number one in though the effort is a long-term, sustaining 
quality in our industry") one. ("Within 60 days; ' we will be paying 
95% of claims within 10 days") 
2 Management takes action steps because 2 Management takes action steps because 
they are 'correct' and fit the program's . ': they appear to 
lead directly toward some 
philosophy. ("I want every manager in the improved results. (". Let's put together a. 
division involved in an action. ") small group to work with you to solve this 
machine downtime problem. ") 
3 °The program's champion(s) counsels, 3 The mood is one of inipatience. 
" 
Management 
patience and fortitude. ("Don't be looking wants to see results now, even though the; ' 
for results this year or next year. This is change process is a long-tem commitment. 
a long-term process, not a quick fix. ") ("If we can't eliminate at least half of the cost 
disadvantage within the next three months, 
we should consider closing the`plant ") 
4'Staff experts and consultants indoctinate 4 Staff experts and consulta=nts help" 
everyone into, the mystique and vocabulary of. managers achieve results. ("We could 
the program. ("It will be a Tower of Babel if we probably work up a way to measure 
try'to'work on these problems before .: customer attitudes on delivery service 
everyone, managers and employees alike, has within a week or two so that you can start 
been through the quality training and has a improving it. ") 
common vocabulary and a common toolkit, ") ` 
.. "#, . 
ßa. 4. .. _ g 
5 Staff experts and consultants urge managers 5 Managers and employees are encouraged, 
and employees to have faith in the approach to make certain for themselves that the' 
and to support it. ("True employee ."f approach actually yields results.,, ("Why involvement will take a lot of time and effort, don't you send a few of your people to the 
and though it may be a real struggle for, quality course to test whether it really helps 
managers; they need to understand that it is them achieve their improvement goals in 
essential to become a total quality company, ") the next month or two. ") 
6 The process requires management to make big 6 Relatively little investment is needed to get 
investments up front -before results have been the process started; conviction builds as 
demonstrated. ("During the first year, we' results materialise: ("Let's see if this 
expect to concentrate on awareness building,, -., approach can help us increase sales of 
and skill training. : Then, while managers begin high-end products in a couple of branches. 
to diagnose problems and opportunities in - If it does, we can take method to the'other their areas, a consultant will be surveying all of branches. ") 
our customers to get their views on the 14 
critical dimensions of service. -And then.. ") 
Source: Schaffer, R H, and Thomson, H A, (1992), 'Successful change programs begin with results', 
Harvard Business Review, January/February, p. 80-89. 
However, the authors claim to present the multivariate model for research and analytical 
purposes, and not for day-to-day application by practising managers. This self-critique is 
appropriate because may practitioners would likely find it difficult to derive pragmatic 
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benefits. The value of the model lies in the emphasis it places on process and context. 
Pettigrew (1985; 1987) has criticised sections of the change management literature for 
not taking process and context factors -external and internal, past and present- into 
consideration. He argues that a robust and insightful model of change is cognisant of 
time, multiple layers and multiple dimensions of organisations. Buchanan (1994, p. 19), 
whilst applauding the theoretical advance of locating the strategic change process and 
change agent in a wider organisational and environmental setting, criticised Pettigrew on 
the grounds that "the richness and complexity of this perspective disable attempts to 
derive parsimonious models of context and process, and there is little attempt to spell out 
the practical management implications of a processual and contextual perspective beyond 
broad generalisations. " 
Dunphy and Stace (1990) have also presented a typology of change, plotting the scale of 
change against styles of change management. Based on research into Australian 
organisations the authors classify the scale of change usefully into four categories: fine 
tuning, incremental adjustment, modular transformation, and corporate transformation. 
They then identify four styles of change management: collaborative, consultative, 
directive, and coercive. Plotting scale against style they suggest four broad types of 
change strategy: type 1, participative evolution; type 2, charismatic transformation; type 
3, forced evolution; and type 4, dictatorial transformation. The conditions for use are 
explained in Exhibit 1.2. Medium to high performing organisations were found to 
undertake incremental and modular transformation change programmes using 
consultative and directive styles of change management. Lower performers were those 
using the same styles to `fine tune' the organisation. "Corporate transformation (using 
directive/coercive style) is the most common change strategy when an organisation needs 
to radically regain fit with a changed environment" (Dunphy and Stace, 1990, p. 88). The 
authors conclude that their differentiated contingency model enables managers to 
consider change strategy in situational terms. Participative evolution, as advocated by 
traditional OD literature, is appropriate in certain circumstances only, whereas in 
turbulent environmental conditions directive and coercive approaches tend to be more 
effective when the organisation needs to reposition itself urgently. Dunphy and Staces's 
work is one of the few that explicitly draws attention to the importance of context, and 
acknowledges that strategies ranging from participation to coercion are appropriate and 
effective in specific circumstances. The authors stress the need to avoid accepting their 
findings as "doctrinaire prescriptions" (p. vii), but they do provide provocative thought 
for both practitioners and researchers. Given that the authors were granted access by the 
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chief executive of each of the thirteen organisations studied it would have been an 
interesting line of enquiry if the research had investigated the role of coalitions within the 
top management team in shaping and selecting the appropriate change strategy. A 
description and analysis of the political behaviours and tactics used between top 
management team members at the proposal stage would have provided a unique insight 
into the change process in Australian organisations. As it is, reference to the use of 
different strategies to move the organisation at the implementation stage represent an 
empirical advancement of the literature. 
Exhibit 1.2 - Dunphy and Stace's typology of change 
strategies and conditions for use 
Incremental Transformative 
change strategies change strategies 
Collaborative/ 
consultative models 
Directive/ 
coercive models 
1. Participative 2. Charismatic 
evolution, v ' transformation 
Use when organisation Use when organisation 
is in fit but needs minor is out of fit, there is little 
adjustment, or is out of time for extensive 
fit but time is available participation but there 
and key interest groups Is support for radical 
favour change. change. 
3. Forced 4. Dictatorial 
evolution transformation 
Use when organisation Use when organisation 
is in fit but needs minor Is out of fit, there is no 
adjustment, or is out of time for extensive 
fit but time is available, participation and no 
but key interest groups support for radical 
oppose change. change which is vital to 
survival and mission 
fulfilment. 
, Source: Dunphy, D, and Stace, D, (1990), Under NewManagement. "Australian Organisations in Transition, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Sydney. 
Another `context' model of change was offered by Buchanan and Boddy (1992). The 
authors plotted the pace of change against the centrality or peripherality of change to the 
primary task of the organisation. This is illustrated in Exhibit 1.3. Their four quadrant 
model can be used by change agents to anticipate the `hassle factor' and their 
`vulnerability' of managing four types of change. For example, in `quadrant four' type 
change when the pace of change is radical and it is core to the primary purpose of the 
organisation, the change agent is likely to operate in a `high hassle/high vulnerability' 
environment. Due to the concertinaed time frame, and quite possibly the magnitude of 
the planned change, the change agent is likely to encounter resistance. Consequently, 
they will have to engage in backstage political behaviours aimed at winning support and 
overcoming opposition. This in itself makes them vulnerable since by upsetting the 
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status quo and threatening the existing power structure, they are as likely to make 
enemies as win support. The change agent is also highly vulnerable because if their 
efforts to implement the change are unsuccessful, their career prospects and reputation 
may be damaged. This too will be compounded by the fact that those who were 
threatened may want to exact some form of revenge, or at least ensure they are unlikely 
to be threatened again by the individual in question. However, Buchanan and Boddy 
(1992, p. 43) suggested that, "Few managers have built highly successful personal careers 
on a history of incremental and peripheral changes to their organisations. " 
Exhibit 1.3 - Buchanan and Boddy's four-quadrant 
model of organisational change 
4 
Radical 
1 
High hassle 
High vulnerability 
Core ----------- 
Low hassle 
Moderate vulnerability 
3 
Moderate hassle 
Low vulnerability 
- ---------- Peripheral 
Low hassle 
Low vulnerability 
Incremental 
2 
Source: Buchanan, D, and Boddy, D, (1992), The Expertise of the Change Agent Public Performance 
and Backstage Activity, Prentice Hall, Hemel Hempstead. 
The work of Dunphy and Stace (1990) and Buchanan and Boddy (1992) adds a new 
perspective to the change management literature. Whereas large parts of the literature 
are either descriptively or prescriptively generic, the work of these authors is 
contextually specific. It recognises that organisations and change agents need to pursue 
different change strategies at different times, influenced in part by the need to ensure 
congruence between the organisation and the environment. The authors also reject the 
blanket acceptance of the more purist approach of the OD theorists by acknowledging the 
usefulness and appropriateness of political behaviours which may include directive and 
coercive methods. 
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One of the key distinctions between the work of Dunphy and Stace (1990) and Buchanan 
and Boddy (1992) is the way in which the latter emphasises the political nature of 
change. It is clear they subscribe to the view that organisations are political entities, and 
therefore, decision making around key events such as large scale change is inherently 
political. Importantly, their position was derived from empirical research. However, as 
with Dunphy and Stace they neglect to discuss the role of coalitions in designing the 
content and process of large scale change. Their unit of analysis is the individual and 
commentary on the expertise of the change agent fails to incorporate or acknowledge the 
multiplicity of inputs and interplay amongst members of the top management team 
before a decision is reached and the change proposal proceeds to implementation. A 
more informative unit of analysis would be the individual in the context of some broader 
decision making group. Clearly for large scale change that group would be the top 
management team. This is because individuals operate in a web of relationships 
characterised by diverse and often competing interests. Due to the magnitude and 
complexity of large scale change, and the often resultant threat to powerful individuals, 
one person is rarely able to win sufficient support and overcome resistance from peers 
without forming a coalition with significant -powerful- others. If we accept this 
logical argument then we arrive at the conclusion that organisations are political arenas 
and politics emerge in top management teams. 
Orgranisations as political arenas and the emergence of politics in top management 
teams 
As we have already noted, Pettigrew (1985) has been critical of the structured planning 
approach to change claiming that it consists of "subtle processes of additively building 
up a momentum of support for change and then vigorously implementing it. " He advised 
"beware the singular theory of process or indeed of social and organisational change", 
advising practitioners and theorists to focus instead on understanding the "political and 
cultural mosaic" of behaviours and processes which underpin large scale change 
initiatives. Pettigrew asserted that rational and political-cultural approaches to change 
are intrinsically related. This finds support from Tichy (1983) who compared significant 
change to a rope with three strands: technical, political, and cultural. He suggested that if 
the three interrelated strands are not managed together, then like a rope they can unravel. 
Gray and Ariss (1985, p. 708) have also been critical of the traditional single strand 
approach claiming, "Many models of how strategic change occurs portray it as a formal, 
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rational, neatly controlled process. They focus on environmental assessment, 
opportunity analysis, and logical, orderly planning cycles. " They go on to argue that 
such a view is severely limited because it ignores the political dimension of change. 
Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) and Allison (1971) have both suggested that most 
strategic decision making processes are political because they involve decisions with 
uncertain outcomes, and actors who resolve conflict through the exercise of power. 
Burns (1961), Butler (1971) and Frost and Hayes (1977) suggested that organisations are 
comprised of constantly shifting groups, coalitions and individuals seeking to impose 
their will on the strategic direction and purpose of the firm. Gray and Ariss (1985) 
following Miles and Snow (1978), Miller (1980), and Miller and Friesen (1980), contend 
that a firm's strategy is the result of a pattern of converging decisions -a gestalt- about 
its purpose. A snapshot of the strategy at any point in time will be the outcome of a 
combination of decisions influenced by the dominant coalition and the environmental 
setting in which the firm exists. 
Allison (1971) advised researchers to adopt a political perspective if they wanted to gain 
insights into strategic decision making and the broader change process. Mintzberg, 
Rasinghani and Theoret (1976) also argued that political behaviour and coalition 
gameplay were an integral part of strategy formulation. Gray and Ariss (1985) remarked 
that theories on politics in change can be traced back to writers such as Weber (1947), 
Barnard (1968), Cyert and March (1963) and Crozier (1964). They noted that theory 
portraying organisations as coalitional in nature (Cyert and March, 1963; March and 
Simon, 1958) was proposed because of dissatisfaction with the notion that organisations 
were rational entities, and that strategy was formulated with perfect knowledge by 
individuals whose sole concern was the best interest of the firm. 
Mintzberg (1985) has rejected arguments that politics emerge because of weak 
alternative systems of influence, such as authority (Klein, 1988). He argued that 
departmentalisation, which is created through authority, can foster conflict and politics as 
units jostle for influence over strategic direction and the allocation of scarce resources. 
Most organisations, he claimed, were political arenas, and to this end he identified four 
types which are described in Exhibit 1.4. Mintzberg's classification is useful because it 
does not treat organisations as a fixed single stage political entity. He recognises that 
different organisations will likely display different characteristics. Although this is 
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Exhibit 1.4 - Mintzberg's four types of political arena 
Type 
Confrontation 
Shaky alliance 
,, ' Politicised organisation 
Complete political arena 
`, -Source: 
Characteristics 
Intense, confined and brief conflict. Unstable. 
Moderate, confined, and possibly enduring 
conflict. Can be relatively stable. 
Moderate, pervasive grid possibly enduring 
conflict: )Relatively stable, so long as artificially, 
supported; 
Intense, pervasive and brief conflict. Unstable. ; 
Mintzberg, H, (1985), 'The organisation as political arena', Journal q 
Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2, p. 141. 
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hardly a revolutionary idea it does open the door to a discussion about how to plan and 
implement large scale change in each context. However, Mintzberg elects not to enter 
the discussion. He does acknowledge that an organisation may transition between types 
over time. On the other hand another conceptual gap in his thinking is his failure to 
suggest that one organisation may exhibit one or several of the four types simultaneously 
in various parts of the entity. A further interesting line of thought would have been the 
applicability of the model to describe different types of coalition in the top management 
team in terms of conflict level and stability. Despite an extensive search this researcher 
was unable to identify any empirical research describing the nature of large scale change 
proposal coalitions and given that it is generally accepted that the top management team 
is the key strategic decision making body this is a serious gap in our understanding of 
coalitions in the change context. 
One problem with Mintzberg's thinking lies in his assumption that conflict is inherently 
dysfunctional. We know from the empirical work of Pascale (1989) that conflict can 
manifest itself as `constructive tension' and improve organisational performance as 
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evidenced in his description of the competition between three internal business units 
within Honda which had to compete for scarce internal resources, whilst integrating their 
activities with each other and remaining competitive in the marketplace. A second and 
potentially more significant weakness in Mintzberg's analysis is the fact that his 
commentary is a theoretical construct and has not been informed or tested in the field. 
Nevertheless, his paper is still valuable because of the questions it prompts during a 
critique. Arguments which attempt to drive a cleavage between various types of 
organisation were discouraged by writers such as Merriam (1950, p. 9) who remarked, 
"Only confusion will be created by trying to draw too sharp and exclusive a line between 
political and other forms of organisation... On the contrary, a clearer view is gained by 
frankly recognising the fundamental similarity between them. " 
Why politics emerge in top management teams 
Why do politics emerge in top management teams? As might be expected there are 
several theoretically and empirically derived positions. The first of these contends that 
politics arise as a result of decentralising power from the key senior decision maker, 
while the second suggests the reverse, that too much decision making power centralised 
in the hands of the CEO causes political behaviour. A self-serving personality has also 
been cited as a cause, while outside the top management team conflict, non-routine 
decision making areas and radical change have all been found to generate political 
activity. It has also been argued that the emergence of politics is contingent upon the 
various stages of the organisational life-cycle. Let us now consider each of these 
positions. 
Several authors have argued that politics in top management teams arise when power is 
decentralised (Dean, Sharfman and Ford, 1987; Hage, 1980; Pfeffer, 1981), although 
they acknowledge this tends to be for behaviouralistic reasons rather than by structural 
design. It is not uncommon for the top management team to be designed to place power 
in the hands of the senior decision maker -usually the chief executive officer, chairman 
or president. However, failure to exert a strong influence over the strategic direction of 
the organisation can create a power vacuum which in turn can generate political activity 
as the other key decision makers attempt to gain control. Pfeffer (1992) cited events at 
the Wall Street financial institution EF Hutton as an example: 
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"Rittereiser (the President) was not a strong leader, and the various people 
hired had no history with each other, no common perspective and no 
shared vision for the firm. Consequently there was a lot of jockeying for 
position. " (Pfeffer, 1992, p. 323) 
He went on to quote Stevens (1989) account of the same problem: 
"It was fever for power -all the guys on Rittereiser's executive 
committee had it. They spent more time battling each other for rank and 
position and clout than in trying to turn the firm around. " (Stevens, 1989, 
p. 219) 
Dichotomously opposed to the `decentralisation equals politics' argument is the work of 
Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) who contended that politics in top management teams 
arise because too much power is centralised in the hands of the most senior decision 
maker: 
"The more powerful a CEO, the greater the tendency among remaining 
executives to consolidate power and engage in alliance and insurgency 
behaviours, while the CEO engaged in tactics for controlling and 
withholding information. " (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, p. 743) 
They also argued: 
"Where power was relatively decentralised, we found that the team 
maintained a collaborative viewpoint. In effect we found co-operative 
behaviour focusing on group, rather than individual goals... The executives 
argued, often strenuously, for their views in an open forum and avoided 
politics. " (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, p. 753) 
One of the most interesting aspects of Eisenhardt and Bourgeois's empirically derived 
commentary was their definition of politics as, "the observable, but often covert, actions 
by which executives enhance their power to influence a decision. These actions include 
behind-the-scenes coalition formation, offline lobbying and co-optation attempts, 
withholding information, and controlling agendas. " This definition is valuable because 
it was generated as a result of field research, rather than desk based theory building. It 
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presents a vivid and intense picture of the strategic decision making process in top 
management teams, and clearly demonstrates the need to understand better the role of 
coalition leaders and the behaviours and tactics they use to gain approval for the 
implementation of a large scale change proposal. 
As a result of interviewing chief executive officers Madison et al (1980) found that one 
third of them cited a senior manager's personality as the reason for political activity 
occuring in the top management team. Those who displayed a political personality 
tended to engage in political behaviour and by their actions encouraged others to do so. 
In general though the authors found that politics was practised most often by individuals 
representing individual interests rather than group interests or both. Seventy-four per 
cent of managers thought individuals represented their own interests while only sixteen 
per cent believed group interests were the objective of political activity (Madison et al, 
1980, p. 87). One example from industry of the most senior decision maker displaying 
this personality was Robert Horton, formerly of British Petroleum. Horton was both 
CEO and chairman of the company from 1990 but by June 1992 his top management 
team had conducted a coup d'etat and replaced him because his personality and 
management style (rather than his abilities) were deemed to be too self-serving for 
someone who was tasked with leading an experienced, multi-national top management 
team (Heller, 1992). Horton's own widely reported remarks about his superior 
intelligence and right to determine the strategic direction, combined with his occupancy 
of both the senior roles -CEO and chairman- appears to support Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois's (1988) suggestion that the centralisation of power leads to political 
insurgency behaviours from the senior managers immediately below the individual 
acting in a political manner. The BP example also provides evidence to suggest a self- 
serving personality contributes to the emergence of politics in the top management team. 
Several authors have argued that a source of politics is conflict (Baldridge, 1971; March, 
1962; Mintzberg, 1985; Pfeffer, 1981). Mintzberg (1985, p. 139) suggested that politics 
arise because of conflict "between employees of the organisation, between interested 
outsiders, or between these groups" in order to influence the behaviour of the 
organisation. Gandz and Murray (1980, p. 239) on the other hand contended that 
conflict, and therefore politics, evolve around "issues and events that were not guided by 
explicit policy or precedent nor derived from an obvious techno-economic rationale. " 
This assertion was based on the findings of March (1962), and Cyert and March (1963) 
who defined all non-routine decision making as political. 
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Radical "frame-breaking" change as termed by Tushman, Newman and Romanelli 
(1986, p. 37) is inherently non-routine because of its infrequency, complexity and 
magnitude. They argued also that it is the cause of political activity since tumultuous 
change tends to produce winners and losers as the power structure is re-configured. The 
authors suggested: 
"Political coalitions opposing the upheaval may be quickly formed within 
the organisation. During converging periods a political equilibrium is 
reached. Frame-breaking upsets this equilibrium; powerful individuals 
and/or groups who see their status threatened will join in resistance. " 
(Tushman, Newman and Romanelli, 1986, p. 40) 
Radical change is only one of the options available to the key decision makers who set 
the strategic direction of the organisation. As discussed earlier Dunphy and Stace (1990) 
have proposed four degrees of organisational change: fine tuning, incremental 
adjustment, modular transformation, and corporate transformation. Commenting on the 
importance of selecting the appropriate change strategy for the situation Haveman (1990, 
p. 48) stated "... organisational change may benefit organisational performance and 
survival chances if it occurs in response to dramatic restructuring of environmental 
conditions and if it builds on established routines and competencies. " However, the 
contention that change, even radical change, should build on existing platforms and 
capabilities is not a view shared by Tushman and O'Reilly (1996, p. 24) who suggested 
that managers may be required to "... periodically destroy what has been created in order 
to reconstruct a new organisation better suited for the next wave of competition or 
technology. " Burgelman and Grove (1996) asserted that in dynamic environments 
executives must develop the capability to sense the need for change and assess whether 
current strategic initiatives are unfolding successfully without unequivocal feedback 
from the marketplace. They declared: 
"Our key premise is that in extremely dynamic industries alignment 
between a firm's strategic intent and strategic action is not likely to last. 
Inevitably, strategic actions will begin to lead or lag strategic intent. Such 
divergences between intent and action cause `strategic dissonance' in the 
organisation. " (Burgelman and Grove, 1996, p. 8-9) 
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In addition to the varying degrees of change that can be implemented, effective 
managers and political actors should be cognisant of the suggestion that political activity 
emerges through coalitions and evolves in line with organisational life-cycles (Gray and 
Ariss, 1985; Pfeffer, 1992). These commentators suggest that a contingency approach to 
political activity can be adopted to improve the likelihood of such manoeuvring being 
effective, since a strategy that produces results in the `birth and early growth' phase of 
an organisation's life may be totally ineffective in the `mature' phase. Indeed, there may 
even be a problem in ascertaining what stage an organisation is in (Pfeffer, 1992, p. 328), 
as it is the cumulative result of combining and weighting of a number of factors such as 
what cycle stage the international economy is in, the national economy, the industry, 
competitors and internal factors such as technology, human resources, finances and 
products. Nevertheless, despite these difficulties Pfeffer (1992, p. 329) noted that "it is 
important to recognise that the political dynamics, and their potential problems and 
dysfunctions, differ across the different stages and processes. " 
Gray and Ariss's discussion of politics and life-cycles was theoretically derived. The 
key criticism of their work lies in the claim that politics arise initially at the `maturity' 
phase because "powerful individuals institutionalise their ideology by establishing 
formal policies and procedures that support their self-interests", (Gray and Ariss, 1985, 
p. 716). Organisations are as likely to experience rapid and radical change in the `birth' 
and `early growth' phases as they are in the maturity phases. There will be both a need 
and opportunity for members of a top management team to shape the strategic direction 
of the organisation. The authors fail to recognise that political behaviour commences as 
soon as an individual starts to build a coalition, which for our discussion purposes may 
well be a large scale change proposal coalition. Such as view regards behaviours as 
political in a broad sense, but several writers including Buchanan and Boddy (1992), 
Egan (1994) and Pfeffer (1992) contend that the moment a person attempts to influence 
the behaviour of others by manipulating structural aspects of the organisation or by 
developing personal relationships for the purpose of winning support, they are engaging 
in political behaviour. Therefore, to suggest that politics emerge only once an 
organisation is mature is to ignore the crucial formative stages of political ideology and 
activity when top management team members create the political process and context. 
Since large scale change initiatives often unfold over extended time periods, it appears 
logical to suggest that they too will be impacted by the organisation's life-cycle. Indeed 
the notion that they might follow their own life-cycle across the proposal and 
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implementation stages of change does not appear unreasonable. Despite an extensive 
search no research on the life-cycle of large scale change proposal coalitions was found. 
This is surprising given the general acceptance that organisations follow life-cycles. 
Therefore, one of the lines of enquiry -articulated at the end of chapter three- to be 
pursued in the empirical study will investigate the possibility of life-cycles existing in 
large scale change proposal coalitions in top management teams. Such an omission 
reinforces the suggestion that the change literature does not distinguish the proposal 
stage from the implementation stage. Whether this conflation is by intent or ignorance is 
unclear. A sympathetic critique would suggest that the paucity of research in this area is 
due in part to the access difficulties to managerial elites that academic researchers suffer. 
However, Pettigrew and McNulty (1985, p. 848) have argued that despite entry problems, 
"direct access to key figures and important processes is negotiable. " 
Kanter, Stein and Jick (1992) observed that the institutionalisation of power through 
change is a cause of politics in top management teams. The authors remarked: 
"... the motivation to maintain organisations may be much greater among 
dependent actors, who need the organisation for an end other than wealth 
creation, than among owners or suppliers of capital, who value only 
economic performance. This motivation to preserve the organisation can, 
in turn, serve to entrench current leaders, as stakeholders agree to support 
management in order to keep their jobs or their customers. As a 
consequence, management might make strategic choices designed not to 
produce high performance but to limit or offset the power of still other 
stakeholders. " (Kanter, Stein and Jick, 1992, p. 49-50) 
Pettigrew (1985, p. xix) has argued also that individuals and coalitions seek to remould 
the power structure to perpetuate their influence. He observed that executive leadership 
often adjusts and interferes with strategy, structures, culture and political processes in the 
organisation to control the design of change and "to create a different pattern of 
alignment between its internal character, strategy, and structure and the emerging view of 
its operating environment. " 
In `Organisational change and the politics of success', Bateman (1980) contended that all 
organisations are political arenas and the more radical proposed changes are, the greater 
the ensuing power struggle will be as individuals and coalitions compete to gain control 
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of the new power structure. Agreeing with Bennis (1978) he suggested that change 
agents and proposers of change should give careful consideration to the political 
dimension and its implications for change. Accordingly, he presented a six stage power- 
oriented model. Stage one formulating political goals, involves gathering the support of 
key figures and developing a broad political base. The second stage is to conduct a 
power audit and ascertain the sources of power which can be used to influence the 
political process. Stage three is concerned with the identification of supportive 
influential targets, who are invited to sit on the steering committee. Such individuals are 
intended to convince others who are wavering, uncommitted or currently in opposition. 
The fourth step is to establish a commitment plan for the influential targets, 
demonstrating the benefits of joining the steering committee or visibly lending support in 
some other way. Incentives are offered -promotions, pay rises and other perquisites. 
Stage five involves the use of power tactics. The steering committee is given legitimate 
authority and the influential supporters' power is harnessed and directed at building up a 
critical mass of support for the change. Once this has been achieved the last step is to 
monitor results, evaluating and refining the strategy so that subsequent change initiatives 
can be implemented more effectively. Although Bateman's work provides a processual 
insight into how political change strategy can be effective, it fails to offer the researcher 
or practitioner detailed descriptions of the behaviours required to successfully implement 
his model. 
Another model offered by MacMillan and Jones (1986) refers to the formulation of 
organisational political strategy formulation but it is interesting to apply the process to 
political strategy formulation at the coalition or individual level. There are four stages: 
establishing independent capability, alliance selection, alliance negotiations, and 
offensive and defensive strategies. 
The first step of establishing independent capability assesses the individual's strengths 
and weaknesses in relation to those on whom they depend. This is done on the basis of 
what can be achieved without allies and what can be achieved with them. Any shortfall 
between the influence possessed and the influence required provides the input for the 
next two stages. Using the 'satisficing' principle a holistic approach that produces the 
optimum strategy at the expense of individual areas is formulated. Incompatible allies 
must be assessed for short and long term contributions to the alliance or coalition, and 
the authors contend it is preferable to sacrifice performance and opportunity in a non- 
crucial area rather than sub-optimise the overall effort. MacMillan and Jones also warn 
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that alliances are dynamic and therefore subject to change, so decisions may need to be 
reversed. The third step in the formulation of a political strategy is to negotiate the 
alliances that will complement the strengths and counteract the weaknesses identified in 
stage one. The authors offer eight points of advice. 
Firstly, the major negotiation issues that will arise should be predicted and the stance to 
be taken on each determined. Secondly, the critical issues, key bluffs, threats and 
promises that both the individual and the target are likely to use must be identified. 
Thirdly, an agenda that maximises the benefits to be derived from having different 
priorities should be drawn up, and fourthly, information about the target's previous 
tactics, their objectives and their alternatives should be collected and analysed. The fifth 
stage is to identify the critical stages of the negotiating process so the strategy can be re- 
directed if necessary in light of unexpected developments. The sixth step is to collate all 
the points so far into a theme that supports the manager's position and provides a 
credible premise or smoke-screen for wanting the coalition. The seventh 
recommendation is to establish a series of measures by which the manager can assess his 
progress at various stages in the negotiations. These will be in the form of a list of 
points gained and points conceded, with the manager having hopefully derived a level of 
benefits that warrant undertaking the negotiations in the first place. The eighth and final 
point is to establish a set of implementation issues so that the outcomes of the coalition 
negotiations can be implemented at a suitable opportunity. 
Once the eight point checklist has been completed the manager then enters the coalition 
negotiations, the results of which are carried forward to the fourth and final stage: the 
formulation of a set of offensive and defensive strategies which harness the strengths of 
the new coalition and direct them towards the accomplishment of the political objectives. 
It is possible that as a result of the negotiations new information will be gained which 
allows the alliance former to modify the original strategy. A sophisticated and flexible 
strategy should "look four ways", anticipating both the potentially positive and negative 
developments. Typically this would involve: 
"... an offensive strategy (1) to exploit the opposition's weaknesses and (2) 
to erode the opposition's strengths. It simultaneously develops a defensive 
strategy for countering the opposition's attempts (1) to exploit the 
alliance's weaknesses and (2) to erode the alliance's strengths. " 
(MacMillan and Jones, 1986, p. 108) 
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In formulating the offensive and defensive strategies, the manager should bear in mind 
the following factors. Action is best taken when the resources of the coalition exceed the 
opponent's by a large margin because they can be used to `out-gun' the other alliances 
into submission or compliance. Secondly, the key decision makers in the opposition 
should be identified so the coalition can calculate the effect of the opponent's strategy on 
them. Reciprocal action must be expected so the coalition has to formulate its own pre- 
emptive and reactive responses. 
In their final recommendation MacMillan and Jones agree with Bateman (1980) that 
there is a need to establish a monitoring and evaluation system which measures progress 
and identifies areas of the strategy that require updating. Political strategy formulation 
like organisational change and power is dynamic in nature and managers who plan with 
this in mind are more likely to be successful in the long term than those who do not. 
Both of these models seek to provide researchers and practitioners with a politically 
informed approach to planning change. Bateman's recommendations are grounded in 
field research but his model can be thought of as a `should be' strategy as opposed to one 
he observed being employed in the organisations he studied. Clearly, if he was reporting 
a process that was being used by practitioners his propositions would be significantly 
strengthened. His work is one of the earliest to suggest the need to proactively plan the 
use of political behaviours and tactics for the purpose of winning the support and 
commitment of key decision makers. However, it is disappointing that he did not 
deepen his analysis to describe specific behaviours and tactics for winning support. It 
would have been interesting to understand whether they varied according to hierarchical 
distance between the influencer and target, or whether they evolved during the life-span 
of the coalition. The fact that there is no empirically generated research which addresses 
these questions is of serious concern and needs to be tackled if we are to gain a deeper 
understanding of the political behaviours and tactics of top management team members 
in the change context. 
The main criticism of MacMillan and Jones's advice on alliance -coalition- formation 
is that it is processually mechanistic and fails to recognise the interactive and untidy 
nature of winning support. As new issues emerge the alliance negotiator will need to 
revisit and revise an earlier stage of the process. Over time this will produce a more 
robust strategy because it develops in line with new information and pressures. In the 
context of coalition building it means that each new member adds another layer of 
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complexity for the builder to factor into their attempts to create an aligned, cohesive and 
stable team. 
The changing role of the top management team 
An increasingly influential section of the literature has written about the role of top 
management teams in relation to large scale change (Beer, Eisenstat and Spector, 1990; 
Bennis, 1997; Burns, 1978; Gibson, 1997; Kakabadse, 1991; Kanter, 1983; Kotter, 1996; 
Kouzes and Posner, 1995; Pascale, 1989; Pettigrew, 1985; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; 
Tushman and Romanelli, 1983,1985; Tushman, Newman and Romanelli, 1986). 
Commentators have investigated top management teams from the perspective of strategic 
choice (Andrews, 1971; Child, 1972), while a number of others have focused on the 
`upper echelon', proposing that large scale change is not the exclusive task of the chief 
executive officer (Drucker, 1974; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Gupta, 1988; Wiersema 
and Bantel, 1992). It is the second of these that is of particular interest given the 
arguments presented in this chapter so far. The theme that unites these writers is the 
belief that one of the primary roles of the top management team is to develop options, 
instigate and implement large scale change. 
In reviewing the leadership literature it quickly becomes clear there are diverse 
perspectives. Terry (1986) claims to have found more than one hundred academic 
definitions of leadership. Bass, (1981) and Yukl (1981) both take the view that new 
definitions, conceptualisations and perspectives have emerged without necessarily 
refuting the existing ones. Therefore, the leadership literature base has developed largely 
in an additive rather than substitutive manner. However, what is clear is that much of the 
literature concerning leadership in the context of change has been influenced strongly by 
the OD school, so considerable emphasis is placed on participative decision making and 
power sharing between the management elite and the lower levels of the organisation 
(Leavitt, 1965; Locke and Schweiger, 1979; Sashkin, 1976; Schultz, 1951; Sorcher, 
1971; Strauss, 1962; Strauss and Rosenstein, 1970; Tannenbaum, 1974). We have 
already laid out the key criticisms of the OD school in relation to change management, 
but there is an argument in favour of participation amongst members of the top 
management team in the form of coalitions. Let us consider then, the changing role of 
the top management team. 
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Warren Bennis (1997, p. 150) has argued that one of the key challenges facing leaders in 
the twenty-first century, will be the need to ensure "they are constantly reinventing the 
organisation. " He suggested, "Tomorrow's leaders will have to learn how to create an 
environment that actually embraces change, not as a threat but as an opportunity", 
(p. 152). Arguing that American organisations were losing their dominant grip on world 
markets to aggressive Asian and European competitors, Richard Pascale (1989) called for 
a new management mindset, one in which business improvements were thought of in 
transformational terms. He argued: 
"The ultimate, and largely ignored task of management is one of creating 
and breaking paradigms... When the competitive environment pushes an 
organisation to its limits, the old mind-set no longer holds... A 
discontinuous improvement in capability is needed, and it entails 
transformation. The trouble is that 99% of managerial attention today is 
devoted to the techniques that squeeze more out of the existing paradigm 
and it's killing us. " (Pascale, 1989, p. 14) 
Pascale's arguments were formulated as a result of his work with top management teams 
at organisations such as General Electric, Citicorp, Ford, Hewlett Packard, General 
Motors and Honda. He urges management to strive for radical innovation and describes 
through his case studies, examples of successful change. However, he does not provide 
any insights into how top management teams arrive at a decision to pursue significant 
change. This is important to understand because radical change is likely to be 
contentious since it often requires a re-configuration of the structure, which in turn will 
mean changes in the degrees of influence and power enjoyed by the management elite. It 
is unlikely that any one individual has sufficient ability or power to design and drive 
through complex, large scale change. Therefore, we arrive at the idea that it must be key 
sections of the top management team which form a coalition which has sufficient 
cohesion to design and unite around a proposal. As has been mentioned at several points 
in this chapter, there is little empirically generated research to describe how coalitions 
form, their characteristics and nature once they have been formed, and the behaviours 
and tactics used by coalition builders to win support and overcome resistance from those 
who oppose the planned change. 
In a series of theoretical papers, Tushman and Romanelli (1983,1985) contended that 
organisations develop through a combination of incremental growth and discontinuous 
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strategic reorientation, characterised by radical shifts in strategy, structure and power. In 
periods of incrementalism -convergence- the executive leadership tended to take a 
back seat, engaging in symbolic activities as lower level management executed strategy. 
However, in times of radical change, executive leadership played a substantive and 
symbolic role. Tushman and Romanelli (1985, p. 214) argued, "only executive leadership 
is able to initiate and implement strategic reorientations. " This reinforces the concerns 
over the scarcity of literature. If commentators agree on the importance and relevance of 
understanding large scale change, it can be legitimately asked why more studies of 
guiding coalitions have not been conducted. In another paper Tushman, Newman and 
Romanelli (1986) suggested: 
"During convergent periods, the executive team focuses on maintaining 
congruence and fit within the organisation. Because strategy, structure, 
processes, and systems are fundamentally sound, the myriad of 
incremental substantive decisions can be delegated to middle-level 
management, where direct expertise and information resides. The key role 
for executive leadership during convergent periods is to re-emphasise 
strategy, mission, and core values and to keep a vigilant eye on external 
opportunities and/or threats. 
Frame-breaking change, however, requires direct executive 
involvement in all aspects of the change. Given the enormity of the 
change and inherent internal forces for stability, executive leadership must 
be involved in the specification of strategy, structure, people, and 
organisational processes and in the development of implementation plans. 
During frame-breaking change, executive leadership is directly involved in 
reorienting their organisations. Direct personal involvement of senior 
management seems to be critical to implement these system-wide 
changes. " (Tushman, Newman and Romanelli, 1986, p. 40) 
Building on these arguments Tushman, Newman and Romanelli (1986, p. 41) asserted 
that the executive leadership must be involved in shaping the political dynamics as well 
as "providing the energy, vision, and resources to support, and be role models for, the 
new order. " Kouzes and Posner (1995, p. 51) contended that "leadership is inextricably 
connected with the process of innovation, of bringing new ideas, methods, or solutions 
into use. " However, Brake (1997) suggested it is the CEO who is ultimately responsible 
for "galvanising" the top management team into developing options for change. This is 
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interesting because although it may be the CEO who needs to countenance the public role 
of coalitions in the top management team, the act of `galvinising' is more likely to come 
from someone below the CEO who has the energy and desire to pursue the development 
of the change proposal. This argument finds support from both Morgan (1986) and 
Hamel (1996) who suggested that most instigators of large scale change are someone 
other than the CEO. Brake does not offer supporting evidence to substantiate his claim 
that it is in fact the CEO, nor does he explain how the `galvinising' takes place in terms 
of process, behaviours or tactics. Kanter (1983, p. 125) chose not to identify who should 
drive the initiative forward electing instead to suggest that, "change requires 
leadership... a `prime mover' to push for implementation of strategic decisions. " 
Gandz and Murray (1980) investigated how coalitions emerge. They found that what is 
required is for someone to step into the leadership role who has sufficient verve and 
ambition to harness the shared views of a collection of individuals and energise them into 
a coalition. Morgan (1986) advanced the view that it need not be one of the most senior 
members who forms the coalition. He proposed, "Sometimes coalitions are initiated by 
less powerful actors who seek the support of others, " (p. 155). Although we know from 
writers such as Kipnis et al (1984) that individuals use different influencing strategies 
depending on whether their target is more senior or junior than themselves, the literature 
offers very little empirically gathered data on whether or not coalition builders from 
different hierarchical levels use different approaches when enlisting support. 
In an influential paper on the changing nature of the top management team Bartlett and 
Ghoshal (1995, p. 133) contended that "the most basic task of corporate leaders is to 
unleash the human spirit, which makes initiative, creativity, and entrepreneurship 
possible. " James MacGregor Burns (1978, p. 461) went even further when he claimed, 
"The ultimate test of practical leadership is the realisation of intended, real change that 
meets people's enduring needs. " However, balancing a galvanising force, team cohesion 
and management performance is not without problems. Nadler and Tushman (1990) 
commented: 
"For a senior team to benefit from its involvement in leading change, it 
must become an effective system for learning about the business, the 
nature of change, and the task of managing change. The challenge is to 
both bond the team together, while avoiding insularity. One of the costs of 
such team structures is that they become isolated from the rest of the 
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organisation, they develop patterns of dysfunctional conformity, avoid 
conflict, and over time develop patterns of learned incompetence. " (Nadler 
and Tushman, 1990, p. 90) 
Eisenhardt et al (1997) also emphasised the difficulties in maintaining alignment and 
solidarity in the top management team. They suggested that turbulence in the team is 
inevitable given the propensity of the organisational environment, both internal and 
external, to change rapidly and demand a shift in strategic direction. Additionally, the 
often strong characters of top management team members and the likelihood they hold a 
diverse range of opinions on the issue of which direction to move the organisation and 
how to move it, are not necessarily conducive to cohesion. The authors asserted: 
"Top management teams typically face situations with high ambiguity, 
high stakes, and extreme uncertainty. Discord, contention, debate, 
disagreement -in short, conflict- are natural in such situations. Why? 
Reasonable people are likely to perceive an ambiguous and uncertain 
world in different ways, to make differing assessments about what might 
happen in the future, and so prefer different alternatives. In addition, 
given the high stakes facing senior executives, they are likely to be 
particularly passionate and vocal about their beliefs. The likelihood of 
conflict is further exacerbated by the fact that senior executives usually 
lead their own large and important sectors of the corporation. So they 
receive information and pressure from their own unique constituencies 
within the firm and form objectives that reflect their differing 
responsibilities. Thus, to the extent that uncertainty and ambiguity cloud 
the future, tough competition with other firms raises the stakes, and 
executives act as forceful advocates for `truth' as they see it, there is apt to 
be active, engaged conflict within top management teams. " (Eisenhardt et 
al, 1997, p. 43) 
Yet these factors, they contend, must not be used to legitimise a failure to align the top 
management team since, "Their ability to engage in effective teamwork can determine 
the success of the firm, " (Eisenhardt et al, 1997, p. 42). Liedtka and Rosenblum (1996) 
adopt a similar stance as they argued there must be: 
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"... a capacity for strategic conversation, or dialogue, at the organisational 
level that draws together these individual conversations and that shapes 
and is shaped by them into a coherent institutional intent. " (Liedtka and 
Rosenblum, 1996, p. 141) 
Whilst the literature has accepted that there are different types of political organisation 
(for example, Mintzberg, 1985), and that these are both the cause and effect of political 
behaviour, it appears to treat coalitions in the context of change as though there is only 
one type. This seems unlikely given the diversity of organisational settings, management 
cultures, magnitude, complexity and urgency of change initiatives. Even so, there is an 
absence of research which describes different types, and because of this no discussion of 
type-specific behaviours and tactics used by coalition leaders beyond the generic. This is 
a surprising finding because of the large volume of writing on the topics of change 
management, top management teams and micro-behavioural analysis. It would be a 
valuable contribution to the literature if this gap were to be addressed. Therefore, it will 
be one of the lines of enquiry -presented at the end of chapter three- in the empirical 
study which underpins this thesis. 
The common theme that is emerging throughout this discussion is the contention that 
large scale change and design is too complex for one individual to take on. Clearly, 
teamwork is a critical success factor. However, it is unlikely to be the entire top 
management team because far reaching change often creates winners and losers amongst 
the current executives and to resort to cliche for just a moment, turkeys don't vote for 
Christmas. Therefore, it follows that it is sections of the top management team in the 
form of coalitions which will take on the task. This has interesting implications for 
academic enquiry because it means a shift in the research agenda away from taking the 
individual as the unit of analysis to the individual in their role fulfilment as part of a top 
management team coalition in the context of large scale change, or indeed, the coalition 
as a group. Although both approaches accept the individual as an interactive unit, the 
latter stresses the heavy influence of context on behaviour. This is a subtle but distinct 
move, and one that if followed will provide deep insights into political process, 
behaviour and tactics. This brings with it problems of gaining access to an increased 
number of top management team members in an organisation. Consequently, researchers 
will need to be resourceful and opportunistic to achieve wider access, and creative to 
construct an innovative yet rigorous methodologies. A few signs of this shift have been 
detected in the literature. 
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Writing of the decision to focus his research efforts on top management team 
development, Kakabadse (1991, p. 9) described his dissatisfaction with the existing 
leadership literature base. He noted how the increasingly turbulent business environment 
characterised by a growth in national and cross-border mergers and acquisitions, the 
globalisation and convergence of industries, the emergence of continental trading blocks, 
advances in technology, and ever more demanding customers, was placing an 
unmanageable strategic burden on the chief executive officer. In light of this, he 
remarked, "The more I dealt with top management, the more I recognised that the top 
team, not the successful business leader, should be the focus of analysis. " Kakabadse 
went on to contend it is the top team that confronts the key business issues which drive 
organisational change: "Close observation indicates that the team running a business is 
the key unit by which meaningful business issues, such as sales and marketing, levels of 
costs required to induce the desired revenue streams, vision, organisation structure, team 
styles, people management styles, and how top managers should behave, are discussed 
and addressed", (p. 10). Agreeing with Kakabadse, Acona and Nadler (1989, p. 20) 
suggested that top management team based approaches to large scale change have 
replaced the `lone hero' CEO approach because of "external demands, organisational 
complexity and succession. " 
In a similar vein Beer, Eisenstat and Spector (1990) argued that the first responsibility of 
senior management is to orchestrate company-wide change. Kotter (1996) also adds 
weight to the view that the role of the top management team, and not just the chief 
executive officer, is to generate options, instigate and lead the implementation of large 
scale change. He asserted: 
"Major transformations are often associated with one highly visible 
individual... After a while, one might easily conclude that the kind of 
leadership that is so critical to any change can come only from a single 
larger-than-life person. This is a very dangerous belief. Because major 
change is so difficult to accomplish, a powerful force is required to sustain 
the process. No one individual, even a monarch-like CEO, is ever able to 
develop the right vision, communicate it to large numbers of people, 
eliminate all the key obstacles, generate short-term wins, lead and manage 
dozens of change projects, and anchor new approaches deep in the 
organisation's culture. Weak committees are even worse. A strong 
guiding coalition is always needed -one with the right composition, level 
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of trust, and shared objective. Building a team is always an essential part 
of the early stages of any effort to restructure, reengineer, or retool a set of 
strategies. " (Kotter, 1996, p. 51-52) 
Jackall (1988, p. 75) related the observation based on his own empirical studies that much 
of the management literature perpetuates the myth that decision making prowess in 
individuals is accorded to either "the consensus guy" or the "take charge guy". A more 
accurate description, he argued would be one that acknowledged "the essential political 
and personal problems that managers face in making decisions. " Non-routinized 
decisions such as large scale change require negotiations, recruitment and alignment of a 
number of the most influential members of the top management team. Reinforcing the 
arguments made earlier regarding the emergence of coalitions due to the creation of 
winners and losers in the top management team, Kotter remarked: 
"In successful transformations, the president, division manager, or 
department head plus another five, fifteen, or fifty people with a 
commitment to improved performance pull together as a team. This group 
rarely includes all of the most senior people because some of them just 
won't buy in, at least at first. But in the most successful cases, the 
coalition is always powerful -in terms of formal titles, information and 
expertise, reputations and relationships, and the capacity for leadership. 
Individuals alone, no matter how competent or charismatic, never have all 
the assets needed to overcome tradition and inertia except in very small 
organisations. " (Kotter, 1996, p. 6) 
His argument provides strong support for empirical research into large scale change 
proposal coalitions in top management teams, particularly as his own comments are 
based on casual observation or ancillary findings from his previous research into 
leadership and change. There is no extant literature on large scale change proposal 
coalitions in top management teams which is surprising given that coalitions in top 
management teams appear so important to the proposing and implementing of large scale 
change. It is imperative there is academic investigation into the nature and 
characteristics of large scale change proposal coalitions and the behaviours and tactics of 
coalition leaders. This thesis will undertake that task. 
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If any further justification for empirical enquiry is required it can be noted that Pettigrew 
(1992) has argued that the study of managerial elites is one of the most under-researched 
and neglected areas of social science investigation. Much of the literature on the change 
agent in organisations conflates the political behaviours and tactics used to a generically 
descriptive and prescriptive level. Even notable exceptions such as Dunphy and Stace 
(1990) and Buchanan and Boddy (1992) considered the issue from a macro-behavioural 
perspective only, commenting on the types of behaviour most appropriate to the degree 
of alignment between the organisation and its environment (Dunphy and Stace, 1990), or 
alternatively the centrality of change to the primary task of the organisation (Buchanan 
and Boddy, 1992). There is a paucity of research into the micro-behaviours of change 
agents, and there is none on individuals who lead large scale change proposal coalitions. 
The empirical research reported in this thesis addresses this gap. 
Conclusion 
In this first chapter we have considered a wide range of contemporary change 
management literature and several key points of contention. The point of departure was 
the argument that the traditional rational-linear approach to change is not the most 
suitable option for organisations faced with complex large scale change in environments 
which are subject to significant and rapid change. It was contended that organisations 
are political arenas comprised of competing coalitions and top management team 
members with different views on which direction the organisation should move. 
Drawing from an increasingly large and influential section of the literature it was 
suggested that a more resilient and pragmatic model is the power-oriented political 
approach to change. Arguments were made also to support the claim that because of the 
complexity, magnitude and frequency of change, the chief executive officer alone cannot 
realistically expect to develop options for large scale change. Rather, it is the role of the 
top management team. The chapter concluded with the assertion that within the top 
management team a guiding coalition is required to develop a proposal. In putting these 
arguments forward the existing literature base was critiqued and a number of 
methodological and assumptive problems were identified. Of central concern is the 
shortage of empirically generated research, and in the area of large scale change proposal 
coalitions in top management teams, no research at all. If these gaps were to be 
addressed the findings would provide deep insights into the nature and characteristics of 
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large scale change proposal coalitions in top management teams, and the behaviours and 
tactics of coalition leaders. 
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Chapter 2 
Intraorganisational Bower: 
nature and sources 
"Innovation and change in almost any arena require the skill to develop 
power, and the willingness to employ it to get things accomplished. " 
(Pfeffer, 1992, p. 345) 
Introduction 
In chapter one we established that top management team coalitions have a key role to 
play in the design of large scale change proposals. We set out the argument that the 
rational-linear approach to change is likely to be less effective than a power-oriented 
behaviour based approach because of the complexity and magnitude of the planned 
change. We established also that because of the scale of the task, top management team 
coalitions, rather than just one individual, have a key role to play in the design of large 
scale change proposals. Given that such change is likely to impact the structural design 
of the organisation there will be winners and losers within the top management team. 
Therefore, the coalition leader must expect to encounter resistance. To overcome 
opposition, build and sustain a coalition the coalition leader must be able to engage 
meaningfully in political activity, whether publicly or privately backstage. To do this it 
is essential to understand the nature and sources of intraorganisational power. A 
coalition leader who has a deep awareness can use this knowledge to construct a 
powerful coalition. Furthermore, they can understand and predict the actions of other 
coalitions and take steps to neutralise them or reduce their likelihood of gaining approval 
for implementation. Clearly, on the assumption that organisations are political arenas, 
the coalition leader who understands power is more likely to be effective than one who 
does not. 
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Therefore, in this chapter we will consider three alternative views on the nature and 
sources of intraorganisational power. The first of these presents power as a personal 
construct which manifests itself through personal attributes or interpersonal exchange 
(For example, Allen et al, 1979; Berle, 1969; Chein, 1970; Dornbusch and Scott, 1975; 
Finklestein, 1993, French and Raven, 1954; Guardini, 1961; Martin and Sims, 1956; 
May, 1972; McClelland, 1970; Minton, 1972; Ogletree, 1971; Pfeffer, 1992; Winter, 
1973). The second school contends that power resides in the structure of an organisation 
(For example, Astley and Sachdeva, 1984; Bacharach and Lawler, 1980; Bailey, 1977; 
Brass, 1984; Brass and Burkhardt, 1993; Ibarra, 1993; Kanter, 1983; Kotter, 1978; 
Krackhardt and Porter, 1985; Pettigrew, 1973; Weber, 1947). The third school suggests 
that power is a situational construct whereby those who can control the strategic 
contingencies acquire power (For example, Hickson et al, 1971; Hinings et al, 1974; 
Pfeffer, 1992; Saunders, 1990). 
During the discussion the existing viewpoints will be critiqued from several perspectives. 
Firstly, power does not reside in just one location or another. Such monocausal 
arguments are unhelpful and serve only to cloud the development of a clearer 
understanding of the phenomenon. Power resides in multiple locations simultaneously, 
there is no fixed amount and it ebbs and flows because of personal, structural and 
situational events. Secondly, much of the commentary on intraorganisational power has 
been theoretically derived. Alternatively, theories have been constructed from casual 
observation. Whilst both of these approaches make valuable contributions to our 
understanding, there is a shortage of empirically generated research, particularly with 
respect to power in the context of large scale change proposal coalitions in top 
management teams. Thirdly, there are a number of contentious assumptions 
underpinning several influential writings. These will be identified and debated. It will 
be concluded that a more synthesised approach to studying intraorganisational power in 
top management teams is required if we are to gain deeper, more informed insights into 
the large scale change proposal coalition building process and the behaviours and tactics 
of coalition leaders. 
Nature and sources of intraorganisational power 
Cavanaugh (1984) noted that in 1938 Betrand Russell predicted power would become a 
central issue in the social sciences, and that five decades on a unified conceptualisation 
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of power had still not been produced. Commenting on the difficulties organisational 
scholars have had in establishing a universally acceptable and useful definition of power 
Bierstedt (1950), commented: 
"We may say about it in general only what St. Augustine said about time, 
that we all know perfectly well what it is -until someone asks us. " 
(Bierstedt, 1950, p. 730) 
Since this observation a considerable number of writers have generated a diverse 
literature in an attempt to understand and describe the phenomenon more fully. Such 
diversity has been a cause for concern to some theorists who believe the continuous 
splitting of power into discrete and often opposing viewpoints, has clouded the picture 
rather than brought it into sharper focus. Astley and Sachdeva (1984, p. 105) claimed that 
"researchers, unfortunately often have lost site of power as a `global' phenomenon. " 
Disappointingly, the authors do not suggest what the benefits of a unified theory would 
be. 
Traditionally there have been three distinct viewpoints on power in organisations. The 
first of these views power as a personal construct, originating in either the individual in 
the form of personal attributes, or alternatively through interpersonal exchange. The 
second viewpoint holds that power resides in the structure of an organisation. The third 
viewpoint takes the position that power is a situational construct. Also refered to as the 
strategic contingency approach, the key premise is that power is something that accrues 
to organisational sub-units such as individuals, coalitions or departments that are able to 
cope with the critical issues facing the organisation. 
Power as a personal construct 
The personal attributes view. Advocates of this argument believe that power is held by 
a person and used at will. Guardini (1961, p. 3) has described power as a "specifically 
human phenomenon. " Similarly, Berle (1969, p. 60) stated, "Power is an attribute of 
man. It does not exist without a holder. " Chein (1970) has suggested that it is an innate 
driver of an individual's personality. The view that people have an inherent need to 
acquire and use power has two explanations. The first suggests that individuals want to 
be powerful and influence the behaviour of others (May, 1972; Ogletree, 1971). The 
50 
second purports that individuals seek power to protect themselves from powerful others. 
In effect it is a balancing item to counteract the behaviour shaping actions of others 
(Minton, 1972; Winter, 1973). In the change context this means that top management 
team members build or join large scale change coalitions either to increase their own 
influence over others and the strategic direction of the organisation, or to resist the 
initiatives of others who wish to exert influence in the same manner. 
The power motive was investigated by McClelland (1970) who described two faces of 
power need: personalised power needs and socialised power needs. The first of these, 
personalised power, was characterised by the individual's pursuance of self-interest in 
the form of `I win, you lose' situations. Socialised power needs reflected a concern for 
group and organisational objectives. McClelland concluded that individuals who had 
successful careers in organisations were those who aligned their own self- interests with 
those of the organisation. That is to say that proposers of large scale change who stand to 
benefit tend to do so because the change produces positive outcomes for the organisation. 
Another investigation into the power motive was conducted by Winter (1973). He 
contended it was "a disposition to strive for certain kinds of goals, or to be affected by 
certain kinds of incentives". His research findings suggested that individuals 
distinguished themselves by displaying either a "hope of power", or avoidance because 
of a "fear of power". Minton (1972) differentiated between intrinsic and extrinsic power 
motives. Intrinsic motives were self-initiated power seeking activities where the desired 
outcome was self-determination. Extrinsic motives were those where power accrued as a 
result of efforts initiated by others. 
Whilst each of these investigations throw light on the drivers of behaviour in the 
workplace they are not sufficiently sophisticated to provide more than a partial 
explanation for the behaviour of large scale change proposal coalition leaders. Since 
these three writers put forward their propositions twenty-five to thirty years ago, large 
scale change has become more frequent and complex. Designing a proposal and winning 
sufficient support from the rest of the top management team is too demanding a task for 
one individual. This is why temporary coalitions are built. In this context, discussion 
about individuals in isolation is no longer the most appropriate since they rarely have 
sufficient energy or capability to create the momentum required to carry change through 
to implementation. It would be more informative if research into the power motive were 
conducted into individuals fulfilling a role, such as coalition leader, in the broader 
context of the coalition since they are now forced -by complexity, magnitude and 
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frequency- to temporarily align their motives, activities and behaviours with top 
management team colleagues. Arguments such as `I win, you lose' undoubtedly still 
apply, but there is a need to research them at the sub-unit coalition level. 
Power is also interesting from the perspective of who is able to instigate large scale 
change. Experience, seniority, education, training and professional activity are attributes 
which act as important sources of power (Finklestein, 1993; French and Raven, 1954; 
Ibarra, 1993), particularly for members of the organisation who occupy junior positions 
in the formal hierarchy and therefore find it difficult to instigate large scale change 
(Mechanic, 1962; Tushman and Romanelli, 1983). Ibarra (1993) cited the work of 
Kimberly and Evanisko (1981) who argued that tenure was an effective substitute for 
hierarchical position and legitimate authority when used to navigate the political waters 
of an organisation to achieve desired outcomes. However, this assumption is too general 
and needs further clarification. This researcher's own casual observations made through 
working for KPMG in a broad range of large organisations with management at all levels 
for the purpose of designing and implementing large scale change indicates that the 
organisational setting is of crucial importance. For example, one of the UK's largest 
financial institutions exhibits a culture which can be described as bureaucratic. Tenure is 
indeed an effective substitute for hierarchical position, not so much to instigate large 
scale change, but to thwart it. There exists a network of long serving individuals, many 
of whom have been with the organisation for longer than twenty years, which operates 
behind the scenes to resist change. On the other hand at one of the world's largest high- 
tech companies tenure is of little or no importance. Large scale change is instigated by 
those with sufficient energy and capability. Tenure appears to be of little use to constrain 
or stop large scale change, due in part to the fact that the critical issues facing the 
organisation appear to change at least once a year: revenue growth, profit growth, cost 
containment, technology development, skills shortage and globalisation are the issues 
which have faced the industry leader refered to above in the last five years alone. 
Personal traits and their linkage to effective political actors occupying the position of 
CEO was the purpose of Allen et al's (1979) empirical investigation. The findings are 
conveyed in Exhibit 2.1. However, the results are of limited value only. Several 
assumptive and methodological criticisms can be levelled at this widely cited research. 
The assumptive concerns are around the identification of cause and effect, and context as 
influence on behaviour. Personal characteristics such as sensitivity or being articulate 
52 
may be the effect of occupying a powerful position or having access to power rather than 
the cause, and undesirable features such as aggressiveness can be suppressed once a 
position of influence had been achieved. It is also the case that certain characteristics 
may be required only in specific situations. Aggressiveness may surface or be necessary 
in periods of economic recession when revenues are threatened, and organisational 
performance has to improve rapidly, but it may be inappropriate during times of high 
profitability when a popular manner might be more conducive to high performance. The 
work of Dunphy and Stace (1990) discussed in the last chapter looked at change 
management style. The authors found that when the organisation was out of fit with its 
environment and corporate transformation was required, a dictatorial transformation 
style had the greatest likelihood of achieving the change required. 
Exhibit 2.1 - Allen et al's responses from effective 
political actors in the position of chief executive officer 
Characteristics of chief executive officers 
60 -a 
m > 
.y 
C 
N 
C', 
ýv 50 
+2 0 m 
at 
>+0+ 40 
Q 
2D ö 
3vý ý' m LO c U) V ýM 30 0rä 
AI xX :5 :E0 
Cf 
20 
ä=p0ö. öý«> 
.G 111-1.6 CO Eu 
v'v QÜ U) ü 
dCwä>2ö. `6 
w. 10 
0 FM 
0 
123456789 10 11 12 
Ranking 
Source: Allen, R W, etal, (1979). 'Organisational Politics: Tactics and Characteristics of its Actors', California Management Review, Fall, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 77-83. 
The methodological concerns lie in the integrity of the data sample since the chief 
executive officers were asked to comment on themselves. Being devious and aggressive 
may be seen by some as unattractive characteristics and consequently avoided in their 
responses, even if they believed them to be valid. It is also hardly surprising that 
characteristics such as sensitivity, being articulate and highly intelligent scored highly. 
The findings would have been more credible and insightful if they were the responses of 
those with a reporting relationship into the CEO. Allen et al also fail to suggest that 
personal characteristics are only one contributing factor to being an effective political 
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actor and for this they can be accused of falling into the `fundamental attribution error' 
trap. Given these criticisms and the wide citation of this work in the political behaviour 
literature, it is clear that researchers are very keen to gain insights into the personalities, 
behaviours and tactics of those in positions to shape the strategic direction of the 
organisation. 
Based on his casual observation Pfeffer (1992, p. 166) identified six personal attributes 
which he claimed were observable in individuals who were effective at acquiring and 
holding power in organisations: 
  Energy, endurance, and physical stamina, 
  The ability to focus one's energy and to avoid wasted effort, 
  Sensitivity, which makes it possible to read and understand others, 
  Flexibility, particularly with respect to selecting various means in order to achieve 
one's goals, 
  The willingness to engage, when necessary, in conflict and confrontation, or, in other 
words, a certain degree of personal toughness, and 
  The ability to submerge one's ego, at least temporarily, and play the good subordinate 
or team player to enlist the help and support of others. 
It would be of academic interest if the personal characteristics and behaviours and tactics 
of large scale change proposal coalition leaders were empirically investigated. It would 
be valuable to understand whether there were any differences between successful and 
unsuccessful -as measured by proposal approval for implementation- leaders, whether 
certain personalities, behaviours and tactics were suited to coalitions with particular 
characteristics such as size, complexity, stability and group constitution in terms of 
seniority or international background of members. Another interesting line of enquiry 
would be to investigate whether coalition leaders from different hierarchical levels 
exhibit different personalities and used different behaviours and tactics. The problem is 
attempting to distinguish between cause and effect. A more junior member of the top 
management team may exhibit a `humble' personality and employ less directive and 
coercive behaviours and tactics when working with more senior colleagues. However, 
the same individual may demonstrate a less `humble' personality and employ directive 
and coercive behaviours and tactics should they become CEO. Such action indicates the 
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importance of structure as a determinant on behaviour. One way to partially offset these 
problems is to conduct a longitudinal study over an extended time period to record and 
analyse changes in an individual who is repeatedly a coalition leader. It is accepted that 
attempting to control for the multitude of variables such as changing environmental 
pressures, new top management team members who join the coalitions, the evolving 
personalities and behaviours of coalition members, the different complexities of the 
proposal being developed by the coalition, to name but a few would be a challenging 
task. Nevertheless, until academic investigations pursue a longitudinal strategy 
-whatever the drawbacks- we must satisfy ourselves with snapshots of coalition life. 
The interpersonal view. The contention that power is a function of social relationships 
is an enlargement of the argument that power is an attribute of the individual. Writers 
who adopt the position that power is an interpersonal construct assert that for an 
individual to have power there must be someone over whom it can be exercised. Martin 
and Sims (1956, p. 25) suggested that "men can only exercise that power which they are 
allowed to by other men... " Several years earlier Laswell (1948) had been even more 
declarative when he stated: 
"Power is an interpersonal situation; those who hold power are empowered. 
They depend upon and continue only so long as there is a continuing stream 
of empowering responses. Even a casual inspection of human relations will 
convince any competent observer that power is not a brick that can be lugged 
from place to place, but a process that vanishes when the supporting responses 
cease. " (Laswell, 1948, p. 10) 
This contention appears to be applicable to large scale change proposal coalition leaders 
who having achieved the purpose of the coalition find their support base waning. 
However, `supporting responses' can be maintained if the coalition leader is able to 
identify another issue to address that is sufficiently compelling for coalition members to 
continue their support. Furthermore, if a coalition leader can help to generate significant 
personal benefits for individuals they are likely to develop an embedded support base 
which can be mobilised if the need emerges. 
The main contribution of those who suggest that power is an interpersonal construct is 
that it is built around the notion that the power of one party is contingent upon the party 
with whom they are interacting. Due to the fact that members of organisations live in a 
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web of continuously evolving relationships, power is subject to an incessant ebbing and 
flowing as the dynamics change. Power is relationship specific. For example, a coalition 
leader who enjoys considerable power over a more junior member of the top 
management team may find that power totally extinguished in their interactions with a 
more senior member than themselves. Dornbusch and Scott (1975) argued, "it is always 
a simplification to speak only of A's power, and to do so is to court danger. " Supporters 
of this view can be sub-divided into those who believe it is important to distinguish 
between `ability' and `use'. A demarcation refered to by Mintzberg (1983, p. 25) as "will 
and skill". Some authors contend that power exists only when it is used. For example, 
Thompson and Luthans (1983, p. 75) maintained that "power is manifested through 
behavioural actions", while Dahl (1957) claimed that unrealised potential is not power. 
Bacharach and Lawler (1980) were clear that the potential use of power and the actual 
use of power are two separate dimensions. On the other hand, McCall (1979) and 
Mintzberg (1983) argued that to distinguish potential from actual was unhelpful, and 
Emerson (1972, p. 67) remarked that "to have a power advantage is to use it. " Others 
view power as the ability of one person to overcome resistance to achieve a desired result 
(House, 1988; Pfeffer, 1981,1992), or quite simply, the ability to get things done 
(Crozier, 1964; Deutsch, 1963; Goldner, 1970; Hall and Bates, 1970; Kanter, 1977; 
Kaplan, 1964; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977; Strauss, 1962; Tushman, 1977; Winter, 1973). 
The A-B model as this is often called, refers to the ability of A to get B to do something, 
with `do' encompassing the broader notions of think, feel and act. Taking this as his 
point of departure Lukes (1974) identified several points of contention. First, does A 
consciously have to attempt to get B to do something before A can be said to have 
exerted power? French and Raven (1954) and Winter (1973) argued against, while Bates 
(1970) contended that A must have been aware. Wrong (1979) asserted that A must not 
only have wanted to get B to do something, but that A's actions were successful. 
The issue of resistance from B to A has also been studied (Gross, 1968; Martin, 1971; 
Michener and Suchner, 1972; Thibaut and Kelly, 1959). These authors argued that to 
consider the power relationship only from the perspective of A would lead to a narrow 
and distorted view of the bi-lateral nature of the power relationship. They contended 
there must be reciprocity between A and B because A could not develop their power if 
they were not open to influence from B. This argument clearly portrays power as a 
dynamic phenomenon influenced by changes in A, their relationship with B, C and 
others, and the environment. 
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One of the classic studies of personal power was conducted by French and Raven (1954) 
who classified the exercise of power in organisations into five `bases': reward, coercive, 
legitimate, expert and referent. The essence of their argument was that power is a 
function of the relationship between the influencer and their target. For power to be 
effective, that is for the target to comply with the intentions of the influencer, the target 
must believe the influencer has the ability and willingness to use it. In fact the influencer 
may or may not have the ability to punish non-compliant behaviour (coercive power), 
and they may or may not have the expertise (expert power) they apparently enjoy. 
Actual possession of power, or the ability to gain access to it, only becomes important if 
they are required to demonstrate it (Bacharach and Lawler, 1980). However, once a bluff 
has been uncovered, particularly long term deception, an individual's influence may be 
severely diminished so in reality organisational influencers must usually possess or have 
access to the powers they claim. 
Reward power is based on an individual's perceived ability and willingness to convert 
incentives into rewards such as promotion, praise, pay improvements and increased 
responsibility. To generate desired behaviour they must be perceived by the target as 
being worth the additional effort. Coercive power represents the other side of the coin. 
The individual must be perceived to possess the ability and willingness to implement 
negative outcomes for the target, who in turn must believe them to be both undesirable 
and deliverable. Although examples of coercion include the threat of demotion, reduced 
opportunity and loss of compensation and benefit, they can be anything of value to the 
individual over which the coercer has influence. Legitimate power, a concept first 
presented by Weber (1947), is the base that most managers have traditionally relied on 
when attempting to gain compliance from subordinates (Shetty, 1978). Its effectiveness 
hinges on the subordinate's belief that because of their manager's position in the 
hierarchy he or she has the right to determine their work content and flow, instruct, and 
demand compliance with rules and regulations. Expert power is based on the experience 
and knowledge of an individual and their ability to influence another person's behaviour 
because of it. Once again the target must accept the relevance and legitimacy of the 
influencer's expertise for it to be effective. The fifth base, referent power, is based on 
attraction and empathetic identification with the influencer. Often described as charisma 
or personal magnetism (Pfeffer, 1992; Shetty, 1978), the individual possesses the ability 
to inspire and align other people's hopes, ideals and aspirations with those expressed by 
themselves. With this type of power employees comply voluntarily because they 
empathise with a personal trait of the influencer, or a cause they espouse. In the context 
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of large scale change this could be because an individual believes in what the proposer 
stands for -maximising shareholder value, for example- or they buy into the vision of 
what the future will look like if the change is successfully implemented. Although 
French and Raven's work is still regarded as seminal, it is more for the identification of 
power sources than the analysis and interpretation of when and where they are most 
effectively used. This has been taken on by others such as Shetty (1978) and Yukel and 
Taber (1983). However, none of these authors located their empirical studies in a top 
management team in the context of leading large scale change. The broader question of 
how large scale change proposal coalition leaders win support amongst top management 
team members, above at the same level, or below themselves remains empirically 
unaddressed. Once again it is clear that our understanding of managerial elites in the 
change context needs to be strengthened through empirical research. 
Shetty (1978) found that effective managers tended to use the power bases in 
combinations. Prudent use of reward and coercive power can strengthen legitimate 
power but excessive use will often serve only to diminish their effectiveness. For 
example, if a manager always praised a member of staff regardless of the quality of 
output, then over a period of time the motivational effect of being praised was devalued 
until its effect was negligible. On the other hand excessive criticism may cause the 
subordinate to give up or stimulate conflict. Shetty (1978, p. 180-181 and p. 185) found 
the most effective managers were those who adopted a contingency approach, matching 
the power base to the prevailing situation. These managers tended to use expert and 
referent power ahead of reward, coercive and legitimate power because they induced a 
commitment culture rather than a compliance culture which increased employee 
satisfaction and performance. This proposition was supported by findings from a study 
by Yukel and Taber (1983). Detracting from the sole usage of referent power was the 
fact that some managers manipulated subordinates for personal reasons. Shetty 
contended that although the opportunity for personal gain can never be eliminated, the 
problem can be offset by using referent power in conjunction with expert power. 
Tannenbaum et al (1974b, p. 74) proposed a sixth base to add to the five submitted by 
French and Raven. They suggested that the additional base "... implies accession to 
influence out of a sense of commitment to a larger purpose served by the organisation. " 
A notion advanced earlier by Rensis Likert (1961) and Mary Parker Follett (1942), and 
discussed above in the context of McClelland's (1970) work on the power motive and 
socialised power needs. Follett refered to the greater purpose as "the law of the 
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situation". Adopting Follet's term Tannenbaum et al studied large and small plants in 
five countries to ascertain that "the law of the situation" rated second behind legitimacy 
as the most important and influential power with expertise, referent, reward and coercion 
rating third, fourth, fifth and sixth respectively. Citing the work of Bachman et al (1968) 
they concluded that "coercion is indeed a relatively ineffective basis of power in the 
modern organisation", (Tannenbaum, 1974b, p. 75). As we have discussed already in 
chapter one there has been a general move against the position held by Tannenbaum and 
others who suggest that coercion has no role to play in large scale change. In recent 
years a number of writers have claimed that coercive and directive behaviours and tactics 
are necessary in change contexts where there is a need for urgency, or there is resistance 
which threatens the health of the organisation (Buchanan and Boddy, 1992; Egan, 1994; 
Hayes, 1984; Kanter, 1983,1992; Mintzberg, 1985; Pfeffer, 1992). 
In 1961 Amitai Etzioni reclassified French and Raven's five bases into two: position 
power and personal power. He argued that three of the bases -legitimate, reward and 
coercive powers- are a function of the structure rather than the person. These he 
refered to as position power. The other two bases -expert and referent power- which 
were classified as personal power, depend largely on the traits and attributes of the 
individual. This recasting of French and Raven's work was one of the early attempts at 
synthesising the personal and structural schools. Let us turn now to a discussion of those 
who suggest that power resides in the structure of an organisation. 
Power as a structural construct 
Writers such as Kanter (1972) and Ryan (1984) have criticised the personal power school 
for over-emphasising the scope for negotiation between individuals in decision making 
processes and paying too little attention to the influence of structure. According to Brass 
(1984, p. 518), "While personal attributes and strategies may have an important effect on 
power acquisition... structure imposes the ultimate constraints on the individual. " If we 
trace arguments such as this back through the literature we arrive at two of the most 
influential voices: Karl Marx and Max Weber. Both writers approached the concept of 
power from quite different directions, but a common theme was the portrayal of power as 
domination which embedded in organisational structures enables managerial elites to 
protect and further their interests at the expense of other groups in the organisation. 
Marx (1976) argued that domination was achieved by controlling the economic factors of 
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production: chiefly capital and labour. Those who owned capital could buy labour and 
therefore achieve dominance. Bureaucratic organisations were the mechanism by which 
the capitalist class ruled the labour masses. For Marx, workers were repressed and their 
challenge was to overcome the structural disadvantage in order to achieve direction and 
power to determine their own actions. Whilst Weber (1947) acknowledged that power 
was derived from owning and controlling the factors of production, he did not accept that 
ultimately power hinged on ownership or non-ownership. He argued that workers 
-admittedly some groups more than others- enjoyed discretion over their decision 
making and work design, and therefore, could not be considered totally disadvantaged. 
After all, if an individual enjoyed discretion, however little, the question becomes how to 
increase it. It is this notion that directly underpins upward influence and power 
acquisition, and more indirectly, influence amongst peers such as top management team 
members. As we have noted already empirical enquiries into the processes, behaviours 
and tactics used in large scale change proposal coalitions comprising top management 
team peers is one area of managerial elites which has not been studied. 
A central concern of Weberian analysis was how organisations sought to reduce the 
discretionary capabilities of workers through the use of structurally embedded rule 
systems. The main formal mechanism for this is the hierarchy since this generates a 
chain of command in which each position has a defined sphere of authority and 
accompanying set of rights and rules. This interlinkage serves to dampen discretion and 
create stability, and it these factors which give rise to bureaucratic organisations. 
Bureaucracies were most commonly associated with public sector organisations since 
these were the institutions of government. Control and order were desirable because they 
produced stability and reduced the possibility of revolution. Today the term bureaucracy 
is used disparagingly in management circles to refer to staid organisations unable to cope 
with uncertainty and turbulent environments. This problem has driven organisational 
designers -both academic and practitioner- to find ways of releasing the energies of 
workers to improve responsiveness and competitiveness. For example, participative 
management and empowerment are two of the ideas developed, at least in part, for this 
purpose. The emergence of large scale change proposal coalitions in top management 
teams is partly a response to an acknowledgement that the CEO is unable to plot the 
strategic direction of the organisation single-handed, even if structurally that power in 
the form of legitimate authority is confered on the office he or she occupies. 
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Dalton (1959) found that some managers exceeded the authority they had been granted to 
make things happen whereas others did not harness their full authority. As an 
explanation for the differences between high-achievers and low-achievers he remarked: 
"One can think of variances in exercise of authority by persons on the same 
level as arising `naturally' from differences in ability to do what is needed, 
from preoccupation with rivalries, or from disputes about goals and 
methods. These concerns may be confined to individuals. But dominant 
and responsible individuals obviously have followers. Thus there are 
unofficial group identities and actions that usually sweep along those who 
might choose to act in the isolation indicated by a chart. The existence and 
action of these groups is obvious to all responsible persons in a firm... " 
(Dalton, 1959, p. 18-19) 
With regard to the sources of power an examination of Dalton's commentary identifies 
individuals who gained influence at the Milo plant as a result of charisma and influence 
(Hardy), working relationships (Springer and Hardy), expertise (Peters and V. Ames), 
formal and informal authority (Springer and Hardy respectively), ethnic bonds (Geiger, 
Meier and Boesel) and the ability to confront the critical issue of hitting planned output 
levels on schedule and budget. Clearly such a variety of sources in one organisational 
setting lends weights to the arguments that power resides in personal, structural and 
situational components simultaneously. 
Amongst contemporary management writers Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1979,1983), like 
Weber, has proposed that power resides in the structure of an organisation. Based on the 
findings of a six firm study of 115 innovations she argued that an individual's 
hierarchical position provides access to three essential lines -supply, information and 
support- from which they derived the power to engage in political activity. `Productive 
lines' and `lines of supply' were later renamed `basic commodities' and `resources' 
respectively (Kanter, 1983, p. 216). Lines of supply consist of funds, materials, money, 
space, staff, time and prestige. They are the things a manager can bring into their own 
domain by exerting influence outside of it. Lines of information represent being `in the 
know' in both a formal and informal context and so includes data, technical knowledge, 
the grapevine, expertise. Lines of support supplement the other two sources of power 
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and provide the manager with additional influence to drive change through. 
Endorsement, backing, legitimacy and approval are examples. 
Effective -powerful- managers aim to keep `productive lines' open, while ineffective 
-powerless- managers suffer as a result of them being closed. Kanter claimed that 
first line supervisors, staff professionals and most interestingly for this thesis- chief 
executive officers, are particularly prone to exhibiting closed lines. Developing the 
argument she suggested `productive' power is also related to establishing relationships 
with other parts of the system, and that such connections stem from two sources. Firstly, 
job activities which allow discretion, recognition and are relevant to pressing 
organisational problems and secondly, political alliances which include coalitions, peer 
networks, subordinates and sponsors. Once productive power lines have been established 
the constituent elements can be used to support a wide range of political behaviours and 
tactics. 
However, her analysis can be criticised because it clearly presents a monocausal view of 
power. She is critical of the emphasis placed on personal power which she regards as 
being of secondary importance to structure. Kanter also ignores the situation as a source 
of power. Her arguments fail to consider that organisations are open systems which are 
subject to impacts and pressures from the surrounding environment. A critic of Kanter's 
arguments is Barley (1990) who wrote, "while people's actions are undoubtedly 
constrained by forces beyond their control and outside their immediate power, it is 
difficult to see how any social structure can be produced or reproduced except through 
ongoing action and interaction", (p. 64-65). Brass and Burkhardt (1993, p. 443) went even 
further stating that, "structure does not exist beyond behaviour. " As we have already 
argued turbulence in the broader arena and the added complexity it brings is another 
reason why coalitions in top management teams are being formed to design large scale 
change initiatives. 
Kanter's commentary is rich in its discussion of relationships or `lines' between parties. 
One of the earliest empirical studies into dependencies in organisations was conducted 
by Thompson (1956). Researching the relative power of work groups in two USAF 
bomber wings he found that although the aircrews enjoyed significant formal authority, 
the technical support teams -which had much less formal authority than the aircrews- 
were able to acquire and use power because of their role in ensuring flight security. If 
the aircraft were not safe to fly they had the power to ground them. Thompson 
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concluded that technical expertise and the interdependencies of roles rather than formally 
prescribed positions in the hierarchy explained the distribution of power. In his study of 
influence capabilities and techniques of lower level organisational members, Mechanic 
(1962) found that technical expertise was one way in which individuals could exert 
influence beyond that prescribed by their position in the organisation hierarchy. 
Support for Thompson and Mechanic's work can be found in Crozier's (1964) empirical 
power study into maintenance workers in a French state-owned tobacco monopoly. The 
production workers, who were paid on a piece-rate system were entirely dependent upon 
the maintenance workers to keep their machines running. Despite the efforts of 
production workers and management to reduce the dependency the maintenance workers 
-who sabotaged the machines and removed manuals in response- were able to extract 
a high degree of autonomy and privilege for keeping the machines running. Such power 
was much greater than that designed into their hierarchical positions. In Dalton's 
ethnographically researched classic `Men who Manage' (1959) it was the operations 
chiefs who acted as the gatekeepers to the executive management on behalf of the 
maintenance workers. They were able to threaten adverse publicity if repairs were not 
completed on time. Those who had the lowest levels of uncompleted repairs had the 
most influence with the operations chiefs. For those of us interested in understanding the 
behaviour of managers and specifically the games they play, the value of ethnography as 
a research method is in the granular descriptions of relationships and the context in 
which they operate. Dalton is able to report the fine detail of plant relations as well as 
colouring in the broader organisational scenery. For example we learn that V. Ames 
headed up the unit most critical to the functioning of the division and that his power also 
flowed from his `know how' regarding negotiations with the unions and the ability to get 
things done which was invaluable to Springer, his new boss and division head, who was 
seeking to make a good impression with the executive management. 
Whereas Kanter infered that acquiring or accessing the elements which comprise 
`productive lines' will make an individual more powerful, John Kotter (1978) offered 
explicit advice how an individual can manipulate their dependencies on other people for 
the purpose of increasing their own effectiveness and power. Kotter argued that to 
become powerful, a manager must first identify their dependencies and assess their 
strength. He suggested that power resides in the quality of the relationship that a 
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manager has with the people on whom they are dependent to perform their job. Using 
the example of a plant manager and a hospital manager he had researched, Kotter noted 
the former had only four notable dependencies -suppliers, customers, plant employees 
and boss, while the latter had at least thirteen. From this he concluded the hospital 
manager expended considerably more time on power-orientated behaviour than did the 
plant manager. His research indicated that "some managers -quite literally- spent 80 
per cent of their time and energy on activities directly related to gaining, maintaining, or 
using power (Kotter, 1978, p. 28). " Taking his analysis a stage further he contended the 
amount of managerial dependence (and therefore the location and degree of power) is 
contingent upon eight contextual factors: organisational size, environmental uncertainty, 
environmental dependencies, organisational goals, technology, formal structure, 
measurement systems and reward systems. 
Firstly, organisational size affects dependency because larger entities have a greater 
division of labour and managers are forced to work with others more than they would in 
a smaller organisation where the division of labour is typically less. Secondly, the 
greater the level of environmental uncertainty an organisation faces the less likely it is 
that set decision making patterns can be established with the result that a manager's 
dependency on others increases. Thirdly, organisations are open social systems and are 
therefore subject to environmental dependencies such as suppliers, customers, trade 
unions and regulatory bodies. The greater the number of these dependencies there are 
the more time a manager has to spend on managing the relationships. Fourthly, the more 
sophisticated and ambitious an organisation's goals are the more efficiently it has to 
operate. To achieve this it must be highly integrated which in turn demands tight co- 
ordination between the groups involved: a factor that once again increases the level of 
dependency. Fifthly, the more sophisticated the technology used, the greater the need for 
co-ordination and efficiency between managers: both of which raise the level of 
dependency. Sixthly, the more decentralised an organisation's formal structure is the 
more managers will have to depend on others to achieve their goals. Seventhly, the less 
an organisation's measurement systems focus on group performance, the lower will be 
the level of dependency because managers will pursue individualistic objectives. Eighth 
and last, the more the reward system is directed towards group performance the greater 
will be the dependency level amongst managers as activities are co-ordinated to derive 
the potential benefits. 
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To ascertain their dependencies Kotter suggested that managers ask themselves the 
following questions. Who do I really depend on? Who is more important than who? 
What is the reason for each dependency? How can I manage them in order to minimise 
the time spent on power-orientated behaviour, thereby freeing me for my job related 
objectives? How can I eradicate any dysfunctional effects on myself and the 
organisation? Once a manager had answered these questions they could manipulate their 
dependencies to maximise the value they extracted from their relationships with others. 
One concern with Kotter's contentions is that he seeks to measure the dependencies as a 
one directional absolute -from A to B- rather than a bi-lateral construct -from A to B 
and B to A. Firstly, he does not advise A to ask the same questions in reverse from the 
perspective of B in the dependency equation. A may have a high dependency on B, but B 
may have an even higher dependency on A. Secondly, he fails to take into consideration 
those on whom the individual is not dependent -for example, C- but still impact their 
sphere of the organisation and therefore influence the dependency between A and B, 
either directly or indirectly. The actions of C may intentionally or inadvertently 
influence the relationship between A and B. For example, if C is the CEO they could 
increase the headcount budget in A's -the operations director- section of the 
organisation, which would mean they were able to recruit their own financial controller 
and reduce their dependency on B -the financial director. In short, it can be argued that 
an apparently simple dependency between A and B is in fact subject to multiple pressures 
from C and others as well as the broader organisational and environmental context. 
This critique once again highlights the need to gain a deeper understanding of the 
processes, behaviours and tactics used by leaders of large scale change proposal 
coalitions. With so many top management team interdependencies at stake and 
individuals with significant levels of formally prescribed rights in the decision making 
process, how does a large scale change proposal coalition leader manage to sustain the 
coalition? This question which is of fundamental importance to our understanding of 
managerial elites is addressed and the findings presented in this thesis. This researcher 
agrees with Watson (1994, p. 37) who suggested that "Managing is essentially a process 
of strategic exchange because it shapes the overall activities of the organisation and how 
it functions in its environment through the continual and continuous exchanging of 
information, favours, material and symbolic resources", (p. 37). Large scale change is 
initiated and driven by coalitions within the top management team and one of the key 
processes by which it is accomplished is the act of exchange between powerful parties. It 
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is difficult to imagine how change in organisations and the influence of significant others 
can be achieved if the party attempting the change has nothing to trade. 
Astley and Sachdeva (1984, p. 105-107) claimed the "formal" structural elements of 
power such as hierarchical authority, resource control and network centrality have been 
overlooked because of the attention focused on the "functional" interpretation of power 
as a dependence generated phenomenon (see for example: Emerson, 1962; Kotter, 1978; 
Pugh, Hickson, Hinings and Turner, 1968). Hierarchical authority, they argued, compels 
the subordinate to comply with their superior's wishes, not because they are dependent 
on them to fulfil their role in the organisation, but because they believe the latter has a 
right to exercise power over them by virtue of a more elevated position in the hierarchy. 
The second formal structural element, resource control, is based on the notion that 
internal dependence between organisational sub-units is superseded by the overall 
relationship that exists with the external environment. The organisation is an open social 
system faced with critical uncertainties and those who can obtain the most critical and 
difficult to secure resources acquire power because of the internal and external 
dependencies that are created subsequently need managing. In his semi-ethnographic 
study of the BBC Tom Burns (1977) reported how the producer's influence waned in the 
early 1970s as that enjoyed by the administrators increased. The administrators argued 
successfully that the role of the BBC was a socially important one and programming had 
to be monitored and set with considerable moral care. Producers were tolerated because 
of the need for ratings, particularly in light entertainment, once the competing channels 
had raised their standards and adapted to deliver what viewers were demanding. Burns 
later concluded that those who shared ideological beliefs -the administrators- gained a 
stranglehold within the power structure and perpetuated their influence by filling the 
most senior positions with those who held the same views as themselves. 
A derivation of the network centrality argument is the idea that power flows to those who 
position themselves at the centre of emergent networks. These are networks that exist 
around rather than within the formal structure of the organisation. Authors such as 
Astley and Sachdeva (1984), Bacharach and Lawler (1980), Brass and Burkhardt (1993), 
Ibarra (1993), Krackhardt and Hanson (1993), Mechanic (1962) and Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978) have argued that emergent networks based on determinants such as friendship, 
trust and respect enable those with multiple contacts to enjoy significant power over 
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other members and to some degree the decision making processes of the organisation. 
It is suggested by writers such as Buchanan and Boddy (1992) that emergent networks 
are imperative to successful `backstage' politicking in change contexts. Drawing on the 
work of Monge and Eisenberg (1987), Ibarra (1993, p. 476) proposed that the key 
distinction between "formally and informally derived power is that the latter comes from 
actors' positions in the actual patterns or interaction that define a social network rather 
than from their positions in the formally defined vertical and horizontal division of 
labour. " Bailey (1977) reported how committees confered decision making power on 
individuals who were able to use them to influence the behaviour of others for their own 
interests. Pettigrew (1973) found that information-flow was a function of structure and 
power was confered on those able to capture, manipulate and disseminate it. 
Another debate in the literature is around the issue of whether or not power can be 
institutionalised in an organisation's structure. Foucault (1980,1981) contended that it is 
not possible to do so for two reasons. Firstly, power is a dynamic phenomenon which is 
created and shaped by the interaction of a continuously changing setting and the 
individual. Secondly, power is relational, and as such it is a function of the relationship 
between interacting parties, "not something that is acquired, seized or shared, something 
one holds on to or allows to slip away (1981, p. 94). " Power is not something that can be 
artificially sustained. His position on this issue is opposed by a number of writers 
(Selznick, 1949; Sculley and Byrne, 1987; Pfeffer, 1992). For example, Pfeffer 
suggested that altering an organisation's structure can embed the distribution of power: 
"Power is built by ensuring that you control as much territory as possible, 
and this control is obtained by placing your allies in key positions and by 
expanding the activities over which you have formal responsibility. " 
(Pfeffer, 1992, p. 273) 
Support for the final suggestion from Pfeffer can be found in Jackall (1988) who 
contended: 
"A fundamental role of corporates politics is that one never cedes control 
over assets, even if the assets are administrative headaches. " (Jackall, 1988, 
p. 28) 
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Following Selznick (1949) Pfeffer also argued that institutionalisation can be achieved 
through the creation of task forces and committees. Members appointed to these groups 
often demonstrate loyalty to the person who nominated or appointed them, by supporting 
proposals put forward by their sponsor. Pfeffer has suggested that if control can be 
exerted over a source of power, it can be institutionalised. However, large scale change 
can involve having to de-institutionalise power if organisational transitions are to be 
implemented successfully (Kanter, Stein and Jick, 1992). Thus, proposers and 
implementers of change need to prepare for the possibility of resistance from individuals 
or groups which stand to suffer a lose of influence or power when the change is 
implemented. An interesting notion is that large scale change proposal coalitions can 
also be subject to the same deinstitutionalisation arguments as other powerful groups. 
An extensive search of the literature failed to uncover any empirically generated research 
in this area which indicates what happens to such coalitions once their proposal has been 
approved or rejected for implementation. Do members of top management teams believe 
that large scale change proposal coalitions should be allowed to continue, or do they 
think they should be disbanded? This question will be tackled in the research study 
presented in this thesis. From this question emerges a series of others, none of which 
appear to be empirically answered in the existing literature. Do coalitions continue to 
exist in their pre-approval/rejection state in terms of membership once they have been 
approved or rejected? If so, do they have a functional or dysfunctional impact on the 
strategic decision making process? Do they break up naturally or are they forced to 
break up? Do they lapse into a state of suspension ready to re-emerge at some trigger 
point? Do they evolve and seek to develop their influence over the broader strategic 
decision making process? Once again these questions will be addressed in this thesis by 
empirical methods. 
The issue of resistance due to loss of power and influence was refered to above. Marx 
suggested that the consistent and cumulative effect of power loss would result in 
revolution from the disenfranchised in organisations. Clearly, this has not happened but 
writers such as Bacharach and Baratz (1962; 1963) have argued that this is because the 
power-holding managerial elite have reduced the discretionary power of subordinate 
interest groups by manufacturing political decision making routines and processes so that 
contentious questions do not make it onto the strategic agenda. In other words conflict is 
repressed. Over time the strategic issue raising and decision making processes become 
accepted and embedded into the organisation culture to such a degree that individuals do 
not believe they have the right to contribute outside of the `safe' agenda (Lukes, 1974). 
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Hardy and Clegg (1996, p. 627) cited Saunders' (1980, p. 22) observation that individuals 
outside the managerial elite have effectively been "duped, hoodwinked, coerced, cajoled 
or manipulated into political inactivity. " However, whether or not political inactivity is 
intentionally achieved, the potential for resistance is always present. This is because 
hierarchy bestows authority through rights and rules, and rules confer discretion on the 
office holder. As long as an individual has discretion over their activity and behaviour 
they have the capacity for resistance. This is one of the central paradoxes of power in 
organisations. The powerful managerial elite cannot avoid empowering subordinates. 
Complete, unshared and unbridled power cannot be achieved. 
Structural power commentators have been criticised by Schminke (1992). He claimed 
that traditional structural arguments explain power differentials between hierarchical 
positions but not within structurally equivalent positions. To resolve these issues he 
called for research to consider both structural and individual determinants of power with 
a view to presenting a more holistic description of how the phenomenon works. 
Schminke's call is a relevant one for the empirical study which constitutes this thesis. 
There is a notable shortage of empirical research into the political processes of top 
management teams in the context of large scale change. Key questions --not born solely 
out of the structural debate- include: How do coalition builders within structurally 
equivalent positions to potential members win support? Are coercive and directive 
behaviours and tactics valid? How does the coalition builder prioritise the order of 
recruitment into the coalition? These questions are posed and investigated in this thesis. 
Power as a situational construct 
In addition to personal and structural power, the situations in which individuals have to 
operate can also act as a source of power. In his landmark analysis Foucault (1977) 
suggested that it is not rule systems which confer power, rather it is social routines which 
normalise individuals into behaving in a way that perpetuates the continuation of 
prescribed power relations. In other words power has a granular quality that enables it to 
seep into the fabric of our everyday world, such that we simply accept it without 
conscious realisation. Managerial elites can reinforce this situation by means of 
surveillance and discipline. Their objective is to monitor and maintain the organisation's 
fabric so that workers do not question their rights and roles. However, and here is the 
crux of Foucault's proposition, such is the pervasiveness of power that even managerial 
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elites are severely restricted in their ability to change the power landscape. All actors are 
trapped in an existing web of power relations from which there is no escape. Indeed, so 
fatalistic were Foucault's arguments that Hardy and Clegg (1996, p. 635) were moved to 
observe that with respect to researchers, "none were to inhabit the poststructural world. " 
Foucault's arguments are appealing because they locate organisations in the broadest 
possible context: society. If organisations are a component of society, it stands to reason 
that they are shaped by society. However, his argument fails to acknowledge that society 
is the sum of its parts and organisations influence its characteristics including the web of 
power relations. Overlay this with the power motive and the need for top management 
teams to achieve organisational competitiveness and renewal through large scale change, 
and the impotence of managerial elites inherent in Foucault's model is fundamentally 
questioned. It seems much more attractive and valuable to adopt a pluralistic view of the 
world. One in which top management teams are characterised by large scale change 
proposal coalitions competing for scarce resources. If it is organisational outputs which 
drive society forward then we should seek to improve our understanding of the nature 
and characteristics of their decision making vehicles, and the processes, behaviours and 
tactics of those who inhabit them. 
Writing before Foucault, Hickson et al (1971) found that individuals or groups which 
managed the organisation's key internal or external interdependencies were able to 
exercise greater power over strategic decision making. This situational perspective is 
also refered to as strategic contingency thinking (Hickson et al, 1971; Hinings et al, 
1974; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977; Salancik, Pfeffer and Kelly, 1978; Saunders, 1990). 
Hickson et al (1971) proposed that power is derived from a department's ability to cope 
with the critical problems facing the organisation and that there are three determinants of 
this. Firstly, the ability to manage ambiguity and uncertainty effectively despite 
imperfect information describing the decision making and operational context. 
Secondly, the centrality of the department in the workflow of the organisation, and 
thirdly, the difficulty with which the department's activities can be conducted by a 
substitute. The greater the degree of difficulty, the more power will accrue to the 
department. When a department is able to achieve some unspecified combination of 
these three factors it is said to control a strategic contingency. 
Building on this base Hinings et al (1974) conducted empirical research at five breweries 
and two container plants, and found evidence to support Hickson et al's strategic 
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contingency theory. All three determinants were found to be positively and strongly 
correlated with the accrual of power. One of the few subsequent tests of Hickson et al's 
theory was the work of Saunders (1990). She found that "combinations of determinants 
and control of strategic contingencies may be used to predict positional and participative 
power, " (p. 16). It was also suggested that power strategies of departments would differ 
by determinant and strategic contingency, and further research on the interrelationship 
between power type and power source was called for. 
Situational arguments of power reinforce the need for researchers and practitioners to 
acknowledge the erodable nature of power. It was argued earlier that organisational 
members live in a web of continuously evolving relationships and that power will ebb 
and flow as the interpersonal dynamics change. However, any reductions or increases 
are subject to structural and situational events. Changes in the organisational design and 
reporting relationships are examples of structural events. Macro-economic cycle phases 
such as recession or growth can also impact the power levels enjoyed by individuals. 
Salancik and Pfeffer (1977) and Salancik, Pfeffer and Kelly (1978) have stated that 
power flows to those who can cope with the critical uncertainties facing the organisation. 
Therefore, it would be reasonable to suggest that large scale change proposal coalition 
leaders who design initiatives to cope with the critical uncertainties facing the 
organisation increase their power. However, it would be interesting to discover 
empirically, whether or not CEOs and other significant players in the top management 
team were content to watch a group of colleagues expand their influence over the 
strategic direction of the organisation. Particularly if the process was an informal one, 
and overlapped with formally prescribed decision making roles. This raises a series of 
interesting research questions with respect to the life-span of large scale change proposal 
coalitions. Do top management team members think they should be permitted to 
continue after the proposal has been approved for implementation or rejected? If yes, 
why and what is their role? If no, why and how are they disbanded? How are learnings 
and benefits captured and transfered to top management team working practices? How 
are the negative aspects kept from finding their way into the working practices of the top 
management team? 
The authors argued that those who have acquired power at the top of US organisations in 
the second half of the twentieth century have done so because their skills enabled them to 
cope with the major environmental pressures prevailing at the time. To illustrate this 
they reported that the backgrounds of CEOs in the United States during the second half 
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of the twentieth century were predominantly production during the 1950s, marketing in 
the 1960s, finance in the 1970s, and as the 1980s approached legal experts were 
increasingly taking the highest offices in organisations. Salancik and Pfeffer also 
suggested that power organises itself around a number of situational -rather than 
structural or personal- variables. Firstly, it clusters around the scarce and critical 
resources. For example, in times of recession as profits fall, internal funds available for 
distribution to divisions or departments are usually restricted. However, few senior 
managers willingly countenance cutbacks in their own areas, and competition to maintain 
budget sizes can be intense. Those who influence the budget allocation process -for 
example, the finance department- acquire greater power than they would otherwise 
possess during more profitable periods. Secondly, power tends to locate around the 
critical activities of the organisation. The production department of a single product 
manufacturing company is far more critical than the payroll department because the first 
is an income generating department whilst the second is an overhead. An individual who 
is located in a critical area and can determine what the critical activities are is likely to 
possess considerable power. 
Thirdly, power organises itself around uncertainty, and this confers power on those who 
can cope with it effectively. Here the authors agree with Hickson et al (1971). Since 
becoming CEO of US multinational General Electric in 1981, Jack Welch has acquired 
an increasing amount of power because of his ability to successfully guide the company 
through problems such as global competition, US deregulation and two recessions. In 
doing so he has created more shareholder value than any other CEO of a listed company. 
Welch reduced the number of businesses from three hundred and fifty to two hundred 
and set rigid targets of being number one or two in the world for that industry or else it 
had to be fixed, closed or sold (Black, 1993, p. 19). Whilst the contribution of others to 
the success of General Electric is not in doubt, Welch is widely regarded as the architect 
of the changes. He was the person who could handle the uncertainties faced by the 
organisation and his power was enhanced as a result of that ability. He proposed and led 
the implementation of several large scale change programmes that were designed to 
confront the critical issues facing the organisation. Pettigrew (1975) and Pfeffer (1992) 
both commented on the importance of timing in the accrual of power. They suggested 
that the salience of issues varies across time as the organisational context evolves. 
Therefore, the acquisition of power is a matter of situational timing and not just 
structural opportunity or personal behaviour. The implications for coalition leaders is 
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that they should be cognisant of the evolving context of change and time the submission 
of the proposal to maximise its relevance. 
The need for synthesis and context 
The three schools discussed -personal, structural and situational- are the cornerstones 
of our conceptual understanding of intraorganisational power. As Hardy and Clegg 
(1996, p. 636) remarked, "Power requires understanding in its diversity even as it resists 
explanation in terms of a singular theory. " However, the student of power has to read a 
wide range of literature before beginning to make sense of it and see the multitude of 
connections and positions emerge. Brass and Burkhardt (1993, p. 442-443) claimed they 
were unable to find any research that tested the links between structure and behaviour. 
They observed, "Structure or behaviour is investigated as if it were unaffected by or 
unrelated to the other. " Yet Krackhardt and Porter (1985) stated that phenomena such as 
power are simultaneously macro-structural and micro-behavioural and the two cannot be 
divorced. In his ethnographic study of a UK telecommunications company Watson 
(1994) noted the interconnectedness of structure and behaviour when he commented, 
"The structures and circumstances in which humans find themselves partly shape what 
they think and do, yet humans also shape those thoughts and circumstances (the extent to 
which they are able to do this varying with the power associated with the position in 
which they find themselves)", (Watson, 1994, p. 27). The true richness of the power 
literature is able to be appreciated only by scholars who have the time to dedicate to 
searching, collating, analysing, interpreting and synthesising. Reading many of the 
writers in any of the three schools, one could be forgiven for not realising, beyond one's 
own intuition, that the other two exist. Exhibit 2.2 offers a simple description of the 
sources of power available to an organisational actor. 
The antagonism and consequent fragmentation that exists between the three schools is 
unhelpful, but a unifying theory is not necessary. No-one has constructed one to date and 
to wonder whether one can be constructed or not misses the point. What is required is 
research to bring an increasingly disparate literature closer together. Clegg (1994) has 
suggested that empirical research has a key role to play, "By listening to the stories that 
subjects are constituted. " Perhaps this can be achieved in part by moving beyond the 
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identification and description of sources in the abstract, to the identification and 
description of sources within a context. For example, to say that power resides in 
structural aspects such as resource control or network centrality means very different 
things depending on where the individual sits in the organisational hierarchy and why 
they want to use it. Convincing a person to accept a secondment is rather different to a 
member of a top management team seeking to build a large scale change proposal 
coalition and influence the strategic direction of the organisation. Context can only 
enrich the literature because it provides a base of relevance from which to investigate 
political processes, and the behaviours and tactics of individuals in their relationships 
with others. The call is for synthesis rather than unification. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have built on the arguments presented in chapter one. Given that large 
scale change is likely to impact the structural design of the organisation, thereby creating 
winners and losers, proposal coalition leaders must understand the nature and sources of 
intraorganisational power if they are to overcome opposition and engage effectively in 
political activity. Therefore, we considered the three major schools of thought on the 
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nature and sources of intraorganisational power: the first of these presented power as a 
personal construct which manifests itself through personal attributes or interpersonal 
exchange, the second school contended that power resides in the structure of an 
organisation, while the third suggested that power is a situational construct whereby 
those who can control the strategic contingencies acquire power. During the discussion 
the schools were critiqued on several assumptive and methodological grounds. 
It was concluded that power does not reside in a single location, and that monocausal 
arguments are unhelpful and serve only to cloud the development of a clearer 
understanding of the phenomenon. Personal, structural and situational power has been 
investigated as if it is not affected or related to each other. Power resides in multiple 
locations simultaneously, there is no fixed amount and it ebbs and flows because of 
personal, structural and situational events. Secondly, much of the commentary on 
intraorganisational power has been theoretically derived or constructed from casual 
observation. There is a paucity of empirically generated research, into the nature and 
sources of power in the context of large scale change proposal coalitions in top 
management teams. A synthesised approach to studying intraorganisational power in top 
management teams is essential if we are to gain a deeper insight into the large scale 
change proposal coalition building process and the behaviours and tactics of coalition 
leaders. 
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Chapter 3 
Intraorganisational politics: 
meanings, inevitability, 
behaviours and tactics 
"Politics is the wheeling and dealing, negotiation, and other processes of 
coalition building and mutual influence that shape so much of 
organisational life. " (Morgan, 1986, p. 148) 
Introduction 
In chapter one we established that the rational-linear approach to change is not the most 
suitable option for organisations attempting to design complex large scale change in 
turbulent environments. Instead, a power-oriented behaviour based approach is more 
resilient and pragmatic because it acknowledges the inherently political nature of change. 
It was argued that top management team members must form coalitions to design and 
propose large scale change. In chapter two we engaged with the literature to contend that 
power resides simultaneously in personal, structural and situational aspects of the 
organisation, and that the large scale change proposal coalition leader must be aware of 
them if they are to engage meaningfully in the political activity which will emerge as 
powerful individuals oppose or resist the coalition's ideas for change. In this final 
chapter of the literature review we critique the extant literature on intraorganisational 
politics. We begin with an acknowledgement that academic enquiry into the subject is 
fragmented and disparate with scholars unable to agree on the meanings and inevitability 
of politics in organisations. We then engage the literature on coalition formation and 
criticise it on several assumptive and methodological grounds. The commentary on the 
behaviours and tactics available to the large scale change proposal coalition leader is 
condemned for being generic, although it is noted that this is unsurprising given the fact 
that large scale change is conflated by most writers into a single homogenous process. A 
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number of gaps and contentious points are raised during the review and the chapter 
concludes with the formalisation of the questions raised in this and the previous two 
chapters into seven lines of enquiry for the empirical study which underpins this thesis. 
Intraorganisational politics: meanings and inevitability 
Politics is the manifestation of power so it is not surprising that much of the commentary 
on politics refers to power. For example, Madison eta! (1980, p. 81) have remarked, "By 
way of analogy, power may be thought of as similar to wealth, while influence processes 
(such as organisational politics) are similar to cash flows by which the wealth is 
accumulated or dispersed. Wealth and cash flow are clearly related, but distinguishable 
concepts. " They asserted also that, "Casual observations and the popular press 
sometimes give the impression that behaviour commonly refered to as `political' is 
rampant in organisations today. " Therefore, they were confounded to find that such an 
apparently pervasive phenomenon has not been researched more extensively even though 
"various members of the research community have recognised both the neglect and the 
importance of understanding political behaviours in organisations", (for example, 
Baldridge, 1971; Bucher, 1970; Pettigrew, 1973; Robbins, 1976; Scott, 1974). Much of 
the extant literature on politics in organisations creates the appearance of a disparate and 
fragmented field of investigation. This criticism finds support from Kakabadse and 
Parker (1984) who citing several commentators (Allen et al, 1979; Lord, 1977; Mowday, 
1975 and Pandarus, 1973) complained there is little consensus about the meaning of 
power and politics. They asked: 
"To what do politics and power relate -intents, means, strategies, 
personal values, group norms of behaviour acts, or events in the life of 
individuals and organisations? Further, what is the appropriate unit of 
analysis -individual, group, division within an organisation or the total 
organisation? " (Kakabadse and Parker, 1984, p. 93) 
In answer to their own question they suggested: 
"The process of political influence is best examined at the individual level, 
exploring the relationships amongst the key actors involved. Thereby it is 
necessary to focus on the recuring and non-recuring patterns of behaviour 
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of individuals and their attempts to influence others through interpersonal 
action. " (Kakabadse and Parker, 1984, p. 88) 
The empirical study presented in this thesis adopts the same position as Kakabadse and 
Parker. However, one of the criticisms of the extant literature made in chapter two was 
the need for context specific enquiry. Consequently the unit of analysis in the empirical 
study presented in this thesis is the coalition leader in the context of a large scale change 
proposal coalition in the top management team. Such a precise definition is important 
because it describes the parameters within which the study findings are relevant. 
Concuring with Madison et al and Kakabadse and Parker on the lack of clarity, Gandz 
and Murray (1980) remarked, "There is a lack of uniformity in the ways in which 
different writers define organisational or workplace politics. " Exhibit 3.1 provides a 
range of meanings and definitions to illustrate this claim. Both Gandz and Murray 
(1980) and Mayes and Allen (1977) have suggested that definitions are clustered around 
two core themes. The first theme portrays politics as a `value neutral' concept. Politics 
is not presumed to be inherently good or bad, it is the behaviour of those who engage in 
it which determines whether its translation is positive or negative. The second, casts 
politics as the behaviours used by an individual to realise their self-interests at the 
expense of others. It is inherently negative. 
Exhibit 3.1 - Mixed meanings: alternative definitions of intraorganisational politics 
Allen, Madison, Porter, Renwick Organisational : politics, involve intentional, acts' o 
and Mayes (1979) influence to enhance', or protect the,, self-interest 
of individuals or groups. 
, Bacharach and Lawler (1980) Politics is the , process whereby individuals  or 
; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) Politics arethe, observable, , but', often 
covert; ', ` 
interest groups' use power to obtain:, or retain 
control of real or symbolic resources. 
influence, a decision. These-'actions include- 
actions by -which executives enhance their, ýpower 
scenes coalition , 
formation, ; offline', ",, 
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Exhibit "3.1 -Mixed, meanings: alternative definitions of intraorganisational politics 
(continued) 
Gray and Ariss (1985) 
Mayes and Allen (1977) 
Mintzberg (1985) 
lobbying and co-optation: attempts, withholding 
information, and controlling agendas. 
Organisational "politics consist of intentional acts; 
of influence undertaken by individuals'or groups to 
ý... ýý ýý ýýýý°., enhance , or, ', protect their self-interest when 
conflicting courses of action are possible. ', 
Organisational: politics is the :. management of 
<>< . d7 influence -to ', _obtain ends not sanctioneda by the 
organisation or to, obtain, sanctioned ends through 
non-sanctioned influence means.,,,, " 
The system ýý of ;' politics.:: mäy;; -, be ; -described a 
perhaps',,, more : accurately, .., `alegitimate') ; in "its' 
reflecting power that'is technically illegitimate, (or, ', 
ýý.,. ý, ý ,, ý.. _ ý.. ý 
means (and sometimes in its ends as well). 
Organisational politics involves ý, tliose activities ', 
.., -} i' -ý -, 
taken within organisations to acquire, develop, and 
., I 
Porter, Allen, and Angle (1983) Organisational political: behaviour is, defined, as: 
prefered outcomes in a situation in which there is,. 
..,.. 
ý,. 
,.., 
ý.,,... 
.. 
ýý ". ",,. 
ý. . 
use power : and ; other,, resources to - obtain one's 
uncertainty or dissensus about choices. 
and groups 
r (units), and 
(4) that{ threaten .; the self-l'- 
promote or protect the'self-interests of, individuals 
discretionary; -'(3) that, äre`5intended (designed) toý;. 
... ý. >, r S' :Y_.. ý'i.. sa. e, i 
(1) Social influence attempts, (2) that are 
interests of others (individuals, units). 
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Within the `value neutral' theme there are several sub-themes. A number of writers view 
politics as the result of conflict over the acquisition of scarce resources (Bacharach and 
Lawler, 1980; Harvey and Mills, 1970; Wildavsky, 1964). Others contend it is conflict 
over any policy decision, not just scarce resources (Eisenhardt and Bourgeios, 1988; 
Gray and Ariss, 1985; March, 1962; Mintzberg, 1985; Walmsley and Zald, 1973). A 
third group claim the use of power in any way is a political act (Butler, Hickson, Wilson 
and Axelsson, 1977; Martin and Sims, 1956). The emergence of politics in top 
management teams was discussed at length in chapter one. 
The `self-interest' theme also has several aspects to it. Pettigrew (1973) suggested that 
politics are the behavioural manifestation of individuals or groups who attempt to further 
their own interests regardless of the impact on the organisation. Herman's (1974) 
research suggested that negative emotions such as anger, hate and revenge are also 
drivers of political behaviour. Mintzberg (1985, p. 134) was even stronger in his 
admonition, "... behaviour termed political is neither formally authorised, widely 
accepted, nor officially certified. As a result, political behaviour is typically divisive and 
conflictive, often pitting individuals or groups against formal authority, accepted 
ideology, and/or certified expertise or else against each other. " The problem with this 
view is that it is too extreme. No room is left to accept there is a positive side to politics. 
The tension and competition that politics causes can drive individuals to improve the 
quality of processes and outputs, advancing both their own skills and the performance of 
the organisation. Politics can be used to the detriment of others and the organisation, but 
it is not always the case. There is an interesting debate here about what constitutes 
political behaviour. Clearly, self-serving and negative behaviours are political, but what 
about a one-to-one session where an individual offers to back the other at some point in 
the future in return for their passive support now? Restricting the application of the term 
`political' to overtly negative behaviour is unhelpful and reduces the debate to a 
simplistic `either-or' argument. This researcher's contention is that politics is inherently 
value-neutral and encompasses any behaviour which attempts to modify the opinions, 
attitudes, values and intents or actions of another individual. This is a broad and 
inclusive definition which permits a wide range of behaviours to be termed political, 
from the collaborative to the coercive. It supports the argument presented in chapter one 
that change is a political process characterised by top management team members 
engaging in attempts to influence each other, either to win support for an idea for change 
or to overcome opposition and resistance. 
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One theme which is often made explicit in sections of the `self-interest' school is the 
assertion that organisational politics is unethical, corrupting the performance of 
individuals and by extension organisations. Seeking to identify the roots of this thinking 
Kakabadse and Parker (1984) remarked that the influence of the Organisational 
Development (OD) school in the 1960s and 1970s meant the majority of writers 
approached the study of political behaviour from the perspective that it was somehow 
morally wrong and therefore undesirable. Burke (1976) acknowledged there was a 
general hesitance to investigate the "darker side of humanity" in case it encouraged 
managers to resort to "the blacker arts of human behaviour. " As we have noted already 
Bennis (1969, p. 81) was one of the first to criticise the naivete of his contemporaries 
when he stated that OD theorists "rely exclusively on two sources of influence, truth and 
love. " Pettigrew (1985) added to Bennis's remark when he described the school as the 
"truth, trust, love and collaboration approach" to change. That certain OD writers had 
perhaps overemphasised the negative aspects of power was noted by Watson (1994, p. 3 7) 
in his reference to Reed (1984, p. 278) who remarked that, "the `platonic' view of the 
manager as the global planner and controller... had been superseded by the 
`Machiavellian' conception of the manager as a situational operator and fixer", (Watson, 
1994, p. 278). 
More recently a number of writers have proposed that politics is an inevitable 
characteristic of organisations and can be used to satisfy the objectives of both the 
individual and the organisation (Buchanan and Boddy, 1992; Egan, 1994; Hayes, 1984; 
Kanter, 1983; Pfeffer, 1992). Approximately two thousand five hundred years ago 
Aristotle described politics as a mechanism to order and manage diversity while avoiding 
totalitarianism. Applying the same thinking to contemporary organisations Morgan 
(1986) argued: 
"By recognising that organisation is intrinsically political, in the sense that 
ways must be found to create order and direction among people with 
potentially diverse and conflicting interests, much can be learned about the 
problems and legitimacy of management as a process of government... " 
(Morgan, 1986, p. 142) 
81 
Further support for this position can be found from Baddeley and James (1990, p. 44) 
who stated, "We believe that a manager who acknowledges politics is in a position to 
welcome diversity, acknowledge the pluralism that is inherent in any organisation and 
embrace its requisite variety. " Those who understand how to engage meaningfully in 
political behaviour are in a position to improve the contribution they make to the 
organisation. Effective change is achieved by working through others, whether by 
empowerment or coercion, and that requires the ability to influence. On this point Egan 
(1994, p. xiii) suggested, "Those who understand and constructively deal with these off- 
stage activities and arrangements, good or bad, can be of great benefit to the company or 
institution. " Schein (1977) went even further when he claimed that "power struggles, 
alliance formation, strategic manoeuvring, and `cut-throat' actions may be as endemic to 
organisational life as planning, organising, directing, and controlling. " That political 
behaviour is inevitable in organisations is a view supported by this researcher. Morgan 
(1986) too has expressed strong sympathies with the `inevitabilists', and argued that 
politics should be studied to understand and diagnose how it can be harnessed and used 
productively: 
"Most people working in an organisation readily admit in private that they 
are surrounded by `wheeling and dealing' through which different people 
attempt to advance specific interests. However, this kind of activity is 
rarely discussed in public. The idea that organisations are supposed to be 
rational enterprises in which their members seek common goals tends to 
discourage discussion or attribution of political motive. Politics, in short, 
is seen as a dirty word. " (Morgan, 1986, p. 142) 
The doctrine of political inevitability was opposed by Klein (1988) who contended that 
arguments for inevitability were based on two underlying assumptions, which although 
persuasive were not conclusive. Firstly, he argued that self-interest was predicated, 
falsely, on the assumption that individuals are driven by a personal power motive. Klein 
suggested instead that "self-interest does not necessarily require the maximisation of 
power, but rather may be satisfied by nothing more ambitious than survival. " As we 
discussed in chapter two this position was put forward by writers such as Minton (1972) 
and Winter (1973) fifteen years earlier. Secondly, he stated that resource scarcity may 
simply be the result of individuals attempting to make them scarce by securing them for 
their own purposes. Based on these arguments he remarked, "Thus, what can make 
political behaviour `inevitable', apparently, is political behaviour itself. As further 
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justification for his claims he cited Pfeffer's (1981) observation that "once politics is 
introduced into a situation it is very difficult to restore rationality. " He concluded that 
although politics may be a common feature, they are of questionable benefit to the 
organisation and are not inevitable. Unfortunately, Klein's argument is a theoretical 
construction and not the result of empirical research. It appears to be based on moral 
opposition rather than observation and as such renders it wishful rather than pragmatic. 
With the exception of a small number of writers such as Klein, the majority of writing by 
the mid-1980s took its point of departure as the acceptance, rather than refusal, of the 
inevitability of politics (Buchanan and Boddy, 1992; Egan, 1994; Kanter, 1983; 
Pettigrew, 1985). With this strengthening change of perspective came a fascination with 
the micro-behavioural aspects of practitioners. Hayes (1984, p. 25) reported that during 
ten years of consulting to British and overseas companies he had found that successful 
managers display three characteristics that differentiate them from their less successful 
colleagues. Firstly, they "appeared to have clear ideas about what they wanted to 
achieve. " Secondly, they "paid attention to what needs to happen if they are to bring 
about the state of affairs they desire, and invest their time, energy and other resources 
accordingly. " Thirdly, they "possessed a set of skills to do with influencing others and 
the exercise of power. " Hayes took a positive view of this final characteristic when he 
concluded: 
"It is not necessary to erode the power of one organisational member to 
enhance that of another. Interactions within organisations do not occur 
within the fixed framework of a zero-sum game. More political awareness 
and greater participation in the negotiation of a new organisational order 
and in the establishment of new working agreements up, down and across 
the hierarchy might best be viewed in the context of an increasing-sum 
game. Effective participation in the political process can lead to a better 
definition of organisational problems and to the generation and 
implementation of more successful solutions. " (Hayes, 1984, p. 33) 
This researcher has not been able to locate any empirical research from the late 1990s 
which suggests that politics does not exist in organisations, or more specifically within 
the large scale change process. One of the contentions made in chapter one was that it is 
the role of the top management team to form coalitions for the purpose of designing and 
proposing large scale change. However, no empirically generated research on the nature 
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and characteristics of large scale change proposal coalitions in top management teams 
exists, so we are left to consider the limited extant literature on coalitions. Therefore, the 
crucial role of the large scale change proposal coalition leader has also gone 
unresearched. The change management literature is guilty of conflating large scale 
change into a single process and describing behaviours and tactics without regard for the 
proposal stage and the key actors within it. This is a serious gap in our understanding of 
managerial elites in the change context. Therefore, let us engage the literature to identify 
the gaps in our understanding of large scale change proposal coalitions and the 
behaviours and tactics of the coalition leader with the aim of generating several lines of 
enquiry for empirical investigation. 
Large scale change proposal coalitions: an absence of empirical reporting 
We know from the discussion in chapter one that coalitions in top management teams 
play a key role in identifying and designing opportunities for large scale change before 
implementing it. We recall Kotter's supportive remark: 
"Because major change is so difficult to accomplish, a powerful force is 
required to sustain the process. No one individual, even a monarch-like 
CEO, is ever able to develop the right vision, communicate it to large 
numbers of people, eliminate all the key obstacles, generate short-term 
wins, lead and manage dozens of change projects, and anchor new 
approaches deep in the organisation's culture. Weak committees are 
even worse. A strong guiding coalition is always needed -one with the 
right composition, level of trust, and shared objective. Building such a 
team is always an essential part of the early stages of any effort to 
restructure, reengineer, or retool a set of strategies. " (Kotter, 1996, p. 51- 
52) 
Based on this and the remarks of several other observers it appears reasonable to suggest 
there are several stages in the life of a large scale change proposal coalition. The first 
stage is formation. There is an extant literature on coalition formation, but not large 
scale change proposal coalition formation. Then the coalition has to be sustained until 
the proposal is submitted. There is no commentary on sustaining a coalition either in 
terms of process or the behaviours and tactics of the coalition leader. Finally, once the 
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coalition has submitted its proposal it can either continue in its original state, mutate or it 
can disband. Once again there is no literature to describe what happens at this stage. In 
reality there is no empirical research on large scale change proposal coalitions in top 
management teams. This is an unexplored area of managerial elites. Therefore, we are 
left with the task of assessing what is at best a partially relevant extant literature with the 
aim of identifying elements which can inform the research questions. 
Coalition formation 
The extant literature on coalition formation is disappointing for several reasons. Firstly, 
it is derived largely from laboratory experiments conducted several decades ago. 
Secondly, it considers the process from the perspective of the potential member only. It 
ignores the crucially important role of the coalition leader and the behaviours and tactics 
they use to win support and recruit members. Thirdly, the rationale for joining is 
portrayed as mainly utilitarian. Political and emotional reasons are ignored or treated 
simplistically. Fourthly, as mentioned above the process of formation is considered only 
until the coalition is built. No consideration is given to how the coalition is sustained. 
Fifthly, the literature on coalition formation refers only to implementation coalitions. 
There is no acknowledgement of the existence of proposal coalitions. Sixthly, the 
majority of empirical literature does not discuss coalition formation in top management 
teams. It describes a generic membership which cuts across all levels of the organisation 
hierarchy, but resides predominantly outside the top management team. 
Between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s the social psychology field of study produced 
several theories of coalition formation. These were Caplow's (1968) power theory of 
coalitions, Gamson's (1961) minimum resource theory, Komorita and Chertkoff's (1973) 
bargaining theory, Komorita's (1974) weighted probability model, and the ideological- 
distance models of DeSwann (1970,1973) and Leiserson (1970). Each of the models is 
constructed in an attempt to explain how individuals choose between alternative coalition 
membership opportunities. 
Caplow's (1956) power theory of coalitions is based on the assumption that actors will 
select the coalition that maximises the number of people they will have control over, both 
inside and outside the prospective coalition. Caplow theorises that it is the number of 
subordinates over whom they will be able to exercise power rather than the power 
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differential that will determine their choice. There are several problems with this 
postulation. Firstly, it casts individuals as relatively unsophisticated decision makers. A 
politically astute or power conscious individual would acknowledge the power 
differential as a crucially important determinant of control. The lower the differential the 
less certain the control. The power differential has been found to be a salient issue in 
establishing and maintaining relationships with others. Dependency theory tells us that 
in forming relationship management strategies, organisational actors are cognisant of 
which party enjoys more power in the organisation (for example, Emerson, 1962; Kotter, 
1978). Caplow also fails to consider the issue of barriers to insurgency. If there are 
structural endowments such as decision making processes which the individual can 
exploit to repress behaviour aimed at overcoming control then a lower power differential 
can be tolerated. Caplow's assumption that it is the number of individuals over whom 
the potential member will exercise control is another weakness in his theory. Once again 
it portrays organisational members as simplistic in their decision making. He ignores 
factors such as the calibre of coalition members over whom control will be exercised. If 
the individual is seen by others to be leading a section of the coalition with highly rated 
members of the organisation who typically win support for their arguments and 
propositions, they are likely to enjoy more power than if they were leading a larger 
section of lower calibre members. Similarly, if the potential member has the opportunity 
to lead a small section of the coalition which is working on a critical element of the large 
scale change proposal, they are more likely to enjoy greater power than if they were 
leading a larger section tackling a peripheral element of the design. Caplow treats power 
too simplistically. For him one person over whom control can be exercised equals one 
unit of power. He fails to understand that in acquiring power questions about quality are 
as important as concerns about quantity. His commentary conveys a shallowness and 
naivete which is a function of the fact that it was generated under laboratory conditions 
rather than in the workplace. 
Gamson (1961) contends that the distribution of resources between coalitions is a 
determinant of the pay-off distribution within a coalition. Pay-off refers to the division 
of reward -resources- between coalition members. The theory assumes that pay-offs 
will be equitable and proportional to an individual's contribution of resources to the 
coalition. The problem with this assumption is that decision making criteria are 
restricted to the utilitarian. It fails to attach a value to contributions other than resources, 
such as expertise or influence over a key decision maker gained through successful 
previous working relationships. Another weakness lies in the idea that there will be 
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always at least two coalitions. It is possible that within the top management team, one 
group of individuals will decide to form a coalition to propose large scale change, while 
the rest of the team does not. This may be out of choice, as individuals elect to comment 
on the proposal from their official roles, or alternatively because the non-coalition 
members have no knowledge of the coalition's formation. Coalitions can be covert and 
members may choose to keep their activities discrete until they believe the proposal has 
been sufficiently developed to cope effectively with resistance and opposition. 
Komorita and Chertkoff's (1973) bargaining theory is an extension of Gamson's 
minimum resource theory. It holds, firstly, that pay-off expectations are based on the 
mid-point between equality and equity, and secondly, that coalitions may form as a result 
of conflict in its early stages rather than its later stages. The key distinction between the 
two theories is that Komorita and Chertkoff contend that coalition members will 
maintain a relationship with non-members and that this can impact the stability of the 
coalition. This is because non-coalition members will seek to increase their influence 
and join the coalition by reducing their pay-off demands to such a low level that the 
resource input to pay-off ratio is too attractive for the rationally driven coalition to 
ignore. Since this will alter the coalition dynamic, the authors infer that the stability will 
be impacted too. Thus, the mid-point between equity and equality will continuously shift 
as non-coalitions exert pressure on the coalition. The value of Komorita and Chertkoff's 
theory is that it is a more realistic portrayal of organisations as dynamic, complex 
systems influenced by the behaviour of members and non-members. However, like 
Caplow and Gamson, it over-emphasises the utilitarian aspects of the decision making 
process. 
Komorita's (1974) weighted probability model advances the bargaining theory of 
coalition formation by considering the number of coalition alternatives available to 
potential members. The theory posits that individuals will prefer to be members of 
smaller, rather than larger, coalitions. This is because larger coalitions are more difficult 
to hold together due to a greater diversity of opinion and intent. Less stable coalitions 
will endanger the likelihood of pay-off. Individuals will weight the probability of 
successful coalition formation and existence by the number of members each prospective 
coalition will have. This is a contentious and potentially misleading logic. Arguably the 
larger a coalition is the more stable it becomes because it can tolerate diversity. If a 
coalition has four or five members and there are two or three strong views on the purpose 
of the coalition or how it should achieve its purpose, then it is fragile because if the 
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tensions become too much the coalition will fracture and collapse. If there are two or 
three strong views in a coalition with twenty or so members then the likelihood is that 
there are sufficient numbers to absorb the tensions. If one or two of the members with 
strong views decide to leave the coalition can still survive. Alternatively, before the 
tension escalates to such a high level there are plenty of members to act as buffers 
between the arguing parties. Either way it can be contended that larger coalitions, not 
smaller coalitions, create stability. Whilst the issue of size is indeed an important 
consideration another weakness of the theory is that it restricts membership consideration 
to utilitarian factors -principally resource pay-off. It does not take into consideration 
emotional factors such as the prestige an individual feels by being a member of a large 
coalition containing the organisation's most senior decision makers, or alternatively 
having the opportunity to be highly visible in front of the organisation's key decision 
makers. It also fails to acknowledge that the decision to join may be for political 
reasons. If the coalition appears as though it has a strong likelihood of succeeding in 
winning support for the implementation of its proposal, individuals may join so they can 
attempt to ensure they benefit from it or at least do not suffer. Alternatively, they may 
just want the positive political side-effect of being associated with a winning proposal. 
The hope being that colleagues will assume they played a key role in the design and are a 
key influencer in determining the future of the organisation. This can result in an 
increase in power because individuals will seek to consult and involve the coalition 
member in other decisions, thereby extending their influence. Another concern with the 
theory is that because the decision to join is based on size differentials, it cannot cope 
with coalitions that have the same number of members. 
The fifth coalition formation theory is the ideological distance model. Each of the four 
theories discussed so far are concerned fundamentally with utilitarian factors in the 
decision making process. All ignore attitudinal and ideological influences. DeSwann 
(1970,1973) and Leiserson (1970) proposed that individuals will seek to ally themselves 
with others who share attitudinal or ideological beliefs, as this contributes to coalition 
stability. It is important to recognise that the type of organisation, its culture and the 
environmental context will affect the ideological dimensions relevant to coalition 
formation. For example, a high-tech computer firm will likely have a different 
ideological framework than a chemical processing firm. Ideological dimensions include, 
purpose, vision, values, beliefs and attitudes. The strength of the ideological distance 
model is that it accepts political and emotional factors as well as utility factors as drivers 
of coalition formation. The underlying weakness of this and each of the other four 
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models discussed above are that they are theoretical constructs established in controlled 
laboratory experiments. None were formulated as a result of empirical research in 
organisations. Additionally, they consider coalition formation only from the perspective 
of the potential member. They ignore the active role of the coalition leader and the 
behaviours and tactics which can be used to win support and overcome opposition and 
resistance. Coalition formation is a political process rich in influencing behaviours yet 
the decision to join is presented as a being solely that of the potential member with no 
other human influences involved. This is a serious assumptive weakness. We know 
from the discussion in the previous chapter that behaviour is shaped by the use of 
personal, structural and situational power so descriptions of decision making processes or 
behaviours and tactics should relate to these sources. In their discussion of structural and 
behavioural power, Brass and Burkhardt (1993) acknowledged the centrality of coalitions 
in creating momentum for major initiatives. The authors remarked they are necessary 
when an individual's personal resources or power are insufficient to achieve the 
objective. They expressed surprise that with the notable exception of Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois (1988) "few intraorganisational coalition studies exist", (Brass and Burkhardt, 
1993, p. 448). 
One of those who has investigated coalition formation in the field is Kanter (1983). The 
findings of her six company empirical study suggest there are five stages to the 
formation of a coalition. Stage one, clearing the investment, involves gaining permission 
from an appropriate superior or colleague, so the initiative is legitimised and permitted to 
proceed. Once this is done the coalition builder can then go on to preselling and making 
cheerleaders. Kanter found that proposers approaching more junior colleagues was 
twice as popular as attempting to win the support of someone more senior in the first 
instance. She argued this was because executives typically wanted to know the project 
was backed by colleagues before committing themselves. In some organisations this 
quasi-begging process was known as "tin-cupping" or "loading the gun" (p. 223). The 
most favoured forum for support gathering was found to be on a one-to-one basis. On 
the issue of coalition size she noted: 
"The broader the ramifications of the issues involved in the proposed 
innovation, and the greater the attendant uncertainties, the larger the 
coalition of supporters needs to be if the idea for innovation is to result in 
productive action. " (Kanter, 1983, p. 221) 
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Horse trading, the third stage, is when offers, pay-offs, exchanges and deals are struck in 
return for support and commitment. These can take the form of information, support for 
a future venture, equipment, funds, manpower, facilities or expertise. Kanter suggests 
the more tangible a form of commitment takes -for example, funds rather than verbal 
support- the greater the demand from contributors for evidence that the initiative is 
viable and likely to succeed. Having assembled the coalition it is still unformed until the 
blessings of senior level executives have been procured. She found that top management 
team members are interested in both the technical and political dimensions of the 
proposed change since they in turn have to justify supporting the plan to their own 
constituencies. The more radical and far reaching the proposed change, the greater is the 
need for a broad coalition within the top management team. The fifth and final stage of 
establishing a coalition is to formalise it. An action plan for the implementation stage 
may entail the setting up of committees, steering groups and task forces. Objectives and 
time frames must be set, roles communicated and deliverables agreed. Mobilising the 
coalition requires the acquisition of resources such as equipment and office space, 
particularly if the coalition intends to work in close physical proximity. Budgets also 
need to be established against which expenditure can be offset. Kanter concludes by 
noting that beneficial side-effects can emerge as a consequence of coalition formation. 
She found examples of new product development, unassociated with the change 
proposal, resulting from the cross-fertilisation of ideas between members. Another 
common benefit was the opening and improvement of communication channels across 
functions and processes. Benefits also accrued to individual members. New 
relationships, skills and a track record of submitting winning proposals enhanced an 
executive's profile in the top management team and smoothed the way for the selling of 
future initiatives. 
Whilst Kanter's work offers a valuable insight into the coalition formation process, it 
does so in the context of innovation rather than large scale change. She studied 115 
innovations in six companies and remarked, "... local innovations that corporate 
entrepreneurs recounted to me are not always `big changes' or `big events', " (Kanter, 
1983, p. 211). Furthermore, the coalition formation process she described was for 
implementation coalitions not proposal coalitions. She described the informal 
acceptance and approval process that circumvents the `red tape' of the formal 
sanctioning route. A skill Kanter identified as essential to instigating and effecting 
change in organisations. Her failure to identify the need for a proposal coalition was no 
doubt due to the fact that she was not investigating large scale change initiatives which 
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were likely to require a strategic re-orientation or significant structural change. Both of 
which are contentious decisions involving rational, emotional and political argument 
across a significant section of the top management team. There is no suggestion that 
Kanter's work is not valid or applicable to large scale change but there is a need for 
empirical research which focuses on how large scale change proposal coalitions within 
top management teams are built. 
Another empirical study on top management team coalition formation is that of 
Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988). Taking as their point of departure, Gamson's (1961) 
contention that people form alliances on the basis of agreement on issues, Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois reported surprise to find that shifting alliances occured rarely in top 
management teams characterised by political behaviour. Instead, they found that 
coalitions formed in politicised teams on the basis of demographic factors such as age, 
office location, similarity of titles and prior experience of working together. However, 
their empirical research into eight firms in the microcomputer industry in the San 
Francisco Bay Area, concluded that demographic similarity is not a sufficient condition 
for stable coalition formation. It produces stability only when power is centralised and 
the use of politics is high. Seeking to explain why their research failed to support the 
findings of others (Bacharach and Lawler, 1980; Stevenson et al, 1985), they asserted 
that industries such as microcomputers which are characterised by discontinuous changes 
in competition, technology and demand mean that "executives simply may not have the 
time to engage in the extensive cognitive processing necessary for forming fluid 
alliances" (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988, p. 756). They suggested also that the 
literature on shifting alliances was largely the result of laboratory studies of one-time- 
only coalition formation under conditions of perfect information about preferences and 
pay-offs. Such conditions do not reflect real organisational environments where complex 
decision making processes and the political behaviour of top management team 
executives lead individuals to recuring patterns of behaviour and stable coalition 
membership. 
The research initiatives of both Kanter and Eisenhardt and Bourgeois were exclusively in 
US organisations. An extensive literature search has been unable to identify any UK 
based studies in this area. Therefore, the study in this thesis will address this problem 
and investigate a range of UK based organisations. The work of the writers discussed 
above raises several important questions that have not to date been answered but which 
need to be if we are to advance our understanding of managerial elites in the change 
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context. Firstly, how are large scale change proposal coalitions in top management 
teams built? Who does the coalition leader approach for support and how do they decide 
in which order to approach individuals? What behaviours and tactics do they use to co- 
opt the support of colleagues in the top management team? Is there any variation if the 
coalition leader is attempting to recruit someone more senior than themselves rather than 
if they are at the same level or less senior? 
The extant literature on the behaviours and tactics available to the large scale change 
proposal coalition leader is disturbingly generic when there is an urgent need for it to be 
context specific. This is not surprising when we note that most writers have been guilty 
of conflating large scale change into a single homogenous process. If we are to advance 
our understanding of managerial elites in the change context we must treat large scale 
change as the multi-dimensional, multi-layered process that it is. We must engage in 
context specific enquiry -for example, large scale change proposal coalitions in top 
management teams- rather than the broader and less meaningful `change process'. 
Authors such as Watson (1994) offer hope that a rich vein may be tapped with comments 
such as: 
"I have long had the suspicion that managers have a much better idea about 
what they are doing, or might do, than tends to be suggested by what we see 
of their actions in the actual setting of the everyday pressures and 
ambiguities of work organisations. " (Watson, 1994, p. 11) 
Whilst there is no directly relevant commentary on these large scale change issues we 
can refer to other sections of the literature to consider what the behaviours and tactics 
could be. For example, with respect to who the coalition might attempt to win the 
support of, we can turn to recent writing about the role of informal networks in decision 
making. Krackhardt (1990) noted that being able to map the political landscape is an 
important skill if an individual needs to tap into it and harness it for their own purposes. 
He remarked: 
"An individual who has an astute knowledge of where the network links are 
can have a substantial advantage. First, this information provides a good 
assessment of who is powerful in the organisation, since the central actors in 
the network can be easily ascertained. Knowing who the central -and 
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powerful- actors are in the organisation is essential political knowledge. 
Second, this information can be used to identify where the coalitions are in 
an organisation. Knowing where the coalitions are, how large they are, and 
where their support comes from gives one an edge in anticipating resistance 
and in mobilising support for action or change. Third, an accurate 
assessment of the network can also reveal the weaknesses in political groups 
by exposing holes, gaps, and locations of lack of support for any particular 
coalition. Thus, understanding the network provides a source of power 
independent of centrality in the network. " (Krackhardt, 1990, p. 343) 
Writing three years later Krackhardt and Hanson (1993) developed this thinking as a 
result of empirical research to argue there are three derivatives of the informal network: 
the advice network, the trust network and the communication network. The authors 
explained: 
"The advice network shows the prominent players in an organisation 
on whom others depend to solve problems and provide technical 
information... The trust network tells which employees share delicate 
political information and back one another in a crisis... The 
communication network reveals the employees who talk about 
work-related matters on a regular basis. " (Krackhardt and Hanson, 
1993, p. 105) 
The writers contended that when problems emerge which cannot be resolved within the 
formal network the informal network is activated. Network management is an important 
skill for proposers of large scale change since mapping advice networks can identify 
individuals whose judgement is respected by key decision makers and potential allies, 
resistors or opponents. They also tend to uncover political conflicts and the reasons for 
goal failure. Analysing trust networks can be useful when planning large scale change 
because lack of trust can be a cause of poor performance and team fragmentation during 
high risk initiatives. Communication networks can identify reasons for low productivity 
such as fractured information flows, poor innovation rates, and the inefficient use of 
resources. Whilst usefully identifying three types of emergent network Krackhardt and 
Hanson's work was not entirely without precedent. The ability to map formal and 
informal networks was noted twenty years earlier by Pettigrew (1973, p. 240) who argued 
"an accurate perception of the power distribution in the social arena in which he lives 
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is... a necessary prerequisite for the man seeking powerful support for his demands. " A 
contention supported by Pfeffer (1981, p. 130) who suggested that Pettigrew's assertion 
that power stems from the control over information flow, in fact "... derives largely from 
one's position in both the formal and informal company networks. " Nevertheless, 
Krackhardt and Hanson's work provides us with suggestions about who the large scale 
change proposal coalition leader may attempt to recruit into the coalition, and it is 
valuable because it is empirically generated. 
A different perspective on network management was provided by Kotter (1985) who 
wrote from an interdependencies viewpoint. His concern was with how a manager can 
extract maximum value from their relationship with others rather than what they can 
contribute back into the network. His empirically gathered data led him to observe that 
effective managers used both personal and organisational resources to develop different 
kinds of power over whom they are dependent. He noted also that these managers used 
persuasive skills in conjunction with their power to influence those whose co-operation 
was required. The favoured approach for doing this was face-to-face discussions or 
alternatively via third parties. Kotter found also that managers maintained a vigilant 
watch over their dependencies and sought up-to-date information so they could modify 
their influencing strategies and tactics. He concluded that in the longer term, effective 
managers manoeuvred themselves into positions that were consistent with their power- 
oriented behaviour. Kotter's analysis which was discussed in more detail in the context 
of structural power sources in chapter two provides us with an understanding of the 
factors determining the level of interdependency. However, he elects not to tell us what 
behaviours and tactics are used to manage them, so the value is limited. 
Coalition sustainment 
The careful use of language is an important aspect of selling the large scale change 
proposal to the key decision makers in the top management team. Buchanan and Boddy 
(1992) in their discussion on the power skills of the change agent argued that private and 
personal motives must be couched in acceptable organisation orientated objectives. In 
support of this contention they offered Tom Burns's (1961) remark: 
"In fact, the only recognised, indeed feasible, way of advancing 
political interests is to present them in terms of improved welfare or 
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efficiency, as contributing to the organisation's capacity to meet its 
task and to prosper. In managerial and academic, as in other 
legislatures, both sides to any debate claim to speak in the interests 
of the community as a whole; this is the only permissible mode of 
expression. " (Burns, 1961, p. 260) 
They argued that as long as personal ambition is tied to organisational efficiency and 
effectiveness, initiatives that advance the former are more likely to be tolerated. 
Ventures that appear to serve only the individual are unlikely to gain support. This 
concurs with the power motive theories of McClelland (1970,1974) and Winter (1973) 
who suggested that individuals who demonstrated strong personalised power motives 
-self-interest were unlikely to be as successful in their careers as those who aligned 
their own objectives with those of the organisation. Pettigrew (1985) refered to the 
manipulation of language for the selling of change as the "management of meaning" 
which is created through "the vitality, imagination, visionary ideas and persistence of a 
leader championing a particular strategic change, " (p. 455). In an attempt to provide a 
checklist for practitioners Kanter (1983) claimed that proposed changes are more likely 
to gain approval if they display the following seven attributes: trial-able, reversible, 
divisible, concrete, familiar, congruent, and sexy. 
Trial-able refers to the viability of piloting the proposal on a small scale without having 
to risk a full scale implementation with all the associated costs and expenses. Reversible 
means that if the initiative begins to fail the status quo can be restored easily. If a change 
programme is presented as divisible, the proposer indicates that the various parts are 
inter-related yet essentially separate. This has the benefit of reducing fears concerning 
the risks involved in resourcing a single large scale exercise, since if one component fails 
the rest will not automatically fail as a consequence. Kanter advises that vagueness and 
uncertainty in terms of potential outcomes should be avoided as far as possible in favour 
of concrete, tangible results that supporters can identify with. Additional sales, higher 
profits, reduced costs and new product ranges are all examples. Closely linked to this 
aspect is familiarity. She argues that by using a language which potential supporters feel 
comfortable with, commitment is more likely to be forthcoming than if alien terminology 
and concepts are thrust at them. There are circumstances that demand radical change, 
but a change proposal should generally attempt to be congruent and fit in with other 
changes being implemented in the organisation. Finally, project proposals should be 
sexy, invoking enthusiasm and excitement amongst those whose support is required if 
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they are to be implemented. Kanter stresses the seven recommendations are not 
exhaustive and neither are they applicable to every situation. Nevertheless, they do 
underline the importance of language as a political skill which can be used by the 
coalition leader when attempting to prepare and sell the proposal. Analysis of her 
suggestions leads the reader to conclude that an important element of selling is the need 
to reduce the appearance of risk. This is interesting given that the recommendations are 
for those proposing innovation rather than large scale change. Arguably then these 
factors will be of greater importance when the future success of the organisation is 
potentially at stake. Incorporating and building on Kanter's work Buchanan and Boddy 
(1992) offered fourteen points of advice concerning the manipulation of language. The 
most salient of which for large scale change proposal coalitions was the need to identify 
the beliefs and values of key potential members so the presentation of the idea would 
strike a resonant chord and produce support. 
A criticism of much of the literature is that coalitions are studied only as far as the 
establishment of the coalition. The commentary ends once a member joins. In large 
scale change proposal coalitions in top management teams this is only the beginning. 
The coalition leader must co-ordinate the work of the coalition and ensure on-going 
commitment from members until the proposal is submitted to the appropriate decision 
makers in the top management team for a decision on whether to proceed to 
implementation. Given the magnitude and complexity of many large scale change 
initiatives it is likely that large scale change proposal coalitions last for weeks or months 
before the proposition is submitted for consideration by the appropriate key decision 
makers in the top management team. We know from the work of Gray and Ariss (1985), 
discussed in chapter one, that organisations go through political life-cycle stages so it 
appears reasonable to suggest that large scale change proposal coalitions experience a 
life-cycle model too, even if it is in a much more concertinaed time frame. The extant 
literature has not addressed this question. We know from the theoretical work of 
Mintzberg (1985), also discussed in chapter one, that organisations may be characterised 
by different political coalition states, so it would be valuable to investigate whether or 
not there are different states of large scale change proposal coalition. It would seem 
reasonable to hypothesise that different types of coalition do exist because large scale 
change proposal coalitions in top management teams are a microcosm of the larger 
political environment in the organisation. However, as with the life-cycle debate there is 
no literature against which to test or challenge these assumptions. Both of these 
pioneering lines of enquiry will be pursued in the empirical study which underpins this 
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thesis. With regard to sustaining a large scale change proposal coalition to the point of 
proposal submission the coalition leader will likely have to engage in a wide range of 
political behaviours and tactics. As we have already remarked there is no commentary 
on sustaining behaviours and tactics. Therefore, they will also be investigated in the 
empirical study. 
We know from the discussion in chapter two that individuals who can manipulate 
structural elements of the organisation can influence the behaviour of others. This is 
reflected in the remarks of Pfeffer (1992) who commented: 
"Structure can be used to divide and conquer the opposition. It can be 
used to consolidate your own power, by placing yourself or your allies in a 
position to exercise more control over resources and information. To the 
extent that structure entails the identification of responsibilities, it can be 
used to co-opt others and to ensure that they support our initiatives. " 
(Pfeffer, 1992, p. 267) 
Concuring with Pfeffer's argument Buchanan and Boddy (1992, p. 130-131) offered 
seven recommendations for the change agent concerning the manipulation of structure. 
The most relevant aspect of their advice for coalition leaders attempting to sustain large 
scale change proposal coalitions was to avoid overly restricting the dissemination of 
information and allocate responsibilities so as to create an atmosphere of influence and 
autonomy. Andrew Pettigrew (1972) argued famously that control over information is a 
power resource available to the change agent. The selective use of information can be 
used not only to influence the behaviour of others but also to raise the status of the 
disseminator for the purpose of gaining access and prime location within a desirable 
coalition or network that in turn can be used to gain access to positions and situations of 
influence. He argued that through the careful use of language, structure and 
relationships, information can be an extremely potent resource, communicating what an 
individual wishes to whom they want and when they want. A well timed word, leak or 
exchange of knowledge can be the basis for coalition formation on the one hand or the 
destruction of an opponent's change proposal on the other. Pfeffer (1992, p. 248) claimed 
"the manipulation and presentation of facts and analysis are often critical elements of a 
strategy to exercise power properly, " while Dubrin (1978, p. 175) argued the importance 
of manipulating information when he stated that "power in most organisations accrues to 
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the individual with access to vital information. " In his study of managerial rules for 
survival in organisations Jackall (1988) noted that following the appointment to a senior 
position of an individual well known for radical cost cutting in the company being 
studied, managers scrambled to write position papers to defend themselves, held rushed 
meetings and made deals in an attempt to "... secure their domains against the coming 
assault", (Jackall, 1988, p. 31). Unfortunately we are not informed of the nature of the 
papers, meetings and deals so we are left to imagine the complexity and intrigue. 
However, we did learn about the importance of appearance in front of colleagues. 
Specifically, we are told that the ability to remain calm and steadfast whilst those around 
are extracting themselves from association to risky decisions earns significant credit 
within the management team: 
"Of course, one must never betray such uncertainty to others. Here the 
premium on self-control comes into play and many a manager's life 
becomes a struggle to keep one's nerve and appear calm and cool in the 
bargain. Making a decision, or standing by a decision once made, exposes 
carefully nurtured images of competence and know-how to the judgements 
of others, particularly one's superiors. As a result, many managers become 
extremely adept at sidestepping decisions altogether and shrugging off 
responsibility, all the while projecting an air of command, authority and 
decisiveness, leaving those who actually do decide to carry the ball alone in 
the open field. " (Jackall, 1988, p. 80) 
The latter part of this commentary paints a different picture to the one described earlier 
by several authors including Buchanan and Boddy (1992) who argued that the majority 
of those who make it to the top of organisations make significant changes at often 
considerable risk to themselves. 
The behaviours and tactics discussed so far are largely proactive and based on the 
assumption that the proposer of change will not encounter resistance to their plans or at 
the very least will have the opportunity to act first. It is unlikely this will always be the 
case since the scarcity of resources means that competition between top management 
team members can be sophisticated and intense. Coalition leaders must be aware of 
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firstly how to overcome such threats and secondly how to counter someone else's 
initiative using blocking and resistance techniques. Kanter (1983, p. 231) offered several 
tactics with which to "disarm" opponents attempting to undermine the proposed changes. 
These are conveyed in Exhibit 3.2. 
As a result of their empirical research into the skills of the change agent Buchanan and 
Boddy (1992) suggested that resistance can form once a proposal has been tabled. In the 
formative period opposition and resistance tend to be relatively passive and covert. 
Examples include: unavailability for discussions and negotiations, criticism of specific 
points, preference for alternative proposals and procrastination in responding to requests. 
In the latter phase opposition to the proposal may become more aggressive and overt 
with resistors directly challenging the need, viability and motives of both the change and 
the change agent. Hidden agendas are sought out so it is vital that private backstage 
language is congruent with public announcements and declarations. 
Lawrence (1969) identified four management actions to deal effectively with resistance 
to change. Broadening staff interests by widening an individual's sphere of activity 
helps to diminish their attachment to the current way of doing things. Consequently, the 
planned change will impact a smaller part of their working life and theoretically be 
easier to accommodate. Using understandable terms is important because one cause of 
resistance can be the lack of clarity in communication between those proposing the 
change and those who stand to be impacted by it. Lawrence notes that unclear, poorly 
explained plans allow rumour to emerge. He also urges senior managers to take a new 
look at resistance, and rather than expect it or consider it something to overcome, people 
should see it as a `red flag' and work together to understand the real cause and identify a 
mutually acceptable and beneficial way forward. His fourth suggestion is that new job 
definitions are required. He contends that, "Participation will never work as long as it is 
treated as a device to get other people to do what you want them to. " Instead, all parties 
should have full involvement in the decision making process as this will reduce the 
potential for conflict later in the change process. It is notable that Lawrence's advice 
belongs to the humanistic, participative school of management. Once again we are back 
to the `playing it straight' OD strategy. He does not believe there is a need for coercive 
or directive behaviours, which more recent writers assert are necessary in time pressured 
situations and when resistance turns to intransigence (Buchanan and Boddy, 1992; 
Dunphy and Stace, 1990). Set against more contemporary commentators on the political 
nature of the change process it can be argued that Lawrence's work is naive, idealistic 
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Exhibit 3.2 - Kanter's "disarming tactics" 
Waiting it out Used when the change agent has no practical tools 
with which to combat the resistance. Once the 
overt criticism has subsided or shifted to another 
issue the change initiative can be revived. 
,, Wearing them 
down Repeating the same arguments for the proposed 
change and refusing to concede major points or 
the abandonment of the undertaking altogether. 
Appealing to larger Gaining the support of and publicly linking the 
principles initiative to a person more powerful than their 
opponents, 
resistance. 
Inviting them in 
Sending emissaries 
to smooth the way 
and plead the case 
Displaying support 
thus negating and overcoming 
Offering to share the benefits that will accrue from 
the change. 
Using diplomatic flag-bearers to test the ground 
and spread the message. Helping to create 
need' for change. 
a `felt 
Ensuring a public demonstration of approval from 
key backers and sponsors. 
Minimising the potential losses likely to be 
incured by the proposed change. 
Warning the critics Informing opponents that their position will come 
to the attention of more senior personnel who are 
supporting the initiative. 
Source: Kanter, R M, (1983), The change masters, New York: Simon & Schuster. 
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and unlikely to be able to cope with the political interplay of top management team 
members in the context of large scale change proposal coalitions. 
It is not always possible or desirable to have full participation in the decision making 
process (Buchanan and Boddy, 1992; Child, 1984; Dunphy and Stace, 1990). For 
example, in times of crisis when decisions need to be taken quickly or when the change 
is contentious and threatens influential groups or large sections of the organisation. If 
the normal consultation and negotiation channels are followed the crisis may cause 
significant damage to the organisation in the interim. Therefore, decisions might have to 
be made unilaterally and implemented by coercive means for the benefit of the 
organisation. Alternatively, there may be circumstances when a change agent has to 
`play it rough' in order to gain the support of key decision makers, dissolve resistance 
and overcome opposition. The use of coercion, perhaps more than any other behaviour, 
epitomises the divide between humanistic OD commentators who strive for rationality, 
emotional care and the eradication of politics in the change process, and those who 
embrace the inevitable existence of politics in organisations and incorporate it into their 
approach. The coercive dimension of political behaviour and tactics warrants further 
consideration because in an era when large scale and transformational organisational 
change has become an increasingly prevalent strategy (Dunphy and Stace, 1992), the 
need for speed and radical restructuring mean that coercive techniques should have a 
place in the armoury of the large scale change proposal coalition leader. 
The use of coercion may involve the delay, withdrawal or limiting of rewards (Buchanan 
and Boddy, 1992; French and Raven, 1959; Gamson, 1968,1975); restricting career 
enhancement opportunities such as promotion or secondment to highly visible and 
influential project teams (Buchanan and Boddy, 1992); "warning the critics" that they 
will be publicly challenged by more senior individuals in the organisation (Kanter, 
1983); "freezing out" a particular individual or coalition from future involvement 
(Buchanan and Boddy, 1992); and administering costs (Bacharach and Lawler, 1980; 
French and Raven, 1959; Gamson, 1968,1975). These few examples highlight the role 
coercion can play in the bargaining process or as a replacement for it. Within the 
bargaining process Bacharach and Lawler (1980, p. 174) suggest that coercion can be 
used to "soften" the opposition's stance on a particular issue, or alternatively it can be 
viewed "as an attempt by its user to gain compliance or concessions from an opponent 
without giving anything in return. " 
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Bacharach and Lawler (1980, p. 178) noted that social psychology literature such as the 
work of Deutsch and Krauss (1962) suggests there are three elements to coercion: 
coercive potential, threat, and punishment. Coercive potential is the possible level and 
range of coercion that the user can deploy on the target if they choose to do so. Threats 
usually convey the level and range of coercion that the target can expect to be deployed 
against them, while punishment is the implementation of the threat. Generally, the aim 
of the user is not to reach the third stage and actually have to administer the punishment 
because it requires an expenditure of resources on their part with the result the target 
becomes less dependent on the user, thereby limiting the effectiveness of further coercive 
influence. 
The effectiveness of coercive action or threats is the subject of two contradictory schools 
of thought. Deterence and subjective-expected-utility theory posits that threats can be a 
very effective method of influence by means of manipulating the utility of compliance 
versus the costs of non-compliance (Morgan, 1977; Schelling, 1960,1966; Tedeschi, 
Schlenker, and Bonoma, 1973), whilst against this conflict-spiral theory suggests that 
coercion is relatively ineffective as a means of influence since the issue of losing face is 
more important than the utilitarian outcomes (Bacharach and Lawler, 1980). Both 
schools have implications for the large scale change coalition leader considering 
coercion as a means of influence with coalition members who are members of the top 
management team. 
Deterence theory proposes that parties with high coercive potentials will be detered from 
actually using it against each other since the magnitude of reciprocal damage will be too 
great. Organisations which have highly interdependent units are therefore less likely to 
engage in coercive activity as long as the threats are credible. Deterence theory invokes 
the notion of utility because compliance versus non-compliance needs to be assessed on 
the basis of potential outcomes: positive and negative. This line of argument leads us to 
subjective-expected-utility theory which proposes that a political actor's behaviour will 
be determined by assessing the magnitude of the potential outcomes and weighting it by 
the probability they will occur. Such arguments hinge on the fact that actors are assumed 
to select the choice that optimises their utility. During the critique of the extant literature 
on coalition formation we remarked on the lack- of completeness and robustness of any 
model that fails to take into consideration emotional and political factors. Therefore, the 
usefulness of subjective-expected-utility theory in explaining behaviour is limited 
because of its reliance on utilitarian factors. For example, a large scale change proposal 
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coalition member might elect to suffer a short term negative impact such as reduced 
responsibility in favour of developing expertise and relationships which will be useful to 
them during the implementation phase. Alternatively, they may accept temporary 
hardship because they are returning a favour made to the coalition leader. This is an 
emotional decision not a utilitarian decision. 
Conflict-spiral theory argues that threats can be a relatively ineffective means of 
influence. Whereas deterence theory contends that greater coercive potential reduces the 
likelihood of parties engaging in conflict, conflict-spiral theory posits that it will lead to 
greater aggression and counter aggression: 
"The greater the total power in a relationship the lower the bargaining 
effectiveness. " (Rubin and Brown, 1975) 
Conflict-spiral theory suggests that for the coalition leader who operates in a top 
management team coercion is an ineffective means of influence. Faced with two 
empirically supported schools of thought Bacharach and Lawler (1980, p. 186-187) 
contend that deterence theory appears to operate in settings where differences in power 
are relatively large, as in superior-subordinate relationships. Conflict-spiral theory 
appears to operate in settings where power is relatively equal or disparities are small. 
The commentary on coercion is fascinating because of its contradictory stances. In one 
corner we have conflict-spiral theory which argues that coercion in top management 
teams is relatively ineffective. In another corner we have the deterence and subjective- 
expected-utility theory which believes coercion in top management teams rarely needs to 
be realised. In a third corner we have recent management writers (Buchanan and Boddy, 
1992; Dunphy and Stace, 1990) who assert that coercion very definitely has a role in the 
armoury of the change agent. This thesis will test whether or not coercion is a valid 
behaviour in top management teams in the change context. It appears though as if many 
commentators and theorists get caught up in the `compliance/commitment' debate. The 
breakthrough made by the likes of Buchanan and Boddy (1992) and Dunphy and Stace 
(1990) is that they side-step the question of desirability and focus on necessity. In the 
turbulent environment of today in which organisations have to move rapidly and 
decisively, compliance is acceptable. This is a powerful blow to the OD originated 
rational-linear approach to change. This one statement crystallises the argument that the 
game has changed and the old rules no longer apply, simply because they cannot cope. It 
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has nothing to do with toughness or being anti-humanistic. The rapidly changing 
environment has compelled and will continue to compel researchers and practitioners 
alike to develop a more resilient and pragmatic approach to large scale change, and that 
process begins at the proposal stage with the use of large scale change proposal 
coalitions in top management teams. 
Lines of enquiry for the empirical study 
During the last three chapters we have engaged the literature to argue that the rational- 
linear approach to change is not the most suitable option for organisations faced with 
designing and implementing large scale change in turbulent environments. Instead a 
power-oriented behaviour based approach is more robust and pragmatic. Due to the 
increasing complexity, magnitude and frequency of large scale change it is no longer 
feasible, or desirable, for the chief executive officer alone to design strategic options. 
Rather, it is the role of top management team members to form proposal coalitions and 
prepare a proposal for consideration by the appropriate key decision makers. Since large 
scale change is likely to re-configure structural aspects of the organisation such as 
reporting relationships and roles and responsibilities, potential winners will seek to 
promote the plans while those who stand to lose out will mount opposition and 
resistance. If the coalition leader is to defend the work of the coalition they will need to 
engage in political activity, and to do so meaningfully they will need to use a wide range 
of behaviours and tactics. Therefore, it is imperative they understand that power can be 
harnessed and that it resides simultaneously in personal, structural and situational aspects 
of the organisation. The extant literature has not identified and reported on large scale 
change proposal coalitions. In conflating large scale change into a single homogenous 
process it has neglected the crucial formative stage when the top management team 
designs the change to be implemented. The literature's treatment of power is generally 
antagonistic and unhelpful. There is a paucity of empirical research into coalitions and 
the commentary on political behaviours is disturbingly generic. If we are to advance our 
understanding of managerial elites in the change context we need to conduct context 
specific enquiry. Therefore, the objective of this thesis is to investigate the nature and 
characteristics of large scale change proposal coalitions and the behaviours and tactics of 
coalition leaders in top management teams across a range of organisational settings in 
the UK private sector for the purpose of informing academic enquiry and practitioners. 
As a result of the critique laid out over the last three chapters we can establish seven 
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lines of enquiry for the empirical study for which there is an urgent need. The seven 
lines of enquiry are: 
#1 Given that large scale change proposal coalitions in top management teams often 
exist for weeks or months do they follow a life-cycle? If so, what are the stages 
and what are the key characteristics of each stage? 
#2 If large scale change proposal coalitions in top management teams do follow life- 
cycles, are different roles, behaviours and tactics adopted by the coalition leader 
during each stage? If so, what are the roles and behaviours used in each stage by 
the coalition leader? 
#3 Are coalition building behaviours and tactics influenced by the hierarchical 
position of the coalition leader in relation to the individual whose support they are 
attempting to enlist, and if so, how do they vary? 
#4 What are the behaviours and tactics used by the coalition leader to build a large 
scale change proposal coalition within the top management team? 
#5 Are there different types of large scale change proposal coalition? If so, what are 
the key characteristics of the different types and what are the behaviours and 
tactics of the coalition leader in the different types? 
#6 Do top management team members think large scale change proposal coalitions 
should have a finite life-span and if so, why? 
#7 What happens to large scale change proposal coalitions once the proposal has been 
approved for implementation or rejected? Does the coalition continue, and if so, 
what form does it take in terms of its membership and their behaviours? Does it 
disband by its own choice, and if so, how? Are coalitions forced to disband, and if 
so, who disbands them and how? 
If the findings of these seven lines of enquiry are pursued using a rigorous and robust 
methodology there is a strong likelihood they will produce rich descriptions and deep 
insights into the nature and characteristics of large scale change proposal coalitions and 
the behaviours and tactics of coalition leaders. It will then be reasonable to claim a 
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pioneering breakthrough in our understanding of managerial elites in the change context. 
No other empirical research has investigated and reported on these issues. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have brought to a conclusion the arguments laid out in chapters one 
and two which asserted that a power-oriented behaviour based approach to large scale 
change is more resilient and pragmatic than the traditional OD originated rational-linear 
model. Given that large scale change often threatens the interests of powerful players in 
the top management team the coalition leader must be able to engage meaningfully in 
political behaviour. This means building a strong, cohesive and stable coalition and 
sustaining it in the face of resistance and opposition, which will likely require the use of 
coercive behaviours and tactics at some point in time. 
The chapter began with an acknowledgement of the disparate and fragmented nature of 
academic enquiry into intraorganisational politics. We considered the meaning of the 
term politics and identified the key themes around which the literature is organised. 
After briefly touching on the morality of using political behaviour we then engaged with 
the debate on the inevitability of politics in organisations. The extant literature on 
coalition formation was critiqued on several assumptive and methodological grounds and 
the wider change literature was used to identify potential coalition building and 
sustaining tactics including the use of networks, language, structure, resistance and 
opposition handling techniques and coercion. The literature was criticised for being 
disturbingly generic, although it was argued that this is unsurprising given that most 
commentators are guilty of conflating large scale change into a single homogenous 
process. During the discussion important gaps and points of contention were identified 
and the chapter concluded with the generation of seven lines of enquiry for investigation 
in the empirical study. It was asserted that there is no empirical research which has 
reported on the nature and characteristics of large scale change proposal coalitions in top 
management teams and the behaviours and tactics of coalition leaders. This is a serious 
gap in our understanding of managerial elites in the change context that if addressed will 
constitute a pioneering breakthrough in our understanding and treatment of the subject. 
There will be significant implications for academic enquiry and practitioners. Let us turn 
then to a discussion of the methodology design and construction. 
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Chapter 4 
Methodology design and 
construction: overcoming the 
problem of investigating 
political behaviour in 
top management teams 
"The craft of research involves imagination, flair, creativity and an 
aesthetic sense -or it ought to. " (Watson, 1994, p. 78) 
Introduction 
In this chapter we discuss the methodology design and construction. The approach was 
heavily influenced and shaped by the need to overcome the difficulties of empirically 
investigating the political behaviours and tactics of top management team members in 
large scale change proposal coalitions. Against this background we consider the two key 
problems of firstly, gaining access to top management team members, and secondly, the 
sensitivity of political behaviours as a topic for investigation. A mix of professional and 
personal ties were used to establish a research sample of fifty members of top 
management teams in fourteen organisations across thirteen industries in the UK private 
sector. An elite style semi-structured interview approach, which facilitated `interview- 
conversations', served to generate rich and candid data which was assessed using 
thematic based content analysis. In addition to a consideration of each of these aspects 
the chapter also discusses the issue of revisiting rich interviews -hot leads, assessing 
participant candour, and post interview correspondence before concluding with a 
reflection on the methodological lessons learned. 
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The research was conducted on the ontological assumption that individual members of 
top management teams construct a unique personal workplace reality based on their 
values, attitudes, motives and goals. Furthermore, their perception of reality is 
influenced and constrained by the culture of the organisation and the behaviour of 
colleagues. This assumption projects members of top management teams as assertive 
individuals, capable of setting and reshaping agendas in response to a changing context. 
Schwandt (1994) described such a view as "everyday constructivist thinking", and 
argued: 
"... human beings do not find or discover knowledge so much as construct 
or make it. We invent concepts, models, and schemes to make sense of 
experience and, further, we continually test and modify these constructions 
in the light of new experience. " (Schwandt, 1994, p. 125) 
This thinking contrasts with the structural-functional approach, which according to 
Blumer (1969, p. 57-58) portrays organisational members as "... merely media for the play 
and expression of the forces or mechanisms of the system itself. " Similarly Garfinkel 
(1967) criticizes the approach for presenting individuals as "judgmental dopes" incapable 
of objective self-determination. 
To study and record the political behaviours employed by members of top management 
teams it was determined that direct face-to-face interaction was essential. The sensitivity 
of the research topic meant that participants were unlikely to yield comprehensive and 
honest accounts unless they felt comfortable with the researcher. Lee (1993) commented 
that investigating sensitive issues demands a mechanism which facilitates the creation of 
trust and rapport. Therefore, a qualitative methodology was adopted. A quantitative 
methodology "which is perfectly comfortable with aggregating large numbers of people 
without communicating with them face-to-face" (Janesick, 1994, p. 210), was rejected 
because it was felt that on balance data elicited via qualitative methods such as elite-style 
semi-structured interviewing would provide a richness and level of insight which could 
not be matched by employing quantitative methods (Hoffman, 1980). 
The objective of qualitative research is often theory-testing or theory-constructing, but as 
Layder (1993) noted, the demarcation line between the two blurs in practice. He further 
argued that between the two ends of the spectrum there are a number of valuable 
t 
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approaches concerned with discovery and exploration but not the generation or building 
of theory. One of these, sensitizing concepts and theoretical description, aims to: 
"... develop concepts and descriptions which are theoretically insightful 
and thus provide useful starting points for further research. In this sense, 
once developed, they act as `sensitizing devices' which help subsequent 
researchers to formulate theoretical ideas or to organise their data. " 
(Layder, 1993, p. 49) 
Indeed there is nothing to prohibit a researcher using such an approach as the first step 
towards constructing theory. Layder noted that Goffman (1968) developed his theory of 
a `total institution' as a result of an earlier study of a mental hospital in which he 
established several working concepts that were later tested and refined. 
Accepting the advice of Layder (1993) and the practice of theoreticians such as Goffman, 
the aim of the research that forms the basis of this thesis is to investigate the nature and 
characteristics of large scale change proposal coalitions and the behaviours and tactics of 
coalition leaders in top management teams across a range of organisational settings in the 
UK private sector to establish empirically grounded sensitizing concepts and descriptions 
which can then be used to inform academic enquiry and practitioners. 
The unit of analysis is the coalition leader in the context of a large scale change proposal 
coalition. Studying complete top management teams was not an option available to the 
author due to resource and time constraints. Therefore, the research effort was focused 
on individuals regarded as key players and decision makers in their organisation. The 
label of key player was determined either by the chief executive or managing director of 
each organisation, or the author's father and uncle who had privileged insights and access 
into the participant organisations. The author's existing relationships with top 
management teams also enabled him to identify the most influential individuals. 
We will now go on to examine the methodology underpinning the research. Specifically 
we will consider: 
  The problem of investigating political behaviour in top management teams, 
  Data sources, 
  The pilot study, 
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  Selecting participants and managing identity to establish access, 
  Conducting the interview: parameters and permissive atmospheres, 
  Data analysis, 
  Following up `hot leads': rich interviews revisited, 
  Assessing levels of participant candour, 
  Post interview correspondence, and 
  Conclusions, reflections and lessons learned. 
The problem of investigating political behaviour in top management teams 
In conducting an empirical study into the political behaviour of top management team 
members two issues strongly influenced the design of the research methodology: 
  The difficulty in gaining access to top management team members, and 
  The sensitivity of political behaviour as a topic for investigation. 
The difficulty in gaining access to top management team members 
In her study of strategic decision making by social elites and boards of directors in 
Canadian English speaking hospitals Hoffman (1980) remarked: 
"The relative scarcity of literature... on such organisational settings as 
boards of directors is doubtless related to difficulties of access. " 
(Hoffman, 1980, p. 46) 
She relates that in her own experience securing access tended to be problematic for three 
principal reasons: protective secretaries and juniors blocked or diverted research 
requests; executives tended not to have much time to allocate to discretionary activities 
such as research; and a substantive element of the strategic decision making process 
occurs outside rather than inside the boardroom, thus making it more difficult to study. 
That the strategic decision making process is conducted largely outside the boardroom is 
supported by Buchanan and Boddy (1992, p. 27) who suggested that those involved in 
organisational change have to support their rational and public arguments with 
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"backstage activity", gathering support and overcoming resistance outside the formal 
setting of the boardroom. They argued that such activity involves power skills and 
influencing tactics and as the term `backstage activity' implies, it usually takes place 
behind closed doors. Therefore, a researcher cannot simply attend a board meeting, 
listen to the debate, observe the interplay, record the exchanges and the decisions taken. 
It would be misleading to assume that the political dimension of top management team 
decision making had been captured. The often covert nature of political behaviour 
requires individuals to be accessed when they are engaged in `backstage activity' so the 
behavioural dynamics and power skills can be observed. However, as we will argue later 
in this chapter an ethnographic approach in which the researcher lived with the top 
management team (for example, Burns, 1977; Dalton, 1959; Watson, 1994) would not 
necessarily lead to observations of candid and open political behaviour. In addition to 
the factor of backstaging behind closed doors there is also the issue of trust in a group 
environment. Individuals are likely to be wary of having their exchanges recorded, 
analysed and reported inaccurately or unfavourably and so may make an extra effort to 
keep their behaviour covert or modify it because of the researcher's presence. Either 
reaction is undesirable from an academic perspective because the descriptions will not be 
of typical behaviour. Alternatively they can be interviewed on a one-to-one basis so their 
opinions and experiences can be related in a confidential and anonymous setting. 
Discussions of data sources and the issue of participant candour will take place in later 
sections of this chapter. 
How then does the researcher gain access to members of top management teams? One 
option is to randomly sample individuals from an appropriate population, for example, 
the board members of the FTSE100 companies. The problem with this approach 
according to the senior managers who participated in the pilot study is that members of 
top management teams receive a large number of research requests each week from 
members of academic institutions, trade institutions such as the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI) and management consultancies. The last of which are increasingly using 
research as a means of introducing potential clients to their services. They are often 
prepared to invest tens and sometimes hundreds of thousands of pounds in conducting 
very detailed research of high commercial value to the participant organisations. 
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This compares with the research student who, promising a report of the results, requests 
access to senior individuals for the purpose of adding to the existing knowledge base. 
There may be commercial implications which add value to the organisation but, unlike 
the management consultancies, they are not the primary reason for conducting the 
research. 
The senior manager often has to choose which invitation to accept and which to reject. 
For members of top management teams whose time is scarce there is an incentive to 
dismiss the request of the academic research student. Expressing concern in adopting 
this strategy the five participants of the pilot study (of which three hold PhDs) further 
contended that the student who is granted access after employing random sampling 
techniques is likely to be allocated individuals who are peripheral members of the top 
management team rather than the key members requested. Several participants likened 
random sampling to cold calling, stating that it conveyed the impression the researcher 
had no purposeful research strategy and was resorting to a "scattershot" approach by 
which to construct a sample. On the strength of these arguments it was decided that 
gaining access to key players in top management teams was unlikely to be achieved most 
effectively by random sampling methods. 
An alternative method proposed by Buchanan et al (1988) and Hoffman (1980) involves 
the researcher exploiting professional and personal ties with individuals or organisations 
which satisfy the research criteria. The participants of the pilot study strongly 
recommended this approach as the one most likely to generate positive replies. 
Consequently the author's father and uncle, both of whom hold senior positions in their 
respective organisations, used internal and external networks to provide nineteen 
members of top management teams in eight organisations across seven industries. The 
researcher's own professional ties were used to co-opt thirty-one members of top 
management teams in six organisations in six different industries. Thus a research 
sample of fifty individuals across fourteen organisations in thirteen industries was 
established. The merits, limitations and process of employing such an approach are 
debated in subsequent sections of this chapter, but first it is important to examine how 
key members of top management teams were persuaded to discuss their political 
behaviours. 
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The sensitivity of political behaviour as a topic for investigation 
Rosabeth Kanter (1979) wrote: 
"Power is America's last dirty word. It is easier to talk about money 
and much easier to talk about sex- than it is to talk about power. " 
(Kanter, 1979, p. 65) 
Yet along with a number of other commentators she came to the conclusion that to be a 
successful executive individuals must be skilled political operators (Buchanan and 
Boddy, 1992; Egan, 1994; Gandz and Murray, 1980; Kanter, 1979,1983; Mintzberg, 
1983; Pfeffer, 1981,1992). Participants in this empirical study were informed in the 
initial written and oral research request the topic of investigation was "top management 
team interpersonal dynamics in the context of large scale organisational change. " Once 
the interview was under way it quickly became evident to the interviewee that the 
discussion focused on the political behavioural aspects of interpersonal dynamics 
between top management team colleagues. On realising this participants expressed two 
principal concerns. Firstly, they would be identified in published accounts, and 
secondly, the content of any interview would be discussed with their colleagues or 
superiors. The consensus was that those who visibly engage in politics are regarded by 
subordinates and peers as lacking in the legitimate skills of management such as 
empowerment, team building and leadership. Furthermore, they are seen as behaving in 
a manner that is morally wrong. This is a concern that finds support in the literature. 
Madison et al (1980), agree with Burns (1961) and Pettigrew (1973) that `politics' might 
be too direct and sensitive a term to use openly. Burns (1961) remarked: 
"No-one regards himself as a politician -or as acting politically- except 
of course on occasions when he is led into accounts of successful intrigue 
and manoeuvring, when he bolsters his self-esteem and reputation by 
projecting the whole affair into the safe social context of a game or a 
joke. " (Burns, 1961, p. 260) 
Commenting on these fears one general manager observed: 
"Some people are going to look at you [the researcher] and say to 
themselves `why should I risk throwing it all away on someone I don't 
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know, and for something that I probably won't get anything out oft"' (Joe 
Clyde, general manager) [parentheses added] 
From an organisational perspective chief executive officers were concerned that findings 
would be disseminated to a broader audience. Richard King, one of the CEOs explained 
that "although we all do it, nobody ever admits it. " He went on to remark that with the 
public, parliamentary and media fascination with executive pay the last thing he wanted 
was "to open the Financial Times next week and see an article under the headline 
`Bastards in the Boardroom! "' Bums (1977, p. xiv) had to face a similar concern from 
executives at the BBC who found his report "... interesting, and more than interesting, 
fascinating. It is also reasonable and balanced, but within its own restricted confines 
only and provided that you do not take these words as meaning agreement with 
everything in it... " In short the BBC did not want any of its `dirty linen' laundered in 
public. 
Writing about the conduct of research on sensitive topics and how to overcome concerns 
such as those refered to above, Lee (1993) remarked: 
"In this context, privacy, confidentiality and a non-condemnatory attitude 
are important because they provide a framework of trust. Within this 
framework, researchers can lead those studied to confront, in a 
fundamental way, issues which are deep, personally threatening and 
potentially painful. " (Lee, 1993, p. 98) 
Once the qualitative researcher has allayed participant fears of identification by 
promising confidentiality and anonymity they then have to deal with the problem of 
respondents articulating a topic which, according to the chief executive quoted above, is 
not usually discussed. The difficulty for the researcher is that some senior managers do 
not view their behaviour as political and therefore fail to mention it. David Knight, one 
of the directors interviewed, expressed surprise that soliciting the support of his 
colleagues in the top management team by trading favours and resources could be 
described as political, "... it's just what top guys do to get things done", he explained. 
Yet he quite readily admitted that threatening a more junior member of the top 
management team in order to gain their compliance was coercive and "very definitely 
political behaviour". 
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Cooper and Branthwaite (1977) have created a useful model of responses obtained by 
researchers who employ interview methods, and this is illustrated in Exhibit 4.1. For the 
purpose of this study we will use Bogdan and Biklen's (1982, p. 135) definition of an 
interview "... a purposeful conversation usually between two people (but sometimes 
more) that is directed by one in order to get information. " By positioning political 
behaviour and large scale organisational change within Cooper and Branthwaite's 
construct, the problems encountered by the researcher of sensitive topics are brought to 
light. 
With the exception of commercially sensitive information, members of top management 
teams were found to be generally willing and able to discuss large scale change issues, so 
in the context of Exhibit 4.1, interviews generate data relatively easily since responses 
tend to be `spontaneous', `reasoned', and `conventional'. On the other hand data 
concerning political behaviour can be harder to extract as responses tend to be 
`concealed', `personal', `intuitive', `imaginative', `unconscious' and `repressed'. 
Managers may be `aware' of the political dimension in their behaviour but they often 
regard it as `private' information and therefore are unwilling to share it. Even if they are 
agreeable to discussions, a manager may need some assistance in `communicating' what 
is often regarded as a taboo issue (Kanter, 1979). The researcher is often forced to probe 
and extract data from areas that may be both submerged and protected. A difficult task 
which cannot be tackled through questionnaires. In terms of Exhibit 4.1 the aim of the 
researcher is to maximise the usefulness of the data extracted by shifting the interviewee 
from: private to public by guaranteeing confidentiality; non-communicable to 
communicable by articulating or translating their knowledge and unaware to aware by 
guiding them into areas they have not previously discussed or articulated with an 
outsider. As Jackall (1988) remarked: 
"Managers do not generally discuss ethics, morality or moral rules in use in 
a direct way with each other, except perhaps in seminars organised by 
ethicists. " (Jackall, 1988, p. 6) 
The need to be able to interact with the interviewee is therefore of paramount 
importance. A semi-structured elite style interview schedule permits a two-way 
exchange of information whilst ensuring the respondent remains focused on the core 
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Exhibit 4.1 - Interviewee responses to 
questions on large scale organisational 
change and political behaviour 
Accessibility Layers of response 
Spontaneous, reasoned, 
conventional 
CL B 
(Large scale organisational 
change) 
E 
E Concealed, personal 
V 
(Political behaviour) 
Intuitive, imaginative 
1 
.2 1w 
> 
L. _ (Political behaviour) 
E 
E Unconscious, repressed 0 
0 
z 
(Political behaviour) 
I 
Responses 
extracted with 
relative ease 
Responses 
extracted with 
relative 
difficulty 
Adapted from: Cooper, P, and Branthwaite, A, (1977), "'Qualitative Technology": 
New Perspectives on Measurement and Meaning Through 
Qualitative Research', Proceedings of the Market Research 
Society Conference. 
issues. A heavily structured survey type interview does not permit either the interviewer 
to probe or the interviewee to digress, while a free format in-depth interview is quite 
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likely to elicit large amounts of superfluous data, thereby wasting valuable time with 
difficult to access time conscious participants. The justification for pursuing an elite 
style semi-structured interview schedule are presented in subsequent sections of this 
chapter. 
Data sources 
The principal source of primary data was a elite style semi-structured interview that was 
piloted with five members of different top management teams before being used in the 
main study with another fifty participants from fourteen organisations. The interview 
schedule is attached as Appendix A. 
The term elite is taken from the sociological literature and refers to groups of individuals 
who occupy the upper echelons of society's institutions. Judges, senior civil servants, 
top management team members, and clerical leaders are a few examples. Thus, elite 
style interviewing refers to a type of interviewing designed specifically for the verbal 
investigation of key decision makers in organisations. Its principal characteristic is the 
high level of two-way interaction between interviewer and interviewee not usually 
associated with the classic structured interview in which the interviewer follows a tightly 
scripted question schedule that allows minimal room for departure. Elite style interviews 
tend to be semi-structured to allow the interviewer to pursue interesting lines of enquiry 
outside the schedule. The argument put forward for by supporters of elite style 
interviewing is that it increases the likelihood of capturing data that is more contextually 
relevant and therefore richer and more insightful than that collected using classic 
interviewing approaches (Adler and Adler, 1992; Hoffman, 1980; Johnson, 1875; Scott, 
1965; Wax, 1952). An alternative style of interview was used by Burns (1977) in his 
study of the BBC. Similar in duration to those which underpin the findings reported in 
this thesis -between one and three hours- Bums described them as more like 
conversations or discussions than interviews. He characterised them as being close to 
normal discourse and related how he had attempted to make them as "non-threatening 
and intrinsically interesting" (p. xii) to his interviewees as possible. Burns admitted how 
his interviews were completely non-standardised and how they would discuss different 
issues depending on what he as the interviewer found interesting. He appears to cast 
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himself as a semi-ethnographer, immersed in the study environment for extended periods 
-fifteen weeks in 1963 and six or seven weeks in 1973- collecting and interpreting his 
observations. While undoubtedly such an approach generates data that is rich in its 
diversity the danger is it lacks focus because of the tendency to pursue the latest line of 
enquiry that attracts the researcher's attention. Due to the precise nature of the thesis 
questions and the resources available to this researcher it was rejected in preference of 
the elite-style semi-structured interview. 
It is recognised that with a view to generalisation and theory building, the findings from 
fifty interviewees are not as meaningful as the findings from a larger sample. However, 
it can be argued that the respondents selected brought considerable experience to the 
study and the data they provided warrants serious consideration. For example, the seven 
members of the top management team at British Petroleum had over two hundred years 
of collective international management experience, garnered from working in more than 
forty countries. The chief executive officer, who aged only in his mid-forties, was 
responsible for instigating the strategic change which delivered record profitability and 
the highest share price in the company's history. He alone has held sixteen different 
posts within the organisation before he was appointed to its highest office. At Whyte & 
Mackay the seven respondents had over one hundred and ninety years of collective 
management experience. While at Scott's Hotels the five members of the top 
management team had over one hundred and forty years between them. Such lengthy 
service records were typical rather than atypical so although one of the limitations of the 
study is that only fifty individuals were interviewed, their opinions, recollections, and 
current behaviours are drawn from and grounded in more than one thousand two hundred 
years of management experience. 
Furthermore, it is important to confirm the participants were key members of their 
organisation's top management teams. Those interviewed were not middle managers or 
peripheral members of the key decision making group. They were members of their core 
top management teams, capable of instigating, shaping or resisting large scale 
organisational change initiatives. Several participants have held senior positions within 
the British civil service at some time in their careers. One individual had been a key 
member of the Policy Unit of prime ministers Margaret Thatcher and John Major in the 
early 1990s, while another had been a senior figure in a government department. One 
participant, in addition to his organisational role of managing director, is the head of a 
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European government's think tank on industry, meeting regularly on a one-to-one basis 
with the country's president. Outside interests of other members of the study included 
being the chairman of the board of directors at an Ivy League American university, 
sitting on the boards of international orchestras, charities, museums and galleries. Such 
activities clearly illustrate the participants of the study were not only successful senior 
managers in their own organisations, but influential and respected members of national 
and international society. Appendix B provides a description of participant organisation 
activities. 
It has already been noted the fourteen organisations studied were selected using 
professional and personal ties on the advice of Buchanan et al (1988) and Hoffman 
(1980). They were chosen to provide a diverse cross-section of British industry, 
organisational settings and size. Those studied operated in the following industries: 
building societies, computer hardware manufacturing, credit card issuing and 
acquisition, electricity distribution, fast food, hotels, oil and gas exploration, 
pharmaceuticals, property construction and management, sponsorship marketing, 
tobacco manufacturing, water distribution, and distilling. The number of people directly 
employed by the organisations ranged from under fifty to in excess of fifty thousand, 
with the mean average being approximately ten thousand. An opportunity to conduct a 
study solely in the computing industry was rejected in favour of an attempt to ascertain 
whether there are any commonalties in the political behaviour of top management team 
members across organisations and industries. The opportunity to undertake a study in 
the computing sector still exists so there remains the possibility of conducting a further 
study to test the findings. One of the limitations of the claims which can be made from 
the data is that the professional and personal ties only extended to the private sector. 
Even though several of the participants had held senior positions in public sector 
organisations the absence of current executives means the findings cannot be generalised 
to public sector institutions. Therefore, in addition to the computing sector research 
opportunity there is also a need to conduct an investigation into the political behaviour of 
top management team members of public sector organisations and contrast the findings 
with the results of this study. 
Organisational documentation, industry reports and press articles were collected and 
used to select large scale change initiatives for discussion. They were also used to locate 
the participants within their top management team. 
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The pilot study 
Once the lines of enquiry had been generated from an extensive review of the literature 
on large scale change, intraorganisational power and political behaviour, the next step 
was to conduct a pilot study of the interview schedule into which the lines of enquiry had 
been converted. Exhibit 4.2 lists the lines of enquiry derived from the literature review. 
Five members of top management teams in five organisations were asked to participate 
and provide feedback. Using pseudonyms to preserve anonymity the five individuals 
included one managing director (Neil Thames), one director (Josh Severn), two general 
managers (Joe Clyde and Niall Trent) and one senior manager (Ian Tay). The feedback 
can usefully be discussed under three headings: research strategy; gaining access; and 
the interview. 
Exhibit 4.2 - Research lines of enquiry 
#1 Given that large scale change proposal coalitions in top management teams often 
exist for weeks or months do they follow a life-cycle? If so, what are the stages 
and what are the key characteristics of each stage'? 
#2 If large scale change proposal coalitions in top management teams do follow life- 
cycles, are different roles, behaviours and tactics adopted by the coalition leader 
during each stage`? If so, what are the roles and behaviours used in each stage by 
the coalition leader? 
#3 Are coalition building behaviours and tactics influenced by the hierarchical 
position of the coalition leader in relation to the individual whose support they are 
attempting to enlist, and if so, how do they vary? 
#4 What are the behaviours and tactics used by the coalition leader to build a large 
scale change proposal coalition within the top management team? 
#5 Are there different types of large scale change proposal coalition'? If so, what are 
the key characteristics of the different types and what are the behaviours and 
tactics of the coalition leader in the different types? 
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Exhibit 4.2 - Research lines of enquiry (continued) 
#6 Do top management team members think large scale change proposal coalitions 
should have a finite life-span and if so, why? 
#7 What happens to large scale change proposal coalitions once the proposal has been 
approved for implementation or rejected? Does the coalition continue, and if so, 
what form does it take in terms of its membership and their behaviours? Does it 
disband by its own choice, and if so, how? Are coalitions forced to disband, and if 
so, who disbands them and how? 
Research strategy 
It has already been argued that a study of political behaviour in top management teams is 
problematic due to the difficulty in gaining access and the sensitivity of the subject 
matter. Consequently the research strategy and particularly the data collection method 
was shaped largely by the constraints. The prefered methodology had to be re-worked 
around them, thus supporting Buchanan et al's (1988, p. 54) remark that "... in the conflict 
between the desirable and the possible, the possible always wins. " 
The original intention was to use a three stage data capture strategy. An interview 
followed by a questionnaire and then a longitudinal diary issued for six months for the 
purpose of `tracking' the day-to-day political behaviour of senior managers in addition to 
any critical incidents that occured when initiating large scale organisational strategic 
change (Buchanan et al, 1988; Hoffman, 1980; Zimmerman and Weider, 1982). 
However, the questionnaire and longitudinal diary were abandoned after the participants 
of the pilot study unanimously argued that because of the time constraints placed on top 
management team members, individuals would agree to only one. It was argued that 
chasing up questionnaires and diary extracts could be construed by participants as 
harassment. Thereby damaging relationships and jeopardising the possibility of future 
access. Echoing the suggestion of Lee (1993, p. 1 15) that diaries "can be burdensome on 
the respondent", Niall Trent, one of the general managers, remarked: 
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"Senior managers tend to dislike paperwork so you would be hard pushed 
to find anyone who would fill it in even occasionally, and when there is a 
big change they simply won't have the time. The other thing you have to 
remember is that you are asking them to make a written record of their 
political behaviour and that of their colleagues. I think I would be just a 
little bit concerned about somebody else taking a look at it. I know I could 
lock it up or take it home with me, but lets face it, it's a hassle I could do 
without. " (Niall Trent, general manager) 
The pilot participants advised that it was reasonable to expect that a request for a one and 
a half hour interview, rather than one hour only, would prove to be acceptable. After 
being interviewed with the proposed semi-structured schedule they contended that with 
some minor reshaping on the question sequence and style, it was fair to expect that both 
specific details and `rich' anecdotal data could be collected in the revised time frame. 
Neil Thames, the managing director, stated that because intraorganisational politics is an 
emotive issue it was likely that a number of participants would be prepared to extend the 
interview in order to "find out if they used similar practices to senior managers in other 
companies. " 
Therefore, it was decided that an elite style semi-structured interview represented the 
best opportunity to collect insightful data for three reasons. Firstly, the researcher 
already enjoyed access to the desired sample through an established professional and 
personal network of contacts, thereby avoiding the need to resort to a time consuming 
`cold-calling' (random sampling) strategy. Secondly, the high levels of trust and rapport 
which existed between the interviewer and the participants helped to create a permissive 
information giving atmosphere, thereby off-setting the problem of investigating a 
sensitive research topic. The third reason was that the interview situation, unlike the 
questionnaire or longitudinal diary permits the interviewer to probe into partially 
revealed and alluded to areas. For these reasons it was contended that a questionnaire 
and longitudinal diary would not generate the same high levels of candour and richness. 
Nevertheless, the interview is not without its limitations. Kahn and Cannell (1957) have 
asserted that researchers enter the interview with a unique set of motives, goals, loyalties 
and attitudes which can manifest themselves during the interview and constitute a source 
of bias, thus influencing or directing the interviewee towards providing answers they 
otherwise might not. The interviewer effect, as this is known, can distort the data 
materially in both the collection and analysis stages. It can be further compounded by 
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bias in the questions. Moser and Kalton (1971) noted that a leading question is one by 
which its content, wording or structure directs the respondent to answer in a certain 
manner. Chisnall (1992, p. 148) contends that both the interviewer effect and question 
bias can be minimised by thorough preparation on the part of the researcher. 
Implementing this advice the questions and style of questioning were tested and refined 
during the pilot study. 
Other data sources such as participant observation were rejected because the participants 
of the pilot study suggested that political behaviour tended to take place behind closed 
doors on a one-to-one basis where it could not be observed. Often for reasons of secrecy 
and deniability on the part of the participants. It was suggested that members of top 
management teams were extremely unlikely to grant access to a researcher for the 
purpose of observing political behaviour. In the unlikely circumstances that they did, the 
presence of a researcher would distort the normal behaviours of those being observed to 
such a degree, the interaction would be unrepresentative. Consequently shadowing an 
executive over several days or weeks was neither viable or desirable. Ethnographers 
such as Burns (1977), Dalton (1959) and Watson (1994) believe strongly in the merits of 
conducting longitudinal on-site research. Watson argues that, "In ethnography, then, 
there is a coming together of the `everyday' thinking of the `subjects' of the research and 
the body of academic knowledge to which the researcher has access", (Watson 1994, 
p. 7). The problem with the approaches of academic investigators such as Burns (1977), 
Dalton (1959), Jackall (1988) and Watson (1994) is that their method cannot avoid 
polluting the organisational system they enter. Watson, for example, is quite open in 
revealing his hand and intent, "I was no neutral fly-on-the-wall in ZTC Ryland and I was 
not `collecting' attitudes and other data like a naturalist netting butterflies. Like any 
other social researcher I was influencing those I was researching... ", (Watson, 1994, p. 7). 
Watson is correct in his assertion that all researchers influence those they investigate, but 
although the ethnographer has a first hand opportunity to form their own impression of 
what is taking place the degree of supposed richness is counteracted by the strength of 
shaping on the behaviour observed. There is no doubt the ethnographer is influencing 
the reality they are reporting. Therefore, even if the resources had been available to this 
researcher it was decided that the price of prejudice was too high and that elite-style 
semi-structured interviewing provided a more informatively impartial interpretation. The 
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issue of not being able to observe events directly was offset partially by cross-checking 
accounts with interviewees and comparing interview notes which gave accounts of the 
same situation. 
The idea of using group interviews was discarded for much the same reason as 
observational techniques. All five participants of the pilot study argued that a very low 
level of candour would be present in the data collected by this method. Ian Tay stated 
that respondents would `cleanse' their answers in the presence of colleagues in order to 
protect their relationships and status within the top management team. Video cameras or 
microphones were rejected on the basis that even if participants consented to their 
presence they were once again likely to present a sanitised and inaccurate picture of their 
political behaviours. 
Having considered the research strategy and advocated the use of an interview the 
participants of the pilot study commented on the matter of gaining access. 
I 
Gaining access 
The unanimous position of the five participants was to exploit any professional and 
personal ties to gain privileged access and establish a research sample of fifty members 
of top management teams. With regard to the physical process of gaining access, the 
primary advice was to behave professionally. One of the general managers remarked: 
"Some academics, including research students, seem to think they 
automatically demand respect because they work at a university, and that 
makes them somehow more intelligent than you are. They are high- 
handed on the phone, arrive late and dress like they have just come back 
from some hippie convention. You are left in no doubt that they are doing 
you a favour and not the other way around. " (Joe Clyde, general manager) 
It was suggested that the initial contact should be made by telephone rather than letter, 
which lends itself more easily to a delay in communication, or indeed no communication 
at all. The participants suggested the most likely course of action was for the manager's 
secretary to ask for a written request. Consequently they proposed preparing a 
standardised `information sheet' explaining the researcher's link with the proposed 
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interviewee or organisation, academic background, research request, a promise of 
confidentiality and an offer to share the results. This would then be faxed immediately 
following the telephone conversation. It was strongly recommended that under no 
circumstances should any reference be made to the intention to study political behaviour. 
Dexter (1970) offered the following advice to researchers: 
"Use some general phrase which the interviewee can interpret for himself. 
Do not be any more precise than you absolutely have to be about what you 
are looking for. " (Dexter, 1970, p. 49) 
The five participants argued that a successful research request to a top management team 
member should stimulate curiosity, encourage altruism and acknowledge the exclusivity 
of the targeted individual. The researcher should make it clear they welcome the 
opportunity to learn from the manager's experience and will feed back a report of the 
results. Concuring with these views Dexter (1970) commented: 
"Probably, the greatest value which many interviewees receive --the 
reason why they enjoy the interview- is the opportunity to teach, to tell 
people something. " (Dexter, 1970, p. 37) 
Prior to transmitting the information sheet by facsimile a time was agreed with the 
manager's secretary when the potential participant's reply would be given. At the 
researcher's prompting this was typically within twenty-four hours. In every instance 
the return phone call yielded a positive reply. Once again on the advice of those who 
took part in the pilot study, interviews were set up at the participant's convenience, 
usually within a month, at the organisation. A review of the literature makes it clear that 
a hundred per cent success rate is very unusual although Dexter notes that Heard (1950, 
p. 891) claimed to enjoy levels in excess of ninety-nine per cent. In assessing why this 
was so it can be argued that using a combination of professional and personal ties where 
a strong previous relationship existed was of considerable assistance. Furthermore, the 
advice of five current members of top management teams (of which three have 
conducted PhD research) concerning the process of how to successfully approach senior 
managers was consistent, unambiguous and insightful. Finally, a commitment to 
punctilious time keeping helped to convey a seriousness of intent. 
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The interview 
The third area of feedback from participants related to interview style and question 
issues. 
Interview style. It was strongly recommended that a time contract be established at the 
beginning of the interview so questions could be prioritised and the schedule modified if 
necessary. Commenting on the interview style it was suggested by all five participants 
that members of top management teams would be more comfortable with an interview 
that appeared to be a two-way discussion rather than a one-way data extraction process. 
This appears to confirm the assertions of several writers including Burgess (1984) who 
prefers to think of "interviews as conversations" and Blum (1952) who describes such 
exchanges as "interview-conversations". Dexter (1970, p. 56) who commented that he 
finds discussion more enlightening than "rat-a-tat-tat questioning", remarked: 
"It is my experience and impression... that many elite interviewees dislike a 
steady flow of questions... They would prefer a discussion, or still more, 
perhaps, something which sounds like a discussion but is really a quasi- 
monologue stimulated by understanding comments. Often, at any rate, I 
try to handle the relationship as discussion -two reflective men trying to 
find out how things happen, but the less informed and experienced one 
(the interviewer) defering to the wiser one and learning from him. " 
(Dexter, 1970, p. 56) 
It was argued by the participants of the pilot study that this would encourage the richer 
`story telling' which portrays political behaviour in organisations more vividly. Josh 
Severn, the director, suggested that in order to elicit such anecdotes a useful ploy would 
be to stimulate the conversation with stories from the literature and, after concealing 
their identity, other participants and organisations. 
Question issues. It was advised, in the context of interviews as discussions, that the 
number of questions should be reduced from thirty to between fifteen and twenty as this 
would permit respondents to answer at more length. Minichello et al (1990) noted 
Askham's (1982) support for this strategy: 
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"She proposes using the device of asking questions in such a fashion that 
the informant would respond with a story. The rationale for encouraging 
stories is that they can be used as part of the process of analysis 
specifically for purposes of clarification. " (Minichello et al, 1990, p. 117) 
It was also recommended that with a research topic as sensitive as political behaviour, 
closed questions would make the interviewee feel threatened, eliciting taciturn, 
incomplete and unrepresentative responses. The participant would not have the 
opportunity to justify or elaborate. Therefore, six closed questions were removed. Josh 
Severn remarked: 
"Don't go asking dumb questions like `do you think politics are good or 
bad for company performance? ' because most people will feel compelled 
to say they are bad. Likewise don't ask `do politics exist in your 
organisation? ' because people will say something like `no more so than in 
other organisations'. You must avoid asking unconsciously loaded 
questions. I would suggest that you make it clear to them that you 
recognise politics are a fact of company life and that everyone gets 
involved. Once the baseline has been drawn you can move on to asking 
what they actually do, getting them to give you examples. " (Josh Severn, 
director) 
The final advice from the participants of the pilot study was to re-order the questions so 
that the non-sensitive enquiries on large scale change were at the beginning. Ian Tay, the 
senior manager, refered to them as "warm up questions". Gradually the focus would 
shift to political behaviour by way of saying that those proposing large scale change 
must gather support, and when necessary overcome resistance. Participants would then 
be asked about their own experiences. The issue of coercion would be tackled towards 
the end of the interview. Once again this approach finds support in the literature with 
Mostyn (1985, p. 135) recommending the `funnel' technique so that contentious issues 
are investigated in the latter stages of the interview. 
It can be concluded that the pilot study was highly influential in helping to shape the 
research strategy, planning how to gain access, and structuring the process and content of 
the interview situation. Being able to discuss the research strategy and test the interview 
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schedule greatly assisted in tightening up the methodology as well as making it more 
robust and operational for the fieldwork phase. 
Once the pilot studies had been concluded and the modifications had been made to the 
interview schedule the next task was to make contact with the selected participants. 
Selecting participants and managing identity to establish access 
It was argued earlier in this chapter that in seeking to conduct an empirical investigation 
into the political behaviour of top management team members, the sensitivity of the 
research topic combined with the difficulties of gaining access, presented a 
methodological problem for the researcher. Observing the advice of both Buchanan et al 
(1988) and Hoffman (1980) professional and personal ties were used to gain access to 
fifty members of fourteen top management teams in thirteen industries in the UK private 
sector. 
We noted earlier with regard to personal ties that two members of the researcher's 
family, both of whom occupy senior management positions in different organisations, 
used their internal and external networks of contacts to introduce nineteen members of 
top management teams in eight organisations across seven industries. The researcher's 
own professional ties were used to gain access to thirty-one members of top management 
teams in six organisations across six industries. Exhibit 4.3, which uses pseudonyms to 
preserve anonymity, illustrates how the research sample of fifty participants was 
constructed. 
Random sampling, although avoiding subjective bias and personal choice, was rejected 
after the participants of the pilot study contended that cold calling was unlikely to recruit 
fifty respondents. They argued further that respondents selected by random sampling 
methods were unlikely to be as candid as respondents who were selected on the basis of 
professional and personal ties, since individuals with whom there is an established 
relationship are more likely to reveal potentially damaging information about their own 
behaviour and that of colleagues. The need to establish a level of trust sufficient to elicit 
data quickly was imperative because on the advice of the senior managers who took part 
in the pilot study, the interview was designed to last only one and a half hours. The 
consensus was that because of the difficulty in gaining access to top management teams, 
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and the sensitivity of the subject involved, methodological purity in the form of random 
sampling was unlikely to generate the same level of candour as could the more 
opportunistic approach of exploiting professional and personal ties. Hoffman (1980) 
found that it was to her benefit to publicise her family's relationship with the senior 
managers who constituted the target sample. 
`By chance during one interview, my respondent discovered that he knew 
a member of my family. `Why didn't you say so? ' The rest of the 
interview was dramatically different from all my previous data [collected 
by interviewing a representative sample]. I was presented with a very 
different picture of the nature of board work... The sudden richness of this 
data, once my informant discovered that he `knew' me, signalled the 
importance of the researcher's identity in field research. Who I was or was 
perceived to be influenced the information to which I would be given 
access. The management of my identity thus became an important aspect 
of my research strategy. " (Hoffman, 1980, p. 46-7) 
Strongly associated to the non-probability sampling method of using professional and 
personal ties is the highly effective technique of `snowball sampling'. As Burgess 
(1990) explained: 
"This approach involves using a small group of informants who are asked 
to put the researcher in touch with their friends who are subsequently 
interviewed, then asking them about their friends and interviewing them 
until a chain of informants has been selected. " (Burgess, 1990, p. 55) 
In his study of managers rules for survival and success in organisations, Jackall (1988) 
conducted sixty interviews across four firms (chemicals, defence contractor, textiles and 
public relations) by snowball sampling through professional and social ties. 
Of the fifty participants twenty-six were contacted directly. Then by snowball sampling 
nine of those individuals were responsible for introducing a further twenty-four people to 
the researcher. A criticism of this approach is that the researcher is `given' respondents 
who they would not select themselves. The fear being that the informants and their data 
will prove to be unsuitable or unrepresentative. However, it can be argued that this risk 
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Exhibit 4.3 - Research sample 
established using professional 
and personal ties 
Raven 
Mallard 
Hawk Nightingale Rook 
Knight 
Plum Silver 
Gold 
Birch 
Key 
O Source of 
professional or 
personal tie 
O 
Sponsor/contact 
Direct contact 
(professional or 
personal tie) 
Indirect contact 
(snowball sampling) 
Ash 
Brown 
Elm 
Roach 
is mitigated in top management teams since they are often relatively small in number, 
and the researcher can stipulate the selection criteria to the sponsor so that only 
individuals appropriate to the study are introduced. 
Minnow Dace 
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In this study sponsors were informed that any person they introduced to the researcher 
had to be a member of the organisation's top'management team. That is to say, the key 
strategic decision making group. Where sponsors introduced multiple participants they 
had to ensure that a representative cross-section of functions and seniority within the 
team. Clusters of individuals from Single grades or functions were rejected. 
Managing identity to establish access 
The process of gaining access to top management team members followed the advice 
offered by the participants of the pilot study. With regard to describing the area of 
research, `political behaviour', was avoided , 
in favour of the more anodyne "top 
management team interpersonal dynamics in the context of large scale organisational 
change. " Commenting on whether to fully disclose the research topic Punch (1994, 
p. 91) quoted Gans (1962): 
"If the researcher is completely honest with people about his activities, 
they will try to hide actions and attitudes they consider undesirable, and so 
will be dishonest. Consequently the researcher must be dishonest to get 
honest data. " (Gans, 1962, p. 91) 
Advocating discretion rather than dishonesty Buchanan et al (1988) remarked: 
"When asked to state research aims in writing, we do so on one page only, 
ensuring that while accurate and clear it reveals as little detail as possible. " 
(Buchanan, Boddy, and McCalman, 1988, p. 57) 
The issue of whether to announce the full nature of the research topic at the outset is also 
debated by Brannen (1988, p. 553) who suggested that it is preferable to let it emerge 
gradually during the interview. Thus giving the interviewer more time to establish a 
rapport with the interviewee and create a permissive atmosphere in which to ask the 
more sensitive questions. 
The assertion that the research topic is an important yet under-researched area was also 
used. The intention was to convince the potential participant their contribution would be 
highly valuable. It was implied that by participating they would be helping to expand 
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the existing knowledge base. Consolidating on this, it was stressed that the findings 
would be fed back into the literature base. Commenting on this issue Buchanan et al 
(1988) observed: 
"Most people are flattered by reasonable requests to talk about themselves, 
and to pass on their experience, where they know it will be used in an 
academic context, to help with a project or on educational courses. The 
opportunity to reflect on one's working life systematically and to extract 
valuable lessons for others can be an extremely 'satisfying, but rarely 
experienced, process. " (Buchanan et al, 1988, p. 57) 
Bert Starling, the managing director who gave six hours of his time, explained that he 
had done so because he liked to "help those starting off on their careers. " Wood (1980) 
found much the same when as a PhD student investigating people's reactions to 
redundancy, the managers of the firms affected agreed to allow him access because they 
thought it would help with his education. They accepted that there would be little if any 
benefit in terms of improved company performance. Punch (1994) appears to confirm 
that altruism encourages participation when he claims that "older" researchers who are 
established in their academic careers, may find it difficult to gain access, whereas: 
"A young student, however, may be perceived as non-threatening and may 
even elicit a considerable measure of sympathy from respondents. " 
(Punch, 1994, p. 87) 
The logic being that because a respondent sympathises with the difficulties faced by a 
young researcher they will seek to assist them by being more candid than they would to 
an experienced interviewer of whom they would be more cautious. As we will consider 
in a later section of this chapter, there is strong evidence to support the claim that the 
respondents in this study did provide candid accounts of political behaviour in top 
management teams. 
On the issue of confidentiality all participants were assured complete anonymity both for 
themselves and their organisations. It is common practice for researchers to offer their 
subjects protection, and when studying sensitive topics where disclosures can be 
distressing or problematic if attributed to a particular individual it becomes even more 
important. A number of writers support this stance: 
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"In general, there is a strong feeling among fieldworkers that settings and 
respondents should not be identifiable in print and they should not suffer 
harm or embarrassment as a consequence of research. " (Punch, 1994, 
p. 92) 
"Because the objects of inquiry in interviewing are human beings, extreme 
care must be taken to avoid any harm to them. " (Fontana and Frey, 1994, 
p. 372) 
"Pseudonyms have long been used in published reports to disguise 
research sites and research participants. " (Barnes, 1979, p. 136-7) 
"Clearly, if respondents are to reveal backstage information about 
themselves, they need to be confident that it will not be used against them 
in any way. " (Hoffman, 1980, p. 49) 
Lee (1993, p. 188) summarises this debate by advocating that fieldworkers exercise "self 
censorship" when writing up and publishing research. The case for adhering to this 
appears to be particularly strong when the participants are high profile volunteers and the 
subject is as potentially salacious as intraorganisational power and politics. 
Conducting the interview: parameters and permissive atmospheres 
The aim of this section is to discuss several issues pertaining to the interviewing of top 
management team members and specifically the relationship between interviewer and 
interviewee. 
It has already been argued that elite style semi-structured interviewing can be an 
effective method of obtaining rich, candid data. The semi-structured approach permits 
the interviewer to depart from the schedule and probe into partially revealed and alluded 
to areas for highly detailed accounts of incidents that substantiate and expand on the 
interviewee's initial responses. However, in order to accomplish the desired collection, 
employing a semi-structured interview format by itself is insufficient. The interviewer 
must establish unambiguous parameters identifying the area of discussion and create an 
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information giving environment, the latter of which was described by Blum (1952, p. 38) 
as a "permissive atmosphere". 
Establishing unambiguous parameters is an integral part of creating a permissive 
atmosphere. Hoffman (1980) argued: 
"... interviews are social encounters in which respondents are influenced by 
how they perceive their interviewer and the nature of the research. " 
(Hoffman, 1980, p. 56) 
Clarity of purpose and objectives ensure that both parties are aware of what is expected 
of them. Therefore, each interview commenced with a brief introduction of the 
academic background of the interviewer, the research purpose and the research objective. 
The parameters were clearly identified as being the interviewee's experience of initiating 
large scale organisational change. In accordance with the suggestions of the pilot study 
and the research methodology literature, the researcher's link with the interviewee or 
host organisation was strongly emphasised (Buchanan et al, 1988; Dexter, 1970; 
Hoffman, 1980). Then having played heavily on that association the permissive 
atmosphere was encouraged further with an assurance of confidentiality. Fontana and 
Frey (1994) contend that if the benefits of trust -candid insights- are to accrue to the 
interviewer then subjects should be guaranteed: 
"Protection from harm (physical, emotional, or any other kind). " (Fontana 
and Frey, 1994, p. 372) 
Observing the recommendation of Hoffman it was stated explicitly that it was not one of 
the aims to portray either the individual or the organisation in a detrimental light, and 
that all confidences would be respected. 
A permissive atmosphere is desirable because it encourages what Spradley (1979) 
refered to as a "free flow of information. " As we have already noted in an earlier section 
Burgess (1984) likened interviews to conversations and Blum (1952) spoke of 
`interview-conversations'. In the context of political behaviour in top management 
teams, permissive means first of all getting participants to admit that politics exist in 
their organisations, and secondly they personally engage in political activities. It was 
found that in addition to promising confidentiality and making an issue of the 
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professional or personal ties the researcher enjoyed with the individual or host 
organisation, exchanging stories of politics in organisations with the interviewee 
encouraged candour. 
There is strong support in the literature that a two-way interview process elicits richer 
data than does the traditional survey type interview (Adler and Adler, 1992; Johnson, 
1975; Scott, 1965; Wax, 1952). Commenting on one of her research student's attempts 
to interview `elite' groups using a one-way schedule, Fine (1994, p. 73) suggests that they 
are usually articulate enough to present a "bump free story" if they so chose. The classic 
one-way scheduled interview is not sufficiently sophisticated to draw a more honest 
account. Ann Oakley (1981, p. 49), writing on the need to engage with the interviewee, 
claims there can be "no intimacy without reciprocity. " She argued interviewers should 
be willing to divulge information in order to gain information and that doing so 
motivates the interviewee to be more honest and forthcoming with details they would be 
unlikely to reveal otherwise. 
Neil Thames, the managing director who took part in the pilot study advocated a candid 
exchange of information because he believes it provides the interviewer with an 
opportunity to demonstrate they are highly knowledgeable about the research subject and 
worthy of serious participation and input. He further contended that a senior manager 
faced with an interviewer who eschews interaction and asks only those questions on the 
schedule, will quickly become bored and arbitrarily decide when they have given enough 
information. Thames posited that many researchers miss collecting rich data because 
they "choose not to work for it. " He concluded that interviewers "only get out what they 
put in. " Remarking on the one-way versus two-way debate Fontana and Frey (1994) 
commented: 
"Interviewing is currently undergoing not only a methodological change 
but a much deeper one, related to self and other. The `other' is no longer a 
distant, aseptic, quantified, sterilised, measured, categorised and 
catalogued faceless respondent, but has become a living human being... if 
we treat the other as a human being, we can no longer remain objective, 
faceless interviewers, but become human beings and must disclose 
ourselves as we try to learn about the other. " (Fontana and Frey, 1994, 
p. 373-374) 
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A further benefit of the interactive interview, described by Dexter (1970, p. 139) as the 
"transactional interview", is that it can offset and even equalise the power differential 
between the interviewer and the interviewee. A number of authors including Finch 
(1984), Graham (1983) and Mishler (1986) have written about the issue from the 
traditional scheduled survey interview perspective in which power tends to reside with 
the interviewer because as instigators they attempt to determine the obligations of the 
interviewer whilst electing for non-disclosure themselves. However, Lee (1993, p. 105) 
has remarked that in elite interview situations power is more likely to reside with the 
interviewee. Firstly, because they are usually senior individuals in their organisation and 
are therefore used to being in a position of authority, and secondly because they possess 
the knowledge the researcher seeks they are in a position to share or restrict it to the 
degree they chose. 
The participants of the pilot study indicated that members of top management teams 
were likely to have no qualms about refusing to answer a particular line of questioning if 
they were unsure of the interviewer's motives. Interaction and the exchange of sensitive, 
anonymous, information helps to make motives more transparent as well as assuring the 
respondent that they have not disclosed anything more sensitive than several other 
participants also have done. Indeed it was found that relaying highly sensitive, but 
anonymous and untraceable accounts, induced a sense of empathy which resulted in 
respondents opening up as they sought to demonstrate that they too had major political 
issues to deal with. For example, on informing one individual of a respondent who in 
previous employment had lied to auditors about the value of stock, he replied that only 
the week before he had to deal with an individual who was holding and possibly 
distributing cocaine on company premises. Thus it can be argued that reciprocity, in 
addition to facilitating empathy and intimacy, permits the researcher to demonstrate to 
the senior executive that they are a knowledgeable individual and worthy of serious 
input. 
There are yet two further advantages to the interactive interview which need to be 
considered. Firstly, there is no need to establish a "front", as advised by Measor (1985), 
who speaks of the classic one-way interview as an "unnatural situation". He suggests 
that richness is gained by being natural rather than deceptive. Secondly, it helps to 
reduce the challenges to authority which Breakwell (1990) warns the survey type 
interviewer to expect since authority is usually an issue of little importance in a trusting, 
intimate and permissive atmosphere. 
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It can be concluded that bilateral semi-structured interviews can generate data from 
members of top management teams that is richer, more insightful and candid than can be 
captured by the traditional survey type interview. This is because the latter does not 
motivate the interviewee into giving extended replies or permit the interviewer to probe 
into partially revealed or alluded to areas. It was found that the desired permissive 
atmosphere could be created by establishing unambiguous parameters and promising 
confidentiality at the outset, and then engaging in reciprocity with regard to political 
stories and sensitive information during the interview. 
Data analysis 
Comprehensive notes were taken in the interviews in accordance with Fontana and Frey 
(1994) and Lofland (1971) who advised the interviewer to write everything down, 
irrespective of how important it seemed at the time. Heeding the advice of Yin (1984) 
the notes were transcribed within twenty-four hours. Content analysis was then used to 
analyse the transcripts. 
Content analysis has several advantages. Firstly, it is unobtrusive and does not influence 
the replies of the respondent because it is conducted away from the interview setting 
(Krippendorf, 1980). Secondly, it synthesises qualitative aspects such as the finding of 
patterns in the respondent's language with an attempt to quantify those patterns in terms 
of the frequency of words, phrases, sentences, themes, or paragraphs used (Carney, 
1972; Krippendorf, 1980; Mostyn, 1985; Weber, 1990). It is reasoned that a higher 
count indicates a more significant pattern than does a low count. However, a high 
frequency may be the result of the interviewer posing leading questions so the approach 
is not without fault. A third advantage is that it uses the interviewee's language and 
concepts to establish categories unlike questionnaires which are precoded using the 
researcher's and thus introduce bias into the results. Fourthly, it is extremely useful for 
identifying specific areas of interest which can be chased up as `hot leads' in a second or 
third round of interviews as was the case in this study. Additionally, the findings may 
suggest areas for future research. 
Thematic units, as advocated by Holsti (1969), were used to conduct the content analysis 
rather than words, phrases, sentences or paragraphs which were rejected because 
respondent answers were relatively focused as a result of unambiguous parameters 
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having been established at the outset of the interview. Specialised software is available 
which automates the analysis but it was not used here because of the focused responses 
and the relatively small number of participants. Content analysis was therefore 
conducted manually. 
Gorden's (1978) four step procedure as described by Mostyn (1985) was used as the 
framework for conducting content analysis: 
"(1) listen and read critically; (2) [ask] probing questions of the data - 
what is the meaning?; (3) look for meaningful relationships; and (4) 
synthesize, arrive at some solution about the data. " (Mostyn, 1985, p. 116) 
[parentheses added] 
Berelson (1971) described content analysis as a "process of discovery, defining and 
redefining one's ideas. " It has been argued that content analysis has a number of 
strengths. Nevertheless, it also has its limitations. In addition to the problem of leading 
questions refered to earlier, there is the possibility that an individual's responses may 
have been influenced by atypical events in the time immediately preceding the interview. 
Had they not occured then the participant's responses may have been considerably 
different. This criticism is not unique to content analysis. It is a problem shared by 
other data capture techniques such as participant observation and questionnaires, and can 
only be offset when the research strategy adopts a longer time frame in which to conduct 
the study. 
After careful consideration of the advantages and limitations it was determined that 
given the problems of access to top management teams, the sensitivity of political 
behaviour as a research topic, and the need to employ an elite interviewing strategy in 
order to collect candid anecdotal data, content analysis was thought to represent the most 
appropriate means of data analysis. 
Following up 'hot leads': rich interviews revisited 
It was argued in the previous section that one of the strengths of content analysis is its 
use in identifying areas of interest for further examination. Having completed the 
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analysis of fifty interview transcripts several areas emerged from the data. These 
included: 
  The existence of a five stage life-cycle within large scale change proposal coalitions, 
  Three coalition leader roles which evolved throughout the five stage life-cycle of the 
large scale change proposal coalition, and 
  Four distinct approaches to building a large scale change proposal coalition, based on 
the hierarchical position of the coalition leader. 
In order to explore further the areas of interest six participants who had provided 
particularly rich data on these topics in the original interviews were contacted and 
invited to take part in a two hour interview. The objective was to capture data in the form 
of anecdotal stories which fleshed out the findings of the initial analysis. 
The interviews which took place in the participants' offices were subject to content 
analysis and the findings are presented in the results section. The decision to follow up 
the `hot leads' was taken on the basis they strengthened the claims made from the initial 
content analysis. 
Assessing the level of participant candour 
The question facing every qualitative researcher who uses interviewing to investigate 
behaviour is `how candid were the participants? ' For those studying sensitive topics 
such as political behaviour the question becomes central to assessing the validity and 
relevance of the data collected. It can be argued that participants were candid in their 
responses for four reasons: 
  There existed a relatively high level of trust between interviewer and interview 
because participants were selected on the basis of professional and personal ties, 
  Sensitive off-the-record asides were commonplace, 
  Non-verbal communication intimated high levels of enthusiasm and honesty, and 
  Respondents volunteered more time and input than was requested. 
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Participant selection on the basis of professional and personal ties 
The alternative merits of detachment and intimacy between interviewer and interviewee 
have been debated by a number of writers. For example Wolff (1950, p. 404) cited 
Simmel's proposition that "the stranger often receives the most surprising openness - 
confidences which sometimes have the character of a confessional. " Similarly, Oakley 
(1981) though ultimately advocating intimacy, contends that the single interview 
encourages an "ethic of detachment" which in turn facilitates penetrative questioning 
because the interviewer is not required to build a relationship since they will not meet 
the interviewee again. Advocates of detachment also believe that `distance' between the 
interviewer and interviewee improves the accuracy, completeness and representativeness 
of the data obtained because the latter does not try to please the former by "giving the 
right answers" (Dexter, 1970). 
Supporters of intimacy on the other hand suggest that a close relationship between 
interviewer and interviewee is more likely to produce an honest account because once 
trust has been established the interviewee will impart more sensitive and informative 
data because they believe their contribution will be treated fairly. Laslett and Rapoport 
(1975) have also argued that there is a need to avoid the "surface" account which is 
typically given in a one-off detached interview. Ribben (1989) noted Cornwell's (1984) 
discussion of Douglas's (1971) distinction between public and private accounts to argue 
that "it will take... quite a lengthy research relationship, before you can hear a private 
rather than a public account, " (Ribbens, 1989, p. 580). 
Selecting participants on the basis of professional and personal ties as advocated by 
Buchanan et al (1988) and Hoffman (1980) enabled several positive attributes of both 
detachment and intimacy to be derived from a single interview. Interviewees were not 
aware of the researcher's opinions on political behaviour and so were unlikely to give 
what they thought were the "right answers". However, because of the professional and 
personal ties they were willing to trust that their confidences would not be abused. A 
supposition supported by Hoffman (1980, p. 50) who remarked that her respondents 
thought she "would `understand' their perspective and would present their points of view 
`fairly'. " This claim can be substantiated further with several examples. 
George Lark, a managing director who knows this researcher's parents well, stated at the 
beginning of the interview, "ask me whatever you want, you're one of the family". Luke 
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Sparrow a chairman with more than forty years experience said "I know your father so I 
know I can trust you. " Explaining why he could "open up to me", one of the chief 
executives, Nigel Kingfisher, remarked: "Your uncle and I always sink a pint whenever 
he's in town and I know he thinks a lot of you. That's good enough for me. Fire away! " 
Such comments were typical rather than atypical and meant that after a short preamble 
establishing educational background and the purpose and nature of the interview, the 
questioning could begin. 
With regard to the researcher's professional ties with five participant organisations, one 
had been the subject of a consultancy/research undertaking with Professor David 
Buchanan in 1993. The newly appointed chief executive commented, "You have a track 
record. You were alright to us then, so I assume you will be now. " Having a `track 
record' helped gain access to another top management team which had previously 
contributed management time to the researcher's final year undergraduate dissertation 
research. The third company which is one of the largest companies in the world as 
measured by revenues had employed the author for nine months during his 
undergraduate studies. A letter to Roger Oak, the company's chief executive officer, 
explaining the research needs received an invitation to interview him and several 
members of his top management team. On reassuring him the researcher had no 
journalistic ambitions and everything he said would be treated in confidence he replied 
in a relaxed manner, "we have been good to you, I trust you will be fair with us". The 
issue was closed and the interview began. The fourth, fifth and sixth organisations were 
the result of contacts established during the period of employment with the third 
company. 
Sensitive off-the-record asides 
It can be argued that if individuals were concerned the information they supplied would 
be used indiscreetly, then they would conceal or at least be less candid in their responses 
so as to be perceived in a more favourable light. They would not disclose sensitive and 
potentially highly damaging details that conveyed a negative image of themselves or 
their organisation. Exhibit 4.4 provides four off-the-record accounts offered by 
interviewees. Their identities have been withheld. 
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Exhibit 4.4 - Sensitive off-the-record accounts 
Account I- Lying to auditors 
Interviewer: "During my time with another company I lied to the auditors 
about how much stock we had and the value ofit. It meant 
that the company remained solvent when technically it wasn't. " 
Interviewer: "What happened'' 
Interviewee: "Neither the auditors or the stock exchange found out so the 
company maintained its credit rating, which saved it tens of 
millions of dollars in loan repayments. The share price stayed up 
too so it detered predators. " 
Interviewer: "Looking hack do you think what you did was ethical? " 
Interviewee: "It was illegal but it was ethical because I saved thousands of 
peoples jobs. The end justified the means so I would do it again 
tomorrow. " 
Account 2- Cocaine on company premises 
"Let me give you an example of the day-to-day problems I have to manage alongside 
change. Last week we found out that someone has been holding cocaine on the 
premises. At the moment we are trying to ascertain if he has been distributing it to other 
staff. What do we do'? Legally we should inform the police, but if we do that the press 
will find out and have a field day. I am sure you have heard the saying about washing 
your dirty linen in public. Well obviously we don't want to, but how do we protect our 
employees, the reputation of the firm and the guy himself? It's ironic but we will 
probably pay him to leave and keep his mouth shut. " 
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Exhibit 4.4 - Sensitive off-the-record accounts (continued) 
Account 3- Terrorism in the Palestine 
"I was at Harvard attending their Advanced Management Programme and this eighty- 
something professor was prowling backwards and forwards in the pit asking forty of us 
who had come from all over the world what we thought about the use and abuse of 
power in organisations. Suddenly this guy stood up and announced himself as one of the 
heads ofthe Israeli secret service. lie took the floor and began to tell us a story that put 
into perspective my problem of whether or not to sack a long term secretary who had 
been falsifying her time sheets. " 
I Ic cuntinuccl: 
The Israeli secret service had been trying unsuccessfully to capture the head of 
I-lezhollab for years when unexpectedly one day they were tipped off unexpectedly with 
information about the exact route and time lie would be travelling by car. As I said they 
wanted to take this guy out for years but the tip-off also said that his wife and new-born 
child would he with him. Ile had been responsible for the deaths of hundreds if not 
thousands of' Israelis over the years so they decided to kill him. They called tip three 
helicopter gunships and ambushed the car with rockets. " 
He concluded: 
"The Israeli said that the only way he sleeps is to think that his wife and child died 
instantly. 1 tell you the place was silent for minutes. Now for god's sake don't put my 
name to this because it is a small world and if it is read by a sympathiser I could be used 
to get revenge on my friend! " 
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Exhibit 4.4 - Sensitive off-the-record accounts (continued) 
Account 4- Sacrificial lambs on the alter of organisational change 
"I know from my discussions with Geoff (pseudonym for the now departed chairman 
and chief executive) that during our last transformation lie used what can only be 
described as sacrificial lambs to implement the most difficult and dirtiest change. These 
poor bastards were junior members of the top management team, just in their forties. 
They hardly saw their families because they gave everything to the company. Anyway 
Geoff used to call them in and fill them up with all this crap about how they would be 
promoted if they got the change in quickly and successfully. `Don't worry about making 
enemies' he would say, you have my patronage'. " 
After a pausing Ior a moment he continued: 
"Well these chaps would go and do what he said but they would piss so many people off 
that even though the change went through their position became untenable because no- 
one would work with them. Geoff would then ask them to leave for the sake of unity. I 
still see two of them. One has done well, and is high up in an American hank, but lie is 
still bitter about what Geoff did to him. The other one hasn't worked since. Mid forties, 
no job, his wife has left him and lie sees his kids one weekend in three. " 
Such asides despite their differing degrees of relevance to the study of power and politics 
are not the kind of disclosure made by someone who is concerned that they will be 
handled indiscreetly. Lee (1993) has argued that self censorship is an important attribute 
of the skilled researcher, particularly if the intention is to maintain access for future 
research, as it was in this case. Adler and Adler (1989,1992) concealed identities and 
withheld information about the findings from their investigations into the drug dealing 
and smuggling network established by one North American collegiate basketball team. 
In addition to wanting to maintain access rights, they also claimed loyalty to their 
interview subjects. They argued that to disclose particular elements of the data captured 
would have caused distress to many of the participants. 
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Non-verbal communication 
An important part of assessing the level of participant candour and the third of the four 
reasons presented here, is what Breakwell (1990, p. 81) and Gorden (1980, p. 335) refer to 
as non-verbal communication. Gorden notes there are essentially four types: 
"Proxemic communication is the use of interpersonal space to 
communicate attitudes, chronemics communication is the use of pacing of 
speech and length of silence in conversation, kinesic communication 
includes any body movements or postures, and paralinguistic 
communication includes all the variations in volume, pitch and quality of 
voice. " (Gorden, 1980, p: 335) 
Using these four terms it can be argued that the non-verbal communication of 
participants was indicative of high levels of candour. 
Beginning with proxemic communication and the use of interpersonal space. Of the fifty 
members of top management teams interviewed, forty-six had secondary seating 
arrangements (conference tables, coffee tables and sofas) in their offices. Of those, 
thirty-two chose to conduct the interview at the secondary site rather than on opposite 
sides of their main desk. Of the fourteen who did not begin the interview at the 
secondary seating arrangements twelve interrupted the interview to suggest the 
discussion continue in the more informal and comfortable secondary seating 
arrangements. Typical reasons given by the participants for doing so were that they were 
finding it "fascinating", "enjoyable" and wanted to spend more time than the ninety 
minutes which they had agreed to originally. 
With regard to chronemics communication there were relatively few periods of silence 
during the interviews. The only ones being when respondents were asked to think of 
examples which illustrated the political behaviour of colleagues. Speech tended to be 
evenly spaced although in terms of paralinguistic factors voices increased in volume and 
strength as participants became more animated. Examples of kinesic communication 
include the tendency for interviewees responding to highly sensitive questions to 
intensify eye contact and became increasingly mobile. Sitting forward, gesticulating 
with their arms, even standing up to pace around the room whilst recounting a story or 
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their opinion of a colleague's behaviour. In one instance a senior manager leaned across 
the desk until her face was a matter of inches from my own: 
"Let me tell you how it really is here. They all hate each other's guts. Oh, 
they're nice to each other's face but talk to them in private and it's all 
about covering their own ass while exposing everyone else's. " (Stacey 
Trout, senior manager) 
Such remarks, in addition to revealing the interviewee's opinion of the political 
landscape in her organisation's top management team, appear to support the claim that 
organisational politics is an emotive and sensitive topic for discussion. However, it 
tended to ignite highly animated and often lengthy discourses rather than a battening 
down of the hatches and a refusal to admit engagement for the purpose of achieving 
personal and organisational goals. Only one person ended the interview prematurely and 
the body language usually associated with unease and lying such as an inability to 
maintain eye contact, fidgeting from side-to-side in a chair, rubbing of the face and 
playing with one's clothing (Davies, 1991), were not observed. 
Indeed several participants concured with a number of writers (Brannen, 1988; Buchanan 
et al, 1988; Faraday and Plummer, 1979; Lee, 1981) who claim that participants in 
studies on sensitive or secretive topics can find the interview a cathartic experience. It 
was noted earlier that political behaviour is rarely talked about by practitioners and when 
it is, it is often associated with immoral or unethical behaviour. Therefore, to be able to 
discuss political behaviour openly in the context of serious academic enquiry into large 
scale organisational change was for many of the respondents their first experience, and 
in the words of several "interesting and enjoyable. " One director, Patrick Queen, 
remarked "I can't say anything to my colleagues about it or I would get stuck with labels 
such as `slick' and `self seeking', and although my wife listens to me she doesn't really 
know what it is like here. " 
Respondents volunteering additional time and input 
The fourth reason why it can be argued that high levels of accuracy, completeness and 
representativeness were captured in the data, is the amount of additional time and input 
participants were willing to commit to the research. 
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The level of interest was such that the average length of' interview was two hours and 
twenty-lour minutes, with the shortest at one hour and fitteen minutes and the longest at 
six hours in a single session. Indeed, with regard to the six hour interview Bert Starling 
ordered in refreshments so that "we didn't have to waste time going downstairs to the 
restaurant. '' Exhibit -1.5 conveys the range of' times that participants were interviewed 
for. 
It is important to note that the fieldwork was designed around a total of seventy-five 
hours of interviews. In fact, one hundred and twenty hours of interviews were 
conducted, with the average interview lasting two hours and twenty-four minutes: fifty- 
lour minutes more than the requested one hour and thirty minutes. This also adds weight 
to the claim that the interviews generated high levels of co-operation and issues of 
substance, worthy of serious academic consideration. 
It can he argued that a member of a top management team who is uncomfortable or 
bored by the research topic is unlikely to spend more time than was asked for. Similarly, 
it is unlikely that with the time pressures senior managers work under they would choose 
to extend an interview to provide inaccurate data. It is more feasible to suggest that they 
would curtail the interview. Only Colin Salmon was interviewed for less than ninety 
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minutes because he said that he had another appointment which had been brought 
forward and could not be rescheduled. Indeed, after over-running by fifteen minutes the 
one hour allocated, his next appointment was shown in as the interview was concluded 
satisfactorily. 
Once again, on the premise that participants were under no obligation to continue their 
input those who offered to be interviewed for a second and third times were clearly 
doing so out of choice. It is unlikely that someone would offer to participate in further 
research in order to lie or mislead. All fifty participants concluded the interview with an 
offer of further participation if necessary and a request to see the results section of the 
thesis. As we will see in the next section of this chapter the network of participants has 
been maintained for future research initiatives. 
Post interview correspondence 
Letters of appreciation 
Letters of appreciation were sent to each participant within twenty-four hours of the 
interview. Arrangements for sending the results section of the thesis were also detailed. 
On leaving the interview specific details were recorded which were then used to 
customise each letter. Ten participants proposed working with the researcher to develop 
a political tool-kit for senior managers, and five managers asked for advice on specific 
change management issues. 
Network maintenance 
In addition to revisiting a number of participants for second and third interviews to 
follow up `hot leads', the network has been maintained by telephone and letter 
correspondence. Commenting on the need to manage productive relationships one 
director who volunteered to take part in future research initiatives remarked: 
"You have to continuously refresh your network or it will die. Take any 
opportunity you can to speak to them. Let them know you are around and 
available and don't ring them just when you want something. Those who 
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put nothing into the relationship most likely will get nothing out. " 
(Geoffrey Silver, director) 
Following this advice has meant that the network has not only been maintained, it has 
been expanded as existing members have introduced the researcher to other members of 
top management teams. 
Conclusions, reflections and lessons learned 
It can be argued that on concluding investigations one of the most valuable questions a 
researcher can ask is `how could the research have been improved? '. Although 
retrospective analysis is central to action research it is uncommon to read an academic 
text in which the author laments a missed opportunity or contends that a methodological 
modification would have yielded data of greater insight or relevancy. Oakley's (1981, 
p. 41) remark that "interviewing is rather like a marriage: everybody knows what it is, an 
awful lot of people do it, and yet behind each closed door there is a world of secrets", 
could well be applied to research in general. Perhaps because it is a luxury of the PhD 
student starting out on the academic research ladder, it is expected that mistakes will be 
made. Sanders (1980) remarked that it is not possible to "learn the ropes" of being a 
researcher without the misfortune of experiencing "rope burns". In this spirit the final 
section will attempt to identify what `could have been' and the methodological lessons 
learned. 
The methodology was driven by two issues: the difficulty in gaining access to members 
of top management teams, and the sensitivity of political behaviour as a research topic. 
The problem of access was overcome by adopting an opportunistic approach which 
involved the researcher making use of professional and personal ties with senior 
managers in order to establish a sample of fifty participants. However, this meant that 
methodological purity in the form of random sampling was compromised, and because 
of the relatively small sample size quantitative techniques were also rejected. Thus, an 
opportunity was missed to integrate quantitative and qualitative methodologies which, if 
they had been supportive of one another in their findings, undoubtedly would have meant 
that stronger claims could have been made from the data. 
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The decision to use professional and personal ties was taken for two reasons. Firstly, by 
utilising a network of fifty individuals known to either the researcher, his father or uncle, 
every participant was known to be a member of their respective top management teams, 
and each was known to be a key decision maker capable of proposing large scale 
organisational change. Secondly, because of the established relationship that existed 
with participants, either directly or indirectly, there was a high level of trust and rapport 
which helped to overcome the problem of investigating an issue as sensitive as political 
behaviour. Thus, it was determined in conjunction with the participants of the pilot 
study, there was a greater likelihood of capturing candid and insightful data using 
professional and personal ties, than by using random sampling techniques, which 
although methodologically pure, could not guarantee that key decision makers had been 
accessed until the interview was under way. 
The lesson learnt from this is that although researchers often strive for methodological 
purity by random sampling, it does not always follow that it will generate data of the 
same high quality as can be captured using non-probability methods such as professional 
and personal ties. However, non-probability methods are not a soft option. Indeed if any 
claim can be made, it is that the justifications for adopting such an approach must be 
more fully explained, rigorous and robust. 
Having dealt with the issue of sampling and methodological purity, a further question 
can be posed: `was the access fully exploited? '. 
This inevitably focuses attention on the questions asked of the participants and the 
instrument used to ask them. In terms of the questions posed it can be argued it was 
appropriate to reject Eisenhardt and Bourgeois's (1988) strategy of investigating the 
political behaviour of top management teams in relation to a single large scale change 
decision. Each person had different levels of involvement and input into decisions so 
some individuals would have yielded highly useful data while others would have been 
able to yield data of negligible value. Thus it can be posited that in this situation the 
access is not being fully exploited. Secondly, the researcher needed to have access to all 
the members of the team who were involved in the single decision. This was not a 
facility enjoyed on this occasion. The researcher's access ranged from just one member 
of a top management team to fifteen members, but then the unit of analysis for this study 
was the individual in the role of coalition leader, not the top management team as a 
group, as was the case in Eisenhardt and Bourgeois's (1988) study. 
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The pilot study was found to be an extremely valuable and worthwhile experience. The 
five participants offered practical advice on gaining access, interview style, question 
format and managing the researcher's identity. With three of the five participants 
holding PhDs their advice was particularly useful from an academic perspective. 
Without the recommendations of top management team members it is likely the one 
hundred per cent acceptance rate would not have been achieved. The interviews also 
enabled the researcher to practice the elite style interview method in a safe environment. 
The five individuals provided feedback and coaching on how to engage members of top 
management teams in a candid discussion of their political behaviour. 
Having discussed the methodology design and construction for research into the political 
behaviour of top management team members in the context of proposing large scale 
change, let us turn to a consideration of the results. 
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Part two 
Results, discussion and 
recommendations 
Participant organisations 
and interviewees 
Researcher's note on anonymity 
In providing candid accounts of political behaviour in large scale change proposal 
coalitions, top management team members who participated in the research expressed 
strong concern about how their responses would be treated. They sought reassurance that 
all input would be treated confidentially and anonymously, and that it would not be 
possible for a reader to connect any remark to an individual or organisation. 
To honour this commitment aliases have been used to conceal the identity of participants 
in the reporting of the methodology design and construction, and the results. The 
following page provides the names of the participant organisations. The two subsequent 
pages give the list of aliases and their organisational titles in hierarchical and 
alphabetical order. To secure the anonymity the list is not grouped by organisation, so a 
director of one organisation is placed next to an individual with the same title from 
another organisation. 
Appendix B offers a brief description of each organisation's activities. 
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The organisations 
Anglian Water PLC 
Barclaycard Limited 
BP PLC 
Brent Walker Limited 
Britannia Building Society Limited 
Gallaher Tobacco Limited 
Karen Earl Limited 
Olivetti Limited 
Perfect Pizza Limited 
Scott's Hotels Limited 
SWALEC PLC 
Syntex Pharmaceuticals Limited 
Whyte & Mackay Limited 
Yorkshire Building Society Limited 
Note: Organisation names are those at the time of research. Flotations, acquisitions and 
mergers mean that some no longer use the same name. 
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The interviewees 
Alias 
Luke Sparrow 
Roger Oak 
Brian Carp 
Simon Falcon 
Nigel Kingfisher 
Kurt Nightingale 
William Wren 
Peter Ash 
John Yew 
Arthur Kestrel 
Richard King 
George Lark 
Colin Salmon 
Bert Starling 
Annie Swallow 
Derek Barbel 
Scott Bishop 
Andre Char 
Michael Gold 
Fred Hawk 
David Knight 
Sylvester Martin 
Louise Pike 
Patrick Queen 
Geoffrey Silver 
Paul Swan 
Fraser Tench 
Dick Tern 
Gordon Black 
Francis Elm 
Title 
Chairman 
Group chief executive officer 
Chief executive officer 
Chief executive officer 
Chief executive officer 
Chief executive officer 
Chief executive officer 
Chief executive officer - geographic region 
Chief executive officer - geographic region 
Managing director 
Managing director 
Managing director 
Managing director 
Managing director 
Managing director 
Director 
Director 
Director 
Director 
Director 
Director 
Director 
Director 
Director 
Director 
Director 
Director 
Director 
General manager 
General manager 
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Alias 
Charles Rook 
Steven White 
Robert Willow 
Ann Cherry 
Tom Chub 
Mark Finch 
Matthew Mallard 
Anthony Perch 
Sam Raven 
Ian Roach 
Owen Rudd 
Phillip Birch 
Ray Bream 
James Brown 
Graham Dace 
Christopher Green 
Andrew Minnow 
Leonard Plum 
Sally Ruffe 
Stacey Trout 
Pilot study interviewees 
Neil Thames 
Josh Severn 
Joe Clyde 
Niall Trent 
Ian Tay 
Title 
General manager 
General manager 
General manager 
Head of function 
Head of function 
Head of function 
Head of function 
Head of function 
Head of function 
Head of function 
Head of function 
Senior manager 
Senior manager 
Senior manager 
Senior manager 
Senior manager 
Senior manager 
Senior manager 
Senior manager 
Senior manager 
Managing director 
Director 
General manager 
General manager 
Senior manager 
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Chapter 5 
Life-cycle phases and leadership 
roles in large scale change 
proposal coalitions 
"Designing a major change effort takes time and as the coalition evolves, 
going through emotional ups and downs, you have to modify your style 
and manage the journey. " (Roger Oak, CEO) 
Introduction 
This chapter presents findings in relation to line of enquiry #1 which sought to 
investigate whether or not large scale change proposal coalitions in top management 
teams followed a life-cycle, and if so, the characteristics of each phase. It also presents 
findings regarding line of enquiry #2 which was concerned with identifying and 
describing the variations in the roles of a coalition leader across the life-cycle phases. 
We will present evidence to support the claim that large scale change proposal coalitions 
follow a five phase life-cycle model within which coalition leaders adopt three leadership 
roles. To the extent the three subsequent chapters provide an in-depth examination of the 
micro-behaviours and tactics of the coalition leader, the intention here is to establish a 
context by examining the evolutionary process, and the role of the coalition leader within 
it. The findings constitute a pioneering breakthrough into the nature and characteristics 
of large scale change proposal coalitions, and the roles of a coalition leader. No other 
empirical research has been conducted into these formative stages of the change process. 
One hundred and twenty hours of interviews conducted with fifty members of top 
management teams in fourteen organisations across thirteen industries found evidence to 
suggest that large scale change proposal coalitions followed a five phase life-cycle. The 
phases are: 
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  Phase 1- Initiate, 
  Phase 2- Build, 
  Phase 3- Sustain, 
  Phase 4- Dissolve, and 
  Phase 5- Capture and transfer learning. 
Furthermore, participant responses indicated that within these five phases coalition 
leaders tended to perform three primary, and typically sequential, roles. The roles are: 
  Builder, 
  Sustainer, and 
  Dissolver. 
Before examining the three roles let us consider the process in which they were used. 
A five phase life-cycle model 
Analysis of the results suggested the majority of large scale change proposal coalitions 
discussed by respondents conformed to a five phase life-cycle. As noted in the 
introduction the five phases can be labelled usefully: initiate, build, sustain, dissolve, and 
capture and transfer learning. Exhibit 5.1 illustrates the phases and the importance of 
capturing and transfering learning to subsequent large scale change proposal coalitions 
for the purpose of improving alignment and cohesiveness, and therefore the likelihood of 
submitting a proposal that is approved for implementation. 
Phase 1- Initiate 
A member of a top management team must bring an idea for large scale change to the 
attention of colleagues if it is to move from concept through design to implementation. 
The coalition building process was found generally to begin in one of two ways. Either 
an individual would have an idea that was entirely new to the organisation, or secondly 
and more commonly, the idea had been discussed already in sections of the top 
management team but no action had been taken. Commenting on the latter Roger Oak 
remarked: 
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"I think coalitions usually start with a common view being held by a few 
members of the executive team. What was probably an off-the-cuff 
remark starts people thinking and a few days or weeks later it's mentioned 
again. Before too long a few people come to thinking maybe there's a 
significant opportunity. At this point most ideas die because people are 
too busy, or they don't want the hassle. Those that make it through are 
thanks to someone who creates energy and enthusiasm, and is prepared to 
stand up and say we should do this'. " (Roger Oak, CEO) 
Concuring with this sentiment, Brian Carp asserted: 
"Someone has to take the bull by the horns if it seems a great opportunity. 
I am always amazed at how many people are prepared to sign up once 
someone else takes the initiative. " (Brian Carp, CEO) 
To generate interest the respondents stressed the importance of selling the idea. Selling 
strategies tended to focus on promoting the benefits for the organisation, but coalition 
initiators would also emphasise the personal benefits for individuals who took a leading 
role in designing the change. At this stage of a coalition's life-cycle initiators were not 
usually in a position to offer tangible incentives since there was no certainty a coalition 
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would be formed. The principal activity can be described best as `sounding out' a few 
potential key members. Therefore, initiators tended to draw attention to the high level of 
visibility within the top management team the potential initiative would likely enjoy due 
to the magnitude of intent. The inference being that coalition members could expect to 
enjoy a high profile amongst senior colleagues. 
An important factor in a large scale change idea finding support in the top management 
team was the issue of timing. The prevailing organisational environment, both internal 
and external, strongly influenced whether an idea would be accepted as legitimate and 
encouraged to proceed to the next phase. Respondents argued that the two most 
important elements of timing were the flexibility of the current strategy and the degree to 
which the idea conformed with or opposed the organisation leader's vision. The other 
most cited reason for coalition formation was agreement on the appropriateness of the 
proposed change in confronting the issues facing the organisation. Other important 
factors included pressure from investors to find new opportunities to improve 
performance, maximise current and anticipated future profit streams, and the desire for 
strategic reorientation amongst colleagues in the top management team. The following 
series of remarks are indicative of the broader body of opinion: 
"It is quite common for someone to have a great idea that falls flat because 
it is simply the wrong time. If the mood at the top is not conducive it is a 
waste of time. " (Robert Willow, general manager) 
"Great company politicians and leaders are acutely aware of expectations, 
both in the City and amongst their own managers. They know when their 
position is safe or under threat, and the best ones know how to play their 
hand and when they need to pull an ace from their sleeve. " (Scott Bishop, 
director) 
"If management attention is focused in a different direction you have no 
chance. The most successful ideas, in terms of winning support quickly, 
are those that confront the major issues facing the business. If you can 
create a burning platform, people will jump into your boat. " (Geoffrey 
Silver, director) 
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These contentions appear to find support in the literature. For example, Mintzberg 
(1984) argued that if the external context was favourable to an internal proposal it was 
more likely to be accepted by the organisation's key decision makers. Pfeffer (1992) 
commented that timing was a critical success factor in winning and mobilising support 
around strategic issues. Pennings (1980) and Scherer (1967) found that mature or 
stagnant industries represented a fertile ground for entrepreneurial propositions. 
Phase 2- Build 
Once an idea for large scale change had received initial support from a few individuals, 
the next phase was to build a coalition of supporters drawn from the top management 
team. The purpose of the coalition was to design an initiative that convinced a critical 
mass of the key decision makers the proposal should be implemented. Evidence was 
collected which suggests that coalition member selection was determined largely by the 
magnitude and complexity of the change to be designed. In situations where the 
organisation would undergo planning aimed at making radical improvements to its 
current operations, members tended to be recruited from the areas of the business that 
would be affected. However, if the business intended to transform and reorient itself in a 
new direction, the membership was more diverse. Individuals who could be described as 
hierarchical heavyweights were teamed with those who had a strong track record in 
designing successful strategies for major change, and experts in the markets the 
organisation planned to enter. Those individuals with formal seniority, the hierarchical 
heavyweights, were invited to join because of their ability to advocate the change 
credibly at the highest level. Individuals who enjoyed informal seniority and those with 
a proven track record were enlisted because of their ability to firstly, incorporate 
learnings into the proposal and secondly, leverage their experience to influence key 
decision makers. Experts were used because of the technical knowledge and insights 
they could bring. The rationale behind the composition of coalitions was captured 
succinctly by William Wren who remarked: 
"If what is being planned is more of the same but better, then you use 
those currently in control of the areas in question. As no-one is 
threatening their turf, confrontation is unlikely and anyway, they know 
their business best. On the other hand, if the proposal is for something 
completely new, politics becomes an issue since there will be winners and 
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losers. Therefore, it is vital you cover all the bases. You need some of the 
most senior people, you need people who have been around a long time 
and have the opinions listened to, and you need enough undisputed experts 
to make sure the plan is bullet proof. " (William Wren, CEO) 
Members were also chosen on the basis that the coalition leader or key members had 
previously enjoyed a productive working relationship with them, or alternatively they 
trusted their judgement and motives. The early stages of coalition formation was found 
to be conducted in almost all instances by the leader alone. However, once the coalition 
had several members, the decision to approach an individual for support tended to be a 
collective one. 
Evidence was also gathered which indicated that the first person a coalition builder 
approached for support was determined largely by the builders' hierarchical position in 
the top management team. Four different approaches were identified. The chairman, 
chief executives and managing directors demonstrated one approach, while directors 
adopted a second, general managers a third and heads of function and senior managers a 
fourth. 
The chairman, eight chief executives and six managing directors tended to approach an 
individual with informal seniority to be the first member. The consensus was that 
winning the support of an executive respected for their experience, perceived wisdom 
and membership of various networks sent a positive message to other key constituencies 
within and around the top management team. On the other hand, the thirteen directors 
would solicit the support of an expert in the first instance. They asserted the office of 
director invested sufficient decision making power in them to develop large scale change 
proposals without seeking permission from the chief executive. Experts were recruited 
because for directors, the most important objective at the outset of coalition formation 
was the need to demonstrate the viability of the proposal. The directors suggested that 
winning support was easier with the backing of experts. The five general managers 
unanimously agreed that the first person they sought support from was the chief 
executive or managing director. The argued that a public endorsement from the most 
senior member of the organisation improved the credibility of the proposal. The 
seventeen respondents who held positions as heads of function or senior managers 
attempted to recruit an individual with informal seniority to act as the first sounding 
board for how the chief executive and other key decision makers were likely to receive 
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the proposition. The full sequence of each of the four approaches is discussed 
comprehensively in the following chapter which focuses on the building phase of a 
coalition's life-cycle. 
Coalitions were built at various speeds. Time frames ranged from several days to several 
months. Respondents across all hierarchical levels suggested the pace of coalition 
formation was contingent upon the criticality of the proposed change to the business and 
the immediacy with which it would impact. Coalitions were often established more 
quickly if the change proposal was critical to the short-term success of the organisation. 
However, proposals which recommended the rapid adoption of major structural changes 
acted as a brake on formation as top management team members jockeyed for positions 
that protected and promoted their own interests. 
Criticality and immediacy of change were two factors that contributed to the emergence 
of opposition. Large scale change proposals that intended to reconfigure the power 
structure within the top management team tended to provoke the formation of rival 
coalitions which submitted alternative options. The first two of the following comments 
were provided by respondents who had witnessed opposition being mounted to their 
coalitions. The second two remarks were made by individuals who had established 
coalitions to counter the intentions of those proposing structural change: 
"Once you go public to the executive about the need to restructure you can 
bet your bottom dollar that resistance will begin. This makes it important 
to get your pre-emptive strike in first. I always draw up a list of who I 
want in the coalition, and I approach the key people first before somebody 
else wins their ear. " (Andre Char, director) 
"I think it is quite useful to know who stands where. Open opposition is 
much easier to deal with than subversive opposition. `Better the devil you 
know... ' sort of argument. I don't think I have ever been involved in 
strategic change when there haven't been at least two opposing camps. " 
(Michael Gold, director) 
"... it was quite a simple decision really. I thought my division was being 
threatened unfairly so I put together a coalition to recommend a different 
strategy. If I had sat by and watched we would have been stuffed. Instead 
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we are still here, and are now one of the most profitable divisions. I 
wouldn't say this to anyone here, but it probably did give us a kick up the 
backside, so in the end it wasn't a bad thing. " (Patrick Queen, director) 
"Executives are always going to have different view on how things should 
be run. That's what we are paid for. I didn't agree with Ronald's [name 
changed] idea so I proposed a different course of action. " (Sam Raven, 
senior manager) [parentheses added] 
The consensus amongst participants was that although competing coalitions caused 
tensions in top management teams, they also encouraged rival factions to improve the 
rigour and robustness of their proposals. It was claimed that in most cases conflicts were 
resolved once a winning proposal had been successfully implemented. Coalition 
building is discussed in more depth in chapter six. 
Phase 3- Sustain 
With a coalition established, its members began to design the large scale change 
proposal. The most effective coalitions were found to be those that were aligned and 
cohesive. If a coalition's members were unified in their objective and approach and 
worked together in a team-like manner, they had a greater likelihood of submitting a 
winning proposal than coalitions without these features. Interviewees who had been 
members of aligned and cohesive coalitions described the experience with adjectives 
such as urgent, exciting, focused and co-ordinated. The following remarks project an 
image of resolute co-operation: 
"I cannot think of a more enjoyable way of working than to be a vital cog 
in a well oiled wheel. There was an air of anticipation because we knew 
we were going to make a difference. " (Andrew Minnow, senior manager) 
"People become very intense, and goal driven. Everybody draws on each 
others' strengths. It is a huge learning experience. " (James Brown, senior 
manager) 
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"We had daily meetings and progress updates. We did our project risk 
assessments, we mapped out deliverables and designed activities 
accordingly. We had all the angles covered. We always felt in control. " 
(David Knight, director) 
One of the most notable characteristics of coalitions during the sustaining phase was that 
the morale of members tended to ebb and flow in response to several factors. This was 
particularly so in coalitions that were not aligned and cohesive. The determinants of 
morale included dissension within the coalition, the fortunes of opposition coalitions, and 
resistance from individuals in the top management team. With regard to the first of these 
it was found that in coalitions other than those which exhibited aligned and focused 
characteristics, interviewees reported that the coalition leader had to spend a significant 
percentage of their total time on sustaining the coalition. Respondents suggested that 
members engaged in dissenting behaviour for three key reasons. Firstly, if the change 
proposal was highly contentious. Secondly, if members were pressured by colleagues in 
the top management team to leave the coalition or join another initiative. Thirdly, if the 
coalition culture became one in which individuals sought to maximise their self-interest. 
The following selection of comments provide support for these assertions: 
"People are emotional beings and transformations hurt people. Fear of the 
unknown and an unwillingness to damage relationships, make it easy to 
see why some individuals baulk at having a hand in the execution of 
friends and colleagues. " (Graham Dace, senior manager) 
"I have been in situations where I have been invited to leave one coalition 
and join another. When the person who asks is more senior, or it is 
someone you respect or are friends with, it takes guts to say no and put 
your career and friendships at risk. People get nervy, and some leave. " 
(Charles Rook, general manager) 
"I think the worst type of group to be in is one where everyone is out for 
themselves. As soon as it becomes known that one person is doing it, 
everybody else dives in to see what they can get. In my experience it is a 
downward spiral from there on and there is little chance of coming up with 
a proposal that is likely to beat off the others. " (Gordon Black, general 
manager) 
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The second apparent reason for swings in members' morale were the fortunes of 
opposition coalitions. Respondents described how members of coalitions would engage 
in gamesmanship in order to unsettle rivals. Accounts were given of individuals 
spreading rumours about the `real' intentions of coalition members. The most common 
was the claim that large numbers of job losses were a hidden part of the proposal that 
would be announced only after the proposal had been approved for implementation. A 
more personalised tactic was to create a rumour that the coalition leader along with other 
key members planned to remove other coalition members from the top management team 
and even the organisation, once the proposal had been accepted. Justifying such 
behaviour, George Lark explained: 
"I am sure it does sound unethical to an outsider but you have to remember 
we are playing for high stakes. People's futures are up for grabs. Now 
what's that quote?... 'The meek shall inherit the earth', yeah that's right, 
what the winners decide to leave! " (George Lark, managing director) 
The third assertion from interviewees regarding the ebb and flow of coalition members' 
morale was the resistance of individuals in the top management team. In the course of 
preparing a proposal, members of the coalition had to work with colleagues who were 
outside the coalition. Market data, financial projections, operational strategies, company 
alliances, and new product development plans were some of the more typical information 
requests. Executives who believed they were likely to lose out under the plans were 
often reluctant to co-operate. Colin Salmon commented: 
"You begin to think you are trying to make water travel uphill. " (Colin 
Salmon, managing director) 
Coalition members found meetings difficult to arrange, documents mislaid, income 
projections hastily revised upwards, strategies re-crafted, and staff advised to ignore 
information gathering requests. 
This analysis appears to paint a bleak picture of coalition life, but the evidence suggests 
that sustaining coalitions is a tense time for members, rival coalition members and top 
management team colleagues alike. It appears that large scale change proposals which 
threaten the power structure stimulate conflict, as individuals who stand to lose out in the 
changes battle to protect their self-interests. It is an acknowledgement of the strain 
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caused between people who have to work together in both their everyday duties and on 
large scale change initiatives, that the consensus amongst interviewees was for coalitions 
to be dissolved as soon as practically possible once a decision on the proposal had been 
taken. A comprehensive discussion on the findings regarding sustaining coalitions is 
presented in chapter seven. 
Phase 4- Dissolve 
Coalition dissolution tended to be a deliberate affair conducted by the chief executive 
officer and coalition leader, unless both roles were occupied by the same individual. 
Large scale change design initiatives were high profile projects, and members of 
successful coalitions, expected to be rewarded for their input. Participants in 
unsuccessful submissions were keen to extract themselves with minimum damage to 
their careers. It is important to stress that in many cases unsuccessful bids were not 
viewed as failures by the top management teams, since their rivalry had improved the 
quality of the successful bid. Roger Oak provided support for this contention when he 
asserted: 
"It is my belief that the purpose of coalitions is to design strategic change 
options. Whether they are implemented there and then is not important. 
We put them on the shelf to be used if and when appropriate. We all need 
to accept that options are perishable and have a limited shelf life, but if we 
learn something from each effort then it is has been worthwhile. " (Roger 
Oak, Group CEO) 
Turning his attention to the issue of dissolution he suggested: 
"People, either as individuals or small groups, can become very powerful 
when designing the future of the firm. There is a danger they introduce an 
unhealthy dynamic into the top management team if they are allowed to 
exert undue influence over the strategic process. Colleagues would 
become resentful, and rightly so. Therefore, it is important to disband a 
coalition quickly and efficiently. " (Roger Oak, CEO) 
He continued: 
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"My management team is successful because it is stable. Everyone 
accepts they will get an opportunity to work on these projects, and they all 
recognise that some will be taken forward and some won't. People know 
that to progress any higher they have to prove themselves many times in a 
range of areas and roles. The crucial point to get across is that everyone 
signs up to these rules because they are naturally fair. It is my job to make 
sure that stability is maintained. " (Roger Oak, Group CEO) 
Participants argued that successful coalitions allowed to continue intact, often re- 
configured the existing power structure within the organisation. As a consequence of this 
top management team members would engage in destructive political behaviours in an 
attempt to restore the status quo or improve their position. Reductions in co-operation, 
teamwork and information sharing were the most frequently cited examples. Executives 
took umbrage at having their decision making powers eroded or usurped, and claimed 
they were usually a precursor to structural change. The consensus was that coalitions 
which became permanent were dysfunctional for organisational performance. The 
majority of interviewees also concured with Roger Oak's comment that to gain 
promotion to the most senior ranks of the top management team, individuals had to 
demonstrate large scale change design ability on a number of occasions. This served to 
encourage coalition members to seek new opportunities sooner rather than later, and so 
acted as a stimulant for dissolution. 
Dissolution of successful coalitions was characterised by members negotiating for 
reward. Examples included pay rises, bonuses, share options and new roles and 
responsibilities. Commenting on this Patrick Queen stated: 
"If it is the third or fourth time you have played a key role in a coalition, 
and on each occasion the proposal was a good one, then it is right that you 
are recognised. Negotiating skills are important because in most 
companies, you get rewarded with as little as it takes to keep you. If you 
know you are good and that you have options outside the firm, then you 
should push for what you think is reasonably due. " (Patrick Queen, 
director) 
He concluded: 
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"I am sure my position as a director is the result of me pushing for it. I 
enjoy working here so I don't want to leave, but I think I am respected for 
not being an easy touch. " (Patrick Queen, director) 
It was also common for members to seek key roles during the implementation of the 
approved change. Individuals whose area of the business was impacted by the change 
reasoned they could exert more influence if they held an operational role. Interestingly, 
evidence was collected which indicated that individuals whose area of control could be 
described as adjacent to the main area impacted, took key positions in order to extend 
their control. Three instances of marketing departments taking control of sales strategy, 
and five occasions in which geographic heads expanded their territories to include 
neighbouring countries were provided by interviewees. 
Dissolution of coalitions which had submitted poor quality proposals was characterised 
by members apportioning and avoiding blame, whilst seeking new opportunities to 
improve or reaffirm their reputation within the top management team. The following 
remarks were made by individuals who had been involved in both types of activity: 
"Everyone is allowed to slip up once or twice. A company will never be a 
market leader if its management won't take risks. But it's important to 
avoid getting tagged as someone regularly associated with failed 
proposals, so you have to CYA [cover your ass]. You need to create the 
impression that the key decisions were made by someone else, or you went 
along with them for the sake of unity. Take some blame because that 
shows you are a team player, but don't chuck your life away. " (Fraser 
Tench, director) [parentheses added] 
"A couple of years ago I had a bad run, and I needed to get back into 
contention. So I kept myself upbeat and visible, making it clear that I 
wanted another opportunity. Eventually I was given a chance and since 
then I have slowly made my way back into favour. If things aren't going 
well you have to get in there and push because no-one else will do it for 
you. " (Mark Finch, head of function) 
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Once a coalition had been dissolved the final phase in its life-cycle involved the capture 
and transfer of key learning points for use on other large scale change proposal 
initiatives. 
Phase 5- Capture and transfer learning 
Learning capture and transfer tended to be conducted simultaneously by the coalition 
leader and individual members of the coalition. Coalition leaders were found to be 
interested primarily in identifying process learning points. Several coalition leaders held 
a learning event in the weeks following dissolution. All coalition members were invited 
to attend, and most of the events were facilitated by someone from outside the coalition, 
or indeed, the organisation. Members were asked to provide evidence of what went well 
and areas for improvement. The following comments convey the various approaches 
used by coalition managers: 
"I like to go back to the beginning when I first began approaching people. 
I ask who else we should have had on board and why. I then run 
chronologically through every major element of the design and ask what 
we did well and what we didn't. " (Geoffrey Silver, director) 
"Usually I ask people to consider how things went from a process 
perspective, a technical perspective, a team perspective, and a man- 
management perspective. " (Fred Hawk, director) 
"I think the toughest but most important aspect is hearing about my own 
performance. If you are going to succeed at the top it is because you can 
get people to work effectively with you. Sometimes you have to take it on 
the chin and learn. " (Brian Carp, CEO) 
In addition to or instead of the learning event some coalition leaders approached coalition 
members on a one-to-one basis. Luke Sparrow, the chairman, suggested the advantage of 
this approach over the learning event was that people were often more candid in their 
feedback. He also related how several groups he had observed developed a "pack 
mentality" during feedback sessions with the result that coalition leaders received an 
unfairly negative and depressing account of their performance. Luke Sparrow concluded 
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that this was more than likely due to members "getting frustrations off their chest" as 
coalition leaders tended to "upset everyone at least once during the preparation of the 
proposal. " 
As well as coalition leaders capturing and transfering learning, members also took the 
initiative. However, rather than focusing on the process, what went well and what could 
be improved, they were interested primarily in building networks and establishing 
productive working relationships. Interviewees described webs of informal micro 
coalitions within their top management teams. Typically relationships between two or 
three individuals which existed discreetly in the top management team. Sylvester Martin 
explained: 
"I am sure you have heard the saying, `it's not what you know, it's who 
you know'. Well it is absolutely true. People get things done through 
others and working in a coalition is an excellent way of getting to know 
what makes an individual tick and what they are really made of. " 
(Sylvester Martin, director) 
Echoing this sentiment, Matthew Mallard asserted: 
"Relationships are the life blood of politics. Without them you are totally 
ineffective. You can't achieve anything by yourself. " (Matthew Mallard, 
head of function) 
Members of networks and micro coalitions discussed ideas for potential large scale 
change proposal initiatives and co-operated with each other to further their shared 
agendas. Participants also admitted assisting each other by sharing privileged 
information on future strategy and promoting one another's interests in formal meetings 
and behind-the-scenes discussions. Christopher Green refered to this as "working the 
system. " 
Within the three core life-cycle phases of large scale change proposal coalitions -build, 
sustain and dissolve- leaders were found to adopt one primary role in each. We will 
now examine each in turn. 
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Three coalition leadership roles 
To the extent phases two, three and four were the core periods of activity in which the 
change proposal was prepared and submitted, evidence was found to support the 
contention that coalition leaders adopt specific roles in each of them. The three roles 
were: 
  Builder, 
  Sustainer, and 
  Dissolver. 
As Exhibit 5.2 conveys, the builder and dissolver roles were more convoluted, 
encompassing phases one and two, and phases four and five respectively. However, the 
roles were played out to a significantly lesser degree in these phases and this is 
represented by the lighter shading in the exhibit above and below the builder and 
dissolver roles respectively. 
Exhibit 5.2 - Five life-cycle phases and three leadership 
roles in large scale change proposal coalitions 
Phase 
1 
Coalition life-cycle phase 
Initiate 
Builder 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Build 
Coalition leadership role 
Sustain 11 Sustainer 
Dissolve 
Lýý 
F 
Dissolver 
Capture and transfer learning 
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Role 1- Builder 
The significant majority of a coalition leader's time in phase two was spent building the 
coalition. This process was characterised by one-to-one support gathering sessions in 
which the coalition leader attempted to persuade individuals to join the initiative. In 
describing their roles and the skills required, participants stated they relied heavily on 
selling and negotiating skills and the need to adapt the approach for each candidate. The 
following two remarks expand on these findings and underline the importance of 
preparing before the one-to-one meetings take place: 
"I believe that you have to be a good salesman. If you are going to ask 
people to stake their reputations on your idea, you have to be passionate 
about it. You have to convince them the changes will be good for the 
business and good for them. I always practice my arguments first by 
drawing a `Mind-Map' which I break into four quadrants with 
opportunities and threats for the business and individuals. I then rehearse 
my arguments before I go meet people. The `Mind-Maps' are useful for 
identifying concerns they are likely to raise. " (Anthony Perch, head of 
function) 
"I find the key skill to have is the ability to negotiate hard. Sometimes you 
have to lean on people and call in favours if the transformation appears to 
be high risk, but it is important to be flexible because people are switched 
on by different things. " (Colin Salmon, managing director) 
He suggested: 
"Before I go in I write up lists of what is on the table for discussion and 
what is not. Obviously, if the person putting the team together is at the top 
then the weapons at their disposal are more varied. If, on the other hand, 
they are not as senior then they are more limited in the scope of what they 
can and cannot do. I think if you are lower down then you are probably 
restricted to offering roles rather than things such as pay raises and 
promotions. " (Colin Salmon, managing director) 
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Interviewees reported that persuasion tactics included: stressing the importance of the 
planned change to the future of the organisation, aligning the target's future with the 
organisation's, offering personal incentives to join, and using colleagues in the top 
management team to influence the prospective member's decision. We will now 
consider each of these in turn. 
The prefered tactic of coalition builders was to win support by emphasising the 
importance of the proposal to the future success of the organisation. Louise Pike's 
description of how she persuaded several colleagues to join her coalition, is 
representative of the stories provided by other respondents: 
"I try to take the person off-site for lunch or at least a drink. That way it 
creates the impression that what we are discussing is out of the ordinary. 
It also takes them out of their territory and me out of mine, so we don't 
have any work baggage with us. " (Louise Pike, director) 
She continued: 
I always make sure I know as much as possible about the person I am 
talking to, particularly their views on the way the company should go 
forward. I begin by outlining the main elements of my idea. I am careful 
to express it in ways that I know will strike a chord. Once I have gained 
their interest, I let them do most of the talking and then steer things back to 
next steps. The discussion usually ends with an agreement to develop a 
proposal and a list of other potential members. " (Louise Pike, director) 
In making the case for preparing the proposal the builder would lay the foundations for 
aligning the target's future with the organisation's. Interviewees asserted that members 
of top management teams were constantly on the look-out for opportunities to take a 
leading role in major change. Coalition builders would play on the importance of being 
seen to move with the tide, and the opportunities that would be created for early 
advocates and designers of programmes which improved competitiveness. 
If a potential member required yet further persuasion to join, builders would offer 
incentives. As noted in the quote above from Colin Salmon, the type of incentive was 
dependent largely on the hierarchical position of the builder within the top management 
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team. Incentives to more senior individuals tended to be restricted to key roles in the 
design and presentation of the proposal, while more junior individuals were offered 
inducements such as salary increases and new responsibilities. 
Most frequently used to support the other three tactics, the fourth commonly employed 
persuasion method was to use members of the top management team to influence and 
encourage a prospective member to join the coalition. Two individuals who particularly 
favoured this approach were Ann Cherry and Dick Tern: 
"I think people underestimate the power of others to persuade on your 
behalf. Once I have a few key individuals on board, I use them to build 
the coalition quickly. It makes sense because three or four people can put 
together a team of ten to twelve people much faster than one person can. I 
spend probably as much as fifty to sixty percent of my time with the first 
three or four making sure they have bought in and are able to sell the idea 
to the others. " (Ann Cherry, head of function) 
"Getting others to present your arguments for you is smart because it casts 
you in the position of leader from the start, and it proves to doubters and 
waiverers that you have influential backers. " (Dick Tern, director) 
To summarise, the role of the builder was to establish a coalition of top management 
team members for the purpose of designing and submitting a large scale change proposal. 
In phase three the role switched from builder to sustainer as the coalition started work 
and began to experience pressures such as resistance from the organisation. This new 
dynamic required a different mindset and approach. 
Role 2- Sustainer 
The primary objective of the coalition leader in their role as sustainer was to establish 
and maintain an aligned and cohesive team. According to interviewees this entailed 
motivating individuals, countering opposition and resistance outside the coalition, and 
managing dissension amongst coalition members. 
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The sustaining phase of a large scale change proposal could last several months, and it 
was not uncommon for the morale of members to suffer at various points in the process. 
For example, negative feedback or resistance from top management members in rival 
coalitions or concerns about the feasibility of the design were found to be a cause of 
reduced effort. Respondents contended that one of the main aspects of their role as 
leader was to ensure individuals were constantly motivated. As the following remarks 
indicate, a wide range of methods were employed to achieve this: 
"Regular team events are the way to do it. I try and arrange something 
different like ten pin bowling or a night at the theatre. " (Fraser Tench, 
director) 
"It is important to treat each case individually. I don't go for the stiff 
upper lip approach. I try to get to know my team intimately, and if 
someone is having personal problems and they need to ease off the gas to 
get things squared at home that's fine. These change planning projects are 
tough on families because they see so little of each other, and in my 
experience many of the problems can be sorted by giving people time off. " 
(Peter Ash, CEO) 
"Every few weeks I ask the chief executive or chairman to drop by and 
chat to the team over a working lunch. It really gives people a lift. " 
(Francis Elm, general manager) 
"Every week I try to spend at least fifteen minutes with each coalition 
member to find out if everything is going OK. It is so important to let 
people know you care about their state of mind and general welfare. I find 
most problems can be nipped in the bud if they are dealt with early 
enough... Grade has nothing to do with it, I have led teams with directors in 
and I know they have appreciated being treated properly. " (Steven White, 
general manager) 
"I think a good idea is to put plenty of milestones in place so people can 
see they are making progress. I also try to make it fun by offering prizes 
for daft things like the funniest quote of the week from a team member, or 
the wackiest idea. " (Sally Ruffe, senior manager) 
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Coalition leaders were also keen to point out that motivation was used not only to raise 
morale, but also to ward off complacency. Whilst not seeking to depress coalition 
members, leaders claimed that on occasion they had destabilised individuals with 
criticism and mild threat in order to encourage higher levels of commitment and output. 
In addition to motivating members the sustaining role of a coalition leader also involved 
countering opposition and resistance outside the coalition. It was noted in the earlier 
discussion about phase three -sustain- that rival coalitions and members of the top 
management team, who stood to lose out if the proposed change was approved, had been 
found to be responsible for mounting sabotage campaigns. The broad body of opinion 
amongst interviewees with experience of managing the problems caused by non-coalition 
members, argued that their task was not only to deal with manifest resistance but also to 
predict it whilst still in its latent form. The comment of Simon Falcon summed up this 
contention: 
"I see my job as steering the ship, but I also have to spend a lot of time up 
in the crows' nest looking at the horizon for signs of trouble. I think once 
you have led these types of projects a few times you develop an ability to 
see into the distance. You begin to sense when things are about to go 
wrong. " (Simon Falcon, CEO) 
Support was also found from Bert Starling who found networks a useful early warning 
system: 
"If you wait until the shit hits the fan, then you have failed as a manager. 
You don't become deaf when you plan major change, although I do think 
there is a tendency to get your head down and become overly task focused. 
I make a point of staying in regular contact with trusted colleagues outside 
the team, and I usually hear rumours through them. " (Bert Starling, 
managing director) 
The third aspect of the sustainer role was managing dissension amongst coalition 
members. Dissension was found to be correlated with highs and lows in morale. The 
lower the morale the greater the tendency for dissension. The evidence collected 
indicated that coalition leaders regarded their role as part healer, part executioner as the 
following assertions demonstrate: 
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"I said earlier that I don't believe in that `stiff upper lip crap' If someone 
is misbehaving it's normally for a good reason. If it is something 
reasonable then I will try and remove the cause of the problem for that 
person. Management teams are too small and people have too long a 
memory to have a high mortality rate. " (Peter Ash, CEO) 
"If it is just one or two people causing trouble I try and sort it out first of 
all myself. If that fails then I ask other coalition personnel to lend a hand. 
If they have no success and the individuals in question are threatening the 
chances of success then they are off the team. " (Derek Barbel, director) 
"If there is one thing it is stupid to tolerate, it is dissension. If people have 
a problem with me or what we are doing, then either I didn't explain it 
properly when I invited them to join, or they have not been straight with 
me about their commitment to change. There is no room for bullshitters 
because if you let them stay they will wreak havoc. Get them out 
immediately. " (Nigel Kingfisher, CEO) 
Role 3- Dissolver 
Dissolution was found to be conducted by the coalition leader and the chief executive 
officer, unless the two roles were occupied by the same person. The CEO, by virtue of 
their hierarchical position, was better placed to issue new roles and responsibilities, 
disperse members and appoint members on new projects. However, the coalition leader 
worked closely with the CEO during this process. 
Interviewees with experience of disbanding coalitions were unanimous in the assertion 
that an orderly, and well managed break-up was important for several reasons. Firstly, to 
enhance their own reputation and position themselves as a leader of future large scale 
change proposal and implementation initiatives, and secondly, to manage coalition 
members' career progression and re-entry into the top management team. With respect 
to the first of these two points the following remarks are illustrative of the comments by 
respondents on the issue of self-interest: 
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"Once a final decision has been taken on the proposal, everyone starts 
looking out for themselves. Your management comes under the spotlight, 
and your right to leadership evaporates. It would be easy to say thanks a 
lot and cheerio, but there are probably bridges to be mended and a few 
favours to be repaid. Therefore, you work with people and help them get 
back into their normal routines. I always take time to go and see their 
bosses and explain the value they added, and possible future roles they 
would be suited to. Word gets back to people that you looked out for them 
and it helps strengthen your own power base. " (Paul Swan, director) 
"It is a small world at the top, and a person may be the brightest and the 
best, but if they forget they are there because of the support from below, 
they do so at their own peril. A few years ago we got rid of our chairman 
and chief executive because of his patronising management style. The 
change programme may have been his idea, but he rubbed people up the 
wrong way. " (John Yew, CEO) 
Drawing conclusions from the experience Yew remarked: 
It was a powerful lesson for anybody planning to get to the top. Self- 
interest is best served by honouring others. I make sure that every team 
member gets a win as a result of working with me. Whether it is public 
praise or a word in the right ear to help them develop, it doesn't matter. " 
(John Yew, CEO) 
"People are usually knackered after we finish, so it is my job to make sure 
they have a soft landing back into their positions. Before now I have had 
to soothe tempers, scratch backs and stroke a few egos that felt they had 
been abused by the planning team. On the basis everyone was working 
under me, I thought it was only right that I shouldered the blame and 
defused the situation as much as possible. What goes around comes 
around is a good creed to live by. " (Arthur Kestrel, managing director) 
The following is an account of how one general manager managed the re-entry of his 
coalition members back into the top management team in difficult circumstances: 
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"Last May I finished leading a change design team that had proposed 
exiting four of our six business. I am sure you can imagine the hostility 
we received from the four businesses when the board voted in favour. 
Half of my ten strong team were from those four businesses. Two of them 
received notes in their in-trays calling them Judas, and one person was 
threatened by phone at home. What are you supposed to do in these 
circumstances? There is no book at business school that tells you how to 
handle situations like this. I sat down with the heads of the four businesses 
to discuss what could be done. " (William Wren, CEO) 
He continued: 
"The discussion did not begin well. One chap stood up and demanded 
their instant dismissal. I went over the rational arguments for the 
divestments and finished by saying if they didn't make commercial sense 
the board would not have backed the plan. It took at least another ninety 
minutes before a tense silence filled the room. I then told them that I 
didn't want the members from my design team to be persecuted and 
victimised, but they were adamant they would not be welcomed back. 
Seeing that it was not in anyone's interests to force the situation I called a 
recess and went to see the chairman. (William Wren, CEO) 
Pausing to rise from his desk and walk to the office window, he appeared to be 
considering what conclusions could be drawn from the episode. After a couple of 
minutes of silence he remarked: 
"He asked me whether or not we should get rid of them for the sake of 
unity, but I warned him that it would send the message to our best people 
that sticking your neck out doesn't pay off. He agreed and proposed 
finding the five individuals equivalent or more senior positions in the two 
businesses we planned to keep. I think the lesson here was that change is 
messy and there can be heavy casualties, but you have to look after the 
surgeons even if it means some of the patients die. " (William Wren, CEO) 
Participants were keen to emphasise the importance of managing re-entry so that the top 
management team did not fragment into `them and us' factions. Several individuals 
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talked of mediating sessions between coalition members and top management team 
colleagues in order to "clear the air" and establish a mutually acceptable way forward. 
Paul Swan described this attitude as a "duty of care". 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have presented the findings in relation to line of enquiry #1. We have 
examined evidence to support the contention that large scale change proposal coalitions 
exhibit five life-cycle phases: initiate, build, sustain, dissolve, and capture and transfer 
learning. This is the first empirically generated research to describe the evolution of top 
management team large scale change proposal coalitions. The finding that the process is 
purposely managed through to dissolution suggests the top management team is acutely 
aware of the benefits and drawbacks of coalitions which continue to exist. It also 
suggests that top management team members are prepared to tolerate temporary super- 
influential informal structures to exist for the benefit of the organisation. This leads us to 
conclude that the behaviours of top management team members is in part influenced by 
their acknowledgement of the fusing between the organisation's success and their own. 
In terms of self-interest it appears that individuals are driven by defensive self- 
preservation as well as offensive self-promotion. This casts top management team 
members as considered, politically astute individuals who in general take a longer term 
view of their careers and contributions to the organisation, and adjust their behaviours 
accordingly. 
With regard to line of enquiry #2 we have discussed the finding that coalition leaders 
adopt three primary roles -building, sustaining and dissolving- across the five phases. 
Once again this provides us with a pioneering insight into coalition life. Not only do we 
now know that large scale change proposal coalitions exist we can also describe the 
behaviours and tactics used as the coalition evolves through the various phases. The 
linkage between process and behaviour in this stage of the change context is also an 
elucidatory finding. 
The findings from the two lines of enquiry have important implications for academic 
research and practitioners and these will be discussed in more detail in chapter nine. In 
the following three chapters we will examine in greater detail the core life-cycle phases 
-building, sustaining and dissolving- of large scale change proposal coalition from the 
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perspective of the coalition leader. Further new insights into the nature and 
characteristics of coalitions and behaviours and tactics of coalition leaders used in these 
phases will be presented. Let us now turn to a consideration of the first of the three 
phases: building large scale change proposal coalitions. 
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Chapter 6 
Building large scale change 
proposal coalitions 
"Credibility is won in numbers, and credibility comes from putting 
together a combination of incentivised, ambitious, experienced, hard 
nosed and trusted individuals who know they can make a difference to the 
future of the business. " (Gordon Black, general manager) 
Introduction 
In this chapter we will consider the behaviours and tactics used by members of top 
management teams in their capacity as builders of large scale change proposal coalitions. 
We will begin by suggesting that the fifty participants are categorised usefully into four 
structurally-derived tiers. We will contend also that the sequence of building a coalition 
is heavily influenced by the hierarchical position of the builder in relation to the potential 
member, and that four tier-specific approaches were adopted by the participants of this 
study. Furthermore, we will assert that a coalition builder's behaviours and tactics varied 
according to whether they were engaged in an upward inter-tier, intra-tier, or downward 
inter-tier support gathering exercise. The results presented in this chapter relate to lines 
of enquiry #3 and #4. Respectively, the influence of hierarchical position on the support 
gathering process and coalition building behaviours and tactics. The findings offer a 
unique and detailed insight into an unexplored area of management elites in the context 
of large scale change proposal coalitions. 
The concept of tiers in top management teams 
During the interviews conducted with fifty participants in fourteen organisations across 
thirteen industries it became clear that top management teams are often ambiguous and 
183 
ill-defined entities. This is due to the fact that the official organisation structure charts 
do not match up with descriptions of who are the key decision makers. In one 
organisation the general managers were presented as "being more powerful than all but 
the most senior directors" (Charles Rook). When questioned as to why this might be so, 
the reply was that "the general managers run the day-to-day business and therefore 
decide what gets done and what doesn't. " In other organisations specific senior 
managers were found to exert more influence over the strategic direction of the firm than 
the general managers above them. In yet another organisation the directors talked about 
the chief executive in terms of a "puppet figure who implements our decisions" (Arthur 
Kestrel). As might be expected, all of the top management teams exhibited unique 
characteristics, but one consistent theme across the fourteen organisations was that the 
behaviour of individuals as coalition builders was determined to a large extent by 
hierarchical position. Even though one person's influence might have been greater than 
that of a more senior individual, they still behaved in a manner that was found to be 
highly similar to others at the same hierarchical level. They still approached coalition 
building in the same way. It was this finding that led to the observation that in the 
fourteen organisations the fifty participants could be categorised into four hierarchy- 
based tiers: 
  The chairman, chief executive officers and managing directors, 
  Directors, 
  General managers, and 
  Heads of function and senior managers. 
Even though directors and general managers in one organisation enjoyed comparatively 
more influence over the strategic direction of the firm than their counterparts in another, 
their behaviours were consistent with each other. To the extent that our primary interest 
here is on behaviours, and not influence per se, a structurally derived mechanism is a 
useful framework in which to report the findings. 
The coalition building process: deciding who to approach for support first, second, 
third. 
Building large scale change proposal coalitions was found to be largely a backstage 
process. Coalitions were built almost always incrementally behind closed doors. Very 
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rarely were members enlisted simultaneously in twos or larger groups. Evidence was 
found to support an assertion that the order in which individuals were invited to join the 
coalition was influenced strongly by the hierarchical position of the coalition builder. 
Analysis of the results indicated the existence of four hierarchy-based coalition building 
models. One for each of the four tiers identified above. 
During the elite style interviews participants were asked to consider their experience of 
building coalitions and the reasons why they had approached individuals in the sequence 
they did. Interviewees were invited to rank a list of seven factors. Although asked to 
add to the list of factors none of the participants did. The seven factors were expertise, 
formal seniority, informal seniority, friendship/trust, working relationship, age and 
physical proximity. Ranked sixth and seventh respectively by participants, age and 
physical proximity were argued to be insignificant factors and have consequently been 
omitted from the following discussion. Exhibit 6.1 illustrates the four coalition building 
sequences described by interviewees. Exhibit 6.2 provides working definitions for the 
selection criteria. 
Exhibit 6.1 - Four hierarchy-based large scale change 
proposal coalition building approaches 
Chairman, 
CEOs and MDa 
Directors 
General 
managers 
Heeds of function 
and senior 
managers 
lnhim, I Form A Informal 
seniority 
Expertise 
seniority seniority 
Working Formal Informal Formal 
relationship seniority seniority seniority 
Formal Informal 
seniority seniority 
Expertise Expertise 
Friendship/trust Friendship/trust Friendship/trust Friendship/trust 
Expertise 
Working Working Working 
relationship relationship relationship 
Whilst there were several similarities between the approaches there were also a number 
of noteworthy differences. We will now consider each of the four in turn. 
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The chairman, chief executive officers and managing directors 
The most senior members of the top management team reported a markedly different set 
of criteria from those below them in the organisational hierarchy. For the one chairman, 
eight chief executive officers (CEOs) and six managing directors (MDs) the most 
important determinant in approaching an individual was informal seniority. The 
consensus was that the commitment of a respected member of the top management team 
possessing attributes such as experience, perceived wisdom, and membership of various 
networks significantly improved the likelihood of an initiative being supported by the 
rest of the top management team. The following confirmatory comments offer some 
explanation for this stance: 
"I know that because of my track record I have the power to force change 
through, but you have to choose your battles. Only an idiot seeks to create 
enemies of his advisors. It is much more productive and politically 
sensible to seek consensus, and for me this process begins with winning 
the active support of the grandees and reference group leaders. " (Brian 
Carp, CEO) 
After discussing several of the grandees in his organisation Carp continued: 
"In many cases they don't hold a lot of functional power and they don't 
hold the purse strings, but because of their performance and the quality of 
their advice they are looked up to and listened to by the rest of the 
executives and senior managers. If you can get them on board you have 
prepared strong foundations on which to build the rest of the coalition. " 
(Brian Carp, CEO) 
"I never start building a coalition by getting my deputies involved because 
that looks like a three line whip to the rest of the team. Ordinarily you 
can't be heavy handed about these things. You have to be intelligent about 
how you sow the seeds of change. I like to win the ear of individuals who 
are generally regarded as being well balanced, perceptive team members. 
Having them with you makes it much easier to win over others because 
they take the message forward and help to build the coalition for you. " 
(Kurt Nightingale, CEO) 
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"For me informal seniority is the most important factor because it is 
politically sophisticated to choose your early supporters from those who 
have much to gain from being associated with you, and yet are not in a 
position to overthrow you. Choose those who the big hitters respect, and 
you will soon find them knocking on your door asking for a piece of the 
action. " (Bert Starling, managing director) 
The most marked difference between the chairman, CEOs and managing directors and 
the other hierarchical levels was the emphasis placed on working relationships as a 
determinant for soliciting support. For CEOs it ranked second while for directors, 
general managers and heads of functions it ranked only fifth. The consensus amongst 
those holding an organisation's highest office was that once the informal seniority 
faction of the support coalition had been established it was vital to ensure productive 
relationships between members. Individuals were only invited to join the coalition if 
they had or were likely to have a productive relationship with the other members. 
Friction and negative jockeying for position within the team were viewed as 
dysfunctional behaviours and likely to slow or divert the coalition from its objective. 
Therefore, individuals who had exhibited a tendency for such behaviour were not invited 
to join. 
Exhibit 6.2 - Support selection criteria definitions 
The following list of working definitions were those offered to and accepted by 
interviewees. 
Expertise An individual's knowledge or skills. 
Formal seniority The position an individual occupies in the official 
organisation hierarchy (as per the organisation chart). 
Informal seniority The position an individual occupies in the hierarchy that 
is different to that illustrated in the organisation 
structure. This may be due to factors such as 
experience, reputation or membership of internal and 
external networks. 
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Exhibit 6.2 - Support selection criteria definitions (continued) 
Friendship/trust The emotional relationship that exists between two 
colleagues. 
Working relulioiisliip The professional day-to-day interaction that takes place 
between colleagues. 
Age The difference between individuals, not the absolute 
figure. 
Physical proximity The spacial distance colleagues have between them in the 
workplace. For example, occupying the same floor, 
same building, different sites in the same country, or 
different sites in different countries. 
Although the chairman, CEOs and MDs, were the ultimate resource holders and 
sanctioners of change, they were aware of the need to enlist the support of the resource 
holders on whom the change would impact. Gaining approval from those with finrmal 
seniority facilitated effective large scale change because the most senior manager in the 
part of the organisation affected by the change had it within their power to actively 
support or oppose the planned initiative. Therefore, it was preferable to ensure, as far as 
possible, that they carried a positive message to their subordinates rather than a negative 
one. As one of the CEOs commented: 
"It is courteous to ask if you can play with someone else's ball rather than 
simply taking over the game or walking off with it. " (John Yew, CEO) 
The fourth most important determinant in approaching a member of the top management 
team for support was that of friendship/trust, with the trust component being the more 
significant element. When attempting to plan and implement an initiative as major as 
large scale change it was of fundamental importance that despite any differences of 
opinion over the nature and content of the proposed change, the coalition members 
trusted each other and did not waste time questioning one another's motives. Large scale 
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change was regarded as too complex for any one person to design at a tactical level, and 
with the speed of decision making an increasingly important capability, members had to 
be able to trust each other to work for the benefit of the coalition. A further point raised 
by the chairman, CEOs and MDs was that during the course of large scale change much 
time was spent in each other's company and the long hours spent working together were 
made easier if the personal relationships between coalition members were convivial. 
The fifth and final determinant, expertise, was considered a resource to be tapped into as 
and when necessary rather than the basis for coalition membership. However, the 
consensus was that if the expertise was of central importance to the success of a change 
proposal, then an individual was invited into the coalition. 
Already possessing formal seniority by virtue of their position, the most senior members 
of the organisation admitted to occasionally forcing decisions on the top management 
team. However, they argued that compliance rather than commitment, was sought only 
in exceptional circumstances. Such situations were usually the result of time pressures 
such as the need to exploit a particularly tight window of opportunity or responding to a 
threat such as a take-over. Nigel Kingfisher, one of the CEOs, recounted the time when a 
change in legislation gave the organisation an opportunity to steal a march on its 
competitors and make a dramatic strategic reorientation: 
"It was the end of a long week and the forecast of heavy snows meant we 
were preparing to go home early for what was probably going to be a long 
weekend. Suddenly we got news that the government had announced new 
legislation which would mean the closing of a loophole by midnight. One 
of our analysts had noticed they were also introducing a modification to a 
tax that made the loophole doubly attractive for any products launched in 
the remaining nine hours. On hearing this I called together my inner 
sanctum of top managers. The guys who have been with me for years. " 
(Nigel Kingfisher, CEO) 
After going off at a tangent to discuss where his managers lived, he returned to the 
account: 
"I set the ball rolling by inviting the analyst to outline the loophole and the 
financial size of the opportunity facing us. We then brainstormed the 
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benefits, drawbacks and what we would have to change if we pursued the 
course of action. The benefits were huge and would win us tens of 
millions of pounds of additional business. The drawbacks were in the 
changes we would have to make to the society. We would have to close 
one large department and while we could transfer and reskill some 
employees, most would lose their jobs. In a company committed to 
serving the community, the change would cause considerable upset, even 
hostility. " (Nigel Kingfisher, CEO) 
Almost as an aside he interjected: 
"It is part of being a CEO that you carry the can but I believe that my role 
is to do what is financially best for the company. " (Nigel Kingfisher, CEO) 
He then went on: 
"By about eight o'clock we had pretty much laid out the bones of the new 
product and it was decision time. Do we or don't we? The debate was 
intense. One of the team was in charge of the department that would be hit 
by the changes and he was set against it. He argued that we should call a 
full board meeting immediately, but looking out of the window at the 
falling snow, he knew that wasn't going to happen. The argument went 
backwards and forwards on a rational and emotional level for well over an 
hour until he said, `You leave me with no choice. If you go ahead with 
this course of action I will resign'. " (Nigel Kingfisher, CEO) 
Pausing to pour us both a cup of tea he shook his head: 
"I was absolutely shocked. Here was a man... a friend I had known and 
worked with for nearly twenty-four years putting a gun to his head and 
threatening to shoot himself. The room was silent and as we stared into 
each other's eyes I knew he meant it. I turned to each of the other four in 
turn and asked for their opinion on what we should do. The outcome was 
three against and only two for. I tried to weigh up the pros and cons but 
whichever way I cut it the best financial option was to launch the new 
product. " (Nigel Kingfisher, CEO) 
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Kingfisher concluded: 
"I admitted to the group that I held the minority view, but that as chief 
executive the final decision lay with me and that my choice was to launch. 
To his credit Gerry stayed with us and finished creating the new product. 
At 11.52pm we faxed the treasury and Inland Revenue details of our new 
product. It was a very sad night. We made an extra £36m as a result of 
the launch and that action helped us in our quest to reposition ourselves as 
an aggressive, cutting edge company. " (Nigel Kingfisher, CEO) 
Forcing compliance or `pulling rank' does have dangers if there are not exceptional 
circumstances such as time constraints. The present top management team of one of the 
organisations explained how a former chairman and CEO had been forced to resign 
because of his over-usage of rank and coercion. Coercive tactics, their benefits and 
drawbacks, are explored more fully later in this chapter, but for now we will turn our 
attention to a group of participants who displayed a different approach to building a large 
scale change proposal coalition in the top management team. 
Directors 
The consensus among the thirteen directors was that expertise was the most important 
factor in deciding which top management team member to approach for support first. 
They argued this was because their hierarchical position provided them with sufficient 
authority to develop strategic change options without seeking the immediate authority of 
the chairman, chief executive or managing director. Experts were used to quickly 
ascertain the technical viability of the proposed change. Unlike the chairman, CEOs and 
MDs who regarded expertise as a resource which could be tapped into when necessary, 
directors viewed individuals with the critical skills as core members of the coalition. 
Fraser Tench made the following remark: 
"It is the job of a director to be thinking about the strategic direction of the 
company, and taking those ideas to the CEO. However, he is going to 
want to know the financial impact, the structural impact and in some 
instances the detail. So you have to be prepared. You stand to lose 
credibility if you don't have answers to the most obvious questions. You 
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will only use ten per cent of the detail you collect, but you don't know 
which ten per cent until you get in there. That's why an expert's your first 
guy on board. " (Fraser Tench, director) 
Patrick Queen, who cited Pfeffer's (1992) text on power and politics in organisations 
several times during the interview supported this view. The following comments are a 
selection of those made by him during a wide-ranging conversation over a twenty minute 
period: 
"The idea of leaving the [name deleted] franchise and taking up the UK 
franchise for [name deleted] had been surfaced on a couple of occasions 
but we hadn't done anything about it. Having studied [our existing 
franchiser's] proposed strategy of becoming more mass market I felt this 
would endanger yet further our increasingly disillusioned core customer 
base of businessmen. If we elected to move to the [new] brand it would 
mean a shift in strategy from low middle market to upper middle market. 
Now while that might sound like a subtle change of direction it is actually 
a huge shift involving millions in refitting, rebranding, retraining and 
remarketing. " (Patrick Queen, director) [parentheses added to protect the 
identity of the company the participant organisation severed links with] 
In relation to the support gathering process and the change design, he remarked: 
"The first step was to bring in several people who had expertise in areas 
such as operations, training, property and marketing and would be able to 
work up the original idea into a costed model... We worked on it for about 
three weeks before it was ready to take into the MD. We put the model 
under the spotlight for an entire day. Every facet of the change was 
debated and debated again. `What if this happened? ' `What if that didn't? ' 
and so on. " (Patrick Queen, director) 
After pausing he resumed: 
"Eventually we decided we hadn't come across any killer issues and 
Richard gave us the go-ahead to put together a team to presenting a 
proposal for changing from [our old franchiser to the new one]... There is 
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no doubt whatsoever that I would have failed if I tried to do it all myself, 
and if I had gone straight to Richard, he would have kicked my butt for 
going to see him with a half-baked idea. If you want to have credibility 
with your MD, use your time with him wisely. He hears a dozen problems 
and proposals every week, so why did he choose mine? Because I could 
show him that experts had built the model! " (Patrick Queen, director) 
[parentheses added] 
As evidenced in the above example, once the experts had established an initial 
justification for proceeding with the change, the next step was to present the findings to 
the chairman, chief executive or managing director in an attempt to gain their support. 
Directors regarded formal seniority as the next step because chairmen, CEOs and MDs 
had the capacity to halt the change proposal, or alternatively, support its development 
and commit scarce resources. Whatever course of action ensued, soliciting support from 
the highest ranking member of the organisation was seen as the first `make or break' 
point for the potential change. 
The time frame between enlisting the support of experts and approaching the most senior 
member of the organisation was contingent upon the complexity and magnitude of the 
potential change. Assuming that experts were working full time on the project, directors 
reported ranges from as short as two weeks to as long as six months. All fifty 
participants were in agreement that the fastest way to build a support coalition was if the 
most senior member of the organisation had originated the idea for change. 
Once the proposed change had been allowed to proceed by the chairman, chief executive 
officer or managing director the directors began broadening the coalition by approaching 
members of the top management team who had informal seniority within the 
organisation. Fred Hawk commented: 
"When you have a strong commercial case for the proposed change and 
the backing of the top man everybody else is eager to sign up unless you 
are proposing the end of the world as they know it... You may find 
individual resistors but you wouldn't be approaching those first. Rather, 
you would wait until you had a strong coalition so the full weight of 
numbers could be brought to bear on those not willing to commit. " (Fred 
Hawk, director) 
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The fourth and fifth most important determinants in seeking the support of a member of 
the top management team were friendship/trust and working relationship respectively. 
As the following remarks appear to indicate the consensus among directors, and indeed 
all the hierarchical levels, was that the trust element was of greater importance than 
friendship: 
"Strategic change is inherently about upsetting the status quo, so there will 
always be winners and losers. As someone who has instigated several 
strategic changes I speak with some experience when I say it is important 
to ensure the coalition you put together is made up of people you can trust. 
Being friends can be an obstacle, particularly if they are going to be a 
loser... If you are a valued member of the management team you will 
always be given something else to do. So I guess I am saying that working 
relationships are important but they follow trust rather than friendship. " 
(Sylvester Martin, director) 
"We have to be clear what we mean by trust. It is not personal trust as in 
confiding secrets, but professional trust which means accepting that 
collectively we are aiming to do the best for the company. Of course the 
world is made up of shades of grey, not black and white. There will 
always be jostling for position and advancement, and there are people here 
who wouldn't hesitate to stick the knife in if they got the opportunity. But 
that's just part of the job. " (Geoffrey Silver, director) 
"I think it is important to get on with fellow directors and senior managers. 
If you can have a round of golf or chat over a drink, you start to build up a 
rapport which smoothes the way in times of change. It is not about 
declaring your undying love for one another, it just means each of you 
understands where the other is coming from and that you will cut each 
other some slack when the time comes. " (Dick Tern, director) 
To summarise, there was a considerable degree of consensus and consistency among the 
thirteen directors as to the rationale and sequence in which members of the top 
management team were approached for support. The same can be said of the five general 
managers. 
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General managers 
In contrast to the chairman, chief executive officers and managing directors who sought 
the support of individuals with informal seniority in order to complement their own 
formal authority, the general managers first sought the approval and support of the most 
senior member of the organisation. As the following series of remarks suggest, the 
general managers were highly aware of their relative position in the top management 
team and the potential amongst directors for resisting the proposal or hijacking the 
coalition. Consequently, the participants contended that obtaining the public backing of 
the chief executive or managing director boosted the credibility of the proposal and 
desire to be in the design coalition: 
"Due to the fact that directors are removed from the day-to-day activity of 
the organisation, they are fearful of strategies not instigated by themselves. 
They are particularly worried about change that is proposed by general 
managers because we control the deployment of resources at the 
operational level. Therefore, what tends to happen is they openly resist it 
by finding any number of logical reasons why the proposal cannot be 
implemented. Reasons that usually come back to them being the only ones 
able to see the `big picture'. " (Gordon Black, general manager) 
He continued: 
"As soon as the directors in this organisation know the substance of a 
proposal being tabled they go and nobble Bob [the CEO, name changed] 
and the thing never gets off the ground. So after years of blood, sweat and 
tears of trying to move us forward I have found the best way of instigating 
change is to go directly to the chief and explain the commercial logic to 
him. Once the statements have been validated the discussion inevitably 
turns to the impact on the company structure and who should be in the 
team. " (Gordon Black, general manager) 
After pulling out a chart of the company structure to demonstrate the complexity of 
reporting relationships he concluded: 
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"By soliciting his advice I am then building a coalition that I know he is 
comfortable with, and because he had a hand in selection he also feels 
ownership. Once he has announced his support for the proposed change at 
the management meeting nobody wants to be seen to openly oppose the 
plan. " (Gordon Black, general manager) [parentheses added] 
"I go straight to the managing director when I have a major proposal that 
will affect other parts of the business, otherwise if any of the directors find 
out they try to take over the initiative on the grounds that the change needs 
to rolled out and co-ordinated across the business. Once he is on-side I 
then go and put the rest of the coalition together. " (Charles Rook, general 
manager) 
"About three months ago I had a great idea for a new product category 
which I happened to mention to one of the directors on our annual golfing 
day. The next thing I know he is setting up a bloody team himself and the 
chief executive is singing his praises from the rooftop. Never again will I 
be sharing any bright ideas with our directors. I will be the one knocking 
on the boss's door. " (Steven White, general manager) 
"I think it is fair to say that in most organisations people fear change, and 
with directors you have to understand they are all one or two steps away 
from being the top dog. They don't want anything messing up their 
chances, and if a general manager threatens their progression of course 
they are going to resist it. Be smart, cut them out of the loop altogether. 
Speak to the CEO first and once he has okayed things start bringing in the 
directors, because you sure as hell will need them to make it work. Just 
make sure they are working with you and not against you. " (Robert 
Willow, general manager) 
Once approval for the proposed initiative had been obtained from the chairman, chief 
executive or managing director, the general managers then switched to informal seniority 
as the next determinant for coalition membership. In seeking to acquire the support of 
respected members of the top management team, they like the chairman, CEOs and MDs, 
aimed to build up a critical mass of senior managers demanding change. 
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Unlike the CEOs who viewed expertise as a resource to be tapped into as necessary, the 
general managers argued that after seniority, expertise was the most important reason for 
inviting a member of the top management team to join the design coalition. One 
manager commented: 
"When demonstrating executive capability it is critical the change proposal 
hits all the right buttons first time. This means you get the experts in. 
What you don't do is attempt it by yourself. I learned that lesson early on 
when I watched one of my former colleagues attempt to design a new 
logistics system without assistance. His intention was to save the company 
several million pounds per annum by consolidating delivery systems and 
suppliers. " (Gordon Black, general manager) 
Breaking off his account to laugh, he remarked: 
"He did the analysis, conducted the design and negotiated enforceable 
contracts which cost us £300,000 to get out of. It was good idea but he 
should have involved people whose job it is to manage logistics. Needless 
to say he pissed people off by treading on their patch. One bright idea 
needlessly cost him his job. " (Gordon Black, general manager) 
General managers expressed the view that expert design was one of the factors most 
likely to convince the most senior individuals to sanction deployment of the resources 
necessary to implement the proposed change. 
In line with the chairman, chief executives, managing directors and directors the fourth 
most important determinant in seeking the support of a member of the top management 
team was that of friendship/trust. Once again the trust component was cited as the more 
significant of the two. The general managers gave the same reasoning as the CEOs but 
added that when contracting out certain elements of a high profile change design to 
coalition members it was imperative no-one engaged in negative politics to slow progress 
or resist the proposer's initiative. 
Unlike the chairman, CEOs and MDs who placed considerable emphasis on the quality 
of working relationship between coalition members, the general managers ranked the 
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factor only fifth. Explaining the rationale behind his position and the relative importance 
of both friendship/trust and working relationships, one general manager commented: 
"It isn't a prerequisite that coalition members are best buddies, but 
empathy helps when the going gets tough. Although, it is much more 
important for there to be trust between members. The coalition will fall 
apart quickly if people's motives and actions are questionable. If you 
don't have trust you can't have a good working relationship. " (Francis 
Elm) 
The general position was that although productive working relationships were important, 
they were insufficient to produce a highly cohesive and effective coalition. It was 
asserted that failure to ensure members had been recruited using the four most favoured 
criteria increased the likelihood of the coalition submitting a losing bid. Indeed, it was 
argued that a productive working relationship is the result of the other four factors since 
everyone is then aware of the reason for their inclusion in the coalition, the objective and 
their role in achieving it. Interviewees further suggested that although the reasons for 
coalition participation were very rarely stated openly, the motive for inviting particular 
individuals was relatively transparent since top management team members were usually 
well aware of their colleagues' strengths and weaknesses. 
Heads of function and senior managers 
The lowest hierarchical level of top management team members interviewed as part of 
this study were heads of function and senior managers. Their ranking of the support 
selection criteria for approaching coalition candidates was, with one exception, the same 
as the general managers. Whereas general managers solicited support initially from the 
CEO -formal seniority- heads of functions sought to gather support in the first 
instance from members of the top management team who had informal seniority. One 
senior manager explained: 
"In my experience it is important to have a godfather figure who is 
publicly supportive of your idea. It legitimises your thinking in the eyes of 
the organisation and it gives you a crucial breathing space to build the rest 
of the coalition and get things running. Potential skeptics and trouble 
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makers will think, `... if Mr so-and-so thinks this is a good idea I will wait 
and see how things unfold before opposing her plan'. " (Sally Ruffe, head 
of function) 
Substantiating this position Christopher Green remarked: 
"Support from a respected figure makes possible resistors wary, neutrals 
prepared to listen and your supporters keener to provide active 
commitment. " (Christopher Green, senior manager) 
Gaining support from those with informal seniority was described by Leonard Plum as 
"establishing an unofficial barometer for how the change proposal will be received by 
those with formal seniority. " Mistakes could be rectified, oversights included and 
refinements made before the proposal was shared with other potential coalition members. 
One head of function stated that: 
"The second echelon of executives is usually a good first port of call 
because in most cases they want to gain promotion to the first echelon, and 
are therefore constantly on the look-out for high profile projects which 
they can be seen to have a leading role in. Why start off in stormy seas, 
when it is much safer to set sail from calm waters with at least one 
experienced hand? " (Mark Finch, head of function) 
To conclude, the heads of function and senior managers asserted that it is easier to win 
the support of chairmen, chief executives and managing directors if it could be 
demonstrated that a respected member of the top management team had already 
committed their support to the initiative. As this tended to reduce their chances of 
exposing themselves to involvement in inappropriate or ill-conceived proposals. 
In this section we have identified and discussed four distinct sets of criteria for selecting 
and inviting top management team colleagues to join a large scale change proposal 
coalition. The criteria were those used by coalition builders, who could usefully be 
classified into one of four hierarchy-based tiers: the chairman, chief executives and 
managing directors; directors; general managers; and heads of function and senior 
managers. We noted also that the sequence in which individuals were approached was 
largely contingent upon the positional seniority of the coalition builder. Having 
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ascertained the criteria and sequencing it is now appropriate to move on to a 
consideration of the behaviours and tactics used by coalition builders to gain the support 
of key individuals. 
Inter-tier and intra-tier coalition building 
We will now consider in detail, with anecdotal evidence, the political behaviours and 
tactics used by members of top management teams in each of the three processes 
identified: 
  Upward inter-tier coalition building, 
  Intra-tier coalition building, and 
  Downward inter-tier coalition building. 
Upward inter-tier coalition building 
It was found that the behaviour of individuals was more complex during upward inter- 
tier coalition building exercises than during intra-tier and downward inter-tier coalition 
building exercises. The evidence suggests that the larger the gap between the coalition 
builder and potential member, the less direct were the tactics used. In this section we 
will consider the range of skills and approaches used by individuals to win the approval 
and commitment of more senior colleagues. 
Directors' upward coalition building behaviours and tactics. With only the chairman, 
chief executive officer and/or a managing director above them, directors demonstrated 
more direct behaviours than did the general managers, heads of function and senior 
managers. It was asserted earlier that directors tended to approach experts first when 
building a coalition. This was so they could use the individual's input to establish early 
credibility with the most senior members of the organisation and persuade them to 
endorse the initiative. To support this strategem directors reported using two tactics 
which can be described usefully as: 
  Ego stroking, and 
  Risk management. 
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Ego stroking. This first method aimed to disarm a potentially skeptical leader by 
convincing them that the large scale change being developed by the coalition would 
enhance their reputation. Particular emphasis was placed on demonstrating the proposal 
was a significant strategic or financial opportunity for the business, and would contribute 
to the fulfilment of the leader's vision. The stroking process also included inferences 
that due to the magnitude of the proposition, only the target had the skills required to 
guide it through the organisation's decision making process. The following series of 
remarks appear to substantiate this contention: 
"It is not enough to go in with a solid business case. You have to 
understand that these guys have egos which need to be boosted and that 
means a little soft sell. Show them what they need to do, what their role 
would be, let them think its their idea, and push them gently into shaping 
the direction and membership of the design team. All the time you are 
reassuring them of their power, and more importantly their ability to 
control the transformation process. " (Louise Pike, director) 
"Sycophancy is never a good option, and open worship is going a bit far, 
but deference never did anybody any harm. " (Derek Barbel, director) 
"The sponsorship of the chief executive is the keystone of any coalition. If 
he is behind you it can make the difference between success and failure, 
and he knows you know that. Even though his power ultimately comes 
from the office, it's smart if you make him feel you are seeking his support 
based on ability rather than rank. " (Michael Gold, director) 
In addition to selling the benefit of enhanced reputation, directors as coalition builders 
also focused on how the change programme would consolidate the desired member's 
leadership position at the top of the organisation. It was suggested that although an 
enhanced reputation would help to generate such a view amongst the other members of 
the top management team, support was more likely to be forthcoming if the proposal 
helped towards this end. Receiving assurance that his comments were confidential and 
anonymous, Michael Gold added to his earlier statement: 
"Look, you must realise that many chief executives are in it for the power, 
and the one thing they fear above all else is losing it. Think about Rupert 
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Murdoch, the moment one of his top executives seems to be garnering a bit 
too much power, he transfers him to a part of the business he knows 
nothing about. Six months later they resign. What I am saying is that I 
always try to stress how the transformation will help them to strengthen 
their grip on the company's tiller. " (Michael Gold, director) 
Risk management. Directors claimed that the likelihood of winning the support of a 
chairman, chief executive or managing director was significantly improved if they were 
convinced the issue of risk management had been given due care and attention. Evidence 
was provided of situations in which stroking egos alone had generated only superficial 
and temporary commitment which evaporated when the leaders' reputation or position 
were threatened by association with the proposal coalition: 
"I learnt a big lesson earlier this year when I was putting together a team to 
work on a plan which promised to revive the company's fortunes. I 
approached Jack [CEO's name changed] and gave him an outline of the 
idea. He liked it and agreed in principle that we should proceed. I also got 
him to agree to give it high priority status by sponsoring it. However, soon 
some of our assumptions started unravelling and the plan looked 
unfeasible. " (Sylvester Martin, director) 
After taking a moment to explain what was wrong with the design he remarked: 
"I think we could have overcome the problems but he dropped it like a hot 
potato. He withdrew the plan at the next board meeting, and I know I 
embarrassed him terribly. Afterwards we had a chat about my risk 
analysis, or rather the lack of it. My reputation has suffered a lot but more 
importantly I have lost the level of trust I used to enjoy with Jack. " 
(Sylvester Martin, director) 
Concluding an assertion that he had witnessed a number of failed coalition building 
exercises due to poorly prepared risk management, Scott Bishop suggested: 
"If you're asking the boss to put his ass in a sling, you'd better make sure 
the sling ain't gonna break. " (Scott Bishop, director) 
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General managers' upward coalition building behaviours and tactics. Interviewees 
in this tier reported using more circuitous tactics than directors who tended to go straight 
to the chief executive or managing director once they had gained support from the 
experts. As illustrated in Exhibit 6.1 earlier, general managers tended to seek formal 
seniority and informal seniority in the early stages of coalition formation. In practice this 
meant attempting to win the support of directors. Of the four hierarchy-based tiers used 
in this study to demarcate levels of seniority within top management teams, the highest 
levels of antagonism were found to exist between directors and general managers. The 
following remarks provide an insight into the difficulties encountered by one general 
manager immediately before he arrived back at his office a few minutes late for our 
interview. After refreshing his memory as to the purpose of our discussion he 
commented that the timing could not have been more appropriate. Standing up for the 
entire duration of the interview -which lasted in excess of two hours- Gordon Black 
began pacing around the office. The following account is a series of remarks he made 
during the interview: 
"Sometimes you come across a director who is really great to work with. 
They recognise the operational issues you are facing, and the fact they are 
removed from the frenetic day-to-day activity. Most directors are OK, but 
occasionally you get a real asshole who behaves like Genghis Khan on 
acid. He has been put on the fast-track and believes the route to the top is 
by enforcing his will over everyone, regardless of whether they have more 
experience, expertise or a better understanding of what needs to be done. " 
(Gordon Black, general manager) 
Pausing to take off his jacket and telephone his secretary to order refreshments he 
continued: 
"Let me give you an example. I have been here for eighteen years. I have 
seen the business grow from what was basically a start-up to market 
leader, and I know that I have played a big part in making that a reality. At 
the moment we are under increasing pressure to improve our profitability, 
so we have two lines of attack: increasing revenues and reducing costs. 
Now if you look at the market data, you can see our margins are by far the 
highest. This is partly due to the economies of scale we get in processing, 
but it is largely a function of our premium pricing... Even though we have 
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the largest market share the evidence suggests that we could double in size 
over the next twelve years. You only have to look at the number and 
quality of new entrants to realise how attractive this market is. My job is 
to run one of the two key divisions, and this year I have been given 
extremely demanding performance targets. " (Gordon Black, general 
manager) 
After an interruption to the interview Black resumed: 
"About a couple of weeks ago once I had studied the latest growth 
predictions for the market and our own research, I decided to put together 
an executive team to work out how we could grow the business by fifty per 
cent over the next five years... Now if I walk into Bob's [CEO's, name 
changed] office and tell him this straight off I know he will laugh me back 
out into the corridor. I need someone with a lot of credibility to support 
my assertions. So I go and see Malcolm [name changed], this hot-shot 
director, to explain my ideas... He sits there like a rabbit caught in fucking 
headlights when I tell him the scale of the plan. Eventually he comes out 
with a statement that it is too difficult, and there is no way he is going to 
fuck up his career by chasing dreams. Much safer to cut costs and show he 
can take tough decisions he said. Tough decisions! What could be 
tougher than growing the business by fifty per cent. I explained to him the 
ideas I want to develop but he wasn't interested. I just stood up and left 
and that's where I am now. " (Gordon Black, general manager) [CEO's 
name changed] 
When asked what he intended to do next he replied: 
"My only hope now is to go and see one of the more established guys. 
Someone who has seen the growth we had in the early days, and will 
understand what it is like to have new competition pouring into the market. 
I just hope and pray that twat won't fight me over it. Chances are he won't 
risk putting his head on the chopping block. He will probably just stay out 
of the way in case a bit of decision making slows his career down. " 
(Gordon Black, general manager) 
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Asked how important it is to establish a strong coalition in circumstances such as this one 
he concluded: 
"Coalition is the right fucking word, because politics is what decision 
making is all about. You can never achieve anything by yourself. 
Credibility is won in numbers, and credibility comes from puting together 
a combination of inventive, ambitious, experienced, hard nosed and trusted 
individuals who know they can make a difference to the future of the 
business. " (Gordon Black, general manager) 
The reluctance of some directors, particularly those on their organisation's promotion 
fast-track, to become involved in developing major strategic decisions was reported by 
three of the five general managers. Described as `risk avoidance' by one, another 
remarked: 
"The benefits of cost cutting can be predicted with more accuracy and 
certainty than can growth estimates, which are nearly always subject to the 
vagaries of the marketplace. It is no wonder then that people often chose 
to go for the quick win to gain attention. No-one ever got sacked for 
reducing overheads, but in many circumstances, particularly in growth 
markets, it is possible to undermine future competitiveness by cutting into 
muscle. By the time this happens though, the person who made the 
decision is usually long gone, and they can always blame it on the next 
manager or poor implementation. " (Robert Willow, general manager) 
The consensus amongst general managers was that successful recruitment and retention 
of directors into coalitions occured when a director's risk exposure was limited. 
Respondents cited restricting involvement to ambassadorial duties such as introducing 
other potential members, allaying concerns over turf issues and mediating in disputes. 
Directors were usually kept away from designing the operational aspects of the proposal. 
Heads of function and senior managers' upward coalition building behaviours and 
tactics. The seventeen participants occupying the lower ranks of their top management 
teams were compelled, by virtue of their position, to employ the most indirect support 
winning methods. Like their colleagues, the general managers, the majority chose to 
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keep directors away from the operational aspects of the coalition's work. The remarks of 
James Brown were representative of the broader body of opinion: 
"Once you have got one or two of the respected heavyweights behind you 
the most important task is to make sure you put together a plan that will 
stand up to scrutiny. Directors are important supporters, and you want 
them with you rather than against you. They know how to make winning 
presentations and the direction the chief executive wants to take the 
company in, but they are usually too far removed from the coal-face to 
provide good advice about what a pragmatic change strategy looks like. 
Therefore, I tend to ask one of the general managers to help me prepare the 
detail. " (James Brown, senior manager) 
Recognition that the hierarchical gap could make it difficult for senior managers to 
recruit support from directors and chief executives or managing directors was highlighted 
in the assertions made by a number of interviewees. They claimed that not having day- 
to-day contact with potential coalition members or a lack of familiarity from not having 
worked with them rendered it difficult to know how best to pitch the bid for support: 
"From what I have seen the people who are best at winning support are 
those who know how and when to push the right buttons. That can only 
come from having an intimate knowledge of what turns a person on, so I 
tend to get someone they respect and feel comfortable with to take my 
message forward. It is much less risky than trying to cold sell yourself. " 
(Ray Bream, senior manager) 
"If you are trying to win someone over who is quite a lot higher up than 
you, it is not enough to present a dry business case. These guys sit and 
listen to proposals all day long. You have to win their hearts and minds, 
but it is tough to know what will work and what won't. " (Philip Birch, 
senior manager) 
He added: 
Since it is unusual to get more than one bite at the cherry I make sure I ask 
people who do know what will hook them. Very rarely do I go and try to 
206 
convince a very senior person to join our team because they would wonder 
how I came to be so well prepared, and because it would be completely 
obvious that I had been doing my homework they would feel manipulated. 
It is much better to make sure you recruit one or two individuals who have 
good relationships at the top and then send them to try and win their 
support. " (Philip Birch, senior manager) 
Using others to win support and enlist members was the most popular technique of heads 
of function and senior managers. The estimated difficulty of convincing a more senior 
individual to join the coalition, the hierarchical gap between the coalition builder and the 
target, the magnitude and complexity of the proposed change, and the perceptions the 
builder believed the target had of them all combined to determine how many people a 
coalition builder sent to try and convince the individual to join the coalition. The greater 
the difficulty, hierarchical gap, magnitude and complexity, and the less positive the 
anticipated perception, the larger the number of people used to win the individual's 
support. Persuasion tactics tended to focus on the benefits to the organisation and the 
political wins to the target such as high visibility and influence over key elements of the 
proposal design. 
Intra-tier coalition building 
It was noted in the literature review that nothing has been written about the large scale 
change proposal coalition building tactics of top management team members at the same 
level in an organisation's hierarchy. The evidence collected in this research initiative 
found there to be no discernible difference in the rationale and behaviours used by 
directors with directors, general managers with general managers, or heads of function 
and senior managers with other heads of function and senior managers. Less complex 
and subtle than upward coalition building behaviours, but not as direct and blunt as those 
co-opting support downwards, coalition leaders attempting to recruit individuals of the 
same seniority were found to be more wary of who they invited and on what basis they 
entered the coalition. One director, Dick Tern, likened the situation to "scorpions in a 
mating dance" because of the potential for both parties to damage the career prospects of 
the other in order to further their own ambitions. Another director, Fred Hawk, 
remarked: 
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"If they are above then they control you. If they are below then you control 
them, but if they are equals then there can be tension because who controls 
who? " (Fred Hawk, director) 
These two remarks appear to indicate an air of hostility between colleagues at the same 
level. However, interviewees did not convey a reluctance to enlist the support of an 
`equal', albeit they were more hesitant in situations where there was little trust. 
Therefore, it is not surprising to find that one of the most favoured approaches for 
winning support was to invite individuals with whom they had successfully worked 
previously. The following series of remarks offer some of the more common 
explanations as to why this was the case: 
"If I am going to provide someone with an opportunity to use me as a 
stepping stone, I want to make sure of two things. One, I don't get 
screwed, and two, I get the tastiest piece of the action. " (Tom Chub, head 
of function) 
"The reality for senior management is that life is a race for ambitious 
people who are always looking for a way onto the next rung of the ladder. 
I have seen change projects fail because people have put their own 
interests first. That is why if I need to choose someone with the same 
status as me I go for people who I know I can work with. If I had to 
choose between someone I could trust and an Einstein, it would be a no- 
brainer. I'd choose the person I trusted every time. " (Andre Char, 
director) 
"Designing change programmes is too hectic to have to worry about 
politics. There just isn't the time to be constantly watching over your 
shoulder. I need someone who I can trust to do the right thing for the 
company, so I go with a person I have worked with before, or a person 
recommended by someone whose judgement I respect. " (Ann Cherry, head 
of function) 
Another aspect of trust closely allied to established working relationships was that of 
shared political agendas. Respondents claimed they prefered working with individuals 
who had the same view on what the future direction of the organisation should be than 
208 
those who did not. They argued that commitment levels were likely to be high since the 
planned change would be advantageous to them both. Charles Rook remarked: 
"It is one less thing to have to worry about when you know that your 
colleague wants the plan to be approved as much as you do. You don't 
have to worry about cracks appearing in the coalition because they 
suddenly reassess their commitment. " (Charles Rook, general manager) 
Explaining the rationale for this he continued: 
"It benefits both people if we get the go-ahead. Let me give you a good 
analogy. If you have ever watched the Tour de France or any other 
professional cycle race you will have seen how the cyclists at the front 
take it in turns to create a slip-stream for the others to conserve energy. It 
appears as if they don't actually compete until the last few hundred metres 
when they break to go for the win. Of course they are working hard all the 
way but they accept that they need to work as a team if they want to get to 
the finish. " (Charles Rook, general manager) 
He concluded: 
"The same thing is true of managers who work their way up in the 
company together. If both know they are in the frame to make it to the 
top, it is often an unspoken rule to save the big push for the home straight 
when only one person can be the winner. Until then there is usually 
enough room for both to win. " (Charles Rook, general manager) 
Louise Pike described how she had observed several colleagues "binding their futures 
together", and suggested that it was not unknown for contemporaries to rise together and 
ultimately hold the chairman and chief executive role, or the chief executive and deputy 
chief executive role. This contention was borne out by at least one of the participant 
organisations where the former chairman and chief executive -one person held both 
roles- and the current chief executive had moved up through the top management team 
together. The pair had been responsible for integrating the company's US operations 
with those of a larger company it acquired. Their close relationship was the subject of a 
Fortune article in which they were refered to as Batman and Robin. As a result of the 
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successful integration the more senior and older of the two Batman- was awarded the 
roles of chairman and chief executive, while the younger of the two was made chief 
executive of the company's most profitable subsidiary. 
In the event that a coalition leader in the role of builder could not recruit an individual 
they had worked with previously or shared a common agenda, another tactic was to co- 
opt someone for whom the most senior members of the top management team were 
predicting a rapid rise within the organisation. This tactic was described by Simon 
Falcon as "attaching yourself to a rising star". By way of an old adage he argued that if it 
was not possible to beat them to the top then it was sensible to join them. One of the 
senior managers, Mark Finch claimed success from "developing proteges who had repaid 
their debts" by supporting change proposal submissions presented by their former 
mentor. 
Downward inter-tier coalition building 
The political behaviour of coalition builders attempting to gain the commitment of less 
senior members of the top management team, was more direct than during upward 
coalition building initiatives. The results indicated that the skills used varied according 
to the difference in seniority between the coalition builder and the potential member. 
Although hierarchical seniority meant that compliance could usually be forced if 
necessary, the consensus among all interviewees was that active commitment was 
preferable. It was argued that compliant coalition membership often resulted in apathetic 
performance, clandestine resistance or sabotage during the design and implementation 
stage. 
Rational argument. As with upward and infra-tier coalition building, the prefered 
technique for attempting to win the support of colleagues in the top management team 
was to present the business case for the proposed change. Interestingly the next three 
comments provide support for the assertion that positional seniority is implicit in 
downward coalition building tactics. The general manager reveals how he had to use 
others to add weight to his argument, while the chief executive acknowledged that 
individuals conform because of his position. Even though he prefered not to use 
coercion, the threat of, it was usually enough to eliminate opposition. The director also 
conceded the potential for extracting compliance because of his position in the hierarchy: 
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"I demonstrate the rationale for change with supporting data presented by 
my new coalition members. " (Francis Elm, general manager) 
"I ask people to list their objections and then discuss them one by one until 
they have been overcome or they will become barriers to performance. 
You have to be patient and allow people time to commit and offer their 
support. Particularly in the management team because if you do not have 
them one hundred per cent behind you the change will fail. " (Peter Ash, 
CEO) 
Later he commented: 
"... it is not a passive patience though, it is very much an active patience 
with you constantly working on them by answering their concerns, 
bringing your coalition to bear or their peers, or even mild coercion along 
the lines of `the trains leaving. Are you coming? ' Usually though you 
don't have to use coercion because of your position as CEO. People 
usually comply if they can see that the change is particularly important to 
the company, but commitment is better than compliance so you try to be 
more sophisticated in your use of politics. It is important not be seen as 
manipulative. Maintaining your integrity is essential. " (Peter Ash, CEO) 
Fred Hawk, one of the directors concured with the opinion that commitment is preferable 
to compliance. He stated: 
"Nine times out of ten a person makes it into the executive team because 
they have demonstrated an ability to add value to the company. They 
understand commercial imperative and if they continue to object it is 
almost certainly because they will suffer if the change goes ahead, and 
they are trying to protect their position. Usually though, commercial logic 
wins the day and people fall into line. The trick is to make it a committed 
line, not a row of nodding dogs simply because I shouted a command. " 
(Fred Hawk, director) 
Reward. The combination of commercial logic and implicit hierarchical authority was 
usually sufficient to win commitment. However, it was noted earlier by Sylvester Martin 
211 
that there are often winners and losers in large scale change, and those who stand to lose 
out are often reluctant to lend their support. Confronted with an unwilling member of the 
top management team whose support was important to the success of the planned change, 
coalition builders holding the position of chairman, chief executive or managing director 
offered inducements to join the proposal coalition: 
"The best way to think of winning support is to imagine you have a jar of 
sweets. Most people like sweets not only because they taste nice but 
because they are associated with being good or doing well. So when I 
want someone's support I explain to them the common sense in doing 
what I propose. Most of the time that's enough. Everyone wants to please 
the boss. However, sometimes it isn't enough because they know the 
change is going to be painful. So out comes the sweetie jar, and we see if 
there is anything in there they like the look of. I have given away 
promotions and pay rises, bonuses, share options and a whole lot more. " 
Kurt Nightingale) 
Explaining his rationale behind this view he remarked: 
"It all depends on the context. How important the change is to the 
company, how important the person you are talking to is to the change 
succeeding, and whether or not you have any other options. The more 
important the change and the person are, and the fewer alternatives you 
have, the better the quality of sweets you have to give away. " (Kurt 
Nightingale, CEO) 
"I don't think it is possible to take the moral high ground in this and treat 
everyone equally. The buck stops with the CEO, which means it is up to 
me to get things done. If that involves a bit of trading then that's what I 
do. " (William Wren, CEO) 
To support his contention he provided an example. The following comments are 
abstracts from a lengthy discourse regarding the episode: 
"Recently, I came to the conclusion that we needed to refocus on our core 
business, which meant selling off the other four businesses we have. They 
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are profitable, but they are a drain on the cash we generate from our main 
business. However, disposing of them meant that our Group directors 
stood to lose a considerable amount of power and in some cases their jobs. 
The top management team was basically split half and half with those from 
the core business supporting the proposal and those who would lose out 
opposing it. Of the eight directors who would lose out under the planned 
change I wasn't worried about losing three of them. " (William Wren, 
CEO) 
He continued: 
"I called the core business directors together and explained the difficulties 
we were facing. In doing so I made it their problem too. I told them that 
we needed to find acceptable positions in the core business if we were to 
win them over. I gave them a week to come up with a solution. 
Meanwhile I started to meet each of the Group directors to find out what 
their concerns were. One was happy to take his pension and a redundancy 
package and so openly welcomed the opportunity, which left seven. " 
(William Wren, CEO) 
After commenting on the personal life of this particular individual Wren returned to the 
account: 
"One wanted to stay, arguing that he had become stale because of lack of 
commitment from the Group to his business, and now wanted a fresh 
challenge. I had to agree that we had been scaling down our investment 
and if that was the cause for his lack of performance then it was only fair 
to give him another chance. The third individual, Bill, said he wasn't 
being pushed out and that we were wrong to sell the businesses as they 
were profitable. " (William Wren, CEO) 
Describing Bill in more detail he remarked: 
"Bill had come into the Group via one of the companies we acquired. He 
had a reputation as an abrasive character which didn't sit well with the 
consensus management we strive for, and on top of that he knew little 
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about the core business. On the strength of that conversation I decided he 
didn't have a future with us after the disposals... I informed him of my 
decision and we started the negotiation process. He asked for a ridiculous 
figure and I replied with one that I knew was too low. Over the course of 
that week we edged closer together until we agreed on a figure that was 
more to his liking than to mine. But he knew we didn't want any publicity 
and the extra money convinced him to go quietly. " (William Wren, CEO) 
After further comments on Bill he resumed: 
"At the end of the week I had given my directors in the core business we 
met to discuss the options. I informed them that Gerry and Bill would be 
leaving us and Steve would be staying on, which meant we would have to 
find a sixth position. Three of the directors in the core business had broad 
sets of responsibilities which meant they were able to transfer enough to 
three of the six for them to have a worthwhile role... They expressed 
concern that reduced responsibility would have a negative impact on their 
salary and bonuses, but I promised to ensure the Compensation Committee 
did not make any waves. We agreed to create three new positions for the 
other three. One in charge of new brands, one with an international focus 
and one in charge of business development. We then spent a couple of 
hours deciding who should be offered which position. " (William Wren, 
CEO) 
On the issue of negotiations with key individuals he recalled: 
"The next step was to take the positions to the Group directors and get 
their responses. Only Tony and Geoff were problems because they both 
wanted to be in charge of new brands. I invited them to make a 
presentation to me and submit a written paper on how our new brand 
portfolio should be developed over the next five years. The author of the 
one I determined to be the best would get the job... As things turned out 
Tony made the best presentation and far exceeded my expectations of what 
someone from outside the industry would be able to bring. Naturally, 
Geoff wasn't very pleased but after I agreed to give him an improved 
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performance related pay package he agreed to take up the post of Director 
of Corporate Development. " (William Wren, CEO) 
He concluded: 
"So you can see from this example that a large part of winning support is 
negotiation, and part of being a good negotiator is being flexible. I could 
have forced the change through. The non-core businesses don't even 
contribute five per cent of profits. But at the end of the day I knew that I 
wanted my guys to ratchet company performance up a gear, and for them 
to fully commit to that, they had to feel I empathised with their problems. 
The easiest form of management is dictatorship, but a fear culture will 
never sustain great results in the long run. " (William Wren, CEO) 
The scope for issuing rewards such as share options and creating directorships was 
clearly possible for only the most senior members of the organisation. Directors and 
general managers were more restricted in the rewards they could use to persuade 
individuals to join their proposal coalition. Examples cited by interviewees included key 
roles in the design, and assistance in positioning the individual for an important role in 
the implementation phase. Promises of recommendations for promotion and additional 
responsibilities were also made, as were opportunities to develop new technical and 
management skills. 
Coercion. In the event that an individual refused the rewards, and their support, or at 
least non-opposition, was of critical importance to the proposed change, the next step 
was to neutralise or eliminate their resistance. One method of neutralising an 
individual's obstruction was to reconfigure structural elements of the organisation. 
Committees, working groups, reporting lines and business unit design are all structural 
levers that were used to overcome resistance. Once again interviewees from all levels 
were in agreement as to the need for coercion, but as the next series of remarks conveys, 
the tactics used were contingent on the hierarchical position of the coalition builder: 
"If you have given someone the opportunity to sign up for the change and 
for whatever reason they won't, then if they are a endangering the 
likelihood of success, you have to take corrective measures. First of all 
you send them messages of your displeasure. Things such as not inviting 
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them to discussions or workshops when ordinarily you would. Once they 
get the picture you throw them a lifeline, have a chat and give them an 
opportunity to come back into the fold. If they choose not to then you get 
the managing director involved and ask him to announce a few changes. 
Transfers of their best people, that sort of thing. They soon get the 
message: sign up or sign out. " (Francis Elm, general manager) 
"Not so long ago I had an incident when one of my best people wouldn't 
support a change I wanted to make in his division. He knew it made 
business sense but saw it as a threat to his power base and therefore 
refused to co-operate. He made things really difficult for me, missing 
meetings and not sending the reports my team needed to firm up the 
proposal. Finally I had to take action because he was starting to 
undermine the business, and since I knew a major overseas player was 
planning to enter the market in the coming months, I couldn't stand by and 
play games with him. " (Paul Swan, director) 
He concluded: 
"I proposed transfering him to a division in which he had no experience. 
Seeing that he could either hang on to part of his existing portfolio or start 
again in another, he opted to co-operate with me... It ended up with him 
actually designing the changes that would impact on his division, so at the 
end of the day my threat got his buy-in. The crucial influence to his 
agreement was that he knew I could and would do it. That type of threat 
can only come from someone who is a very senior director or the top dog 
himself, because you have to be sure your power base is there if someone 
tries to call your bluff. " (Paul Swan, director) 
The soon to retire chairman of one of Britain's most profitable companies employed the 
same technique with a similar outcome: 
"I am a member of the Institute of Directors and at some of our more 
social meetings we often discuss any problems we are having. At a recent 
charity event I was telling a fellow chairman about how the deputy chief 
executive had started to challenge and undermine some of the major 
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changes I had presented to the board. He suggested that I could curtail his 
behaviour by threatening to create the position of chief operating officer 
and transfer some of his powers and duties to the new position. I followed 
his advice and I haven't had any trouble since. " (Luke Sparrow, chairman) 
Two other techniques were commonly used by coalition builders at all levels to 
neutralise opposition. Firstly, segmenting the change to limit the potential for sabotage 
by the resistor, and secondly, exclusion from the decision making process. The 
following remarks illustrate how careful planning and the pressure to conform were used 
to overcome opposition: 
"If the person failing to commit is someone who you cannot afford to lose, 
one way around the problem is to design the change in such a way that 
they have only a small part of the change to design. It is important to 
ensure that the dependencies and connections between change in their own 
area and change in the others are kept as low as possible. That way any 
attempt to damage the process is restricted. " (Robert Willow, general 
manager) 
"I have led the design of a number of change programmes that I knew 
would cause resistance from particular members of the executive team. I 
was able to work around them by giving additional responsibilities to their 
colleagues. After a while they recognised they were one of the few being 
excluded from the coalition and they started to make attempts at 
reconciliation. People's need for power should never be underestimated. 
For power to be real you must have people to influence, and if you are not 
involved in taking key decisions you soon feel pretty powerless. " (Andre 
Char, director) 
"Some years ago when I was a relatively junior member of the 
management team at my previous organisation, I made the mistake of 
declining to join a coalition setup by the company chairman. He was nice 
enough face-to-face but I quickly found I wasn't invited to meetings I 
usually attended... Over the next few weeks I was visited by a number of 
his very polite but insistent messengers who urged me to reconsider my 
decision. I finally caught on when the sixth visitor said on his way out that 
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Lord McKenna had always thought I had such a bright future with the 
firm. I literally had to go to his office and grovel before I was allowed 
back. " (Steven White, general manager) [Lord McKenna's name changed] 
"One of the best ways of sending a message is to start taking decisions that 
they are usually consulted about. Hold a committee meeting when they 
can't attend and take an important decision that affects their area. All 
senior managers have a finely tuned sense of where the power lies, and if 
they detect any being taken away from them they usually come back with 
cap in hand. " (Colin Salmon, managing director) 
If all other methods of persuasion had failed to convert the individual's resistance into 
support or at least passive co-operation, and the coalition builder believed the change 
was in the best interests of the organisation then they took steps to remove the individual 
from the organisation. Clearly, removing a member of the top management team was an 
act that required the sanction of the chief executive officer. Interviewees were keen to 
point out that this course of action was only used as a last resort when either there were 
intense time pressures and the resistor was forcing the coalition off its critical path, the 
co-operation of the office held by the individual was essential to the design process, or 
the resistor was threatening disruption within their own area of control. 
All participants were in agreement that downward inter-tier coalition building tactics 
inherently invoked the hierarchical position of the influencer. Whether it was persuasion 
through the presentation of a rational business case, reward or coercion, the coalition 
builder could not escape the possibility that less senior colleagues in the top management 
team were complying rather than committing to their involvement in the large scale 
change proposal coalition. The greater the gap in seniority between the coalition builder 
and the potential member, the greater the likelihood that compliance was a decisive 
factor. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have presented findings in relation to lines of enquiry #3 and #4. We 
have considered the approaches, behaviours and tactics used by members of top 
management teams in their capacity as builders of large scale change proposal coalitions. 
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We began by examining the concept of tiers in top management teams and identified four 
hierarchy based levels. The chairman, chief executive officers and managing directors 
were the most senior, followed by directors, general managers and then heads of function 
and senior managers. The evidence collected from fifty interviewees drawn from these 
positions suggested the existence of a different coalition building sequence for each 
level. This is the only research to identify and describe this characteristic of top 
management teams. These findings provide compelling reasons for academics to re- 
configure the research agenda into managerial elites so that the top management team is 
not treated as a homogenous strategic decision making group. This evidence also 
supports the notion that large scale change is not a rational-linear affair and the key 
actors within it adopt a pragmatic political behaviour based approach to winning support 
and coalition building for the purpose of designing and proposing large scale change. 
These findings also suggest that structure is an influential determinant of behaviour. 
Coalition builders are acutely sensitive to their position in the hierarchy in relation to 
those whose support they are attempting to co-opt. However, interpersonal relationships 
between builder and potential member and the magnitude and complexity of the large 
scale change being proposed are also important determinants of behaviour. The call 
made in chapter two for researchers to treat power as residing simultaneously in multiple 
locations, and to study the phenomenon in specific contexts is given strong support by 
the fact that these findings are the result of empirical research rather than theoretical 
arguments. 
Having discussed the four sequences in detail, we then examined the behaviours and 
tactics used during upward inter-tier, intra-tier, and downward inter-tier coalition 
building exercises. Using anecdotal evidence it was argued that upward inter-tier 
building required more complex tactics than either intra-tier or downward initiatives. It 
was also reported that upward coalition building exercises had tier-specific tactics. A 
characteristic not present in intra-tier building and less pronounced in downward 
approaches. Intra-tier coalition building was distinguished by the wariness of individuals 
attempting to enlist the support of someone against whom they were often competing for 
advancement. The main finding from the analysis of downward inter-tier building was 
the inherent presence of coercion due to the higher seniority of the builder in relation to 
the potential member. Whether or not the coercive powers were deployed, the target of 
the influence was aware they lay behind the presentation of rational logic and the use of 
reward. The greater the hierarchical gap between the coalition builder and the target, the 
more likely it was for the target to join the coalition for reasons of compliance rather than 
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commitment. No other research has investigated large scale change proposal coalition 
building behaviours and tactics used in top management teams. That this study is able to 
describe those used in upward, downward and same level initiatives is a significant 
advancement in our treatment of managerial elites in the change context. It lays the 
foundations for further research to challenge and deepen the descriptions. The findings 
have important implications for academic enquiry and practitioners and these are 
discussed in chapter nine. 
Having analysed the behaviours and tactics of the coalition leader during the building 
phase of a coalition's life-cycle, we will now consider those used in the next phase, when 
the leader's objective shifts from building to sustaining the coalition. 
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Chapter 7 
Sustaining large scale change 
proposal coalitions: leadership 
behaviours and tactics in 
four coalition types 
"You can't be an idealist when dealing with politics. The only way to 
survive and prosper is to be a pragmatist. " (Simon Falcon, CEO) 
Introduction 
In the last chapter we considered how large scale change proposal coalitions were 
established. In this chapter we discuss how they were sustained successfully until the 
proposal was submitted for approval or rejection by the appropriate decision makers in 
the top management team. We consider the behaviours and tactics used by coalition 
leaders in their role as sustainers. The results presented in this chapter relate to line of 
enquiry #5 which investigated whether or not different types of large scale change 
proposal coalition exist in top management teams, and in the event they did, report on the 
key characteristics of each, and the behaviours and tactics used by coalition leaders in the 
different types. 
Four large scale change proposal coalition types 
Analysis of the interviews conducted with the fifty participants' found four principal 
types of large scale change proposal coalition existed in the fourteen top management 
teams studied: 
221 
  Aligned coalitions, 
  Unaligned coalitions, 
  Unfocused coalitions, and 
  Fragmented coalitions. 
There were a small number of hybrid variations of the four coalition types, and it is 
possible that in a larger sample these would have been more pronounced. However, in 
this study the differences were not significant enough to support a separate 
categorisation. Thus, the discussion will be restricted to the four coalition types that 
were found across a range of organisational settings. 
Of the four coalition types the most stable and cohesive was the aligned coalition. This 
was followed by the unaligned coalition and then the unfocused coalition. The least 
stable and cohesive structure was the fragmented coalition. It was found that stability 
and cohesion were regarded by participants as positive characteristics which encouraged 
the design of a change proposal likely to be approved for implementation. Consequently, 
the aligned coalition was the most desirable coalition type to create and sustain. 
However, on occasion there were circumstances when it was not possible due to 
interpersonal problems between coalition members or extraneous organisational and 
environmental factors such as resistance from colleagues or the announcement of a take- 
over of the organisation by another entity. Pressures which caused individuals to 
reassess their commitment to the coalition. 
From the perspective of the coalition leader there were four key differences between the 
aligned coalition and the other less stable and cohesive coalitions. In less stable 
coalitions there was firstly, a tendency for higher levels of coercion to be used, secondly, 
a greater propensity to seek personal reward, and thirdly, more frequent renegotiation 
with members to sustain their commitment to the coalition. These three factors 
combined to result in the fourth factor, increased maintenance time required to keep the 
coalition together. These issues in the context of sustaining large scale change proposal 
coalitions are illustrated in Exhibit 7.1. 
The closer the coalition type to the fragmented coalition, the more demanding was the 
task of the coalition leader in terms of the time required to sustain the group and the 
range of behaviours and tactics necessary to do so. We will now consider, with 
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anecdotal evidence, the behaviours and tactics used to sustain each of the four coalition 
types. 
Exhibit 7.1 - Leadership issues in sustaining large scale 
change proposal coalitions 
Low 
Coercion 
High 
High 
Renegotiation 
Low 
Behaviours and tactics in aligned coalitions 
An aligned coalition was one in which its members were agreed on the overall objective 
and how to achieve it. Activities tended to be complementary and any conflict which 
emerged was typically constructive tension, to the extent that it was used positively to 
improve coalition performance. The coalition leader's primary concern was how to 
sustain the alignment of members in order to maintain effectiveness and maximise the 
likelihood of accomplishing the agreed objective. In general, the behaviours and tactics 
needed to achieve such a shift were found to be less sophisticated than those required by 
a leader of an unaligned, unfocused or fragmented coalition. Aligned coalitions were 
found most often in situations where the proposed change was relatively uncomplex or 
uncontroversial, or paradoxically because it was complex and controversial but time 
pressures forced members to align quickly behind a common objective. 
One such scenario was found in an organisation where one of the directors -Sylvester 
Martin- described the top management team as being "at war with one another. " The 
company was being threatened with take-over due to poor performance. The 
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organisation's top management team had only a few weeks to present a credible 
alternative for significantly improving shareholder value. Gerry [name changed], the 
chief executive elected to prepare a pre-emptive bid defence by establishing a coalition 
tasked with designing a two-pronged strategy. The first prong was a large scale cost 
reduction programme, while the second prong detailed an accelerated revenue 
enhancement initiative based on the launch of a new product platform. The coalition 
-in this case the majority of the top management team- recognised the strong 
likelihood that they would lose their jobs in the event of a take-over, and therefore 
decided to put their differences aside and align behind the chief executive's strategy. 
As we have already noted the primary task of the leader of an aligned coalition was to 
sustain the unity of intent amongst members until the submission of the change proposal. 
It was found that two tactics were commonly employed to do this: 
  Control information dissemination, and 
  Link coalition members' career progression to the successful implementation of the 
proposal. 
Control information dissemination 
Coalition leaders endeavoured to create stable conditions that encouraged cohesiveness 
amongst members. One of the favoured methods for achieving stability was the control 
of information dissemination within the team, and between the team and other parts of 
the organisation. As we see from the following series of remarks there were three key 
reasons for this. The first reason was that it provided a mechanism for the coalition 
leader to establish a position of influence over members: 
"If they are being honest any senior manager will tell you that information 
is power. There may be occasions when you want only one or two 
individuals to be made aware of something so that you can influence their 
behaviour, or there may be times when you want to flex your muscles and 
prove you are the gatekeeper. The point is that you can shape people's 
behaviour and their opinion of you by manipulating information. You 
have to control information or it will undermine your authority as rumours 
and counter rumours spread through your team. " (Richard King, CEO) 
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"What you have to do is divide the group into activity based units that 
communicate with each other through you. Make sure you are the only 
one who knows how everyone's contribution fits into the overall strategy, 
and let it be known that you are the communication lynch-pin of the 
coalition by being first to publicise privileged information. Everyone will 
then gravitate towards you to be updated on progress and to find out how 
the rest of the executive body views the group's work. " (Bert Starling, 
managing director) 
A second reason why coalition leaders sought to control the dissemination of information 
was that it enabled them to determine the content of communication with members: 
"In the course of preparing a detailed change programme, there will 
inevitably be times when there is bad news as well as good news, and quite 
often you have little opportunity to decide when it happens. What you can 
affect is how the communication is delivered. Granted, there is news such 
as take-overs, closures and job losses that is too big to be controlled, but 
the everyday tittle-tattle and low level announcements can be packaged 
into a message that has your gloss on it. " (James Brown, senior manager) 
He recalled: 
"In one team I put together I described to them how the announcement 
about the cutback in expenditure made the success of our new product 
development initiative crucial, since additional revenues would release the 
downward pressure on expenditure. If I hadn't done that there was a good 
chance they would have thrown in the towel there and then since it had 
implications for high cost items such as R&D and new product 
development. " (James Brown, senior manager) 
The third reason why coalition leaders attempted to control the dispersal of information 
was because communication provided a lever to motivate key individuals. As the 
following assertions suggest, this was used to encourage members to improve their own 
performance or to modify their behaviour for the purpose of optimising the coalition's 
performance: 
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"I have had to tell people on a number of occasions to pull their finger out. 
The one thing that many people forget when they take on large change 
planning exercises is that they can't be done on a part-time basis. People 
often see these projects as a good way of catching my eye by being seen to 
do things beyond the call of duty. The problem is they end up between a 
rock and a hard place because they fail at both. There are also occasions 
when managers don't pull their weight and I have to tell them that there is 
no room for passengers on the change train. A well timed reference to the 
chief executive's interest in our project usually does the trick. " (Arthur 
Kestrel, managing director) 
"As circumstances change you have to be able to adapt the proposition you 
are putting together so it remains the best option. This may mean taking 
one or two of the members to one side and asking them to shift their effort 
from one aspect of the design to another. It can be a bit tough asking 
someone to ditch several weeks of work that you originally sold to them as 
being vital, but you have to maintain flexibility within the team. " (Robert 
Willow, general manager) 
After a brief pause he continued: 
"An example of this from a couple of years ago was when we had a 
particularly bad set of results, which meant the closure and sell-off of a 
number of our non-core subsidiaries. I had to ask several members of the 
team to start again because we had been planning to use the spare capacity 
of those plants. At a practical level, the members had to switch their 
approach from winning the buy-in of those plant managers, to informing 
them, at least in one instance, that they were going to be made redundant. " 
(Robert Willow, general manager) 
Link coalition members' career progression to the successful implementation of the 
proposal 
In order to encourage commitment coalition leaders often sought to tie members' careers 
to the success or failure of the proposal's implementation, thereby providing every 
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member with an incentive to ensure they produced a results oriented, pragmatic design. 
The following remarks indicate how the current management vogue for team working 
and empowerment helped to forge the linkage: 
"Once I have got the team together I hold a launch party, and invite the 
chief executive and chairman along. Everyone gets a personal introduction 
and an opportunity to discuss their role. The team really enjoy it, feel 
important and go away on a high. Such high visibility events engender 
team spirit and are symbolic in the sense that you get everyone into the 
same boat. " (Geoffrey Silver, director) 
Leaning back in his chair and closing his eyes George Lark made the following 
comment: 
"I call this the `domino' approach to team management, because if one 
falls down the whole lot go with them. The beauty of it is that you get to 
call it empowerment, because you give responsibility and accountability to 
individuals, thereby gaining their buy-in. It is only when the final 
deliverable looms they realise they are inextricably linked to the quality of 
their output. If the output is looking good they feel proud, and quite 
rightly everyone hears about their involvement. But if it looks as though it 
is going pear-shaped then there is nothing like the threat of negative 
association to develop a cohesive team and get things back on track. " 
(George Lark, managing director) 
The last remark hints at a manipulative style of leadership but the majority of coalition 
leaders believed that credit should be given to those who delivered good results and 
blame should be laid at the doors of poor performers. Coalition leaders argued that 
because top management teams often consist of relatively few individuals, all of whom 
know each other on first name terms, members taking credit for work well done by others 
was seen as short-termist, and no-one admitted to having done so, although most could 
cite instances when it had been attempted by others. Therefore, any credit they sought 
was for the successful demonstration of managerial and leadership qualities and the 
ability to deliver the overall project. 
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Behaviours and tactics in unaligned coalitions 
An unaligned coalition was one in which its members were agreed on the overall 
objective but not how to achieve it. Activities tended to be non-complementary and any 
conflict that occured was often not used positively, thereby reinforcing the unaligned 
nature of the coalition. The primary task for the coalition leader in their role as sustainer 
was to align the members in order to increase the likelihood of submitting a change 
proposal that would be approved for implementation. In general the behaviours and 
tactics required to achieve such a shift were more sophisticated than those required by a 
leader of an aligned coalition. Unaligned coalitions were often due to the proposed 
change being relatively uncontroversial, but the route to delivering it somewhat 
contentious. This meant that coalition members would disagree as to the activities to be 
undertaken. As Exhibit 7.2 conveys the objective for the leader of either the unaligned, 
unfocused or fragmented coalition was to transform it into an aligned coalition. 
It can be noted from Exhibit 7.2 that unaligned coalitions required more maintenance 
time generally, greater coercive measures, additional personal rewards, and renegotiation 
between the coalition leader and members in order for it to remain intact and working 
towards the delivery of a large scale change design. These additional tasks were found to 
require a modified set of behaviours and tactics compared with those used by the leader 
of an aligned coalition. However, it is important to note the tactics were additive rather 
than substitutive. It was proposed at the beginning of this section that the members were 
agreed on the objective but not how to accomplish it. When talking about unaligned 
coalitions, informants described the team dynamic as unstable, with individuals typically 
threatening to leave the coalition to join a rival initiative. Obtaining their continued 
support required negotiating skills and the willingness to coerce or offer reward if 
necessary. 
In addition to the two tactics used by the leader of an aligned coalition, it was found that 
leaders of unaligned coalitions used three other principal tactics: 
  Manipulate decision making processes, 
  Create a `hard' vision, and 
  Activity map by majority rule. 
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Exhibit 7.2 - Aligned coalitions as 
optimal configurations 
High 
Personal 
reward 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Coercion 
Maintenance 
time 
High 
Renegotiation 
Low 
High 
High 
Manipulate decision making processes. The problem of members disagreeing over 
how to deliver the agreed objective was resolved, in part, by modifying the manner in 
which decisions were made. In some instances coalitions were left unformalised and the 
coalition sustainer led by common consent. This meant the behaviours and tactics tended 
to he more complex than those used by leaders who relied heavily on formal authority by 
virtue of their position in the hierarchy. Respondents suggested it was difficult to 
identify the point where influence through formal authority gave way to non-hierarchical 
influencing skills, since hierarchical advantage was always implicit in discussions 
between individuals from different levels. Therefore, when attempting to modify 
decision making processes coalition leaders tended to enlist the co-operation of others 
rather than rely on their position in the hierarchy to enforce decisions. This finding is 
supported by the following comments: 
"... changing the way in which decisions are made begins with finding the 
people in the coalition who agree with you on the way forward. You then 
employ divide and conquer tactics by picking off and converting the 
dissidents one-by-one until the group is of a sufficient size to suppress 
opposition and take what appears to be a democratic decision on the way 
forward. " (Nigel Kingfisher, CEO) 
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"If the decision making system is not working then it must be changed. 
Consensus management is the most ludicrous and difficult way to get 
things done. You can't be an idealist when dealing with politics. The only 
way to survive and prosper is to become a pragmatist. In a coalition where 
people cannot agree on how to accomplish the goal, its leader should break 
the deadlock by making deals. For better or for worse you have to 
eliminate the obstacles at some stage, and you may be required to give 
ultimatums to some, and unfair disproportionate benefits to others. It is 
not possible in coalitions to jump up and down shouting `I am in charge'. 
You need the support of either a majority or at least the ones who are 
crucial to the plans being accepted. " (Simon Falcon, CEO) 
He continued: 
"I remember when I had to change a decision making process in order to 
get things moving. There were nine of us in the coalition and whilst we all 
agreed on what we wanted to achieve there were four views on how we 
should do it. We were in danger of not doing anything when I decided the 
situation was untenable. I waited until two of the group were overseas and 
then started negotiating with the four individuals who did not share the 
view held by three of us. I offered additional responsibilities to two, 
threatened one with the loss of her bonus and promised the other a six 
month sabbatical once the change had been implemented. If it's broke fix 
it. " (Simon Falcon, CEO) 
Create a `hard' vision. Objectives that were poorly defined and left room for 
disagreement were proposed as a cause of unaligned coalitions. So called `soft' visions 
-fuzzy and solely emotionally based- resulted in several interpretations of the `agreed' 
objective which meant that when it came to planning activities it was exceedingly 
difficult to establish a mutually acceptable and achievable programme. Consequently 
when it came to designing large scale change, members were as likely to pull apart as 
pull together. In several organisations this situation was remedied by holding visioning 
workshops that developed a `hard' vision comprising targets, measures and activities. 
The importance of these three factors is conveyed in the comments of coalition leaders 
who employed this approach: 
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"Looking back I have only myself to blame for not being specific enough 
when I was putting the team together. I painted a picture on too broad a 
canvas with the result that people saw different things. I suppose I was 
subconsciously aware of it but I turned a blind eye in favour of pumping 
up the team. Next time I will make the end goal very clear. " (Annie 
Swallow, managing director) 
Offering an example to evidence her analysis she commented: 
"Anyway, we were about three or four days into formulating our 
proposition when a disagreement about the purpose of the exercise broke 
out between two individuals. Everyone was in the room at the time so it 
quickly became clear that every person had a different expectation. 
Eventually everyone sat in silence looking at me for the answer. I could 
see that I risked alienating some if I gave my answer there and then, so I 
announced we would hold a facilitated workshop to confirm the goal and 
how we were going to achieve it. " (Annie Swallow, managing director) 
Pausing, ostensibly to collect her thoughts, she concluded: 
"I don't think I could have chosen a better course of action. We got a 
recently retired director to facilitate the meeting and spent the morning 
hammering out a vision with tangible targets. The facilitator also made us 
develop measures which we all had to sign up to. By the end of the day we 
had a reference document containing our vision, how to get there and how 
to measure progress. We all signed the document and made a copy each, 
and from that day on we all worked in the same direction and there were 
no more serious disagreements. " (Annie Swallow, managing director) 
"For me the important thing is measurement. It is one thing having a 
vision and getting people's support for it, but it is crucially important to 
drive down to the activity level and develop measurement systems. That 
way there is no room for people to disagree over the way things should be 
done. I find that when people try to wriggle out of projects they usually 
argue they didn't know what was really involved. Make sure you have 
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agreed measures at the activity level and no-one can claim the vision was 
ambiguous. " (Richard King, managing director) 
Both of these quotes make reference to the process of planning the activities that would 
deliver the agreed objective. This was the third principal behaviour exhibited by 
coalition leaders faced with the task of sustaining alignment. 
Activity map by majority rule. Several coalition leaders were found to align members 
by inviting them to map out the activities required to deliver the agreed way forward. 
Once again this was often in the format of workshops. However, one useful tactic was to 
lay down the ground rule that the majority view would be adopted if a total consensus 
could not be reached in the given time frame. Those who did not agree still had to sign 
up: 
"I actually had the suggestion made to me by one of the group who said he 
was fed up with the lack of progress and would follow a plan agreed to by 
most of the group rather than sit around arguing and not doing anything. 
Once everybody had agreed to this we were on our way. " (Owen Rudd, 
head of function) 
"You have to understand how to motivate people. Even if they don't get 
their own way most people will still go along if they feel they have at least 
been listened to. Senior managers can't afford to go off and sulk these 
days or someone else will be knocking on the door to take their place. Just 
give people the opportunity to contribute to the design and then shape it in 
the direction you want by playing the role of problem owner or expert. It's 
your idea and you will have spent more time thinking about the issues than 
they have at this stage so your scope for influencing the design is greatest 
at this point. " (Derek Barbel, director) 
These then were some of the behaviours and tactics favoured by leaders of unaligned 
coalitions in their attempts to align members. As we will see in the next section, leaders 
of unfocused coalitions use a broader range of tactics to focus and align members into an 
effective team. 
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Behaviours and tactics in unfocused coalitions 
An unfocused coalition was one in which its members were not agreed on the overall 
objective and consequently found it difficult to work together in a co-ordinated manner. 
Although conflict tended to emerge around the objective, members were willing to work 
together if an objective was commonly agreed. The primary concern for the coalition 
leader was how to focus and align the members in order to improve the likelihood of 
delivering an implementable plan for change. In general the behaviours and tactics 
required to achieve such a shift were more sophisticated than those required by a leader 
faced with sustaining either an aligned or unaligned coalition. Unfocused coalitions were 
found to occur in situations where the proposed change was complex and likely to impact 
on many of the coalition members' areas of responsibility. Thus, disagreement on the 
overall objective existed because coalition members sought to maximise self-interest. 
The behaviours and tactics commonly used by leaders to improve stability and cohesion 
in unfocused coalitions were the same as those used by leaders of unaligned coalitions: 
  Create a `hard' vision, and 
  Activity map by majority rule. 
Additionally, participants refered regularly to three other techniques: 
  Create an enemy, 
  Produce quick wins, and 
  Trade resources. 
The first priority of the leader of an unfocused coalition was to establish a shared 
objective amongst the members since this would help to create alignment and cohesion. 
A number of the participants with experience of this situation resolved the problem by 
conducting a visioning workshop. 
Create a `hard' vision. The process was very similar to that employed by the leader of 
an unaligned coalition. However, the key difference was that the scale of the task in 
unfocused coalitions was greater since the members could not agree even on a loose 
vision that needed tightening up with targets, measures and activities. Workshops were 
used as the final step in achieving a common vision but the majority of the sustainer's 
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time was spent negotiating with members backstage on a one-to-one basis. The 
following comment supports the contention made in Exhibit 7.1 that unfocused coalitions 
were higher maintenance in terms of the frequency of renegotiation, and the use of 
coercion and personal reward as inducements for commitment: 
"In the change process I led last year, there were times when I had to 
behave in a way that could be described as political. For example, early in 
the process my team could not agree on a goal and it was getting to the 
point of breaking up. In one of my previous jobs I worked with a great 
politician who taught me that to get people to do what you want it is 
necessary to understand their personal agendas. It seems insanely obvious, 
but like he said, think how much time we spend convincing people of our 
agendas without appreciating their own. I have used his advice ever since 
and I have to say it is far more effective than attempting to argue your way 
to victory by rational means. " (Francis Elm, general manager) 
Elm then went into a lengthy account of an experience he had leading an unfocused 
team: 
"My team were on the verge of disintegration and time was running out. 
My first task was to identify those who were closest to my position. Out 
of the seven people I thought that two had the same general idea as me, 
two were waiting to see which way the wind would blow and two were 
edging towards the view held by one individual who had gone from being 
my biggest supporter to my biggest opponent since her attempt to hijack 
the group for her own purposes. The problem stemmed in part from the 
fact that I was one of the more recent additions to the senior management 
team and I was something of an unknown quantity. " (Francis Elm, general 
manager) 
After a brief description of his previous roles he resumed: 
"I went to talk separately to the two people I thought were closest to my 
position and asked them three questions. What did they want to see 
happen? What did they want to achieve for themselves out of the project? 
What concerns did they have? I was a little surprised to find that the real 
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concern for them was not the change I was proposing, they thought that 
was a good idea, but the fact that, because I was new to the company, I 
didn't have a track record for delivering large projects. By allying 
themselves to me they felt exposed. " (Francis Elm, general manager) 
Pausing for a moment he then continued: 
"To offset the risk they were taking I agreed to reduce the scope of the 
planned change to the core elements of what I thought the business had to 
achieve in the coming year. I also offered them higher profile roles in the 
coalition as workstream leaders. It was an important win for me because 
they are both well respected directors, and whilst they are not the most 
senior, they do have the reputation of getting things done and doing what 
is best for the business. " (Francis Elm, general manager) 
He added: 
"The next step was to win the support of the two who were waiting to see 
which way the wind was blowing. My natural instinct was to do it myself, 
but on reflection I decided to ask the two directors to go and win them 
over. Partially because they were at the same level or more senior, but 
also because as converts to my cause they were likely to be more 
convincing than me because they could offer an unbiased view... Jane 
[name changed] fell into line once she saw that the other two had 
commited their support, but Steve [name changed] realised he had room to 
manoeuvre and extracted a number of favours from me regarding 
resources in return for his support. " (Francis Elm, general manager) 
Concluding his recollection of the episode Elm, by now very animated and gesticulating, 
remarked in an intense manner: 
"We were now in a position of five against three and the momentum was 
building up. We started to send signals that if they weren't going to join 
us we would go it alone. We had one or two meetings to get the ball 
rolling, and we asked the chairman for his advice and input into the 
planning process. Once the other guys found out that it was going to 
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happen with or without them they asked to rejoin the group ... I told them 
that if there was any further disagreement as to the purpose of the group 
they would be cut. I also transfered some of their project responsibilities 
to the others who I considered to be more loyal. A lot of these threats, if 
you want to call them that, could only be made because I had the support 
of people more senior than me. I wouldn't... couldn't... have been as blunt 
by myself... As for the chap who I mentioned earlier had become an 
obstacle. We eventually informed him we no longer required his input. " 
(Francis Elm, general manager) 
Activity map by majority rule. As in the unaligned coalition, once a common vision 
had been established the next step involved developing a detailed plan of the activities 
required to formulate a design for change. Once again the most common approach was 
to conduct a workshop, the purpose of which was to reach a consensus on the way 
forward. 
In addition to vision formulation and activity mapping, leaders of unfocused coalitions 
commonly cited the use of three tactics that leaders of aligned and unaligned coalitions 
did not. 
Create an enemy. We noted at the beginning of this chapter that coalition leaders 
endeavoured to create a stable and cohesive team. It has been asserted this was achieved 
in part by agreeing firstly, a vision and secondly, the activities necessary to prepare a 
proposal for submission to the top management team. In addition to these two 
approaches, one other popular method of creating cohesion and stability was to identify 
an enemy the coalition could compete against. Participants were keen to point out that 
resources in organisations are finite and less than the sum of the demands placed on them 
by the full range of strategic options. Therefore, coalitions found themselves typically in 
bidding situations from which emerged winning and losing propositions. Many leaders 
exploited this tension to increase the level of commitment from members and generate a 
team spirit. The following remark is illustrative of the lengths to which some leaders 
would go to create a cohesive team: 
"The shift in strategic direction that we were proposing required a huge 
investment of management time and financial resource. If accepted it 
would be the major undertaking of the year and supersede all other 
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activities. What we were proposing was a radical restructuring that meant 
acquiring companies and selling off non-core units. " (Fred Hawk, director) 
He recalled: 
"Just after we started preparing the plan, one of the other directors who 
was in charge of several of the units we were proposing to lose, set up his 
own task force to look at alternative options. He is a resourceful, hard 
headed businessman and I knew he would play hard to win. If we were 
going to be successful we would have to wring out every ounce of 
potential from the team. We had to want to beat them. It had to be 
competitive. I commandeered a project room, put a lock on it and papered 
over the windows so no-one could see in. I got us a microwave, fridge and 
kettle, and we put up motivational slogan's around the room. The room 
became known as `the bunker'. " (Fred Hawk, director) 
Some leaders went even further, taking the team off-site for the duration of the project. 
Holidays were sometimes cancelled, weekends often went untaken and one coalition 
leader even installed sofa-beds in the project room so that people did not have to go 
home. 
Produce quick wins. In situations where the coalition was unfocused or there were 
competing coalitions, some leaders thought it was important to secure positive support 
from influential decision makers: 
"There is nothing more motivating than having the chairman or chief 
executive come down to see how things are progressing. Tired individuals 
suddenly find the will to work even longer hours. " (Ray Bream, senior 
manager) 
"I try to break the proposal formulation into stages for two reasons. 
Firstly, no-one is surprised by the magnitude of what we are proposing at 
the final presentation since they have seen it evolve, and secondly getting 
people to say `yes' at crucial junctures is motivational for everyone 
involved in putting the bid together. On extremely large and complex 
proposals it is tough to sustain effort for long periods of time without 
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encouragement because as people tire they can become depressed or 
cynical about the chances of success. It is vitally important to receive 
regular boosts. " (Philip Birch, senior manager) 
Trade resources. In the earlier section on creating visions we noted how some coalition 
leaders engaged in the trading of favours and resources as part of the renegotiation for 
continued commitment. It was found that members of top management teams entered 
into agreements in respect of secondments of key personnel, support for a members' own 
initiative at some future point in time, transfer of financial resources, loaned equipment, 
and access to privileged information. The extent to which a coalition leader would 
bargain was contingent upon how important they believed it was to enjoy the continued 
commitment of the individual with whom they were negotiating: 
"Sometimes the contribution of a particularly bloody-minded individual 
might be quite minor, but having their presence on the inside is infinitely 
preferable to having their opposition on the outside. I feel much more 
comfortable being able to keep an eye on someone whose commitment and 
motive is questionable. If that means I have to agree to scratch their back 
some time in the future then in my view that is a price worth paying. " 
(Michael Gold, director) 
"I once had to agree to second three of my best people in return for a 
colleague's support because the idiot had fucked up big time in sorting out 
the firm's logistics and needed someone competent to bail him out. I had 
to have his support because our proposal impacted on the distribution fleet 
which was under his control. " (Geoffrey Silver, director) 
"In my experience trading between executives is rife. In some companies 
it is more explicit than in others, but I have never worked anywhere and 
not had to give and take to get things done. You can't risk blowing your 
plans simply because it seems unprincipled to oil the wheels. If people 
weren't prepared to trade, everything would grind to a halt. Every 
company has a `favour bank', you just have to know your limits and use it 
wisely. " (Scott Bishop, director) 
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During the course of the interviews and the subsequent analysis of the responses given by 
participants it became apparent there was a fourth type of coalition that seemed to 
operate in an imminent state of collapse. Yet in a number of cases the manager contrived 
to sustain the group and submit a change proposal that was approved for implementation. 
We will now consider the behaviours and tactics used by leaders of fragmented 
coalitions. 
Behaviours and tactics in fragmented coalitions 
A fragmented coalition was one in which its members were not agreed on the overall 
objective or the composition of the team. Conflict tended to arise around the objective, 
and members were often unhappy about working together. The primary task for the 
coalition leader was to un-fragment, focus and align the members in order to improve 
effectiveness and increase the likelihood of preparing a winning bid. In general the 
behaviours and tactics required to achieve such a shift were more sophisticated than 
those required by a leader of an aligned, unaligned or unfocused coalition. Fragmented 
coalitions were found to occur most often when the organisational environment was in a 
constant state of upheaval due to intense internal or external pressures. They were also 
found to exist in situations where the majority of members were attempting to use the 
coalition to further their own objectives. 
In addition to deploying the full range of tactics employed by leaders of the other three 
coalition types in their role as sustainers, leaders of fragmented coalitions were willing 
and able to demonstrate considerable innovation and flexibility in the areas of reward, 
coercion and negotiation. Doing so necessitated the use of several additional tactics: 
  Exploit or create a crisis, 
  Disproportionate reward, 
  Direct coercion, 
- `heavy artillery', 
- `ambush', 
- `leg breaking', and 
- `sacrificial lambs'. 
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A consistent theme in respondents' descriptions of behaviours and tactics employed or 
observed in strongly discordant and fragile coalitions was the direct and forceful nature 
of leadership actions. A typical comment was that if a coalition was close to disbanding, 
participative methods were unlikely to produce a common view. It was argued that any 
semblance of cohesion and stability was best achieved by demonstrating strong 
leadership. A style that often involved direct confrontation. This contentious stance was 
summed up best by the following remark which was delivered in a heated manner: 
"You can't be subtle when it is falling down around your ears. You have 
to get in people's faces and provoke them into laying their differences on 
the table. It is essential to get people's attention and focus their minds. 
Pussyfooting around won't get you anywhere. You will certainly upset 
people and make enemies but what are your options? You play it hard 
because you have no other choice when your back's against the wall. 
You're not given many chances to deliver when you are at the top. Fail 
more than once in a big way and you're out! " (Kurt Nightingale, CEO) 
Exploit or create a crisis. One popular method of focusing members minds was to 
exploit or create a crisis that threatened the coalition and by extension the future of its 
members within the organisation. Crises could `emerge' within the coalition or from the 
surrounding environment. The following remarks of Bert Starling are abstracts taken 
from an extended account of an experience he had of leading a fragmented coalition: 
"About four or five years ago I was a member of someone else's proposal 
project, and it was a disaster. Everyone had their own view on what 
needed to be done. It was like when you were a child at school and you 
would talk amongst yourselves when the teacher was trying to get your 
attention. You would ignore her just to see how much she would tolerate. 
The real problem was that Peter [name changed] failed to demonstrate 
leadership. We were a group of strong willed individuals and he didn't 
impose himself. One day he walked into what was probably going to be 
our final meeting and announced that he had just spoken to a City analyst 
who had heard rumours we were being lined up in the market for a bid. In 
the same breath he stated that he was disbanding the team in order to start 
another one. " (Bert Starling, managing director) 
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Laughing at his memory of the event and standing up from his chair to walk around the 
room, he commented: 
"It was as though someone had lobbed stun grenades into the room. Two 
explosions, one after the other. People were reeling with shock as Peter 
turned on his heel to walk out. Suddenly people were clamouring for 
information and nobody would let him leave. People were asking him who 
the bidder was and what we should do. Proposals flew around the room 
for twenty minutes or so until it became apparent that no-one really knew 
what to do. People turned back to Peter for guidance. Drawing out the 
silence Peter made eye contact with everyone around the room before 
asking if anyone had a strategy that would stand up to scrutiny. No-one 
did. " (Bert Starling, managing director) 
After taking a phone call, he continued: 
"Looking back now he had everyone by the balls. Until then no-one had 
shown any appetite for cutting back on the corporate extravagance, and it 
was six years since we had last launched any new products which had 
made a significant contribution to the bottom line. I wouldn't have 
thought it was possible to turn such a group of malcontents into one that 
produced such a high quality proposition... When the bid materialised we 
were able to convince the city that our plans would produce a greater 
return for shareholders than those of the bidder. Two years later Peter 
became chief executive, since then he has weeded out the trouble makers 
and established a highly effective team. " (Bert Starling, managing 
director) 
The problem with creating a crisis is that it escalates the risk of the coalition breaking up, 
and there were several examples of this happening. Instances were cited when members 
took the view that they were better off outside the coalition, either by themselves or as a 
member of a more aligned and focused rival coalition. 
Disproportionate reward. An alternative to exploiting or creating a crisis was the tactic 
of offering attractive incentives to individuals whose support was essential to the 
development of the change proposal. Evidence of `star player' rewards, significantly 
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beyond anything offered to other members of the coalition, was refered to by 
interviewees. However, it appears that such rewards were restricted to very few 
individuals in exceptional situations where the short term health of the organisation was 
at risk. 
Interestingly, in the four situations where disproportionate reward was cited by 
interviewees as a tactic for rescuing a coalition from impending failure, none of the 
individuals receiving the reward were the chairman or chief executive officer. The four 
rewards made were: share options worth over two million pounds Sterling, promotion 
from general manager to deputy chief executive officer (missing out the level of 
director), a bonus equivalent to 4.5 times salary, and the transfer of a company owned 
residence to the individual who designed a re-engineered process that increased 
profitability by forty-six per cent over a two year period. 
Direct coercion. In the event that creating a crisis or disproportionate reward did not 
create a cohesive team, leaders of fragmented coalitions claimed to use direct coercion as 
a last resort. Informants stressed the negative aspects of using force with colleagues, but 
explained it was justified for change initiatives which were critical to the future success 
of the organisation. Examples were given of relationships that were irrevocably 
damaged, and in one organisation which requested anonymity, several members of the 
top management team resigned in protest against a proposal to reduce the workforce by 
sixty per cent during a three year period. 
There follows a discussion of four behaviours used by leaders of fragmented coalitions. 
Of the fourteen fragmented coalitions recorded in the study, eleven of them had used one 
or a combination of the tactics discussed below. Additionally, the insight they offer into 
the backstage behaviour of top management team members in the context of large scale 
change proposal design make them worthy of consideration. 
`Heavy artillery'. In situations where the coalition leader was more junior than those 
whose support they were unsuccessfully seeking to obtain, one course of action was to 
ask the most senior member of the top management team to enforce co-operation. 
Participants with experience of this tactic asserted that it could only be used when the 
change was of critical importance to the organisation, and failure to deliver a proposal 
would undermine the chief executive's or managing director's right to lead: 
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"If you use the chief executive's name as a weapon you had better make 
sure the gun's loaded, because if they find out you are firing blanks, you 
might as well get a real bullet and shoot yourself. " (Ian Roach, head of 
function) 
"When I was really up against it and the other guys were blocking because 
they feared what the change would mean for them, I took the decision to 
go and seek help from above. It's the last card in the deck, but if you 
believe you are right then you have to play it. " (Paul Swan, director) 
Exponents of this approach admitted that enforcement tended to generate compliance 
rather than commitment since members of the team were unlikely to maximise their 
contribution if they were working under threat of sanction. Leaders also stated that long 
term relationships were damaged unless individuals derived substantial benefits in return 
for their support. As one respondent commented: 
"People regard bringing in the boss as treachery, so the only chance of 
forgiveness is if they make big personal wins as a result of their 
involvement. " (Sam Raven, head of function) 
`Ambush'. Another tactic employed to gain the compliance of obstructive coalition 
members involved the leader engineering a situation whereby individuals were exposed 
as resistors in front of the top management team. Coalition leaders invested periods of 
several days winning the support of key executives outside the coalition before inviting 
the resistors to make a presentation of the coalition's progress. 
During the presentation the pre-positioned key decision makers would question the 
members in order to uncover their opposition. Charles Rook asserted: 
"In the event that direct accusations were not made against them, they 
were nevertheless left in no doubt that their non-cooperation was strongly 
disapproved of, and action would be taken against them later. " (Charles 
Rook, general manager) 
`Leg breaking'. This rather emotive term was used by one director to describe the 
process of eliminating an individual's support amongst his or her own subordinates. 
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Respondents cited occasions when individuals were able to resist because they led large 
or influential units, departments or teams. Fred Hawk explained how his company had 
overcome a powerful individual in order to outsource one of its key functions. The 
director explained how the head of accounting had tried to sabotage the initiative by 
ensuring no member of his department supplied the financial information required to 
conduct a feasibility study. The coalition leader waited until the individual was abroad 
before appealing directly to his staff. He explained to them that if they co-operated they 
would have the chance to shape the change and influence their future salary packages and 
career paths. On returning from his trip the head of accounting found that his only 
realistic option was to co-operate with his staff who now believed that he had been 
attempting to protect his own empire rather than promote their interests. 
`Sacrificial lambs'. In the most extreme circumstances coalition in-fighting 
compromised a top management team's ability to set strategic direction. Two leaders of 
fragmented coalitions had successfully resolved the problem by removing key resistors 
from the organisation. It fell to the chief executive or managing director to inform the 
resistor of their sacking and both the interviewees stressed that such actions had only 
been taken once all other options had been explored. Interviewees were united in their 
assertion that termination of employment rather than relocation within the organisation 
was the appropriate course of action for dealing with individuals who refused to modify 
their stance if they acknowledged the damage they were causing: 
"I had worked with Michael [name changed] for fifteen years and whilst 
we weren't best of friends, I didn't dislike the guy. The fact of the matter 
was that he was bringing the company to its knees and these days you 
can't afford to stand still. Perhaps ten to fifteen years ago we could have 
negotiated longer, but not now when competitors are breathing down our 
neck every day and the City is scrutinising our performance every 
quarter. " (Roger Oak, CEO) 
"Sometimes you are just never going to see eye-to-eye with people, and if 
you have behaved in an honourable manner and investigated all other 
routes, then they have to be taken out of the game. You cannot let a 
business suffer because of one or two individuals. Of course you don't 
want to lose too many people so you make an example of one. " (Nigel 
Kingfisher, CEO) 
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As with calling in the heaiv artillery this had long term negative implications for 
working relationships with the remaining coalition members and both the coalition leader 
and the chief executive had to work hard at rebuilding an effective team and a climate of 
trust. In response to a question on dismissing individuals who threatened the success of 
large scale change proposals Kurt Nightingale gesticulated forcefully as lie cited former 
US General Colin Powell's now infamous press conference statement made during the 
Desert Storm campaign of the Gulf War in 1991: 
"Executive means to execute and there are times when you have to do just 
that. If one of your own people is damaging the firm's performance and 
they refuse to co-operate, then they become the enemy within. You must 
he quick and decisive. First of all you cut'em off and then you kill'em so 
the cancer doesn't spread to the rest of the team. " (Kurt Nightingale, CEO) 
These then are four direct coercion tactics employed by leaders of fragmented coalitions. 
It is important to reaffirm the participants' assertions that they were used only as a final 
option once all other approaches had failed. A wide range of behaviours and tactics have 
been discussed in the context of the four coalition types identified in this study. These 
are summarised in Exhibit 7.3. 
Exhibit 7.3 - Principal leadership behaviours and tactics 
used in four coalition types 
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It has been stated at several points in this chapter that the principal task of a coalition 
leader is to create a stable and cohesive team. It was asserted that coalitions exhibiting 
these characteristics were more likely to submit a winning large scale change proposal 
than those which displayed less stability and cohesion. As a final footnote to this chapter 
it is worth discussing briefly the role of constructive tension: a term coined by Pascale 
(1989) to describe healthy competition amongst key decision makers and business units. 
The majority of participants adopted the position that a mildly competitive environment 
within a coalition avoided complacency and stagnation. 
Interviewees did not think total harmony between members was conducive to high 
performance. Indeed many thought that an absence of constructive tension produced 
sterile, unoriginal recommendations, and most of those expressing this view could cite 
examples of coalition outputs that had been condemned as such by those who rejected 
them in favour of other submissions. However, a final note of caution on the subject of 
conflict and tension is appropriate. A few participants could recall coalitions that had 
examples of coalition outputs that had been condemned as such by those who rejected 
them in favour of other submissions. Top management team members advised that 
tension should be continuously monitored and adjusted throughout the course of a 
proposal's preparation. Furthermore, optimal levels of tension were coalition specific 
and varied according to the interpersonal dynamics between members and the importance 
of the proposal to the future of the organisation. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have presented results relating to line of enquiry #5, which set out to 
consider whether or not different types of large scale change proposal coalitions exist in 
top management teams, and if they did, the characteristics of each and the behaviours 
and tactics of coalition leaders in each type. The evidence that there are four types of 
large scale change proposal coalition which exist in top management teams is a major 
new insight. The extant literature treats coalitions as a homogenous type irrespective of 
the change process stage or purpose. The findings presented here suggest that coalitions 
can vary considerably in their nature and characteristics, and the degree of stability and 
cohesiveness has an influence on the likelihood of submitting a proposal which receives 
approval for implementation. The type of coalition also determines the behaviours and 
tactics required to be used by the coalition leader. This supports the arguments that the 
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effectiveness of behaviours is contingent upon the prevailing situation. That coercion is 
deemed a legitimate tactic strengthens the assertion made in chapter three of the 
literature review that a political behaviour based approach to managing coalitions is 
necessary to navigate an ambiguous and uncertain change context, characterised by 
competing agendas, opposition and resistance. 
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Chapter 8 
Dissolving large scale change 
proposal coalitions 
"Once the coalition has fulfilled its purpose and the plan has been 
accepted or rejected, it is important that people go their separate ways. If 
the coalition was successful it is tempting to keep the group together... But 
the fact is you can't do that. If the group is truly first class then you can 
get a shadow executive, which starts second guessing the real management 
team. " (Peter Ash, CEO) 
Introduction 
In chapter four we examined evidence to support the assertion that large scale change 
proposal coalitions exhibit a five phase life-cycle. The finding that leaders of coalitions 
adopt three primary roles during these phases was presented and discussed. In chapter 
five we considered how change proposal coalitions were built, and in chapter six we 
discussed how they were sustained in the context of four coalition types. To conclude 
the results section of the thesis, this chapter will focus on the dissolution of coalitions. 
The results presented relate to lines of enquiry #6 and #7 which respectively set out to 
investigate the issues of coalition life-span and what happens once the proposal has been 
approved or rejected. The central finding was that coalitions should be dissolved once a 
proposal has been approved or rejected and any learning has been captured and 
transfered into the top management team with a view to improving the alignment and 
cohesion of future coalitions. The reasons behind this consensual assertion are explored 
along with a review of three favoured dissolution techniques. Dissolution of large scale 
change proposal coalitions in top management teams has not been researched previously. 
The behaviours, tactics and processes identified represent the first empirical insights into 
this unexplicated element to the change context. 
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The need to dissolve large scale change proposal coalitions 
In setting the context for this chapter it is important to surface and discuss the issues of 
instigation, motive and timing in the dissolution of coalitions. It can be argued with 
respect to instigation, that a coalition can be dissolved either voluntarily by its members 
or by edict of the chief executive. It is possible for a coalition to break up naturally once 
a decision on the change proposal has been made by the appropriate decision makers 
within the top management team. However, it was found that this tended to occur only in 
coalitions which had been unsuccessful in winning approval. Coalitions that had been 
successful tended to attempt to continue working together and increase their degree of 
influence over the strategic direction of the organisation. Kanter, Stein and Jick (1992) 
in their discussion of coalitions in the context of organisational change contended: 
"Though the dominant coalition [in the top management team] takes shape 
because its collective interest is relatively enduring, challenges to its 
preeminence and new claims to membership are ever present. " (Kanter, 
Stein and Jick, 1992, p. 47) [parentheses added] 
In light of this statement, the motive for dissolution is transparent: self-preservation. 
Therefore, it was unsurprising to find a unanimous view amongst the chairman, chief 
executives and managing directors that all coalitions, but particularly successful ones, 
should be dissolved as soon as practically possible once the proposal had been approved 
or rejected. Whether couched in arguments on the need to maintain `stability', `balance' 
or `diversity', the evidence appears to suggest the holders of an organisation's highest 
office seek to restore an environment in which their level of influence is maximised or at 
least not diminished. Dissolution was found to be conducted by the coalition leader and 
the chief executive officer unless the two roles were fulfilled by the same individual. 
The CEO by virtue of their structural position in the hierarchy was usually better placed 
to allocate new roles and responsibilities, disperse coalition members geographically if 
necessary, place individuals on new projects and generally make pay-offs. However, 
coalition leaders worked with the chief executive to execute the dissolution in the top 
management team. This brings us to the question of timing. It has already been 
mentioned that the view from the most senior interviewees was that coalitions, and 
specifically successful coalitions, should be broken up at the earliest feasible 
opportunity. However, it would be erroneous to present the view that the preference was 
for coalitions to be dissolved rapidly, regardless of the cost to the business. The 
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instigators were strongly in favour of capturing and transfering learning into the working 
practices of the top management team for the purpose of improving the alignment and 
cohesion of future coalition initiatives. Thus the question of timing was situation 
specific, with the decision driven primarily by the level and immediacy of threat to the 
existing leader on the one hand, and the nature and complexity of the learnings to be 
transfered on the other. The dissolution process was found to take weeks rather than 
months. 
The problem of dealing with the issues of when, what and how to dissolve coalitions was 
best articulated by chief executive, Roger Oak, when lie used the phrase `throwing out 
the hathwater whilst keeping the baby'. Adopting this metaphor we will now consider 
both the `hathwater' and the *baby' in order to gain an insight into the thinking and 
behaviours of top management team members around the time of coalition dissolution. 
Exhibit 8. I summarises the arguments. 
Exhibit 8.1 - Reasons for dissolving large scale change 
proposal coalitions 
'Throwing out the bathwater... ' 
  Dysfunctional organisational performance 
  Transient relationships 
  Healing wounds' 
  Purging old blood' 
  Avoiding 'them and us' attitudes 
n the top management team 
'... whilst keeping the baby' 
  Transferable relationships 
  'Dividing the spoils' 
  Skills development 
  Enhanced decision making processes 
  'Restless ambition' 
  Institutionalisation of temporary teams' 
`Throwing out the hathwater... ' 
Although the strongest advocates of coalition dissolution were the chairman, chief' 
executives and managing directors, there was consensus amongst all participants that 
coalitions should not be allowed to remain intact once the change proposal had been 
approved or rejected. As conveyed in [xhibit 8.1 the reasoning centred around five key 
arguments: 
  Dysfunctional organisational pcrlörmancc, 
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  Transient relationships, 
  `Healing wounds', 
  `Purging old blood', and 
  Avoiding `them and us' attitudes in the top management team. 
Dysfunctional organisational performance. The key concern in allowing the 
continuation of change proposal coalitions was their potential for negative impact on the 
performance of the top management team, and by extension the organisation. 
Participants were aligned in arguing that successful coalitions tended to upset the delicate 
balance that often exists between the hierarchical and non-hierarchical elements of the 
team. It was asserted that whilst an infusion of new perspectives, skills and ideas is 
essential to ensure renewal, the introduction of an influential group is likely to cause 
fragmentation and the emergence of uncooperative behaviours: 
"When people read books like Barbarians at the Gate and Liars Poker 
they gain the impression that executives spend the vast majority of their 
time fighting for power. In my experience teams function best when there 
is a degree of stability that simply couldn't exist if people were constantly 
wrestling for control. Now don't misinterpret what I am saying. People 
don't love one another but generally they do respect each other's abilities 
and right to ambition. It is accepted that it takes time to build up a power 
base and establish a right to lead and direct. If all of a sudden you allow 
the latest idea to rule the day you will soon have an anarchic environment 
in which everyone fights for themselves. " (Scott Bishop, director) 
Becoming highly animated, he continued: 
"Once you change the rules of the game it descends into political chaos. 
Anyone who has ever experienced it will testify it's no way to manage. 
This is exactly what happened at my last company, which I can tell you is 
now a sitting take-over target. It became a lawless state in which it was 
impossible to do anything remotely strategic. Annual turnover of key 
personnel was forty percent! It is vital to listen to the latest idea, but it is 
wrong to let the authors of those ideas take control, otherwise you end up 
with the paralytic Italian style of governance. " (Scott Bishop, director) 
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Scott Bishop's argument found support from a number of others including Patrick 
Queen. Turning to point at the texts in the cabinet behind his desk, he commented: 
"I have read Pfeffer's book Managing with Power and I agree with him 
that power flows to those who can successfully confront the critical issue 
facing the company. So if the coalition is developing a strategy to deal 
with the critical performance issue then they will become increasingly 
important. People will start to seek them out, and they will be given more 
responsibilities. If the entire coalition succeeds in developing their power, 
and individual members decide to wield it collectively they could 
potentially overthrow the existing top management team. " (Patrick Queen, 
director) 
Pausing to remove Pfeffer's book from the cabinet he commented: 
"Where I do not subscribe to the theory is when the coalition which 
successfully confronts the critical issue takes power. You cannot live in an 
environment of coup d'etats because they would be constant in today's 
world. The critical issue changes monthly in some industries. What you 
need is stability at the top... Sure the chief executive may not always be the 
best person to lead the organisation in confronting a particular issue but he 
doesn't have to be. He just has to create the appropriate framework. The 
beauty of coalitions is that you get the best people, but once the issue has 
been successfully dealt with they must then resume their normal activities. 
Just because someone makes a great coalition manager doesn't mean they 
would make a good leader of the company. " (Patrick Queen, director) 
Further support was found in the remark of Peter Ash: 
"Once the coalition has fulfilled its purpose and the plan has been accepted 
or rejected, it is important that people go their separate ways. If the 
coalition was successful it is tempting to keep the group together. 
Everyone feels a winner, and they want to get on with implementing it. 
But the fact is you can't do that. If the group is truly first class then you 
can get a shadow executive, which starts second guessing the real 
management team. I have seen situations where the benefits from having a 
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coalition were lost because the management team imploded. " (Peter Ash, 
CEO) 
Later in the interview he returned to the issue. 
"Once people see an opportunity to increase their power by apparently 
legitimate means, they are quick to forget the coalition was established to 
benefit the company. Of course, it would be stupid to break up the group 
without keeping the good things, but it is important that everybody feels 
the break up is a normal and constructive part of the overall process. " 
(Peter Ash, CEO) 
The impact on organisational performance of sustaining coalitions beyond the proposal 
phase was also considered from the perspective of personal cost to key decision makers. 
The following remarks, made by Geoffrey Silver, were indicative of the views expressed 
by other interviewees: 
"It is an intense and unsustainable way of working. You give it your all 
and say cheerio to your family for considerable periods of time. But you 
don't mind because you know it will end. Most senior managers exposed 
to such a way of working for an extended period, could not keep up the 
pace and would seek alternative opportunities outside the company... You 
can't afford to lose your best people, and by best I don't mean the chief 
executive. As the top man he knows that he has to subjugate himself to the 
company for his term of office, but for the others who know they are not 
going to make it to the very top, you have to manage them carefully. They 
have a life-time of experience, and you can't afford for them to leave in 
numbers. " (Geoffrey Silver, director) 
Transient relationships. It was found that the intensity of working in large scale change 
proposal coalitions would often have one of two effects on a relationship between 
members. Respondents suggested that prior to working in coalitions it was typical to 
have a relatively neutral opinion of a colleague. However, working intimately with 
someone for several weeks or months tended to produce views that moved away from 
neutrality towards a more definite opinion. At one extreme relations were strengthened 
considerably. At the other extreme relations soured to the point where individuals would 
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refuse to work together again. We will examine the benefits of transferable relationships 
later in this chapter, but first we will consider the assertion that dissolving coalitions 
ensured unproductive relationships remained temporary. Participants asserted that 
coalition dissolution meant that transient relationships would have a natural end, rather 
than be forced to continue. As Leonard Plum commented: 
"It is inevitable that you get on with some people better than others. After 
all you are working in a close-knit team for months at a time, and you 
become like a family. Some people become blood brothers, while others 
you don't want to work with again if you can help it. Because it's a 
project you know it has a finite life-span, so you are kind of on your best 
behaviour and more tolerant. " (Leonard Plum, senior manager) 
Echoing this sentiment Ann Cherry added: 
"In this company I don't think the coalition way of working would have 
been as successful if the teams had been forced to continue working 
together. I think you take forward some relationships because you worked 
well and they add value to your own thinking and practices, but there are 
others that you haven't gained anything from which are best left behind. " 
(Ann Cherry, head of function) 
A more general view was expressed by Matthew Mallard who suggested: 
"One of the main benefits of working in coalitions is they are short term. 
People are exposed to new ways of thinking and working. They get to see 
parts of the organisation they haven't seen or really understood before, and 
for many it will be the first time they have had an opportunity to actively 
influence the direction of the company. " (Matthew Mallard, head of 
function) 
`Healing wounds'. A third reason why participants believed dissolving successful 
proposal coalitions was preferable to sustaining them was that it forced the designers of 
change to rebuild relationships with those who would suffer if the planned change was 
implemented. The consensus was that large scale change inherently upsets the status 
quo, redefining decision making processes, spheres of authority, and reshaping the power 
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structure. Therefore, those responsible for its design had to work to ensure they still had 
productive relationships with members of the top management team outside the coalition. 
This view is conveyed in the following series of remarks from individuals who had 
experienced being inside and outside proposal coalitions: 
"During complex change proposals it is easy to forget that you are 
tramping about on other people's turf, and even though they may vote for 
you, they probably are not going to thank you for it. Once the proposal has 
gone through I usually try to lay low for a while and spend time with those 
who will lose out under our plan. You have to heal wounds, rebuild 
bridges, mend fences or whatever you want to call it. " (Dick Tern, 
director) 
"It is a foolish individual who neglects to patch things up as quickly as 
possible, because in a matter of months he or she could find themselves 
losing out under another plan. You have to find wins for as many people 
as possible because what goes around comes around. " (Stacey Trout, 
senior manager) 
"The one part of my job I find really tough is deciding who should do what 
in a major re-organisation. I have worked with some colleagues for more 
than twenty years. Recently I was on the outside looking in and I found 
out how others must feel. You hear rumour and counter-rumour about 
what is going to happen, and it is easy to start resenting and resisting those 
doing the planning. " (Francis Elm, general manager) 
`Purging old blood'. The majority of interviewees also suggested that proposal 
coalitions should be dissolved once the plan had been approved because members did not 
necessarily have the skills required for the implementation phase. A new team would 
bring new ideas and skills, members of the design team could be rested, while those 
taken forward could be taught and coached the required skills by colleagues: 
"I believe there comes a point, once the project has been okayed, when you 
need to inject some new blood into the team. It revitalises the initiative, 
creates new energy and brings a fresh perspective to things. " (George 
Lark, managing director) 
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"The majority of people are pretty worn out once they get past the 
psychological milestone of getting the go-ahead. A good analogy is the 
American football team, where players are continuously taken on and off 
the pitch. There are teams for defence, offence and there are special teams 
for key moves. The system allows people to develop core competencies, 
much like industry with its planners and implementors. A good chief 
executive will rest his star players because he wants them to stick around. " 
(John Yew, CEO) 
However, the consensus was that there should not be a complete transfusion of coalition 
members. Continuity of key personnel was regarded as a critical success factor for 
translating the blueprint into action. David Knight argued the point: 
"I remember one major change programme about four years ago. The 
industry was going into recession and we put together a plan for 
restructuring the business while it was still healthy. We did a good job, 
but once it had been approved the managing director took everyone off the 
project and put together an entirely new team. He said it was because 
people in the business units should lead it... One could see a certain logic in 
his argument but I bet if you asked him now he would agree that he should 
have had one or two people from the design team to explain the rationale 
and establish the overall context. You definitely need new people but as 
with most things in company life it is a question of balance. " (David 
Knight, director) 
Avoiding `them and us' attitudes in the top management team. It was claimed that 
proposal coalitions which established permanent roots in the top management team 
reduced the level of collaboration between individuals. Coalition members tended to 
work together, excluding members of the wider management team. Several individuals, 
in different organisations, described the interpersonal dynamics as `them and us': 
"If coalitions actually stuck around I think it would be pretty divisive on 
several accounts. First, you would end up with a powerful group exerting 
considerable influence over the future direction of the business. Second, 
that group would piss off people who's job it is to make those decisions, 
and third, it encourages a political environment in which you have the `in' 
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crowd and the `out' crowd. Once you get into that way of thinking 
speeches about teamwork have a hollow ring. " (William Wren, CEO) 
"If the team continues it sustains the thinking that somehow their work is 
more important than anyone else's. It is symbolically very important to 
break up the group, even if some of the key individuals are given new high 
profile tasks. It sends a message to the rest of the management team that 
normal business, and equality, has been resumed. " (Mark Finch, head of 
function) 
When asked about this allusion to feeling less than equal, he became quite agitated, 
leaning forward across the table and stabbing his finger in the air to make the following 
point: 
"You better believe it. It was impossible to get time in Richard's [name of 
chief executive changed] diary. He became over-involved, and if you ask 
me he neglected the other parts of the business. It was as though we stuck 
in the eye of the hurricane, because it was clear that although everything 
around us was up in the air, we were left sitting on our hands waiting for 
the storm to ride out. " (Mark Finch, head of function) [parentheses added] 
Clearly there were a number of arguments put forward by participants in support of the 
claims that large scale change proposal coalitions should be dissolved once their plans 
had been approved or rejected. These arguments were presented with particular vigour 
for coalitions that had been successful. It is important to recognise that while it is easy to 
identify the motive of self-preservation for the chairman, chief executives and managing 
directors, no-one at any level in any of the top management teams favoured indefinite 
continuation. 
`... whilst keeping the baby' 
Although all of the respondents argued in favour of disbanding proposal coalitions at the 
earliest feasible opportunity, it was suggested that dissolution take place only once the 
learnings and benefits had been captured, disseminated and embedded into the working 
practices of the top management team. Participants identified six positive aspects of 
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coalition working which can benefit the working practices of top management team 
members: 
  Transferable relationships, 
  `Dividing the spoils', 
  Skills development, 
  Enhanced decision making processes, 
  `Restless ambition', and 
  `Institutionalisation of temporary teams'. 
Transferable relationships. We noted in the earlier discussion on transient 
relationships that working in coalitions together tended to result in individuals holding a 
stronger opinion of their colleagues, and that this view could either be more or less 
favourable. We have already considered the reasons why it is preferable to dissolve 
coalitions from the perspective of unsuccessful working relationships. However, this is 
only one side of the story because there were a number of accounts from respondents 
concerning successful relationships from which all parties had derived benefits. The 
following series of remarks support this assertion: 
"Relationships are the oil that allows the corporate decision making wheels 
to turn. One of the key benefits I get out of the coalition way of working is 
the understanding and trust I build up with some of my colleagues. It is 
said that when you pass steel through fire it becomes stronger, and I think 
the same could be said for relationships that are forged in times of 
change. " (Steven White, general manager) 
He continued: 
"Hard as you may try not to, you have to lay yourself bare. Under pressure 
you inevitably show what makes you tick, what you care about and what 
you are prepared to fight battles over. But it works because everybody is 
in the same position. It is a zero sum game if people want to use the 
information against each other. I think you come out at the other end with 
a healthy respect for your colleagues and for a few in particular you carry 
forward a deeper understanding that results in a more productive working 
relationship. " (Steven White, general manager) 
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"I have worked for four other companies in my career, all in different 
industries. In two of those I have held senior management positions. 
Looking back now it is quite funny to think that I once thought a good 
working relationship was someone with whom you didn't fall out or could 
enjoy a game of golf. They were rather staid, mature industries and about 
the only structural change was occasional consolidation between some of 
the players in response to more nimble companies coming into the market 
as the industry's demarcation lines blurred. " (Bert Starling, managing 
director) 
After a short discussion about how the industries had changed over several decades he 
resumed: 
"In this roller-coaster industry [information technology], rapid change is as 
common as eating your breakfast. Hardly a day goes by without a rumour 
of a major merger or acquisition or a breakthrough technology about to be 
commercialised. We are constantly driven by the fear of falling behind. 
Even if we did have time to play golf, it just wouldn't provide the 
foundation on which to build the strength of relationship necessary to plan 
and drive through a robust, pragmatic change programme... You are 
constantly working at the edge of people's physical and mental capacities 
and you have to have a deep understanding of where your colleagues are in 
their competence zones at any given time. Gaining such an understanding 
is something that only comes from working together under intense 
conditions, but once you have it you will beat the competition on a level 
playing field nine times out of ten. " (Bert Starling, managing director) 
[parentheses added] 
"Even now I can pick up the phone and receive coaching and advice from 
individuals I worked with eight or nine years ago in another company. As 
long as you don't abuse it, trust never dies. They know too that they can 
pick up the phone and call me about anything, anytime, and I will be there. 
It is an elevated form of networking. It is a trust network. " (Dick Tern, 
director) 
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`Dividing the spoils'. Another strong theme which emerged from the analysis of 
participants' responses was the need to share the positive outcomes from successful 
initiatives. The following selection of remarks are indicative of the views expressed: 
"There has to be a pay-back time for putting your reputation on the line. I 
have been involved in projects where I have had to really go out on a limb 
for the chief executive, and if it had all failed I have no doubt I would have 
been canned. If you invest your reputation, time and energy it seems fair 
to earn a dividend. If the change is a financial success then I would expect 
to receive a bonus, pay rise or share options. If it is a strategic success 
then I would expect a promotion or at least a broadening of my 
responsibilities. " (David Knight, director) 
"I think the trick is to avoid situations where there are obviously winners 
and losers, otherwise you find a mercenary culture establishes itself quite 
quickly, and that is not conducive to co-operation and teamwork. Of 
course you do have to reward sterling performance but you don't rub other 
people's noses in it. I am in favour of rewarding people over longer time 
frames and if possible in groups. That way you lock in good performers 
and link up destinies. It also keeps people on their toes rather than sitting 
back on their laurels. " (Robert Willow, general manager) 
"What I find works well is dangling the carrot just out of reach. To keep 
people motivated you have to let them have a few treats but if you give 
them the whole carrot, then in my experience they tend to ease off a bit 
and become a little too self-satisfied. You have to know your top team 
well and keep them motivated at all times which means you can let some 
eat more of the carrot than others. " (Kurt Nightingale, CEO) 
Skills development. Building on the idea of transferable relationships the participants 
shared the view that coalition working on large scale change initiatives was an effective 
means of broadening and deepening an executive's skill set. Members of top 
management teams adopted the position that the magnitude of the risk and reward 
directly associated with the proposed change forced designers to achieve a degree of 
originality and robustness not usually required in smaller scale initiatives. When asked 
"did you `grow' as a result of the experience? ", every participant replied in the 
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affirmative. Interestingly when asked the logical corollary "how? " it was found that 
managers developed to varying degrees in a number of different dimensions. These are 
summarised in the Exhibit 8.2. 
The following series of short remarks provide a sample of the wide range of benefits 
derived by individuals as a result of working in coalitions on large scale change planning 
initiatives: 
"If you are going to change the direction of the firm you have to think 
strategically, and planning teams are a great way of cultivating those skills 
amongst a number of people at the same time. " (Tom Chub, head of 
function) 
"I confess I rated myself pretty highly on leadership until I had to lead 
change design teams. I have learnt so much from those around me in the 
last couple of years. " (Matthew Mallard, head of function) 
"I had always thought I had worked in top management teams until I began 
working in coalitions. Then I realised I had only ever worked in top 
management groups. I am an extremely strong advocate of working in 
coalitions on a project-by-project basis. Coalitions are the future of 
executive working in this company. I have developed skills I didn't even 
know existed five years ago. " (Robert Willow, general manager) 
"As the good man [Dale Carnegie, 1953] said, it is all about winning 
friends and influencing people. I would add it is also about making 
enemies and learning how to deal with them. I have realised that once you 
stick your head above the parapet and start proposing changes you enter 
the political game and you see things in an entirely different way. The 
company is made up suddenly of this coalition and that coalition, and you 
are either with someone or against someone. You have to take a position 
because you need supporters to get things done. I have proved I can play 
that game, but you never know when the tide's going to change. " (Patrick 
Queen, director) [parentheses added] 
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Exhibit 8.2 - Respondent skill development due 
to working in large scale change proposal 
coalitions 
Terms used by fifty interviewees to describe their skill development. 
Skill developed 
Strategic thinking 
Leadership 
Team working 
'Man' management 
Political adeptness 
Internal networking 
Commercial pragmatism P. 
Motivation (of others) 
Innovative thinking 
Communication 
Financial planning 
Self confidence 
Self motivation 
Risk management 
Number of respondents citing skill 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Responses given by fewer than five people are not reported. 
Total 
16 
16 
16 
15 
13 
13 
12 
12 
9 
8 
7 
5 
5 
5 
"I have got to where I ani today by being a strong ideas nman, but I knew that 
ii' I didn't eliminate some of my knowledge gaps in the area of project 
planning and programme management I wouldn't go any higher. Having to 
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build intricate yet pragmatic transformation plans has enabled me to tackle 
my deficiencies and I now feel confident to take another step upwards. " 
(Christopher Green, senior manager) 
"I was always strong on the financial side of things and I could do 
projections and budgets until you said `enough'. I now realise that there is 
more to planning than that. I now know that if you can underpin your 
arguments with a compelling commercial logic you increase your chances 
of success, both in winning support for your proposal and extracting value 
from the implementation. " (Fred Hawk, director) 
"I have undergone something of a personal transformation over the last 
twelve months. My 360 degree appraisal feedback told me that people did 
not enjoy working with me because I had poor communication skills. We 
have just completed this year's feedback and I have improved 
dramatically. I don't recognise myself from last year. Working closely 
with the rest of the team, both above and below me has taught me the 
importance of interpersonal skills. " (Paul Swan, director) 
"Shareholder value is something the City are starting to ask about so we 
have had a consultancy come in to explain the drivers to us, and we now 
incorporate Economic Value Added in our major change designs. 
Working in coalition teams has brought the concept into sharp focus for 
most of the executive group. " (Philip Birch, senior manager) 
"Risk and reward were never really an issue for us when our industry was 
slow moving, but over the last five years or so, we have seen profitability 
squeezed by global competition and we have had to be more particular 
about which projects to commercialise. I tend to be labelled the risk expert 
now which is certainly something I would never have been called twelve 
months ago. " (David Knight, director) 
Even though each of the respondents developed to varying levels in different dimensions, 
they were unanimous in the contention that exposure to working in coalitions on large 
scale change planning exercises produced executives and senior managers with more 
`rounded' skill-sets than those who did not. It was argued that individuals who worked 
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consistently in such an environment over a period of twelve to eighteen months were 
better equipped to take on the responsibility of higher office. This sentiment was best 
captured by Robert Willow who commented: 
"I came back from a secondment overseas eager to assess myself against 
my colleagues. I was shocked to see they had grown to such an extent that 
I could no longer think of them as my peers. Their growth was beyond 
what I thought possible. " (Robert Willow, general manager) 
Enhanced decision making processes. Analysis of participant responses also found that 
working in coalitions could improve an organisation's decision making processes. Prior 
to the introduction of coalition working the conventional decision making process had 
largely been a function of the hierarchy, with the more senior members of the top 
management team taking the key investment and planning decisions. However, due to 
the often radical reduction in elapsed decision making time -fifty to seventy per cent 
reduction was typical- the traditional process was not able to handle the increasing 
demands placed on it. Particularly as a majority of the participant organisations reported 
designing larger, complex change plans more frequently. 
Respondents proposed that the decision making processes had changed to a model in 
which knowledge supplanted hierarchy as the key driver. This view appears to support 
an assertion that large scale change design initiatives can create a new political 
landscape. One in which top management teams become more fluid as power ebbs and 
flows from one individual or coalition to another. The 'so what' test when posed found 
that participants, including those in the most senior positions, believed the quality of 
decision making had improved. Largely, it must be stated, as a consequence of increased 
rigour and robustness in the proposals tabled. Interviewees at all levels described feeling 
more confident about large scale change proposals designed in coalition structures than 
conventional hierarchy based channels. 
Decision making was further enhanced by an increase in the number of market 
opportunities identified. A common view expressed by participants was that coalition 
working created a competitive atmosphere amongst top management team members. 
There was constant pressure to build and be in a winning coalition. Bert Starling and 
Matthew Mallard commented that the constant flow of alternative strategic options 
benefited both individuals and the organisation. Whereas formal hierarchy based 
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structures were seen to encourage inertia, temporary coalitions were dynamic, 
stimulating initiative and innovation. 
`Restless ambition'. "Executive life is never the same again after the business has been 
through a transformational change", commented Andre Char. A common view amongst 
participants was the belief that large scale change planning exercises created a spirit of 
restlessness in the top management team as the following comments suggest: 
"It is rather like a drug. You just want to keep going. You start to search 
for your next fix. You want to be the one who finds the next great 
opportunity. You want the big bonus, the share options, but most of all 
you want to prove to your colleagues that you are better than they are and 
that you could run the show. " (Geoffrey Silver, director) 
"Transformation gets your adrenalin going. You feel great to have been 
part of something big. The pressure to perform at the top increases 
because it has been done once and therefore it is expected again. The era 
of one big change a decade has gone. These days if we don't generate half 
a dozen or so major strategic options a year, of which we will pursue 
between two and four, then we have under-performed. It's tough work, 
and for some of the guys it is a real shock to the system because they have 
created a comfort zone for themselves and they are being forced out of it. " 
(John Yew, CEO) 
"I remember sitting here and thinking, this is why I wanted to make it to 
the top. To be able to have the power to influence people's lives. To be 
able to do things for them they are unable to do for themselves. Sure I 
have had people complain to me about how they have lost out, but if in 
your heart you know the decisions should be taken, then you have got to 
take them. No-one likes the taste of medicine. So few people say thank 
you, but you feel the change. It is in the air... there is a buzz about the 
place, a feeling of expectation. People come into work earlier and stay 
later. They smile more. " (Roger Oak, CEO) 
"I love this stuff. I feel proud to be able to use my skills to improve 
things. I feel a sense of duty to make a positive difference to people's 
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lives. Two years ago this organisation was a basket case, now look at us, 
the City loves us and people enjoy working here. " (Peter Ash, CEO) 
`Institutionalisation of temporary teams'. It was asserted in the earlier section, 
enhanced decision making, that coalitions brought a dynamic to top management teams 
in the form of constant energy and innovation. It may seem paradoxical to talk about the 
institutionalisation of something temporary, but it was a phrase used in one of the 
organisations to describe the adoption of coalitions as the prefered method for generating 
strategic change options. By coining the phrase, Roger Oak intended to convey that 
change had become a constant, and dealing with it effectively required a more fluid 
structure. 
Whilst the consensus was that coalitions should be dissolved, respondents were united in 
their belief that the coalition way of working should be embedded in the top management 
team. Based on his experience of working in coalitions Roger Oak stated: 
"I think networks and coalitions are the future of change management and 
top management team working practices for several reasons. Firstly, high 
performers seek each other out to work together and secondly, in large 
organisations where there are numerous opportunities for change, high 
performers inevitably learn how to by-pass the bureaucracy which slows 
the decision making process down. Lastly, the younger generation of 
senior managers who are starting to come through now are naturally more 
team oriented than the traditional executive who got to the top usually by 
individual performance. " (Roger Oak, CEO) 
A common view was that senior managers and members of the executive were more 
trusting in transfering decision making power to others on the basis that it was 
temporary. Bert Starling described this symbiotic nature of decision making power as 
"... the planets orbiting around the sun, with the hierarchical top management team being 
the sun and the temporary teams the planets. " He went on to argue, "... that if the sun 
were to be extinguished, the planets would descend into chaos, so it is in the interests of 
everyone for the sun to exist. " 
Astronomy metaphors aside, the opinion across all hierarchical levels was that temporary 
coalitions within the top management team had a positive impact on organisational 
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performance, and therefore, are a valuable means of designing large scale change 
initiatives. 
The mechanics of dissolution 
With a strong consensus on the need to disband large scale change proposal coalitions 
once the benefits had been extracted, the question emerges of how dissolution is 
achieved. In most instances it was only the most senior individual in the organisation 
who could take steps to ensure the coalition was not able to exert unsolicited influence on 
the strategic direction of the organisation behind the scenes. The evidence suggests that 
three principal tactics were frequently used to dissolve coalitions: 
  New roles and responsibilities, 
  Geographic dispersal, and 
  New projects. 
New roles and responsibilities. It has already been noted that coalition members 
believed it was important they were rewarded for their involvement in successful large 
scale change proposals. The most favoured reward amongst participants was hierarchical 
advancement since promotion was public confirmation to the other members of the top 
management team, and the larger organisation, that an individual had played a key role in 
a successful initiative. Other benefits usually included increases in compensation, share 
options and access to larger bonus pools. The following two remarks were typical of the 
broader body of opinion: 
"It is proof positive that you have done a good job and are regarded as a 
key strategic thinker... " (Patrick Queen, director) 
"It sends a message to the rest of the senior team that innovation is 
encouraged and rewarded. " (Annie Swallow, managing director) 
The next best alternative to hierarchical advancement was a lateral move into a 
strategically or financially important area of the business: 
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"Being given responsibility for one of the core lines of business is a vote 
of confidence from the CEO that you have the ability to manage and grow 
the area. " (Fraser Tench, director) 
"... such a move can go either way. You can make a success of it and go on 
to greater things, or you can blow it. It is always preferable to be given a 
growth business rather than a mature or declining one. " (Francis Elm, 
general manager) 
Similar in status to a lateral move was the remit to establish a new business unit. 
However, several respondents expressed the view that this was the highest risk option 
with the potential to damage career prospects if the business did not become a success: 
"About five years ago I was asked to set up a new subsidiary. I was lucky 
because with a background in venture capital I had been used to growing 
embryonic businesses. At the time I was reading a book that recounted 
how Napoleon was given the Egyptian campaign by his generals because 
they thought it was likely to fail, and he would be eliminated as a 
leadership contender... I have also witnessed situations in previous 
employment when the chief executive has given a seemingly impossible 
task to someone who they considered to be a threat to their leadership. A 
few were able to deliver and go on to greater things, but some didn't and 
they were put out to grass in a business unit. " (George Lark, managing 
director) 
He concluded: 
"A smart chief executive tries to lock the winners into all of his major 
decisions because if he goes down they all go down together. " (George 
Lark, managing director) 
"If you are going to make it to the top then sooner or later you are going to 
have to be confronted with growing the business. I think it is fair to test 
someone who appears to have the potential. Sure it is a poisoned chalice 
but you need to see what people are made of. Everyone looks good in a 
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safe environment. The real test comes when you have to stand up and be 
counted. " (John Yew, CEO) 
The least favoured reward, because of the difficulty and risk of the task, according to the 
majority of interviewees was to be given a turnaround assignment: 
"If the business development option is a poisoned chalice then the 
turnaround job is like being given a bullet with your name written on it... " 
(John Yew, CEO) 
"Most people always think of turnarounds as cost cutting, but that is 
usually the quickest and easiest task. The real work starts when you have 
to increase revenues. Unless there has been an idiot in the job before you, 
there is usually a good reason why the business is in the shit. I think they 
are the assignments with the most pressure. They just consume all of your 
emotional energy. I think company doctors can do it only because they 
can retain a level of detachment which employees don't have the luxury 
of. " (Leonard Plum, senior manager) 
Awarding new roles and responsibilities enabled chief executives to break up coalitions 
in a positive manner. None of the participants thought that it was possible to refuse new 
hierarchical responsibilities without losing face and jeopardising future career 
development opportunities within the organisation. However, whilst positional 
responsibilities were the most visible symbols of recognition, a number of roles were 
also used to develop individuals and share the coalition's learnings with a wider 
audience. Three roles in particular were found to be commonly used in the organisations 
studied: leaders, coaches and emissaries of change. 
Chief executives and managing directors allocated leadership roles to individuals they 
believed had the potential to hold the organisation's highest office at some future point in 
time. Examples of leadership roles included heading up prestigious internal task forces 
to address issues such as reducing operating costs. In one organisation the target was to 
reduce costs by a percentage that translated into an increase in profitability of three 
hundred and twenty million pounds Sterling: a task that was achieved successfully. In 
another company the objective was to increase the number of commercialised new 
products from six to fifteen per annum. Leadership roles were also given with an 
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external focus. Several organisations had individuals who sat on boards of 
environmental, charitable, arts and sports bodies. The assumption behind using 
leadership roles to groom individuals was that chairmen and chief executives had a duty 
to portray their organisations as active corporate citizens involved in the development of 
local communities. 
In discussions about the motivation and behaviour of top management team members, 
the chairman, and several of the chief executives and managing directors added to their 
earlier comments that coalitions encourage an environment of co-operation based on 
mutual benefit. To further embed this benefit, key individuals were given coaching roles 
in which their task was to develop colleagues. Some chief executives and managing 
directors favoured selecting the pairings, while a smaller number including the chairman 
were satisfied with allowing the coaches to chose individuals. Those who prefered to 
select the pairings did so because it enabled them to put together team members who 
enjoyed a particularly strong rapport or alternatively to force individuals who did not like 
each other to work together. Coaching roles were found to be an effective way of 
reducing people's skills deficits. 
The third role which can be described as emissaries of change, refers to the task of 
disseminating the concept of continuous change to the broader organisation. Four of the 
chief executives and two of the managing directors expressed the view that if change was 
to become an accepted characteristic of their organisations' cultures then it had to reach 
an audience beyond the key decision makers in the top management team. Walking over 
to a flipchart in the corner of his office Brian Carp drew a cone shape. He explained: 
"It is the 1,10,100,1000,10000 principle. First one person has the idea 
for change, then the design coalition sell it to the rest of the executive and 
the senior management below them. From there it goes down through 
middle management to the entire organisation. By disseminating the 
message in waves you pick up the reference group leaders who are much 
more effective in selling the idea to the rank and file than I could ever 
hope to be. " (Brian Carp, CEO) 
Carp concluded: 
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"The problem with preaching from the top is the physical and emotional 
gap between oneself and those with whom one does not have regular 
contact. I don't know what turns them on, and more often than not my 
messages would leave them cold and unmoved. If there is one thing I have 
learnt as the leader of several major change programmes, it is to follow up 
the grand speeches with a very carefully orchestrated selling programme. 
That is why it is crucially important to hand pick individuals who are 
respected by the business to sell the change design. " (Brian Carp, CEO) 
Geographical dispersal. In organisational environments when a dissolved coalition 
continued to exert a high degree of influence over the strategic direction of the 
organisation, chief executives were found to employ the tactic of geographically 
dispersing members of the coalition across the organisation in an attempt to minimise 
their influence. Clearly this strategy can only be employed in organisations that have 
multiple sites, but of the twelve participant organisations that had operations in more 
than one location, ten had used this approach at some time within the last five years. The 
following remarks are representative of the arguments used to justify the dissolution of 
successful teams: 
"I was once nearly deposed by a coalition that built up such a momentum 
for its idea that a sizeable constituency in the management team thought its 
leader should replace me. Of all the key decision makers I had the support 
of only the finance director and the chief operating officer. Their 
intransigence was enough to see me through, but it was a narrow 
escape... We implemented the change successfully but the guy in question 
seriously blotted his copy book the next year when he put forward a couple 
of ludicrous suggestions concerning the takeover of two larger well known 
companies. We would have lost credibility in the City, and there were 
absolutely no financial or strategic benefits to be gained from acquiring 
them. His strong support base disappeared quickly and I have been able to 
steer the company successfully since. " (Bert Starling, managing director) 
He concluded: 
"It was a valuable lesson though and ever since then I break up successful 
coalitions as quickly, efficiently and quietly as possible. Sending one or 
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two of the more vocal members to foreign shores for a tour of duty is 
usually enough to dispel any question of revolt. " (Bert Starling, managing 
director) 
"It seems paradoxical to say that successful coalitions can be detrimental 
to the business, but experience suggests that it can be true. Obviously you 
have to use your judgement because you can't go tarring everyone with the 
same brush... Successful coalitions that have quite a few members of the 
executive can form a powerful group, and they exert a very strong 
influence over the rest of the team. Their influence is at its greatest in the 
weeks following the acceptance of the plan, when they believe they can 
change the world. Whilst not in the long term interests of the business, it 
can be to its short term benefit if you let them cool their heels overseas for 
a while. Especially if the ones you send are those who are not needed for 
the implementation phase. " (Roger Oak, CEO) 
Interestingly, the one chairman and seven of the fourteen chief executive officers and 
managing directors asserted that it can be important to disperse unsuccessful proposal 
coalitions geographically. The reasons for doing so ranged from the need to remove 
under-performers from the top management team to the need to maintain morale and 
commitment amongst the members whose proposal had been rejected: 
"Coalitions that fail and constitute a significant proportion of the top team 
carry the danger of creating a negative, downbeat culture. It is inevitable 
that people will feel disappointed, embarrassed or aggrieved depending on 
the reasons for the plan being rejected. You have to take a balanced view 
in such circumstances... You have to weigh up the importance of the 
change to the company, understand why they failed, and calculate how 
much you need the individuals who were involved. " (Nigel Kingfisher, 
CEO) 
He continued: 
"You can't wipe out your team, and you have to give second chances, but 
if it is clear that one or two people were not up to the task, then you have 
to take decisive action... I know it sounds brutal but anyone who has 
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worked at the top of companies for any length of time will tell you that the 
`Peter Principle', which states that people rise to their level of 
incompetence, is true. It doesn't mean that they cannot make an important 
contribution to the success of the company, but it does mean that 
contribution is likely to be best made slightly lower down or in a non-core 
area. " (Nigel Kingfisher, CEO) 
"If people don't move on psychologically in a short period of time there is 
a danger that the management team treads water because the people who 
were in the team are mulling over the reasons why their plan was rejected. 
I have seen it turn nasty because it was the rest of the management team 
that turned down their idea. Therefore, the moment I see signs of it 
becoming divisive I give them overseas assignments where they can't do 
any harm. " (Roger Oak, CEO) 
Opposing these views was the comment made by Richard King, which found support 
from Brian Carp, Annie Swallow and Simon Falcon: 
"Your top management team are the real wealth creators and you have to 
look after them. I don't buy into this macho crap about one chance and 
you're out. You need to cultivate a team spirit which says its OK to take 
risks and make mistakes. In my experience one of the best pick-me-ups is 
a challenging foreign assignment that you know they can deliver. Six 
months away is usually enough to restore confidence. I make regular 
monthly calls to boost confidence and show they haven't been forgotten 
and normally they come back in fighting spirit ready to work on new major 
change projects. " (Richard King, managing director) 
He concluded: 
"Just like the banker who is said to be poor if he never makes a bad loan, a senior 
manager is poor if he never makes a recommendation that is rejected. You want 
people to push the boundaries and challenge the way we operate. Success today is 
about radical, purposeful change. Unambitious, incremental change doesn't put 
you ahead of the competition any more. " (Richard King, managing director) 
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New projects. In addition to the need to disband coalitions because they were a threat to 
the chief executive's ability to set the strategic direction of the firm, a third reason was 
that putting individual members of successful coalitions onto new projects was a way of 
injecting success and best practice into other parts of the organisation. The following 
remarks appear to confirm this position: 
"In general people enjoy being associated with winners so I find a number 
of other projects that need taking forward, and I put the guys from the 
successful proposal on to the new ones. If the initial project was a major 
transformation, people tend to think those involved have the key to 
winning. " (Brian Carp, CEO) 
"You have to understand that being a leader is about releasing the energies 
of those who have ideas. Think about it, you have a number of individuals 
who are full of enthusiasm, packed full of learning. You can either let it 
sit there untapped, or you can exploit it by giving them new projects to 
take forward. " (Luke Sparrow, chairman) 
"It only takes one highly visible success and you can change senior 
management's mindset from one of slow change to the art of the possible. 
I think the chief executive has an obligation to shareholders to utilise the 
ambitions of senior management. In this day and age ten to twenty heads 
have to be better than one. Maybe only one in four ideas will come off, 
but you have to let people run with possibilities. In fact I would say that 
over the last five years we have switched from the traditional structured 
planning approach to a simultaneous multiple option approach... You 
cannot predict the future like you could, you have to have a number of 
balls in the air at once because you don't know which one will be 
appropriate until they come down. " (Roger Oak, CEO) 
Conclusion 
In this fourth and final results chapter we have brought the analysis of large scale change 
proposal coalitions to a conclusion with a consideration of the arguments for dissolution 
and the methods by which it can be accomplished. The results presented in this chapter 
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related to lines of enquiry #6 and #7 which respectively investigated the issues of 
coalition life-span and what happens to coalitions once a proposal has been approved or 
rejected. 
Unanimous support from participants for the dissolution of coalitions was based on 
arguments that continuation had a dysfunctional impact on top management team 
cohesion and by extension organisational performance. Unproductive working 
relationships were terminated and neglected ones rebuilt. Poor performers were replaced 
and stability restored in the top management team. There were also several positive 
reasons for dissolution. Successful relationships were maintained for future large scale 
change proposal initiatives. Members were rewarded for their contributions, new skills 
were transfered into everyday working practices, and the rigour of decision making 
processes was improved. Top management team ambition for organisational success 
increased and temporary teams became the norm. It was also found that dissolution 
typically was conducted by the leader of the coalition in conjunction with the chief 
executive officer. New roles and responsibilities, geographic dispersal and new projects, 
were the three mechanisms most commonly used. 
The dissolution of large scale change proposal coalitions has not previously been 
researched. Therefore, this empirical investigation represents a pioneering study. We 
now understand practitioners' rationale behind the need for dissolution, how it is 
performed and who is involved in the process. Once again we have linked behaviour 
with process, thereby providing a context within which to make meaning of the findings. 
This has been a common feature of each of the results chapters. We have considered the 
large scale change process from building to dissolution and the behaviours and tactics 
used by the coalition leader at each stage. This provides a descriptive richness which 
elucidates our understanding of this crucial, yet unexplored, strategic direction setting 
phase of the large scale change process. No other research can make such a claim. 
Therefore, these findings warrant serious consideration. Let us now turn to a discussion 
of the implications for academic enquiry, research methods and practitioners with 
recommendations for each. 
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Chapter 9 
Discussion and 
recommendations 
"Power and political processes in organizations can be used to 
accomplish great things. " (Pfeffer, 1992, p. 16) 
Introduction 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the nature and characteristics of large scale 
change proposal coalitions and the behaviours and tactics of coalition leaders in top 
management teams across a range of organisational settings in the UK private sector for 
the purpose of informing academic enquiry and practitioners. The findings of the study 
presented in this thesis present large scale change as a political process. The idea that it 
is a rational-linear affair has been refuted with substantial empirical evidence. Top 
management team members seek to protect and promote their self-interest by engaging 
in political activity designed to manipulate the behaviours of others to achieve desired 
outcomes. This is the testimony of fifty top management team members in fourteen top 
management teams across thirteen industries in the UK private sector. The assumption, 
often implicit in much of the extant literature, that change is one single process has been 
rejected. This thesis is the first to identify and report on large scale change proposal 
coalitions in top management teams. Our understanding of managerial elites in the 
change context has been advanced by providing deep insights into the nature and 
characteristics of large scale change proposal coalitions and the behaviours and tactics of 
those who lead them. There are important implications for academic enquiry and 
practitioners. 
The central thrust of the literature review was that the rational-linear approach to change 
is not the most suitable option for organisations faced with large scale change in 
turbulent environments. Instead a power-oriented behaviour based approach is more 
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pragmatic and resilient. Furthermore, because of the increasing frequency, complexity 
and magnitude of large scale change it is the role of the top management team -and not 
chief executive officer alone- in the form of coalitions to propose and execute large 
scale change. Given that such change is likely to impact the structural design of the 
organisation there will be winners and losers within the top management team. 
Therefore, the coalition leader must expect to encounter resistance. To overcome 
opposition, build and sustain a coalition, the coalition leader must draw on personal, 
structural and situational sources of intraorganisational power to engage meaningfully in 
political activity. A wide range of behaviours and tactics ranging from the collaborative 
to the coercive are required by the coalition leader. 
The problem with the extant literature is that it has failed to investigate the proposal 
design stage of the large scale change process. Change has been conflated into a single 
homogenous process, and discussions of power are locked in unhelpful, antagonistic 
debate about whether it can be found in personal, structural or situational aspects of the 
organisations, when in fact it resides simultaneously in all three. The research on 
coalition formation is largely theoretical and laboratory generated. No scholars have 
identified and investigated large scale change proposal coalitions. The extant literature 
on political behaviours and tactics in the change context is also disturbingly generic. 
Academics and practitioners alike have been left to try and make sense of descriptions 
and prescriptions and apply them to their own realities and areas of interest. 
The findings presented in this thesis are the result of pioneering empirical research into 
large scale change proposal coalitions in top management teams. The evidence is 
context specific and describes the nature and characteristics of large scale change 
proposal coalitions and the behaviours and tactics of coalition leaders in top management 
teams across a range of organisational settings. Therefore, in this final chapter we will 
consider the implications for academic enquiry and practitioners. In the first section we 
examine what the seven lines of enquiry mean for academic enquiry by recapitulating the 
key findings and comparing and contrasting them with the extant literature where 
appropriate, and identifying new lines of enquiry for future research. In the second 
section we discuss the implications for research methods, and in the third section we 
explore the implications for practitioners. The chapter ends with a discussion of how this 
thesis has advanced our understanding of managerial elites in the change context and 
what it means for the research agenda. 
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Implications for academic enquiry 
Line of enquiry #1 
Given that large scale change proposal coalitions in top management teams often 
exist for weeks or months do they follow a life-cycle? If so, what are the stages and 
what are the key characteristics of each stage`? 
In chapter live evidence was presented to suggest that large scale change proposal 
coalitions follow a live phase life-cycle. Respectively these were: initiate, build, sustain, 
dissolve, and capture and transfer. No other existing empirically derived literature has 
reported these descriptions. Therefore, the findings represent significant new 
developments in our understanding of large scale change proposal coalitions. 
A live phase life-cycle model 
Coalitions were found to be initiated in one of two ways. Either an individual would 
generate an idea that was entirely new to the organisation or an idea that had been 
discussed in the top management team but had remained dormant would be developed. 
The person with the idea would then begin to approach one or two other members of the 
top management team to assess the possibility of forming a coalition to design a 
proposal. Timing and agreement on the appropriateness of the proposed change in 
confronting the issues facing the organisation were found to be important determinants 
of whether the idea sparked the coalition formation process. If the idea was congruent 
with the vision of the organisation's leader then the likelihood of it being developed was 
greater than if it was incongruent. In this respect the finding lends support to Kanter's 
(1983) remark on the importance of congruence. Similarly, if the current strategy was 
flexible enough to accommodate a shift in strategic direction then the chances of it 
finding initial support were higher than if it was not. 
Elements of the literature suggest that coalitions form on the basis of agreement on the 
issues lacing the organisation (E3acharach and Lawler, 1980; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 
1988; Damson, 1961; Stevenson et al, 1985). The finding that they form around the way 
to confront the issues is a subtle yet distinct difference. It is agreement on the 
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prescription rather than description. This implies a more active decision making 
dynamic than has previously been thought. Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) argued that 
in "high-velocity" environments, executives do not have time to engage in forming 
temporary coalitions. Several of the organisations studied for this thesis could be 
described as operating in such conditions, as indicated by the rapidly changing nature of 
the competitive landscape in terms of constant new entrants, high levels of mergers and 
acquisitions, regular new product launches and aggressive pricing. The findings from 
this study contradict the assertions of Eisenhardt and Bourgeois. It was found in the 
research presented here that the top management teams of organisations operating in 
fluid environments do engage in temporary coalition formation for the purpose of 
proposing large scale change, and that once approved or rejected they seek to dissolve 
the coalition so as not to re-configure the existing power structure and duplicate the 
designated roles and responsibilities. This provides us with a new insight into the ability 
of the top management team to organise itself for action and restore stability for the 
purpose of self-preservation. To the best of this researcher's knowledge this 
characteristic has not been reported previously. Problems over gaining access to 
managerial elites and the secrecy surrounding the machinations of top management 
teams in large organisations is no doubt partly responsible for this. Future research 
should be directed toward clarifying the reasons for formation and the prevalence of 
temporary coalitions in organisations operating in environments ranging from the slow 
moving to the highly fluid. Eisenhardt and Bourgeois studied eight US microcomputer 
firms whereas this study investigated fourteen UK firms in thirteen industries, including 
one large firm in the microcomputer industry. Therefore, future research should seek to 
ascertain whether there are differences in coalition formation behaviour in different 
countries. 
Once the coalition had been initiated it was then built by the coalition leader. The size 
and composition of the coalition was contingent upon the magnitude and complexity of 
the proposed change and whether or not it intended to make radical improvements to 
existing areas or reorient the organisation in a new direction. The greater the magnitude 
and complexity and the more radical the change being proposed, the larger was the 
coalition and the more varied was the membership. This confirms the findings of 
Kanter's (1983) six company empirical study. She remarked: 
"The broader the ramifications of the issues involved in the proposed 
innovation, and the greater the attendant uncertainties, the larger the 
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coalition of supporters needs to be if the idea for innovation is to result in 
productive action. " (Kanter, 1983, p. 221) 
Interestingly, Kanter's study of innovation involved members of the organisation outside 
the top management team so it is informative to discover that the same principles around 
size and composition apply inside and outside the top management team. Another new 
finding is that potential members are attracted by emotional and political considerations 
such as the desire for high visibility in front of top management team colleagues, and 
particularly the chief executive officer. Laboratory derived theories such as Komorita 
and Chertkoff's (1973) bargaining theory and Komorita's (1974) weighted probability 
model consider only utilitarian outcomes such as resource distribution pay-offs. Caplow 
(1956) posited that the number of subordinates a coalition member would have power 
over would determine their selection of coalition to join. Forty years later, the 
opportunity to influence the strategic decision making process was found to be a more 
compelling reason to join. The coalitions discussed by participants in this study were 
found to be devoid of official management positions in the temporary structure. One of 
the key characteristics was the absence of control relationships, irrespective of hierarchy 
differences between members. Only the coalition leader could be described as holding a 
quasi-official position from which to direct the activities of members. Evidence was 
collected to support the claim that the sequence in which the coalition leader approached 
top management team members to join the proposal coalition was contingent upon the 
coalition leader's position in the hierarchy. The chairman and chief executives adopted 
one approach, directors another, general managers a third, and senior managers and 
heads of function a fourth. The last of these findings is discussed in more detail under 
line of enquiry #3. 
When a coalition had been established it began to design the large scale change proposal. 
The objective of the coalition leader was to create and maintain a cohesive and aligned 
coalition. It was found that coalitions which exhibited these characteristics were more 
likely to submit a proposal that was approved for implementation. No other empirical 
research has connected these characteristics with success rates. The morale of members 
was negatively impacted by three key factors. Firstly, if the proposal was contentious, 
secondly, if members were pressured to leave the coalition to join another competing 
group, and thirdly, if the coalition culture became one in which members sought to 
maximise their own self-interest. Sustaining large scale change proposal coalitions is 
discussed in more depth in the discussion of line of enquiry #5. 
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After a proposal had been approved for implementation or rejected the results indicated 
that coalitions were actively dissolved, either by the coalition leader or the chief 
executive officer. This was to avoid the coalition -particularly a successful one- from 
reconfiguring the power structure and reshaping the existing decision making processes, 
and roles and responsibilities within the top management team. Members expected to be 
rewarded for their contribution to proposals which were approved for implementation. 
Pay-offs included promotions, pay rises, bonuses, share options and key positions during 
the implementation of the planned change. Coalition dissolution is considered at more 
length under lines of enquiry #6 and V. 
The final stage of a coalition's life-cycle was characterised by the capture and transfer of 
learnings from the coalition to the working practices of the top management team. 
Coalition leaders and members both took part in this process. It was found that 
productive relationships were used to form emergent networks and micro coalitions of 
individuals who sought to promote shared agendas within the top management team. 
Once again the feature of capturing and transfering learnings has previously gone 
unreported in the literature. As with the proactive dissolution of the coalition, this action 
demonstrates that top management team teams actively manage the role and life-span of 
coalitions and seek to adopt new and improved ways of decision making, problem 
solving and working together effectively as a team. 
Research is urgently needed to investigate the process of capturing and learning. We 
know from this research that workshops and one-to-one debriefings are two mechanisms, 
but both of these are relatively formal methods. Are more informal methods used, and if 
so, what are they? If so much of politicking takes place backstage then it is reasonable to 
suggest that the final stages of coalition dissolution also take place behind the scenes. 
We know from the results that members, either as individuals or clusters of individuals, 
develop emergent networks and micro coalitions to support their own initiatives. Over 
time if these are developed they are likely to represent potent power bases which can be 
used to influence the strategic decision making process. This post-dissolution 
environment is currently unexplored and if researched would add a further layer of 
understanding to the change context. It provides support for the notion that top 
management teams are a web of multiple agendas which likely conflict, evolve 
constantly and unfold concurrently. 
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Line of enquiry #2 
I Flarge scale change proposal coalitions in top management teams do follow life- 
cycles, are different roles, behaviours and tactics adopted by the coalition leader 
during each stage? 1f so, what are the roles and behaviours used in each stage by the 
coalition leader? 
As well as presenting evidence on the five life-cycle phases of a large scale change 
proposal coalition, chapter five considered results which indicated that within the five 
phases coalition leaders tended to perform three sequential roles: builder, sustainer and 
dissolver. Once again these findings are important because despite an extensive search 
the existing literature does not appear to have identified these roles. As with the 
discussion on the three central life-cycle phases -build, sustain and dissolve- the three 
roles and their implications for academic enquiry will be considered under the remaining 
lines of enquiry. 
Line of enquiry #3 
Are coalition building behaviours and tactics influenced by the hierarchical position 
of the coalition leader in relation to the individual whose support they are attempting 
to enlist, and if so, how do they vary`? 
In chapter six we considered how coalition leaders built large scale change proposal 
coalitions. The first of the two major findings was that the support winning process 
which underpins coalition formation, is contingent upon the hierarchical position of the 
individual building the coalition. Although theoretically this might be expected, the 
processes have never been empirically identified and reported. Therefore, it can be 
claimed that these findings extend our understanding of coalition formation from both a 
processual and behavioural perspective. 
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Four hierarchy basal coalition building approaches 
Across the fourteen organisations the support gathering processes of the fifty participants 
was found to conform to one of four approaches. The chairman, chief executives and 
managing directors adopted one common approach, directors a second, general managers 
a third and heads of function and senior managers a fourth. These are conveyed below in 
Exhibit 9. I . 
Exhibit 9.1 - Four hierarchy-based large scale change 
proposal coalition building approaches 
Order of 
epproech 
Order of 
approach 
Inter m at Formal I I) to rn lill 
seniority 
Expertise 
seniority seniority 
Working Formal Informal Formal 2 
relationship seniority seniority seniority 
Formal Informal 
3 
seniority seniority 
Expertise Expertise 
4 Friendship/trust Friendship/trust Friendship/trust Friendship/trust 
Working Working Working 
Lxpartiso 
relationship relationship relationship 
Liven though the relative influence of a general manager might be greater than that of 
their counterpart in another organisation both individuals tended to follow the same 
sequence when approaching members of the top management team for support. This 
leads us to conclude that behaviour is strongly influenced by structural aspects of the 
organisation. Such a contention would find support from those who view organisational 
power as a structural construct and the ultimate constraint on behaviour (Brass, 1984; 
Kanter, 198 1). I lowever, much of the commentary from participants indicates that their 
behaviour was also a function of the interpersonal relationships they had experienced 
previously or expected to experience with the individual they were approaching for 
support. Furthermore, the impact of situational factors such as timing and the 
congruence between the coalition builder's idea for change and the organisation leader's 
vision were also important determinants. This fusion supports the assertion made in 
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chapter two of the literature review that power does not reside in one location or another, 
but in personal, structural and situational locations simultaneously. 
Commentators such as Astley and Sachdeva (1984) have criticised the study of power for 
becoming overly fragmented and consequently unhelpful to those attempting to explain 
behaviour in organisational settings. The polarity that exists between pursuing a singular 
theory and instigating further fragmentation casts investigation as a black and white 
debate, leaving little room for more realistic shades of grey. If the study of power in 
organisations is to break free from its current `either-or' simplification, it will be 
necessary to approach the phenomenon from an entirely fresh perspective. Therefore, it 
is suggested that researchers should attempt to synthesise the three positions -structural, 
personal and situational- within specific contexts, such as large scale change proposal 
coalitions. Ultimately, if sufficient context specific empirical studies in organisations are 
conducted, a synthesised description of power will emerge. Surely this is a more robust 
and informative approach than trying to force connections between the current 
antagonistic positions. 
In terms of the support winning approaches displayed by the fifty participants 
categorised into four hierarchy-based tiers there are several important implications for 
our understanding of top management team decision making processes. We know now 
that the hierarchical position of the coalition builder plays a key role in ordering the 
entry of individuals into a coalition. We know also that for the most senior members of 
the top management team -chairmen, chief executives and managing directors- 
winning the support of those with formal seniority is less important than it is to those in 
lower positions. Considered in conjunction with the rest of their support winning process 
we can see they believe it is more important that the early members are individuals who 
have the respect of the rest of the top management team and those with whom they have 
a productive working relationship. With regard to the first of these, it may be because 
the chairman, chief executive or managing director want to avoid the appearance of 
being heavy-handed and gaining compliant support rather than committed support, or it 
may be due to them wanting to ensure there is no immediate threat to their leadership of 
the coalition by surrounding themselves with other hierarchical heavyweights. Expertise 
appears to be of little importance. For coalition builders from the other three hierarchical 
tiers, formal authority, then informal authority and expertise are the three most important 
determinants of who to approach for support. These findings suggest that for all levels 
below the chairman, chief executive or managing director hierarchical support is 
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regarded as the first or second most important determinant of coalition membership. 
This appears to support those commentators who stress the inherent and unavoidable 
pervasiveness of structure in the decision making process. 
Future research should aim to test and deepen the findings reported in this thesis. It 
would be valuable to understand the precise relationship between coalition size and the 
complexity and magnitude of change. We know from the literature that commentators 
such as Kanter (1983) contend that coalition size inflates with increases in these factors, 
and the participants of this study confirmed this. However, there appears to be no studies 
which produce quantitative evidence. Relative rather than absolute figures might be 
more enlightening because of the wide variations in the size of top management teams, 
and the not insignificant problem of deciding who is in the top management team. For 
example, it would be useful to know that one third of the members of the top 
management team form a coalition for a change that is predicted to improve profitability 
by sixty per cent. On the issue of identifying key decision makers in the organisation 
Pettigrew (1992, p. 178) suggested, "Rather than assuming titles and positions as 
indicators of involvement in choice and change processes, the first task of the process 
scholar is to identify which players are involved, and why. " Reflecting on the lessons 
learned from this study this appears to be sound advice. Hierarchical titles should be 
used as guides, but taken in isolation they can be misleading. At one organisation 
considered for this study, there were four levels of director, and many US organisations 
have a large number of vice presidents. Still, titles are a useful starting point but the 
researcher must ascertain an individual's involvement in major decisions that influence 
the strategic direction of the organisation. This qualification is likely to reduce the 
number of top management team members to the key players. 
It would also be valuable to understand if there is a link between the hierarchical level of 
the coalition leader and the approval rate of proposals. It is reasonable to hypothesise 
that the chief executive officer enjoys the highest approval rate because they create 
compliance as a result of the structural power they hold simply from occupying the 
office. However, no evidence exists and what does the curve look like for those below 
the chief executive? Another interesting line of enquiry would be to investigate whether 
or not the four approaches vary according to the urgency of change? 
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Line of enquiry #4 
-- What are the behaviours and tactics used by the coalition leader to build a large scale 
change proposal coalition within the top management team'? 
The second of the two major findings presented in chapter six concerned the behaviours 
and tactics used by the coalition leader to build a large scale change proposal coalition. 
No other empirical study has investigated these issues from the perspectives of inter-tier 
and infra-tier coalition building within the top management team. 
Inter-tier and intra-tier coalition building behaviours and tactics 
Coalition building behaviours and tactics are contingent on the hierarchical relationship 
between the coalition builder and the potential member. Different behaviours and tactics 
are used to recruit individuals further tip in the hierarchy than if they are at the same 
level or lower down than the builder. In chapter three we discussed Kanter's (1983) 
commentary on the coalition building process. Comparisons with the findings of this 
thesis are difficult because her investigations were into the innovation process rather than 
large scale change and coalition membership was drawn principally from outside the top 
management team, not exclusively within it. Mechanic (1962) reported on the upward 
influencing behaviours of lower level members of the organisations, not junior members 
of the top management team, and despite citing coalitions as the most popular 
influencing tactic used by managers with superiors, Kipnis et al (1984) failed to describe 
the building tactics and behaviours employed. Similarly, Kotter (1996) was unable to 
provide us with an insight into how large scale change coalitions were formed, even 
though he identified guiding coalitions in the top management team as one of the critical 
success factors of business transformation exercises. It is difficult to find any 
commentary in the extant literature which argues that coalitions in top management 
teams are anything other than an important direction setting decision making unit in the 
change process. Yet there is a serious absence of empirical research which describes 
coalition building behaviours and tactics. Therefore, we are left with a pool of largely 
generic or implementation focused political behaviours from which to make assumptions 
about their relevance for an individual attempting to build a large scale change proposal 
coalition. Clearly, this is an unsatisfactory situation. The findings of the study presented 
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in chapter six are the first to describe the behaviours and tactics of coalition builders in 
the top management team. 
We know now that upward coalition building behaviours and tactics in top management 
teams are focused predominantly around ego stroking and risk management. Strong 
personal wins such as high visibility and influence over key elements of the design along 
with a demonstration of how problems will be managed so the potential member can 
avoid being blamed for them, are effective recruitment strategies. In chapter three we 
discussed Kanter's advice on selling innovation ideas and identified the underlying tone 
as being one of risk aversion. The findings of this study into large scale change proposal 
coalitions corroborates her findings, but interestingly it does not require interpretation: 
interviewees openly cited it as a crucial upward building tactic. For the most junior 
members the prefered method is the indirect route of working through others who enjoy 
informal seniority within the team. The greater the hierarchical gap between coalition 
builder and target, the greater the magnitude and complexity of the change being 
proposed and the lower the level of credibility the coalition builder has with the target 
the greater the use of intermediaries. This tells us that the credibility of both the builder 
and the idea for change are crucial to getting the coalition off the ground. It also tells us 
that top management team member interaction is a chess-like affair with key pieces 
being moved around strategically to achieve the desired end game. Based on these 
results it is clear that top management team members generally want to be wooed and 
they use the approach to jockey for position and derive maximum personal benefit. 
From a power perspective the hierarchy lines are clearly visible in the behaviours. The 
most senior members want to be assured of positive personal outcomes and they want to 
hear it from individuals who they respect. The fact that directors in particular are kept 
away from designing the operational aspects of the proposed change and pushed towards 
ambassadorial duties indicates that heavy emphasis is placed on both making the change 
design robust and working the decision making network outside the coalition. 
As researchers we know now that intra-tier coalition building is characterised by the 
highest levels of suspicion over motives. Whereas upward or downward recruitment was 
characterised by circuitous and structural authority respectively, the main concern for 
individuals attempting to recruit someone at the same level is that the situation becomes 
politically competitive and one party or the other will use the proposal design process to 
advance their own career whilst taking the opportunity to damage the other's. Members 
are selected on the basis of successful previous working relationships or shared political 
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agendas about the future direction of the organisation. Sometimes individuals decide to 
work together to gain advancement within the top management team, choosing to put 
aside personal competition until occupying the apex of the organisation becomes a 
realistic prospect for one or both of them. Recruiting a rising star who is currently at the 
same level is also a popular and effective tactic because it brings high visibility to the 
project and if the idea for change is indeed large scale with far reaching consequences for 
the organisation it offers high visibility in return. No other empirical research has 
reported on intra-tier support gathering behaviours and tactics in large scale change 
proposal coalitions. 
The findings from this study provide strong support for the structural school of power, 
from which ones of its advocates has argued, "while personal attributes and strategies 
may have an important effect on power acquisition... structure imposes the ultimate 
constraints on the individual" (Brass, 1984, p. 518). Downward coalition building 
behaviours and tactics cannot avoid the intermediating effect of structure on behaviour, 
either in the actions of the power holder, in the role of coalition builder, or in the 
responses of the potential member. Coalition builders attempting to recruit the support 
of individuals below them know they often do not have to extend their efforts beyond 
rational argument because they have the power to instruct them to comply if necessary. 
Similarly, targets know that in the final analysis they may have little option, short of 
taking extreme action such as mobilising opposition, than to comply if they do not want 
to be in receipt of coercive action. It would be valuable to discover whether individuals 
engaged in downward coalition building exercises try less hard to be innovative and 
accommodating in their approach simply because they do not have to. It would be 
interesting also to understand if targets comply rather than commit and what impact this 
has on commitment and loyalty. It would be valuable to discover if there is a link 
between coalition type -aligned, unaligned, unfocused and fragmented- and the 
number of members who were recruited by downward behaviours and tactics. Perhaps in 
complex large scale change proposals coalitions which are subject to opposition and 
resistance it is difficult to maintain cohesion and stability if a significant proportion of 
the members joined because of compliance rather than commitment reasons. These 
questions should be researched. 
This description of coalition building behaviours and tactics used within and across 
hierarchy levels paints a process that is strong in emotional and political tones. The 
rational arguments about what is best for the organisation are there, but they are the 
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canvas on which the personal issues create a unique and context specific picture. This is 
very different from the traditional laboratory derived theories on coalition formation 
which make the mistake of over-emphasising the rationality of the decision and the 
consideration of pay-offs in purely utilitarian aspects such as a share of the resources 
acquired (Gamson, 1961; Komorita and Chertkoff, 1973; Komorita, 1974), or the overly 
simplistic political consideration of how many coalition members the individual will be 
able to exert control over (Caplow, 1956). Another weakness of this particular section of 
the literature is that it only considers coalition formation from the perspective of the 
potential member. The research presented here is the first to consider large scale change 
proposal coalition formation from the perspective of the coalition leader. Future 
research should seek to explore the emotional and political dimensions of coalition 
building behaviours and tactics. The study presented here provides a point of departure 
for future research to investigate inter-tier and intra-tier building behaviours and tactics 
in large scale change proposal coalitions. As with the findings from each of the other 
lines of enquiry it would be of academic interest to compare and contrast them with 
organisations in different countries. This would inform us whether or not there is an 
British model of coalition building, a European model or some other derivation such as 
Anglo-American. It would also be interesting to conduct research exclusively into 
coalition building. In this research it was only one line of enquiry out of seven. 
Inevitably therefore, it has not been possible to achieve the same depth. This researcher 
believes there are a number of interesting questions which it would be valuable to 
investigate. For example, what do the intermediaries gain from recruiting others into the 
coalition? After all, this process is not without risk for them because in performing the 
task they ally themselves to both the idea and the coalition builder. How are refusals 
handled and are they triggers of opposition and the emergence of competing coalitions? 
Given the argument raised in chapter two regarding the need for context specific studies 
of power in organisations, an investigation of inter-tier and intra-tier coalition building 
would provide the researcher with an opportunity to test the hypothesis that power 
resides in personal, structural and situational locations simultaneously. Clearly there are 
a number of exciting ways in which large scale change coalition building can be used to 
deepen our understanding of managerial elites in the change context. 
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Line of enquiry #5 
Are there different types of large scale change proposal coalition? If so, what are the 
key characteristics of the different types and what are the behaviours and tactics of 
the coalition leader in the different types? 
One aspect of the discussion and recommendations driven out of the results is concerned 
with the behaviours and tactics of the coalition leader in their roles as builder, sustainer 
and dissolver. A second key element is the description of the processual and contextual 
characteristics of large scale change proposal coalitions. That behaviours are context 
specific and structures and processes are fused with behaviours is a major step forward in 
the treatment o1' change because it elucidates its multi-dimensional nature. Change is a 
rational, emotional and political tapestry of behaviours framed by context. It is only by 
attempting to consider the complete picture that subtle images of process emerge and 
become relevant. Without acknowledging the interconnectedness of the different threads 
the researcher's comprehension cannot move beyond the abstract. Therefore, that we are 
now able to describe the nature and characteristics of four types of large scale change 
proposal coalition and the behaviours and tactics which cause and are caused by them, 
breaks new ground. 'I'he findings are not the production of theoretical musings, they are 
the output of empirical research across a diverse range of organisational settings and 
because of this they merit serious consideration. 
Four types of large scale change proposal coalition 
That there are lour types of large scale change proposal coalition -aligned, unaligned, 
unfocused and fragmented- is insightful because it deters the temptation to believe that 
change coalitions are homogenous and devoid of differentiating features. There is no 
literature which comments on these issues but academic enquiry can now depart from the 
position that there are several, if not many, types which vary significantly in terms of 
stability and cohesion. The evidence found that these characteristics were determined in 
part by the behaviours of members and the internal organisational environment. The less 
members could agree on the purpose and objectives of the coalition, and the activities 
required to design a proposal that satisfied these two drivers, the more likely it was that 
stability and cohesion would not emerge. Similarly, if tensions served to pull members 
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apart rather than together stability and cohesion were unlikely to be found. Unaligned, 
unfocused and fragmented coalitions were labels used to describe a negative escalation 
in these aspects. From a process perspective the more aligned a coalition was the greater 
the likelihood of submitting a proposal which received approval for implementation. 
However, the author believes the issue of causation needs to be explored more deeply. A 
beachhead has been established but a more intrusive foray is required if we are to assess 
the relevance and significance of the interacting factors. This is because the question is 
rendered more complex when the behaviour of the coalition leader is introduced into the 
situation. The leader is responsible for organising the activities of coalition members to 
achieve the purpose and objectives, so their actions must contribute to the outcomes. 
Conversely though, the behaviours of coalition members and pressures from outside the 
coalition all act to influence the leader's ability to achieve consensus. We are left with 
the need to split out and measure the significance of each driver on both the inside of the 
coalition and outside of it. If we can move towards a more precise description we can 
generate sensitising predictions for further research into coalition dynamics to test. 
We know now that the behaviours and tactics required to manage one of the four types 
can vary significantly. Coalition leaders need to have a versatile skill set. An interesting 
line of enquiry would be to investigate whether or not coalitions metamorphose between 
the four states, because if they do then the range of skills required by the coalition leader 
must be extremely wide and sophisticated. For the more coercive measures required to 
sustain a fragmented coalition it is difficult to imagine a junior member of the top 
management team being able to engage with more senior individuals and win. However, 
as no evidence was found to indicate that coalition leaders of less stable and cohesive 
coalitions had to be from the most senior echelons of the top management team, coalition 
leaders must have used indirect methods. Either that or the influence of structure on 
behaviour has been overstated by advocates of the structural school of power. An 
investigation which commented on these questions would serve to advance our 
understanding of the political aspects of the change context. The finding that coercive 
behaviour is a core tactic of large scale change proposal coalition leaders faced with 
dissension, resistance or opposition is an outright contradiction of the arguments put 
forward by supporters of the OD originated rational-linear approach to change. They 
find the use of coercion to be non-humanistic and urge change agents to `play it straight' 
and seek consensus (Beckhard, 1967; Blake and Mouton, 1964,1968; Cummings and 
Huse, 1989; Tannenbaum et al, 1974). Kanter's "warning the critics" is the equivalent of 
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the `heavy artillery' tactic identified in this study, but `ambush', `leg breaking' 
-eliminating a resistor's support base- and `sacrificial lambs' are much more 
aggressive than anything reported in the extant literature. 
It is interesting to note that few of the behaviours and tactics employed would find 
favour with the humanistic management writers. It appears that even in relatively stable 
and cohesive conditions coalition leaders use political behaviours to sustain a member's 
commitment. For example, manipulating decision making processes to centralise power 
in the hands of the coalition leader is clearly designed to disenfranchise coalition 
members. Similarly, controlling the dissemination of information is also designed to 
shape behaviour. More obviously, creating a crisis and coercing an individual to comply 
are political actions, but in studying each of the eleven tactics used by participants in this 
study it is difficult to avoid the fact that they are all designed to manipulate another 
person's behaviour. It could be argued that the study sample is unrepresentative, but 
while it was not large at fifty participants, they were drawn from fourteen organisations 
in thirteen industries. Therefore, the findings must be taken seriously. There is no 
escaping the fact that political behaviours and tactics are used by leaders of large scale 
change proposal coalitions in top management teams. Such tactics portray top 
management team members as individuals who constantly seek to protect and promote 
their self-interests, yet even fragmented coalitions were found to submit innovative and 
challenging proposals which the organisation went on to implement successfully. These 
findings condemn those who argue that political behaviours have no place in the change 
agent's skill set. It appears that without the ability to engage in political activity by 
using the behaviours and tactics identified and described in this study an individual faced 
with leading a coalition drawn from the top management team has little chance of 
sustaining it through to proposal submission. Members are powerful individuals in their 
own hierarchical positions and are used to shaping other people's behaviour. They 
cannot help but bring those behaviours into the coalition. Future research should seek to 
investigate the coalition member's behaviour in relation to the coalition leader. What do 
they hope to achieve by creating instability? How do they choose their behaviours and 
tactics? By understanding both sides of the interaction we will deepen our understanding 
of the drivers, actions and processes involved in sustaining a large scale change proposal 
coalition. This would extend our knowledge of a previously unexplored aspect of 
managerial elites in the change context. 
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Line of enquiry #6 
Do top nuuuºgement team members think large scale change proposal coalitions 
should have a finite life-span, and if so, why? 
By virtue of the fact that lame scale change proposal coalitions have not previously been 
the subject of academic enquiry, it stands to reason that the issue of dissolution has not 
been considered either. Therefore, the findings to this line of enquiry represent new 
thinking about this unexplicated element of the change process. 
The need to dissolve large scale change proposal coalitions 
It was found that coalitions which had been successful tended to attempt to continue 
working together for the purpose of extending their influence over the strategic decision 
making process. This caused tension between members of the top management team 
who were structurally endowed with decision making roles and responsibilities and 
viewed any extension as an infringement of their rights. Therefore, the view expressed 
by all fifty interviewees, was that large scale change proposal coalitions should be 
dissolved as quickly and practically as possible once a decision had been taken on 
whether or not to implement the proposed change. However, dissolution should not be 
executed without seeking to capture and transfer coalition learnings into the top 
management team. As a result of this thesis academics are now aware of eleven 
arguments why coalitions should be disbanded. Firstly, continued coalition existence is 
likely to lead to dysfunctional organisational performance since coalition members and 
individuals outside the coalition in the top management team are likely to engage in 
negative jockeying fir power rather than focusing on fulfilling their official hierarchy 
roles. Secondly, unproductive relationships between coalition members can be 
terminated. Thirdly, damaged relationships between coalition members and those top 
management team members affected negatively by the proposed change can be repaired. 
Fourthly. more appropriately skilled individuals for the implementation phase can be 
brought into the process. It is important to avoid automatically awarding key roles in the 
execution phase to coalition members simply because they produced a good proposal. 
Fifthly, dissolution thwarts the emergence of 'them and us' attitudes between coalition 
members and the rest of the top management team which occurs when the former creates 
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-intentionally or unintentionally- exclusive decision making processes. On the more 
positive side a sixth reason is that productive relationships can be transfered into the top 
management team. Relationships in which candid debate took place were found to 
strengthen the strategic decision making process. Seventhly, dissolution constituted an 
event when members of successful coalitions could be rewarded for their involvement. 
Eighthly, the skills developed in the coalition could be used in the individual's official 
role and shared with other members of the top management team. Ninthly, by adopting 
the coalition's knowledge based decision making processes in place of the hierarchy 
based alternatives used in the top management team the time to develop strategic options 
was reduced significantly. A tenth reason was that working for short periods of time in 
coalitions created a culture of restless ambition amongst members of the top 
management team who wanted to be intimately involved in designing large scale change. 
The eleventh and final argument for dissolution was that the temporary team way of 
working should be institutionalised in the organisation. If coalitions were seen to 
improve the effectiveness of the top management team, then individuals were more 
likely to accept the existence of temporary super-influential informal structures which 
overlapped with formally prescribed decision making roles and responsibilities. 
These arguments present top management team members as considered individuals who 
want coalitions to improve the performance of the top management team and by 
extension the organisation. McClelland (1970,1974) would describe this as a strong 
socialised power motive. However, the arguments also convey the political awareness of 
individuals. Top management team members are acutely aware of any threat to their 
power and will act to prevent it. The arguments provide strong evidence that individuals 
oppose erosion for reasons of self-preservation rather than self-promotion. This opposes 
those theorists (for example, Klein, 1988; Mintzberg, 1983) who claim that political 
behaviour can have only negative consequences once it is introduced into the decision 
making process. Instead we see a more pragmatic approach by practitioners who 
accepting that conflict and competition are the by-products of ambition seek to find ways 
to extract organisational and personal benefit. Political behaviour was clearly present in 
all of the organisations studied and it is reasonable to assume that all had one or more 
individuals who pursued self-interest at the expense of colleagues and the organisation. 
However, no-one expressed the view that organisational politics was inherently 
dysfunctional. Indeed the comments of the fifty participants indicate that political 
behaviour is a natural feature of top management team life. 
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Future research should seek to deepen our understanding of the rationale behind the 
dissolution phase of large scale change proposal coalitions. The reasons offered above 
should be tested, added to, refined or rebutted if appropriate. It would be valuable to 
understand how the positive aspects of coalitions are captured and transfered into the top 
management team. We know that workshops and one-to-one debriefings are conducted 
by coalition leaders, but beyond these initial events we do not know the techniques used. 
Are there further events or is there a sophisticated descriptive and prescriptive 
codification process that takes place or is it a more haphazard affair left to individual 
members? Another intriguing question is what happens when a coalition member is not 
satisfied with their pay-off? What is the interplay that occurs between the dissatisfied 
party, the coalition leader and the chief executive? Another line of enquiry should seek 
to investigate the emergent networks and micro coalitions which result from the 
dissolution of large scale change proposal coalitions. What role, if any, do they play in 
the top management team and do they influence the strategic decision making process? 
We know that one of the reasons why dissolution takes place is because top management 
team members want to avoid any long term encroachment on the officially prescribed 
rights of office. The precise roles of the chief executive officer and the coalition leader 
during dissolution need to be more clearly understood. How do the two interact and 
what are determinants of the nature of that interaction? Hierarchical gap or strength of 
relationship based on mutual respect derived from previous experiences working 
together are just two of a range of possibilities. From an contextual point of view we 
should seek to understand the impact of the broader internal and external environments 
on the dissolution process. Does the speed and process change if, for example, the 
organisation suffers a sudden deterioration in its performance, or conversely a radical 
improvement? 
Clearly there is much work to be done if we are to develop a more informed view of the 
dissolution process, but the finding that large scale change proposal coalitions should be 
dissolved and the identification of eleven reasons why they should be constitutes the first 
academic enquiry into this area. They provide an illuminating point of departure for 
future initiatives. 
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Line of enquiry #7 
What happens to large scale change proposal coalitions once the proposal has been 
approved for implementation or rejected? Does the coalition continue, and if so, what 
form does it take in terms of its membership and their behaviours? Does it disband 
by its own choice, and if so how? Are coalitions forced to disband, and if so, who 
disbands them and how? 
In addition to discussing the need für dissolution chapter eight also presented the 
findings relating to how large scale change coalitions are disbanded and who is involved 
in the process. Once again this is an entirely unresearched area of large scale change so 
the evidence provides a unique insight into the dissolution process. 
The dissolution of large scale change proposal coalitions 
Throughout the discussion so far it is has been made clear that members of top 
management learns involved in large scale change proposal coalitions recognised that it 
was important to align self-interest with that of the organisation. Designing large scale 
change proposals is a manifestation of such thinking. Individuals sought to position 
themselves advantageously within a strategic direction that was best for the organisation. 
However, when the life-cycle of the coalition entered the dissolution phase it quite 
obviously became pay-off time. We know the objective of the chief executive officer 
was to re-establish a stable and cohesive top management team strengthened with new 
working practices, decision making processes and skills. We know also that they wanted 
to avoid the emergence of a shadow top management team which undermined the ability 
of the existing team to lead the organisation or threatened the office of the chief 
executive officer. These concerns had to be balanced with the need of coalition members 
to be rewarded for their involvement in designing the proposed change, particularly if the 
change had been approved for implementation. 
The extant literature on coalition membership pay-off suffers from a lack of' 
contemporary empirical research. Unfortunately we have to satisfy ourselves with 
theoretical laboratory derived descriptions and predictions of behaviour. Coalition 
formation theorists stich as Gamson (1961), Leiserson (1970), DeSwann (1973), 
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Komorita and Chertkoff (1973) and Komorita (1974) all thought of pay-off in terms of 
resources. In essence the resources that were put into the coalition were paid back with 
interest. These simplistic assumptions are refuted by the findings of this empirical study. 
Three types of pay-off were offered by chief executive officers: new roles and 
responsibilities, geographic dispersal, and new projects. By far the most desired by 
coalition members was new roles and responsibilities which took the form of hierarchical 
promotion, lateral moves into strategically or financially important areas of the 
organisation, a remit to establish a new business unit or a turnaround assignment. The 
last of these situations was the least sought after reward. There were two reasons why 
new roles and responsibilities were the most popular pay-off. Firstly, it was public 
acknowledgement that the individual was worthy of improved status, and secondly, it 
carried with it increases in salary, access to bonus pools and stock options. The pay-offs 
are all structural but underpinning them is the public recognition and personal reward 
that boosts an individual's ego. Once again we observe the combination of structural, 
personal and situational factors in the workplace. It is important that researchers observe 
this feature and incorporate it into their investigations. Top management team members 
are interested in increasing their power and they look to acquire it from structural, 
personal or situational sources. 
Three other types of role pay-off are leadership roles, coaches and emissaries of change, 
but these are less popular because they carry less tangible signs of structural 
advancement. Geographic dispersal of coalition members tells us that chief executive 
officers take the threat of their leadership being undermined or overthrown very 
seriously. Such tactics are a clear acknowledgement of the power a successful coalition 
can acquire during the design of a large scale proposal. This is particularly the case in 
coalitions dominated by hierarchical heavyweights or coalitions that contain a significant 
proportion of the top management team. This provides us with a new insight into the 
mindset and behavioural drivers of a chief executive officer. That they put coalition 
members on to new projects to inject coalition learnings into other parts of the 
organisation can be seen as serving the interests of the firm as well as their own. 
Clearly, dissolution is a high risk time for the chief executive officer and one 
characterised by political behaviour as both chief executive and coalition members seek 
to protect and promote their own interests along with those of the organisation. Future 
research should investigate whether dissolution ever fails and results in a change of 
leadership for the organisation. For the chief executive to be so concerned about the 
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threat of the coalition would seem to suggest that this occasionally occurs. If evidence is 
found to support this contention then it would be valuable to understand how the process 
unfolds, and the behaviours and tactics of parties on both sides in what must be a highly 
charged political environment. If power does change hands, how does the coalition share 
power, and how does it consolidate its position? Furthermore, does this turbulence have 
any effect on top management team performance and by extension the organisation's? 
Further research is needed into dissolution techniques. The ones presented above appear 
to focus on the individual as the recipient of the pay-off, but contemporary management 
literature advises rewarding teams since this encourages team working. Perhaps top 
management teams are an exception to this, or maybe they have sufficient power as 
individuals to negotiate and insist on individual reward. In this respect it would be 
interesting to know if top management teams are any different than other levels of the 
organisation. 
A longitudinal study would possibly be able to ascertain how pay-offs have to evolve 
over time if individuals who stay at one level are to remain motivated. In organisations 
where the chief executive holds office for an extended period, it must mean that those 
immediately below them cannot be promoted. Since there must be limits to the 
additional roles and responsibilities that can be confered on an individual, what pay-offs 
are they offered? Similarly, for individuals thought unable to progress to the next level 
in the hierarchy but who make a valuable contribution to the design of large scale 
change, what pay-offs are they offered to ensure sustained motivation? In both of these 
circumstances is there a switch from structural rewards to personal rewards, and if so 
what form do they take? 
Another line of enquiry would be to study organisations in different countries to see if 
the pay-offs differ. Pay-off strategies in public sector organisations should also be 
compared and contrasted with the findings of this study. Finally, it would be interesting 
to know whether the ability to negotiate pay-offs is contingent upon the hierarchical level 
of the coalition member, and if so, what the pay-off ranges are for each level and the 
behaviours and tactics used to negotiate them. 
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Implications for research methods 
As we noted in chapter four, the research objective was to investigate the nature and 
characteristics of large scale change proposal coalitions and the behaviours and tactics of 
coalition leaders in top management teams across a range of organisational settings in 
the UK private sector. Conducting an empirical study presented two significant 
problems. Firstly, gaining access to top management team members, and secondly, 
overcoming the sensitivity of political behaviour as a topic for investigation. Having 
successfully conducted elite style semi-structured interviews with fifty members of top 
management teams in fourteen organisations across thirteen industries, and a pilot study 
with five other executives, there are several important learnings which have implications 
for academic enquiry and the process of conducting research. These can be considered 
under the following headings: 
  Gaining access to top management team members, 
  Investigating the sensitive topic of political behaviour, and 
  Alternative research methods. 
Gaining access to top management team members 
As early as 1957 Kahl observed that, "those who sit amongst the mighty do not invite 
sociologists to watch them make the decisions about how to control the behaviour of 
others, " (p. 10). More recently several writers including Hoffman (1980) and Pettigrew 
(1992) have remarked on the difficulty in gaining access to managerial elites. Despite 
entry problems, it is difficult to find anyone who does not accept that the empirical study 
of managerial elites is an important area both for sociologists and management writers. 
Indeed, given the complexity, frequency and magnitude of large scale change in many 
organisations, understanding the dynamics of the key decision making group is 
imperative if we are to deepen our knowledge of change processes and the behaviour of 
individuals. 
The entry method used in this research appears to be atypical. Very few managerial elite 
studies openly cite social and professional ties as the means of generating a sample. 
Commentators such as Buchanan et al (1980) and Hoffman (1980) are advocates of using 
professional and personal links, with the former asserting that it epitomises an 
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"opportunistic" and highly pragmatic approach to empirical research. The scarcity of 
research employing this strategy may be due to concerns over the purity of the sample, 
since it is not randomly selected, or it may be that some researchers choose to play down 
the fact that their samples are built, at least in part, by asking someone they know to 
effect introductions. On the other hand it might be simply that few researchers enjoy 
high level contacts in organisations. It is accepted the approach is open to criticism 
about sample purity, but the richness of the data collected in this study indicates that 
careful sample construction combined with an appropriate data collection method can 
produce insightful results which withstand scrutiny and make a valuable contribution to 
the knowledge base. The approach should be considered by other empirical researchers 
investigating managerial elites, particularly those wanting to study sensitive topics such 
as political behaviours, since trust is an important driver of candour. 
One of the main learnings from the construction of the sample, which it is useful to 
share, was the need to identify trusted individuals who can be described as `hubs'. Hubs 
can be sub-divided into `primary hubs' who are approached first and `secondary hubs' 
who are approached subsequently. For the research reported in this thesis, the primary 
hubs were the researcher, his father and uncle, the latter two of whom both occupy senior 
management positions in their respective organisations. It is important to identify 
primary hubs because the desired characteristics of the sample can be explained at length 
and a vetting process established. The primary hubs provided thumbnail sketches to the 
researcher so only key decision makers were accepted into the sample. The three 
primary hubs identified nine secondary hubs who in turn introduced twenty-four 
appropriate participants -spokes- to the study. The remaining `spokes' were 
contacted directly by one of the three primary hubs. This process was found to be highly 
effective and not at all cumbersome to operate. If anything, early contact with the 
secondary hub, typically an organisation's chief executive, helped to establish trust and 
convince the CEO that the researcher was professional and worthy of serious 
consideration and input from their top management team. 
A critical success factor was the speed and manner in which a request for access was 
made. Once a participant had been identified by one of the other two primary hubs, the 
author would agree the wording of the initial contact to be made by them. This was 
purposely kept vague and described the research as being "in the area of strategic 
change". The researcher's father and uncle were asked to say, "it is probably better if I 
get Nick to contact you to explain in more detail exactly what he is after", and agree a 
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time -usually within the following forty-eight hours so the individual would remember 
the request- when either the potential participant or their secretary could be contacted. 
Not one individual turned down this initial request. The agreed follow-up phone call was 
made by the author at the specified time, and immediately followed up with a facsimilied 
single page request. At this time all participants were informed that the research was 
about "top management team interpersonal dynamics in the context of large scale 
organisational change. " An explanation only slightly more revealing than that offered by 
the researcher's father or uncle. A response was requested and typically received within 
twenty-four hours. This approach yielded a one hundred per cent acceptance rate. 
Buchanan et al (1988) encouraged researchers to be as vague as possible when 
communicating the purpose of the research. In light of the experience here, this advice is 
supported, particularly since it inhibits participants preparing for the interview in order to 
provide data they believe is desired, or alternatively cancel their involvement due to a 
fear of the subject matter. 
Once an interview had been conducted with a secondary hub the author would then ask if 
there were any other suitable participants in their top management team who could be 
interviewed. In the instances when a positive reply was received the secondary hub was 
asked to effect an introduction, and having done so the follow-up phone call procedure 
was repeated. Using this incremental approach a sample of fifty members of top 
management teams was established. 
The main benefit of this approach was the control that could be exerted over the selection 
of participants. It was imperative that they were key decision makers who could 
influence the strategic direction of the organisation by instigating and playing a central 
role in large scale change. On several occasions individuals were rejected by the author 
because it was determined the potential participants were peripheral members of the top 
management team or too junior. This view can be arrived at by ascertaining where they 
sit hierarchically and a brief description of their roles and responsibilities, and their 
involvement to date in large scale change initiatives. These questions are more difficult 
to pose remotely through a questionnaire or over the telephone, and the risk of dishonest 
responses -which cannot be validated- is significantly higher than in face-to-face 
contact. Pettigrew (1992, p. 176) articulates the concern over identifying who is in a top 
management team. Based on the experience of generating a sample for the study 
presented here it can be suggested that titles are used as a starting point and a guide, but 
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the researcher should attempt to gather evidence which supports any claim that they are a 
key decision maker and not simply the holder of an impressive sounding title. 
Overcoming the problem of investigating the sensitive topic of political behaviour 
The richness and candour which is clearly demonstrated in the comments of participants 
provides support for the elite style semi-structured interview approach used with the fifty 
participants. The method hinges on the ability of the interviewer and the willingness of 
the interviewee to create an environment of near equals. The qualification on the term 
equals is important. Dexter (1970, p. 56) wrote of the need to create the impression that 
the interview is about "two reflective men trying to find out how things happen, but the 
less informed and experienced one (the interviewer) defering to the wiser one and 
learning from him. " Considerable effort was put into implementing this advice. The 
researcher's perception was that participants spent the first five to ten minutes deciding 
whether the author was worthy of their commitment to the interview. It was perceived 
that they did this by assessing the relevance of the questioning and the disposition of the 
author. This is where the value of the pilot study was realised. 
A pilot study was conducted with five practicing members of top management teams. 
They advised on question content, process and style of delivery as well as access 
strategy. The pilot allowed for mistakes to be made in a safe environment and the author 
to develop the executive presence required to conduct a lengthy interview about the 
strategic issue of large scale change and the emotionally sensitive subject of political 
behaviours and tactics. The strong recommendation is for other researchers who find 
themselves confronting these issues to conduct a pilot, however self-conscious and 
awkward -and at times embarrassing- it may feel at first. 
The first five to ten minutes of the interview were spent asking `safe' questions about 
whether change strategy was the result of vision or managing emergent issues, and 
whether or not the pace of change in the environment influenced the formulation process. 
Examples were given of organisations which fit any of the possible responses, and an 
effort was made to display a maturity of thinking and understanding of the complex 
issues surrounding the decision. Simply firing off the question and awaiting a 
monologue was avoided at all costs. If the participant did not engage in a two-way 
conversation, a two-way conversation was engineered so that the author could talk for 
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between twenty and thirty per cent of the time during the first few questions. The ratio 
was adjusted in response to the reactions of the interviewee. The more relaxed and 
engaged the respondent was, the less the researcher talked. This approach clearly differs 
from the antiseptic classical style but it was found to be a highly effective means of 
establishing emotional rapport and technical credibility with the participant. 
Blum (1952) and Burgess (1984) emphasised the need to treat the interaction as an 
"interview-conversation" in which both parties exchanged data, and Oakley (1981) 
argued that, "there can be no intimacy without reciprocity. " Both of these contribute to 
what Blum called a "permissive atmosphere". That is an environment in which the 
interviewee feels able to talk openly about the subject of discussion. Based on the 
experience gained through conducting the research reported in this thesis it can be argued 
that the key contribution to an atmosphere which "encourages the free flow of 
information" (Spradley, 1979), is the creation of trust. If rich, candid and insightful data 
is to be extracted from interviews with members of the managerial elite the interviewee 
must trust the interviewer. It was found that trust is created through a mix of intimacy, 
credibility and risk assessment on the part of the respondent. The combination of the 
three elements is unique to each interview situation and the interviewer needs to be 
sufficiently sensitive to detect the elements which need to be emphasised, and capable of 
switching or reinforcing one, two or all three of the factors as necessary. The equation 
was found to change throughout the interview as the focus switched from `safe' rational 
questions purely about the change process to the emotional and political aspects of 
leading large scale change proposal coalitions and the behaviours and tactics used. The 
more emotional and political the questions became the greater was the tendency to need 
to reinforce intimacy and reduce the interviewee's feeling of risk incurred from 
divulging potentially damaging information about themselves and colleagues in the top 
management team. Interviewers who are cognisant of intimacy, credibility and risk 
factors and are sufficiently skilled to adjust their emphasis on each in relation to the 
changing rational, emotional and political context of the questions are more likely to 
establish trust and therefore elicit richer, more candid and insightful data than those who 
are not aware of these subtleties. 
It is also useful to share the learning that generating a permissive atmosphere was 
achieved by a preparedness, on the part of the interviewer, to deviate from the interview 
schedule. If an interesting line of enquiry emerged then the interviewee was encouraged 
to develop it. If a particular element of the discussion was clearly important to the 
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interviewee, they were allowed to pursue it. There were several instances when 
interviewees entered into a monologue which was apparently for cathartic reasons. 
Some even acknowledged that the data was of little relevance to the interview, but more 
than half the participants ended the interview by remarking that they had not previously 
discussed political behaviour in a non judgmental manner. That individuals enjoyed the 
interview and were keen to tell their stories is evidenced through the extended duration 
of the interactions from the requested one and a half hours to an average of two hours 
and twenty-four minutes. That theoretically derived descriptions and prescriptions of top 
management team relational dynamics add to the knowledge base is not in doubt, but 
when such richness can be generated simply by letting people tell their stories, there is a 
strong case to suggest that the research agenda should reorient its focus to exploring and 
advancing qualitative-empirical methodologies. If we do so then we will begin to deepen 
our understanding of the change context, the processes of decision making and the 
behaviours and tactics of those who influence the strategic direction of the organisation 
by proposing large scale change. 
Alternative research methods 
There are several other methodological considerations for future empirical studies into 
the nature and characteristics of large scale change proposal coalitions and the 
behaviours and tactics of coalition leaders in top management teams. 
The unit of analysis in this study was the coalition leader in the context of a large scale 
change proposal coalition in the top management team. The emphasis was on the 
relational behaviours and tactics of the individual in the role of coalition leader with 
members of the coalition. Despite an extensive literature search no other empirical 
research was found using the same unit. Therefore, further research which takes the 
same unit of analysis is required to support this breakthrough study. Whilst the 
individual is an extremely common unit of analysis, large scale change proposal 
coalitions are not. It is this fusion which breaks new ground. By taking the same unit we 
will form a clearer view of the decision making processes within the top management 
team in the change context. This position clearly casts the top management team and the 
change context as political in nature. The point of departure is an assumption that 
competing coalitions exist to advance alternative strategic directions and that political 
behaviours and tactics are used to win support and overcome opposition and resistance. 
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This view rejects the position that change is a rational-linear process. Another 
informative unit of analysis would be the large scale change proposal coalition as a 
group. Although presenting the researcher with access and coalition membership 
identification problems, as well as the need to ensure coalition completeness, such a unit 
would provide a more holistic view of the decision making processes, behaviours and 
tactics of top management team members in the formative stages of the change context. 
Yet another unit would be the large scale change proposal coalition member. Analysing 
the behaviours and tactics and motives of individuals in their interactions with the 
coalition leader would provide us with an insight into life on the other side of the 
relationship. Such a position clearly portrays coalitions as two-way decision making 
environments. Once again this would represent an advance in the treatment of large 
scale change because it refutes the often implicit assumption that decision making is 
mono-directional and that the leader's will is imposed over the rest of the coalition. 
Other advancements would be to move through the large scale change process into the 
implementation phase and consider the emergence of coalitions in top management 
teams for the purpose of implementing, reshaping or resisting the change designed by the 
proposal coalition and approved by the top management team. Once again this presents 
the change process and its constituent parts and parties as a dynamic environment 
characterised by political processes and machinations. It is only by taking a longer view 
of the large scale change process that we can construct a richer, more informative, 
holistic picture which presents change as a complex multi-dimensional, multi-layered 
process, directed by value and motive laden individuals, and influenced by the internal 
and external organisational environments that in reality it is. We must avoiding seeking 
the singular prescriptive theory. Rather we must create descriptive fragmentation before 
engaging in reconstructive synthesis. 
The study reported in this thesis was the result of mostly single interviews with 
participants. This was due to the access rights and resources available to the researcher. 
A different perspective would undoubtedly be gained by conducting a longitudinal study 
across a range of organisational settings. The objectives of this study are ideally suited 
to a more lengthy investigation. The finding that large scale change proposal coalitions 
experience life-cycle phases would be strengthened by several data points over an 
extended time scale. It was found that large scale change proposal coalitions could exist 
for weeks or months so repeat interventions would serve to construct a more granular 
case study of the evolving processes and the behaviours and tactics used by the coalition 
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leader to build, sustain and dissolve the coalition. Other data collection devices such as 
diaries issued to participants may well capture the more `raw' and immediate 
observations of process and behaviour. Although the problems of ensuring completion, 
and avoiding the rewriting, sanitisation or removal of particularly blunt and emotion 
laden comments is difficult to manage. The possibility of direct observation using audio 
or video recorders is highly unlikely to be approved or produce insightful data in this 
researcher's opinion, since participants will almost certainly modify their behaviour and 
act out an unrepresentative portrayal of their role and actions in the change process. 
Larger sample sizes should also be constructed. Fifty participants in fourteen 
organisations across thirteen industries were as much as this researcher could reasonably 
establish with the timescale and resource constraints. There are a couple of interesting 
possibilities here. Firstly, the sample could simply be larger. Secondly, the sample 
could be international, drawing participants from across a range of countries and regions 
around the world. This would highlight commonalties and differences in process and 
behaviour between different cultures. The findings in the study reported here were that 
the processes and behaviours were common across all fourteen organisations in thirteen 
industries, which in itself is a major finding. However, the findings are limited to the 
UK private sector. It would also be interesting to extend the study into public sector 
organisations to investigate how large scale change initiatives are instigated and the 
behaviours and tactics used by those who drive them forward. It would be informative to 
compare and contrast the findings with those presented in this thesis. 
Clearly there are limitations to the research methods used in the empirical study which 
underpins this thesis, and with more resources and time these could have been 
counteracted. As we have discussed there are a number of interesting perspectives which 
need to be considered in future research initiatives if a deeper and more holistic view of 
the change process is to be established. However, the problems of investigating the 
political behaviour of top management team members in the context of large scale 
change proposal coalitions -a previously unresearched area- demanded an innovative 
and sensitive approach. Despite this a rigorous methodology was constructed which 
means that the results warrant serious academic consideration. Having considered the 
implications for academic enquiry, let us now turn to a consideration of those for 
practitioners. 
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Implications for practitioners 
In addition to the substantial implications for academic enquiry and research methods, 
the pioneering research presented in this thesis also has important implications for 
members of top management teams involved in proposing large scale change initiatives. 
In common with any research that breaks new ground the researcher is presented with the 
problem of choosing depth or breadth in their discussion and recommendations. In this 
case it was decided that since all seven lines of enquiry delivered fresh insights into this 
very important, yet unexplored area of large scale change, it was appropriate to adopt a 
wider coverage because the aim is to demonstrate to the reader that on a number of 
occasions the boundaries of our understanding of managerial elites in the change context 
have been extended. Depth will be achieved in a different forum, by presenting a more 
detailed discussion of each line of enquiry in its own paper. 
A five phase life-cycle model and three leadership roles 
A member of a top management team armed with the knowledge that large scale change 
proposal coalitions, such as the one they are planning to build, tend to go through five 
life-cycle phases and require the leader to perform three primary roles during its 
existence, would be more likely to gain approval for the proposal than an individual who 
was not availed of this information. This is not to suggest that the individual without the 
knowledge will fail but they face greater uncertainty over how to navigate their way 
through the complicated rational, emotional and political waters which they will enter. It 
stands to reason that if uncertainty can be reduced, the coalition leader can spend more 
time focusing on improving the proposal and creating personal wins for members -such 
as skills development- and less on reacting to unanticipated issues. In designing a 
complex change proposal which has far reaching implications, it is likely that unexpected 
events will occur. However, if the programmable aspects of coalition evolution have 
been planned for, the likelihood that non-programmable events will overload the 
coalition leader and fatally damage the coalition's prospects of success are reduced. 
Furthermore, by leading a well ordered large scale change proposal coalition from which 
members derive personal benefits, the coalition leader will establish a track record and 
over time a power base of support from which to extend their influence over the strategic 
decision making process of the organisation. Casual observation in organisations would 
suggest that executives who create the impression of being in control are thought of as 
307 
being more capable and mature than those who appear not to be in control. The most 
senior positions in top management teams appear to be awarded, in part, to those who 
display characteristics of control, capability and maturity. 
Clearly it is important to understand the life-cycle phases and roles because there are 
benefits for the organisation, coalition members and the coalition leader. One of the first 
and most valuable tasks the potential coalition leader can perform is to ascertain the scale 
of the task ahead. This first step of planning the programmable elements requires 
answers to the following questions: 
  What is the purpose of the proposal to be designed? 
  What is/are the deliverables? 
  What rational, emotional and political contributions to the coalition will be needed to 
produce a proposal likely to be approved? 
  How many people will be required to make the necessary rational, emotional and 
political contributions? 
  How stable is the coalition likely to be? 
  How long will it take to produce a proposal likely to be approved for implementation? 
By answering these questions the coalition leader will be able to predict the magnitude 
and complexity of the large scale change proposal and the coalition to be led. Planning 
can then be conducted within a meaningful framework. The coalition leader will be able 
to assess their own skill set, identify gaps and then plan the construction of a team which 
eliminates, or minimises as far as possible, the shortfalls in all the critical areas of 
developing a proposal and winning support from the relevant decision makers within the 
rest of the top management team. Once this initial preparatory work has been conducted 
the coalition leader can then begin to approach the individuals they want to join the large 
scale change proposal coalition. 
If a coalition leader knows that they will be required to perform the three primary and 
sequential roles of building, sustaining and dissolving the coalition over a period of 
weeks or months, this will also inform their planning. The coalition leader could study 
the results presented in this thesis and adopt the behaviours and tactics used by others to 
manage the coalition's life-span from initiation through to the capture and transfer of 
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learning. When building a coalition selling and negotiating skills are necessary for one- 
to-one support gathering sessions with potential coalition members. The coalition leader 
must construct an argument that blends the rational case for change with the emotional 
and political reasons why it is in the interests of the target to be involved in designing the 
change. In those instances where a coalition leader does not enjoy the credibility to 
personally recruit a member, they should enlist the assistance of one or more other 
members who do have the relationship to approach the target on their behalf. When 
sustaining a coalition, the leader must maintain or create stability and cohesion between 
members. This can be achieved through organising events which involve the chairman 
and CEO visiting the team to demonstrate the importance of the initiative. Social events 
are also an effective means of bonding a team, and spending time regularly with 
members on a one-to-one basis to discuss and resolve personal issues promotes loyalty to 
both the leader and the coalition. Complacency can be avoided with mild criticism and 
dissension can be handled by discussing it openly with the individual concerned and 
taking prompt action, even if that means dismissing the member. Dissolving a coalition 
requires the coalition leader to work closely with the chief executive officer to determine 
the pay-off strategy for members. In addition to conducting learning capture and transfer 
workshops, and one-to-one debriefing sessions with members, the coalition leader can 
expect to be involved in allocating new responsibilities and roles, dispersing members 
geographically and suggesting individuals for new projects. 
These insights are highly relevant for contemporary organisations faced with the need to 
plan and implement large scale change. A coalition life-cycle model provides a 
framework within which to implement the activities and predict the emergence of 
problems such as resistance and opposition from outside the coalition. A politically 
aware model avoids the contrived nature of the rational-linear approach to change which 
provides false hope for practitioners seeking to cope with environmental turbulence. It is 
the intention of the author to discuss the findings and offer descriptive and prescriptive 
advice in the wider forum of a management journal. 
Four hierarchy based coalition building approaches 
The finding that there were four hierarchy based approaches to building a large scale 
change proposal coalition is valuable to three types of individual in the top management 
team. Firstly, it is important that coalition leaders and potential coalition leaders are 
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aware of the prefered order of recruitment into a coalition because they have to build it. 
Secondly, it is also useful for potential members to know when they might be invited to 
join so they maximise their attractiveness or unattractiveness accordingly. Thirdly, those 
who might wish to thwart a coalition building initiative can benefit from knowing who 
might be approached for support so they can take counter measures. 
Coalition leaders can emerge from any level of the top management team, so it useful to 
know that different recruitment processes are used according to the coalition leader's 
position in the hierarchy. Although no linkage was identified between coalition building 
approach and proposal approval rates in this study, it can be reasoned that individuals at 
the same structural level in different organisations who were consistently found to 
employ the same approach were unlikely to do so if it regularly produced unsuccessful 
outcomes. Learning from others can save considerable time and effort since it can avoid 
using the wrong process or the right process in the wrong order. Importantly it can also 
enable the potential coalition leader to avoid making expensive political mistakes such as 
approaching the chief executive too early without sufficient backing, which costs the 
forming coalition its credibility and reduces its chances of winning approval for 
implementation. The costs of making an error can be high. 
For example, heads of function and senior managers would be advised in the first 
instance to approach experienced members of the top management team who are 
respected for their track record, network connections, and enjoy informal seniority. 
Once their support has been gained they then have the legitimacy to attempt to win the 
backing of those with formal seniority. Expertise should then be added and followed by 
individuals who the coalition leader can rely on for reasons of friendship or trust. 
Finally, people with whom coalition members have experienced productive working 
relationships are recruited. However, as Exhibit 9.1 illustrated earlier in the chapter the 
approach used by the most junior members of the top management team are very 
different to that used by chairmen, chief executives and managing directors. 
Knowing a tried and tested order of winning support is also important if an individual is 
wondering whether they will be invited to join an emerging coalition. Understanding the 
process allows a potential member to establish a strategy of making themselves either 
attractive or unattractive to the coalition. If the large scale change being proposed by the 
coalition appears to be something the potential member would like to be involved in, 
they can time their availability to maximum advantage. For example, if the potential 
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member in question has in-depth knowledge about the acquisition process, and this skill 
is essential to the success of the coalition being built by a director, the individual can 
ensure the director is made aware of the role they could fulfil. If their skill is scarce then 
theoretically they can negotiate for a higher pay-off which might take the form of a key 
role during the implementation phase of the proposal. Alternatively, the pay-off may be 
less tangible and long-termist. For example, the potential member might be satisfied 
with raising their profile with other key members of the top management team. This 
strategy might be expected for more junior individuals. The same expert would also 
know not to expect an early invitation from the chief executive. Once again this is useful 
to know because being last into the team can be emotionally debilitating and confidence 
sapping if the individual believes the coalition is built solely on who the chief executive 
rates as a high performer. Therefore, it is useful to know that it appears to be nothing 
personal, rather, it is simply the way in which chief executives typically construct 
coalitions. Understanding the four approaches is also important because it enables a 
person to position themselves for different roles in the coalition. The same acquisition 
expert may also happen to have worked productively with the chief executive on a wide 
range or projects, produced good results and been an effective team player. Therefore, if 
they want to join the coalition they could do worse than find an opportunity to remind the 
chief executive of their previous experiences together. 
On the other hand a member of the top management team may want to avoid being 
approached to join a coalition which they do not think will succeed, or appears not to be 
in the best interests of either themselves or the organisation. There are many reasons 
why an individual may want to make themselves unattractive. To do so they have to 
look up the approach -in Exhibit 9.1- likely to be used by the coalition builder and 
then either present themselves at the wrong time of the support gathering process or cast 
themselves in one of the last roles to be filled. That way they have time to construct an 
argument why they cannot join the coalition or they can suggest another candidate. 
The third type of top management team member for whom these findings are important 
are those who, for whatever reason, want to resist or obstruct the coalition building 
process. Such action is possible because when a resistor identifies another member of 
the top management team attempting to construct a coalition, they could use the 
information conveyed in Exhibit 9.1 to predict the recruitment path. This would enable 
them to stay one step ahead and approach the next candidate ahead of the coalition 
builder with the aim of detering their support. The approach could be made directly by 
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the resistor or indirectly via other channels such as colleagues or reports which present 
opposing data. Although suggesting the use of these findings for obstructive purposes 
appears to be negative, this need not necessarily be the case. It would be wrong to 
assume that all large scale change proposal coalition ideas are the best option for the 
organisation, and it is quite likely there will be more than one proposal coalition 
competing for scarce resources and approval for implementation. Nevertheless, 
organisations are political arenas and actors in top management teams undoubtedly use 
power to protect and promote their self-interest. It would be naive to believe that armed 
with this knowledge some parties would not seek to abuse it for personal gain. Despite 
this, these findings represent a positive contribution to the knowledge bank for 
practitioners who lead or want to lead large scale change proposal coalitions. 
Inter-tier and intra-tier coalition building behaviours and tactics 
Given the management literature's fascination with managerial elites and decision 
making processes, change management and the political behaviour of individuals, it 
seems surprising there is no empirically generated research on the large scale change 
proposal coalition building behaviours and tactics of top management team members. 
Therefore, a study which goes even further and identifies specific inter-tier and intra-tier 
behaviours and tactics provides practicing top management team members with a unique 
insight into the coalition building process. 
Taken in conjunction with the process of coalition formation discussed in the previous 
section, the findings suggest that coalition leaders seeking to win support from higher up 
the hierarchy than themselves must use more indirect behaviours and tactics than when 
attempting to recruit members from further down the hierarchy. An individual looking 
for support from more elevated levels should stroke the ego of the candidate by 
suggesting that the change will benefit their profile and reputation within the 
organisation. They would also be advised to infer that the proposal requires inputs which 
only the candidate can contribute because of their superior capabilities. However, the 
line between flattery and sycophancy is a fine one, and if the reason for the attention is 
transparent, it is unlikely the attempt to win support will be successful. Coalition 
builders should stress the attention that has been given to minimising the risk of failure 
and the consequent negative impact it would have on their more senior colleague. It is 
important that ego stroking is not used without risk management tactics because the 
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evidence suggests that ego stroking can produce only superficial commitment which 
disappears when the coalition encounters opposition or resistance. The third tactic is to 
use another member of the top management team to approach the candidate and attempt 
to win their support. This is particularly effective if the emissary is respected by the 
potential recruit or the hierarchical gap between the coalition builder and the target is so 
great that the former has insufficient credibility or intimacy to persuade the latter to join. 
When it comes to intra-tier coalition building, coalition builders should expect their 
peers at the same hierarchical level to be wary of their motives because some will 
assume the coalition is being used as a mechanism for the coalition leader to further their 
own career at the expense of the potential member. One way to get around these 
problems is for the coalition builder to recruit people whom they have worked 
successfully with previously. Another resolution is to find individuals who share the 
same political agenda since both people are then working for a common greater goal. A 
third tactic is to enlist the support of a peer who is thought of as a `rising star' in the 
organisation. If the large scale change proposal offers the potential member the 
opportunity to perform in front of the organisation's most senior management the 
evidence indicates they will be interested in joining the coalition and working to ensure it 
submits a proposal that receives approval for implementation. 
To recruit support from members of the top management team lower down in the 
hierarchy than themselves, the coalition builder is able to use more direct behaviours and 
tactics than when targeting a potential member who is more senior or at the same level in 
the hierarchy. Coalition builders are able to use rational argument because they know 
the target is likely to comply because of the builder's more elevated position in the 
hierarchy. However, the findings of the study indicate that the smaller the hierarchical 
gap between builder and target, the less opportunity the builder has to force support. The 
evidence suggests that compliance tends to produce apathetic performance, clandestine 
resistance and even sabotage during the implementation of the proposal. Reward is also 
a useful tactic to incentivise support, particularly for those individuals whose expertise is 
important or whose public endorsement will convince key sections of the organisation to 
add their support. Rewards can include promotions, pay rises, bonuses, stock options, 
and increased responsibilities and authority. If rational argument or reward fails to 
deliver support then coercion can be used to force coalition membership or remove 
obstructive individuals. Examples of coercion include the threat and implementation of 
demotions, pay reductions, loss of bonuses, reduced decision making authority and 
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ultimately dismissal. However, this approach should only be used if all other methods 
were unsuccessful or if the individual is threatening the performance of the coalition or 
organisation. Inappropriate use of coercion can undermine coalition and top 
management team morale, reduce cohesion and stability, and therefore, the likelihood of 
submitting an approval winning proposal. 
These behaviours and tactics when used in conjunction with one of the four hierarchy- 
based coalition building approaches, offer practitioners prescriptive advice on how to 
win support and construct a large scale change proposal coalition. Once built the focus 
of the coalition leader switches to sustaining the coalition, and here too, the findings of 
the research offers practising managers a pioneering insight into the types of large scale 
change proposal coalition which can exist in organisations. The findings have important 
consequences for both coalition leaders and members. 
Four types of large scale change proposal coalition 
Once the coalition leader has built the coalition the objective is to sustain it to the point 
when the proposal is approved or rejected by the relevant decision making parties in the 
top management team. It is important that both coalition leaders and members are aware 
that four types of large scale change proposal coalition exist in top management teams. 
The four types are: 
  Aligned coalitions, 
  Unaligned coalitions, 
  Unfocused coalitions, and 
  Fragmented coalitions. 
An understanding of the nature and characteristics of each type and an ability to diagnose 
the status of a coalition informs the coalition leader which behaviours and tactics are 
most appropriate. Coalition leaders and members alike have a strong interest in the 
proposal being approved for implementation, or in the event of it being rejected, to have 
been seen to have contributed to a well' organised initiative that was attempting to serve 
the best interests of the organisation. 
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Therefore, there is a need to attempt to create an aligned coalition since this type is most 
conducive to submitting a proposal that receives approval. Aligned coalitions are 
characterised by complementary activities and any tension which emerges can be used 
constructively to improve coalition performance. The leader's primary concern is how to 
maintain alignment and the time they can expect to spend renegotiating commitment 
through reward or coercive means is low. Alignment is maintained by controlling the 
dissemination of information and linking coalition members' career progression to the 
successful implementation of the proposal. Clearly, it is important that coalition leaders 
understand which coalition type they are managing, so it is necessary that they are able 
to diagnose status. This can be achieved by asking the following questions: 
  Do I spend a significant percentage of my time renegotiating the commitment of 
individual members? 
  Do I have to resort to reward or coercive powers, rather than rational argument to 
keep individuals in the coalition? 
  When tension emerges is it used constructively to improve coalition performance or 
does it cause divisions between members? 
  Are there substantial differences of opinion between members on what the objective 
is? 
  Are there substantial differences of opinion between members on how to achieve the 
objective? 
  Do I believe that the majority of members are trying to use the coalition to promote 
their self-interests ahead of the organisation's? 
If the answer to more than a couple of these questions is yes then the likelihood is that 
the respondent is leading an unaligned, unfocused or fragmented coalition. The more 
frequent and stronger the answer in the affirmative is, the greater the likelihood that the 
coalition is either unfocused or fragmented. There is an opportunity to develop these 
initial questions into a more elaborate and sensitive diagnostic for practitioners to use in 
the workplace. It is the intention of the author to create such a device and present it for 
discussion in the form of a journal paper. 
Leaders of unaligned, unfocused and fragmented coalitions respectively can expect to 
spend increasing amounts of time renegotiating commitment through reward or coercive 
means. As the lack of alignment and cohesion in the three types escalates the likelihood 
of failing to submit an approval winning proposal increases in step. For those who do 
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find themselves leading one of these three types the objective is to evolve it into an 
aligned coalition. This is illustrated in Exhibit 9.2. 
High 
Personal 
reward 
Low 
Exhibit 9.2 - Aligned coalitions as 
optimal configurations 
Low 
Coercion 
High 
High 
Renegotiation 
Low 
Low 
Maintenance 
time 
High 
There are several behaviours and tactics which can be used to improve alignment. In 
addition to controlling the dissemination of information and linking career progression to 
the successful implementation of the proposal, the coalition leader can manipulate 
decision making processes so that power is either centralised in them or shared amongst 
supporters. The primary objective though is to remove decision making power from 
dissident members. Another tactic is to create a `hard' vision which clearly defines the 
deliverable and how success will be measured. Once the deliverable has been agreed a 
fifth strategem is for the coalition to design and organise the activities by majority 
decision. Sixthly, coalition leaders can also create an enemy against which the coalition 
can unite and direct their efforts. A seventh option is to produce a quick win since this 
can have the effect of creating alignment and encourage members to achieve further 
results. An eighth tactic is for the coalition leader to trade resources with members in 
return for their continued commitment. Examples of resources include the secondment 
of key personnel to the member's section of the organisation, the transfer of financial 
resources, loaned equipment and access to privileged information. A ninth option is to 
exploit or create a crisis so that members have little choice but to work in an agreed 
manner towards a common objective. An tenth tactic is to offer disproportionate rewards 
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to key members of the coalition in return for their active support. The danger with this 
approach is that if the other members become aware of the differentiation then the 
collapse of the coalition is a real possibility if the leader is unable to offer similar 
rewards. The eleventh and most heavy handed tactic is to use direct coercion. This can 
take the form of asking the chief executive to enforce the will of the coalition leader. It 
can also involve exposing the resistant members in front of the top management team, or 
removing the support base of those being obstructive. Dismissal is the final coercive 
technique. These eleven tactics offer the coalition leader a range of options to create 
alignment in unaligned, unfocused or fragmented coalitions. The diversity of approaches 
means that the tactic can be matched to the severity of the problem. This is important 
since the objective is to sustain the coalition. Measures which are seen to be unfair or 
draconian are likely to cause the collapse of the coalition. 
There are several reasons why it is important the coalition member, and not just the 
coalition leader, is able to diagnose the type of coalition they are working in. Firstly, it 
enables them to assess the likelihood of the coalition failing to submit a proposal which 
will be approved for implementation. We have already noted that being associated with 
failure repeatedly carries the risk of damaging career progression. Secondly, in light of 
this analysis the member will be able to make an informed decision about whether or not 
to remain in the coalition. Thirdly, on the basis that they do stay, they will be able to 
support the coalition leader in attempting to create an aligned coalition. For individuals 
who intend to lead their own large scale change proposal coalition this will undoubtedly 
prove to be a valuable learning experience. 
The identification of four coalition types and eleven alignment tactics provides 
practitioners with a pioneering insight grounded in empirical research. It is the first 
study of large scale change proposal coalitions and enables coalition leaders and 
members to improve their understanding of the change context as well as enhancing their 
coalition sustaining skills. 
The need to dissolve large scale change proposal coalitions 
Having put considerable time and energy into building and sustaining a coalition for the 
purpose of designing and submitting a large scale change proposal, the coalition leader 
could be forgiven for wondering what should be done with the team once a decision 
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regarding implementation has been made. If the coalition has been successful in its 
submission, the members will have influenced the strategic direction of the organisation, 
and due to their privileged insights into the most detailed elements of the plan, have the 
opportunity to be key players during the execution of the plan. It is likely that there will 
be mixed emotions on the part of some members about whether to attempt to extend their 
influence into other areas of the strategic decision making process. However, the 
unanimous response from the fifty top management team members who participated in 
this research was that large scale change proposal coalitions should be dissolved as 
quickly as practically possible once the proposal had been evaluated and a decision taken 
on whether to proceed. It is important that practising members of top management teams 
understand why this is the case. 
Firstly, coalitions that seek to continue their existence do not fit comfortably within the 
formally prescribed structure of the organisation. Nor can they be described as an 
emergent network since they are too well structured and have a well defined purpose. 
Furthermore, by the time the proposal has been submitted they have taken on a quasi- 
legitimacy. They have become a temporary super-influential informal structure. The 
dominance of an informal group is likely to cause friction with the formal top 
management team since the latter will feel their structurally prescribed rights are being 
unfairly eroded. A second reason why coalitions should be dissolved is that 
unproductive working relationships can be terminated. Working intensely with people 
for weeks or months under considerable pressure can cause stress and a deterioration in 
the quality of interaction and personal performance. In today's turbulent environments 
where organisations need to extract as much value as possible from their top 
management teams, obstacles to performance need to be eliminated. Another pragmatic 
reason for dissolution is that it forces coalition members to rebuild relationships with 
colleagues in the top management team who stand to lose out under the proposed 
changes. The evidence suggests that in time coalition members are likely to find 
themselves on the receiving end of someone else's plan. Therefore, it is wise to create 
an environment where change is depersonalised and regarded as a normal course of 
events. Furthermore, because of the increasing complexity and magnitude of change it is 
likely that large sections of the top management team will have a key role to play in the 
execution of the plan, so dealing only with other coalition members will produce a silo 
mentality and sub-optimal implementation. A fourth reason for disbandment is that 
proposal coalition members may not be the most appropriate individuals to conduct the 
implementation. It is likely that different skill sets will be required. A fifth argument is 
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that it avoids the sustainment of `them and us' criticisms which characterise top 
management teams in which influential temporary coalitions are allow to continue. 
Insularity and the subsequent failure to collaborate with colleagues outside the coalition 
will cause unproductive divisions within the top management team. Common to each of 
the five reasons is the desire to avoid negative consequences in the top management 
team. However, there are also six arguments for dissolution based on capturing the 
positive aspects of coalitions and embedding them in the working practices of top 
management team members. 
Firstly, those conducting the dissolution should seek to identify productive intra- 
coalition relationships which could be transfered into the top management team. The 
additional energy and performance generated by pairs and small groups of individuals 
can be channelled towards tackling a complex issue or one of the critical uncertainties 
facing the organisation. Secondly, dissolution can also be used to motivate individuals 
by rewarding coalition members for their contribution. Such events, however informal, 
provide a sense of occasion and are an important symbolic aspect of management. 
Thirdly, coalition members enhance their personal skill sets and these learnings should 
be put to use in dealing with broader organisational issues. Skills likely to be developed 
in coalitions include: strategic thinking, leadership, team working, `man' management, 
political adeptness, internal networking and commercial pragmatism. Fourthly, the 
decision making processes used in coalitions are knowledge based rather than hierarchy 
based. This means that decisions can be taken as much as fifty to seventy per cent faster 
than when using conventional hierarchical routes. In an era when many organisations 
operate in increasingly fluid environments and are required to adapt rapidly and 
frequently this is a significant and valuable modification. Large scale change proposals 
are also likely to be more robust and rigorous if they are designed by those with the 
appropriate knowledge rather than members of the top management team who believe 
that the magnitude demands authorship by a particularly elevated hierarchical level. 
Fifthly, working in coalitions can increase the energy and ambition levels of executives. 
Being provided with the opportunity to influence the strategic direction of the 
organisation, enhance skill sets and receive rewards is a potent aphrodisiac for 
individuals who display a strong power motive. Coalition formation is a proactive event 
so armed with the knowledge that proposal design is likely to take only weeks or months, 
executives will be encouraged to take up the short-term challenge. If enough individuals 
adopt this mindset the culture of the top management team will become more action- 
oriented, as it fulfils its role of creating strategic options. The sixth and final reason for 
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dissolution is that temporary teams should be institutionalised as the normal method of 
designing large scale change. Not only are they likely to produce more rigorous and 
robust proposals, faster than the conventional hierarchy based alternative, but the top 
management team is more likely to be tolerant of sharing influence if they know it is 
only for a short period and for a specific purpose. 
Naturally it is necessary for coalition leaders to be cognisant of the reasoning since along 
with the chief executive officer they will have a key role to play in dissolving the 
coalition. In addition to advising the chief executive on the dissolution process and the 
pay-offs for members they can also run learning capture workshops and one-to-one 
debriefing sessions. However, it is also important for coalition members to understand 
the arguments because their active support will facilitate the process and enable learning 
capture and transfer to proceed quickly and smoothly. Interestingly it is equally 
important that the rest of the top management team, and particularly the chief executive 
officer, acknowledge the need for dissolution. If all elements of the top management 
team, both inside and outside the coalition accept there is a need for disbandment then 
temporary super-influential informal structures are more likely to be tolerated. We know 
from the arguments presented in the literature review that organisations are political 
arenas and the promotion and protection of self-interest are two causes of political 
behaviour emerging in top management teams. If the need for an executive to constantly 
bolster and advance their position can be avoided it means they will have more time to 
dedicate to fulfilling their legitimate role in the top management team. 
The mechanics of dissolving large scale change proposal coalitions 
The focus of the discussion in the last section was on the reasons why top management 
team members should dissolve large scale change proposal coalitions once their plans 
have been approved for implementation or rejected. In this final section we conclude 
with a consideration of who disbands coalitions and how practitioners can conduct the 
process. Once again the suggestions provide executives with fresh insights into a 
previously unexplicated area of the change context. 
It is important that members of top management teams know how large scale change 
proposal coalitions are disbanded because they may be required, in their roles as chief 
executives or coalition leaders, to conduct the task. Alternatively, as coalition members 
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they may be part of a dissolution process. In this case it is valuable to know how the 
dissolution may unfold in terms of pay-off. If coalition members are aware of the 
methods commonly used by those who dissolve coalitions then they have the opportunity 
to position themselves to receive the pay-off they would consider most attractive. Three 
tactics can be used to produce effective dissolution. 
  New roles and responsibilities, 
  Geographic dispersal, and 
  New projects. 
In terms of new roles and responsibilities one of the most popular rewards amongst 
coalition members is hierarchical promotion. This is because it is public 
acknowledgement that an individual has made a significant contribution to the strategic 
direction of the organisation, and is thought capable and deserving of increased 
responsibility and authority. Other prefered outcomes include improved compensation 
and benefit packages which encompass aspects such as base salary, access to bonus pools 
and share options. An alternative to hierarchical advancement is a lateral move into a 
strategically or financially important area of the organisation. This is likely to be viewed 
by coalition members as an assessment on the part of the chief executive officer that the 
they have earned his or her trust to manage a key element of the organisation. Another 
new role and responsibility option is the task of setting up a new business unit. Although 
often thought of as a high risk assignment it is likely to be prefered to a turnaround 
assignment, which tends to carry the highest risk of failure. Coalition members who are 
given this responsibility may well wonder whether they are being rewarded or punished, 
although it depends on the magnitude and difficulty of the turnaround. 
Coalition dissolvers can also use non-positional roles to reward members. Leadership 
roles, coaching roles and emissary roles are three options which have been used by 
practitioners in a variety of organisations. An example of a leadership role is heading up 
a prestigious internal task force set up to confront a critical issue facing the organisation 
such as major cost reduction or identifying acquisition targets. Sharing the learnings of 
proposal coalition working in a coaching role is a way of casting the coalition member as 
an expert in the eyes of top management team colleagues. Individuals with strong 
communication skills can act as emissaries of change. This option may be particularly 
attractive in organisations which face the problem of `unfreezing' their employees from 
their current ways of working because they do not see the need for change, fear change, 
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or do not know how to change. Common to all of the new roles and responsibilities 
discussed above is that they provide coalition members with the opportunity to make 
further contributions to improved organisational performance as well as broadening and 
deepening their own skill sets and increasing their visibility within the top management 
team and the wider organisational constituency. 
It might not always be the case that coalition members willingly accept a return to their 
previous positions of influence over the strategic direction of the organisation, 
particularly if it is less than that enjoyed in the coalition. It is also possible that alliances 
of former coalition members may unite behind the scenes to re-establish influence. If 
this circumstance arises the chief executive can disperse the offending individuals 
geographically in an attempt to extinguish the problem before it becomes a threat to the 
stability and performance of the top management team. This tactic is also useful if a 
coalition member has not performed well and needs to re-establish their confidence or 
develop new skills away from day-to-day colleagues. 
The third key tactic of the coalition dissolver is to place coalition members into new 
projects. This is to ensure the learnings from a successful coalition are transplanted into 
other parts of the organisation. Examples of learnings include a `can do' culture, more 
efficient and effective working practices, team working skills, improved decision making 
processes and internal selling skills. 
How to dissolve large scale change proposal coalitions effectively so that members are 
rewarded appropriately, and contribute to the performance of the organisation without 
exerting unwanted influence over its strategic direction and destabilising the top 
management team is an important skill for chief executive officers and coalition leaders 
to learn. The recommendations discussed above are the first to be made in the area of 
large scale change proposal coalitions, and they warrant serious consideration by 
practitioners because they are distilled from the rich and varied experiences of their 
contemporaries who were drawn from a wide range of organisational settings. It is the 
intention of the author to communicate these findings to a broader management audience 
in the near future. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis began by identifying a serious gap in the study of managerial elites in the 
change context. It was asserted that given the management literature's fascination with 
managerial elites and decision making processes, change management and the political 
behaviour of individuals, it is surprising that large scale change proposal coalitions in top 
management teams have never been investigated. The literature review criticised those 
who portray change as a rational-linear process which unfolds neatly. It was argued 
instead that change is a messy cocktail characterised by competing and conflicting 
interests. Therefore, a power-oriented behaviour based approach to change is more 
pragmatic and resilient. Furthermore, it was contended that it is the role of the top 
management team, rather than the chief executive officer acting alone, to establish 
coalitions for the purpose of designing and proposing options for large scale change. 
This is because of the increasing complexity, magnitude and frequency of change 
required in contemporary organisations. In large scale change which impacts the 
structural aspects of the organisation it is highly likely that some members of the top 
management team will benefit while others lose out. Therefore, political activity is 
inevitable as individuals seek to protect and promote their self-interests and those they 
believe to be the organisation's. In view of this the coalition leader must understand that 
power resides simultaneously in personal, structural and situational aspects of the 
organisation and must be accessed and harnessed if they are to engage meaningfully in 
political activity through defensive or offensive behaviours and tactics. The extant 
literature on coalition formation was criticised for its reliance on laboratory experiments 
and theoretical argument and the paucity of recent empirical study. The commentary on 
political behaviours and tactics in the change context were criticised for being 
prescriptively generic when what is required are context specific descriptions. 
As a result of engaging with the extant literature seven lines of enquiry were established 
to investigate the nature and characteristics of large scale change proposal coalitions and 
the behaviours and tactics of coalition leaders in top management teams in a range of 
organisational settings. The objective of the empirical research was to inform academic 
enquiry and practitioners. Access was negotiated to fifty key decision makers in top 
management teams in fourteen organisations across thirteen industries in the UK private 
sector. One hundred and twenty hours of elite style semi-structured interviewing 
produced pioneering insights into large scale change proposal coalitions. The key 
findings were: 
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  Large scale change proposal coalitions follow a five phase life-cycle model: initiate, 
build, sustain, dissolve, and capture and transfer learning, 
  Coalition leaders adopt three primary sequential roles: building, sustaining and 
dissolving, 
  Coalition leaders adopt one of four hierarchy-based coalition building approaches, 
  Coalition building processes, behaviours and tactics vary depending on whether they 
are upward inter-tier, intra-tier or downward inter-tier, 
  Four types of large scale change proposal coalition exist: aligned, unaligned, 
unfocused, and fragmented. Each exhibiting their own nature and characteristics, and 
requiring different coalition leader behaviours and tactics, 
  Large scale change proposal coalitions should be dissolved as quickly as practically 
possible once the proposal has been approved for implementation or rejected, and 
  The chief executive officer in conjunction with the coalition leader dissolves the large 
scale change proposal coalition using three principal techniques: new roles and 
responsibilities, geographic dispersal and new projects. 
The richness and elucidatory nature of the findings compels researchers to reconsider the 
way in which we approach empirical investigations into sensitive topics with managerial 
elites. Exploiting professional and personal ties has proved to be an effective entry 
strategy and one which fosters the climate of trust necessary to elicit candid data. This 
study also compels the researcher to reconsider the drawbacks of adopting the often 
antagonistic approach to arguments and perspectives exemplified by the debate on the 
sources of power in organisations. Simplistic `either-or' positions are unhelpful and 
limited in their usefulness. They cast shadows where we need light. 
The results of the research represent a pioneering breakthrough in our understanding of 
the change context. This is the first empirical investigation into large scale change 
proposal coalitions in top management teams. It provides substantive support for the 
arguments put forward in the literature review and opens up new frontiers in the 
management research agenda. The findings provide a meaningful starting point from 
which to conduct future research and it is the intention to communicate them to a broader 
academic audience by publishing in appropriate journals. This research clearly portrays 
the large scale change proposal process, with its use of coalitions and power-oriented 
behaviours as a political process, rich in influencing behaviours designed to win support 
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and overcome opposition and resistance. Given that it is based on the responses of 
practitioners it will undoubtedly strike a chord with practicing members of top 
management teams who to date have been educated mainly in the less unpragmatic and 
suitable Organisational Development originated rational-linear approach to change. This 
thesis pushes the researcher to view the large scale change process in a different light. 
One in which change is acknowledged as a complex, multi-dimensional, multi-layered 
process, directed by value and motive laden individuals and impacted by the internal and 
external organisational environments. It is hoped that this thesis encourages others to 
acknowledge the validity of this perspective because fusing behaviour with process will 
lead to a more contextualised understanding of managerial elites in the change context. 
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Appendix A 
Interview schedule 
Questions 
The literature presents two opposing viewpoints on how to successfully manage 
large scale change. The first school of thought argues that change is best achieved 
by developing and then executing strategy, whilst the second contends that 
because we cannot accurately predict the future there is little point in developing 
strategy. In your experience which of these is likely to produce the most 
successful change? 
2 Can the pace of change in the marketplace, be it slow, medium or rapid, determine 
whether an organisation tends toward strategy or managing issues as they arise in 
order to successfully manage change? 
3 When a member of top management team proposes large scale change they often 
have to gather support by forming a proposal coalition of colleagues in the top 
management team. Does this reflect your experience? 
4 [Ask if answer to previous question was yes] 
Please rank the following list of criteria to indicate the order in which you would 
approach members of the top management team to join the proposal coalition? 
(Show list on separate page) 
Friendship/trust 
Formal seniority 
Informal seniority 
Age 
Working relationship 
Expertise 
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Physical proximity 
Other (please specify) 
5 What behaviours and tactics do you use to convince someone to join the proposal 
coalition? 
Supplementary: Is coercion an effective tactic? 
6 Do your behaviours and tactics vary depending on whether the potential coalition 
member is more senior, more junior or at the same level as you? What are the 
similarities and differences in behaviours and tactics? 
7 Where do these support gathering exercises take place? Please indicate as many 
as necessary from the following options. 
(Show list on separate page) 
In your office 
In the other individual's office 
In a neutral meeting room 
Over a meal in the organisation's building 
Over a meal outside the organisation's building 
Over drink's in a hotel/pub/bar 
During a leisure activity 
In the corridor 
At some other venue/on some other occasion (please specify) 
8 In your experience are there different types of large scale change proposal 
coalition? If so, what are the nature and characteristics of the different types? 
9 How stable do large scale change proposal coalitions tend to be? 
10 What factors determine how stable a coalition is? 
11 What behaviours and tactics are used to sustain a coalition? 
Supplementary: Is coercion an effective tactic? 
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12 Should large scale change proposal coalitions have a life-span? 
Supplementary: How long is the life-span of a large scale change proposal 
coalition? 
13 Do you think that large scale change proposal coalitions follow a life-cycle? If so, 
can you describe the various stages and the characteristics of each? 
14 [Ask if answer to previous question was yes] 
If coalitions do follow a life-cycle does the role of the coalition leader change 
across the phases? 
Supplementary: If yes, what are the different roles and what are the behaviours and 
tactics used in each role? 
15 What happens to large scale change proposal coalitions once they have been 
approved or rejected for implementation? 
Supplementary: If it continues, what form does it take in terms of it membership 
and their behaviours? 
Supplementary: If it disbands, is it by its own choice? 
Supplementary: Are coalitions forced to disband, and if so who disbands them and 
how? 
16 Do coalitions have any other purpose other than the reason for formation? 
Supplementary: Did you experience personal growth as a result of leading or being 
a member of a large scale change proposal coalition? If so, what aspect of 
personal growth did you experience? 
17 How does the proposer of large scale change overcome resistance from other 
members of the top management team? 
328 
18 Sometimes large scale change can become politicised which is to say that 
disagreements and opposition emerges. In your experience why do you think 
change becomes politicised? 
19 What would you say are the most common reasons for large scale change 
proposals failing to be approved? 
Thank interviewee for participating and ask if they can recommend anyone else. 
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Appendix B 
Description of participant 
organisation activities 
A further note on anonymity 
Due to the high profile nature of many of the organisations which took part in the 
research it is tempting to provide the reader with the list of names of those who kindly 
agreed to be interviewed. The list contains many names we regularly read about in 
management journals, business magazines and newspapers as well as watch on television 
and listen to on radio. Those interviewed are the men and women who run their 
organisations. They are responsible for setting strategic direction, initiating and leading 
large scale change. In short they are the key decision makers. 
However, it is not possible to name the participants through their job titles since the list 
of interviewee aliases is provided at the beginning of chapter four. As there can only be 
one chairman or chief executive officer an alias or title provides little security. 
Confidentiality and anonymity was sought by interviewees and promised to all. 
Therefore, I request the tolerance of the reader and trust the anonymity does not detract 
from the experiences, comments, opinions and observations shared. 
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The organisations 
Anglian Water PLC 
The principal activities of the Group are water supply and distribution, sewerage, sewage 
treatment and disposal and process engineering. The group is split into the regulated 
business which provides water to 4.0 million consumers a day and 1.77 million 
properties from the Humber in the North, the Thames in the South and from Daventry in 
Northamptonshire to the East coast. Anglian Water International provides long term 
concession operation, operations and management, process design for water and waste 
water treatment, innovative technologies and design and build contracts. The company 
was privatised in December 1989. At the time of research the company was attempting 
to design and implement an aggressive overseas expansion plan to generate revenue 
streams outside the review of the regulator. 
Barclaycard Limited 
The principal activities of the company are credit card issuing and acquisition. The 
company's best known product is Barclaycard which has been issued to over 7 million 
customers. It is a subsidiary of Barclays PLC. Set up in 1966 Barclaycard was the first 
to offer credit cards in the UK in conjunction with Bank of America's BankAmericard. 
Today it is the largest issuer of credit cards in the UK. At the time of research the 
company was attempting to improve its competitiveness by reducing costs and creating 
innovative new products to compete with the entrance of American competitors such as 
GM and Ford which used credit card loyalty schemes as discounts to attract customers to 
purchase their vehicles. At the same time rival financial institutions were launching low 
cost cards in an attempt to take market share away from Barclaycard. 
BP PLC 
The principal activities of the Group are the exploration and production of crude oil and 
natural gas; refining, marketing, supply and transportation, and manufacturing and 
331 
marketing of petrochemicals and solar power generation. The Group has major 
operations in Europe, North and South America, Asia, Australasia and parts of Africa. 
The company was privatised in three tranches in October 1979, September 1983, and 
October 1987. In August 1998 it announced a £45 billion merger with Amoco. This will 
position the company in the super-league of oil-gas giants with Shell and Exxon. At the 
time of research it was in the process of implementing an organisation-wide large scale 
change programme which involved transforming strategy, structure, culture, people, 
processes, and technologies to make radical improvements in competitiveness and 
performance. 
Brent Walker Limited 
The principal activities of the Group are the operation of betting shops and betting 
services. At the time of research it also had a property management business which 
owned several hotels and sporting stadia in the UK. Due to over-expansion in the late 
1980s the company was unable to meet its borrowings. The founder, Jack Walker was 
removed and a bank appointed top management team was installed to run the company 
with a view to disposing of assets to pay off capital and interest debt. In October 1997, 
the company's listing on the London Stock Exchange was cancelled and it is now 
operated by the principal financial lenders. At the time of research the company was 
attempting a radical cost cutting exercise and disposal programme. 
Britannia Building Society Limited 
The principal activities of the Group are the provision of financial services including 
lending activities (mortgages, mortgage risk management and insurance), savings and 
investment services, treasury operations, life assurance, fund management and property 
development. At the time of research the company was embarking on identifying options 
for large scale change which would increase its revenues and profits. 
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Gallaher Tobacco Limited 
The principal activity of the Group is the manufacture and marketing of a range of 
cigarettes, cigars, and pipe and hand-rolling tobacco products for the United Kingdom 
and overseas markets. The Group's brands include: Benson and Hedges and Silk Cut 
cigarettes, Hamlet cigars, Old Holborn, Amber Leaf and Samson handrolling tobacco, 
and Condor and Mellow Virginia pipe tobacco. In May 1997 the company's Ordinary 
shares were admitted to the London Stock Exchange. Prior to this the company had been 
a subsidiary of American Brands Inc. At the time of research the company was 
conducting a large scale re-organisation of its UK sales force, a disposal programme of 
its non-core businesses, and the identification of overseas expansion opportunities. 
Karen Earl Limited 
The principal activity of the company is sponsorship marketing consultancy which 
includes sponsorship audit, corporate consultancy, sponsorship creation and 
development, contractual negotiations, sponsorship guidelines and manuals, and 
sponsorship exploitation. The company provides services to more than twenty of the 
FTSE 100 members. At the time of research the top management team was in the process 
of designing a strategy that would deliver rapid expansion in growth. 
Olivetti Limited 
The principal activities of the Group are divided into the following sectors: systems and 
services (provision of IT services to the banking and finance sector, to public authorities, 
and to the retail markets, as well as specialised automation systems), telecommunications 
(provision of fixed-line and satellite telecommunications, provision of Internet access 
and on-line shopping services, publishing of entertainment and education CD-ROMs), 
smart cards, and document production equipment. The Group operates across all 
continents. The research was conducted in the company's PC business, which it sold in 
spring 1997 to Piedmont International SA (Centenary Group). Olivetti is still entitled to 
5 per cent of net income for the years 1997,1998 and 1999. At the time of research the 
company was designing a large scale change initiative to restructure its business in the 
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face of mounting losses, and establish a strategy to compete with the leading US 
manufacturers such as Dell, Compaq and IBM. 
Perfect Pizza Limited 
The company's sole activity is the operation of pizza take-away restaurants. It is the 
UK's largest pizza take-away chain. It operates in the region of 300 restaurants of which 
approximately 75 per cent are franchised. It is owned by Scott's Hospitality Inc, a 
Canadian based multi-national company. At the time of research the company was 
identifying and developing organic and acquisition growth strategies. 
Scott's Hotels Limited 
The principal activity of Scott's Hotels was the operation of Marriott hotels in the UK. 
In 1996 the company was sold to Whitbread PLC. At the time of research the company 
was owned by Scott's Hospitality Inc, and it was conducting a large scale change 
programme to rebrand its hotels, increase revenues, reduce costs and create a customer- 
focused culture. 
SWALEC PLC 
The principal activity of the company was electricity generation and distribution. Like 
all the other Regional Electricity Companies it was privatised under the Conservative 
government. The company which served the South Wales area merged in 1997 with 
Welsh Water to create Hyder. At the time of research it was designing a large scale 
change strategy to increase profitability through cost reduction and overseas expansion. 
It was also attempting to identify potential acquirers or merger partners to enable it to 
expand outside the geographic constraints of its South Wales boundaries. 
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Syntex Pharmaceuticals Limited 
The principal activity of the company was the research, development, manufacture and 
marketing of human and animal pharmaceutical products and medical diagnostic 
systems. At the time of research the company was attempting to refresh its new product 
development pipeline. However, due to the long lead time involved in creating new 
product development opportunities the company suffered from diminishing profitability. 
Therefore, it was designing a large scale change programme to reduce costs and create 
new products more efficiently and effectively than previously. Its world class research 
staff and facilities made it an attractive acquisition target and in 1994 it was acquired by 
Hoffman La Roche, the giant Swiss pharmaceutical company best known for Valium, the 
tranquiliser. 
Whyte & Mackay Limited 
The principal activities of the company are the manufacture and marketing of whisky and 
spirits. It owns several distilleries in various whisky producing regions of Scotland and 
its brands which are sold world-wide include Whyte & Mackay Special Reserve, 
Vladivar Vodka and it distributes Jim Beam for its parent Fortune Brands, Inc, the US 
Fortune 500 company listed on the New York Stock Exchange. At the time of research 
the company was undergoing a business process re-engineering programme. It was also 
designing a large scale change exercise based around creating closer operational links 
with major customers such as the supermarket chains. 
Yorkshire Building Society Limited 
The principal activities of the Group are concentrated on mortgage lending, deposit based 
savings and non-regulated insurance products. At the time of research the company was 
designing an organic growth strategy based on increasing the number of its customers 
outside its northern stronghold in the UK. 
Note: Organisation names are those at the time of research. Flotations, acquisitions and 
mergers mean that some no longer use the same name. 
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